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**NEW YORK**

**CONTENTS**

Agenda item 24:

- Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction (continued):
- (a) Report of the Disarmament Commission;
  - (b) Expansion of the membership of the Disarmament Commission and of its Sub-Committee;
  - (c) Collective action to inform and enlighten the peoples of the world as to the dangers of the armaments race, and particularly as to the destructive effects of modern weapons;
  - (d) Discontinuance under international control of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons . . . . . 25

**Chairman: Mr. Djalal ABDOH (Iran).**

**AGENDA ITEM 24**

**Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction (A/3630 and Corr.1, A/3657, A/3674/Rev.1, A/3685, A/C.1/793, A/C.1/L.174, A/C.1/L.175/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.176/Rev.2, A/C.1/L.177, A/C.1/L.178/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.179) (continued):**

- (a) Report of the Disarmament Commission;
- (b) Expansion of the membership of the Disarmament Commission and of its Sub-Committee;
- (c) Collective action to inform and enlighten the peoples of the world as to the dangers of the armaments race, and particularly as to the destructive effects of modern weapons;
- (d) Discontinuance under international control of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons

1. Mr. HORVATH (Hungary) said that representatives of small States could only echo the hope of their Governments and peoples that agreement among the great Powers would deliver mankind from the horrors of an atomic war. The Hungarian people, having suffered greatly from two world wars, expected their representatives in the United Nations to speak in the interests of all the peoples of the world and thereby to promote an easing of world tension and the solution of disarmament problems—questions which were indissolubly linked together.

2. Since the current armaments race was partly a consequence and partly a cause of international tension, disarmament could in turn be partly a cause and partly a consequence of the lessening of that tension. Accord-

ingly, those who really wanted to see progress in disarmament made proposals designed to reduce world tension, while those who claimed that the tension must be relaxed before disarmament could be achieved unwittingly betrayed the fact that they wanted neither.

3. The claim that international tension was caused by ideological differences was false; different ideological and social systems could live peacefully side by side and work together. The claim that international tension, and consequently the armaments race, had arisen because the West had felt itself threatened by the socialist countries of the East was equally untenable. The many public figures that had recently visited those countries were agreed that the socialist countries did not want war. Indeed, it was only natural that nations that had had a bitter experience of war and had inherited backwardness and poverty from the past should want only to raise their levels of living and serve the cause of human progress while at peace with their neighbours and the world.

4. The causes of the prevailing international tension and the unceasing armaments race were to be sought, rather, in the harmful influence certain powerful groups in the West exerted upon their Governments. Some of those groups wanted to replace the Governments of the socialist countries by Governments more to their liking. Others wanted to maintain the dependence of certain Asian and African countries and to extend such dependence to other areas; the Eisenhower Doctrine was an example of such an attitude. Others again were intent upon reaping high profits from the munitions industry. Those groups, which sometimes overlapped, maintained close contact with one another and utilized every means of propaganda and all the political influence they possessed to prevent agreement between the East and the West. They sought to frustrate the establishment of mutual trust by fostering the myth that international communism and military aggression were threatening from the East, and at the same time they instigated certain Western Governments to take steps which prevented socialist countries from gaining confidence in the good intentions of the West. Lastly, by inspiring draft resolutions which they knew to be unacceptable to the socialist countries, they tried to create the impression that it was those countries which were unwilling to come to an agreement.

5. The best way to frustrate the designs of those groups and to establish the minimum confidence necessary for further progress would be for the great Powers to come to an agreement on at least some part of the disarmament problem. The General Assembly at its present session could do much towards that end. It had been argued that disarmament problems should be settled in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, because the Powers possessing the latest weapons of mass destruction formed the majority

in that body. In his opinion, however, failure to achieve some agreement at the present session of the General Assembly would be harmful to the peoples of the world, because every day of delay inflicted great moral suffering and material losses upon them, and harmful also to the United Nations, because the peoples' confidence in it would be lessened. The representatives of countries which did not possess nuclear weapons but which were naturally concerned about the fate of their people should facilitate agreement between the great Powers by expressing their people's desire for peace and by presenting and supporting realistic proposals taking due account of the complexity of the problem before them.

6. The United States representative had made (866th meeting) an extremely interesting statement on disarmament, on which unfortunately the bad elements had cancelled out the good. He had spoken of the need to free the peoples from the burden of taxation imposed on them by the armaments race and from the fear of a war of annihilation, and had expressed the desire to reach realistic agreement on certain disarmament problems, without political strings. Yet, after stating that all peoples should know the terrible facts of modern warfare, he had gone on to say that further experimentation with thermo-nuclear weapons was desirable as a means of self-protection. He had conceded that a discontinuance of tests of nuclear weapons might be reassuring for the people, but had then advanced the scientifically unsound claim that the human body might receive more harmful radiation from the dial of a wristwatch than from a hydrogen bomb exploded for experimental purposes. After giving the impression that agreement was desired, he had stated that the United States was forced to arm and to continue nuclear tests because it feared an attack from the Soviet Union. Incidentally, he had thus returned to an outworn argument of the "cold war" because it was apparently no longer deemed politic to invoke the so-called liberation of enslaved peoples. That excuse had so little to support it that it was difficult to believe the United States had any real desire to come to an agreement. The United States representative had spoken of his people's desire for peace, but he had sought to delay the solution of the disarmament problem by arguing that the General Assembly should refer the matter to the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission for further discussion. Lastly, after saying that agreement on the various stages of disarmament should not be made subject to political conditions and thus indicating a desire for rapid action, he had gone on to list various stages of disarmament the joint discussion and examination of which would inevitably take up considerable time. Those were but some of the many contradictions to be found in the speech, but they should suffice to show that the present session of the General Assembly was faced with the same danger as the Sub-Committee's London meetings in June 1957 had been: that the influential groups he had mentioned earlier would step in at the last moment and, in defence of their selfish interests and to the detriment of all mankind, prevent agreement between the great Powers concerned.

7. Nevertheless it was to be hoped that the United States delegation would let itself be guided by the vital interests of its own people and all the other peoples in the world. If the great Powers and all other Member States made a joint effort, the General Assembly

should be able to reach decisions holding out a promise of peace. One important decision to be taken was on the discontinuance of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons. Several delegations had presented draft resolutions on the subject, reflecting the universal concern over the dangers of such tests. For his part, he supported the USSR draft resolution (A/3674/Rev.1), because it provided for immediate action and was in the best interests of peace. The adoption of the other USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.175/Rev.1), calling upon the States possessing nuclear weapons to assume a temporary obligation not to use them, would also have a reassuring effect upon public opinion and would pave the way to further agreement.

8. The Hungarian people had learned through bitter experience to abominate war and therefore followed with profound misgivings the current trend of world affairs, especially in Europe. It could see how Nazism had been revived in West Germany under the occupation of the Western Powers. That country was a danger to the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe, for it had been turned into a war base and made a member of the Western military bloc, which supplied its reconstructed army with the latest weapons. The continuation of military occupation did not help to combat Nazism and militarism; on the contrary, it fostered them by preventing the reunification of Germany on a democratic basis and by drawing West Germany into the armaments race. Since German militarism was a danger to Hungary, as well as to other countries, his Government had welcomed the appeal made in May 1957 of the Polish and Czechoslovak Governments to the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany to prohibit the construction of atomic bases and the stockpiling of atomic weapons in their territories. The German Democratic Republic had already made such a proposal. It would have a favourable effect on the international situation if another neighbour of West Germany, France, were to make a similar declaration. Furthermore, the peaceful, democratic reunification of Germany by the German people themselves—a measure which would eliminate the danger of German militarism—was possible if the great Powers would undertake the first steps towards a relaxation of international tension and gradual and supervised reciprocal disarmament.

9. He hoped that the General Assembly would at its present session take decisive steps towards agreement which would ensure the maintenance of international peace and security.

10. Mr. POPOVIC (Yugoslavia) said that the complexity of the disarmament problem was due partly to the magnitude of the political and economic interests at stake, the intransigence of the positions which had been taken up, the distrust on both sides, and the cumulative effect of past failures to reach agreement. In spite of that complexity, however, the present situation was clear in some respects. It was clear, for example, that the world was in the midst of large-scale preparations for war and that the disarmament negotiations had moved backwards in relation to General Assembly resolution 808 (IX) of 4 November 1954 in which the basic tasks in the field of disarmament had been very clearly set forth.

11. The positions of the two main sides were also clear in the sense that they had been exhaustively

elaborated, although many of the attitudes taken were still difficult to understand. The arguments adduced on both sides were compelling when they were conducive to agreement; they were anything but convincing when their sole purpose was to acquire or maintain certain advantages, real or imaginary, over the other side. But even the undeniable logic on which the views of both sides were based in a sense merely confused the issue still further, for the similarities between them were so often befogged, differences were so strongly emphasized, and so many different arguments were advanced with regard to certain points that their effect was exactly the opposite of the one intended. As long as negotiations moved within the orbit of those logical constructions there was always the danger that one or another aspect of the problem would, whether intentionally or not, grow into a fresh obstacle to agreement. Thus the fact that the comprehensive views of both sides had been worked out and put forth as entities to be adopted or rejected as such had brought matters to a deadlock. That approach was both impracticable and unrealistic; only a solution based on compromise was possible and realistic. It was therefore essential so to rearrange the elements of the problem as to do away in practice with the closed formulations of both sides.

12. The task of mankind as a whole was to seek a common logic which would lead to agreement, to discern the nature of the difficulties which stood in the way of such an agreement and to find the most effective means of overcoming them. In that respect, the countries which did not form part of any bloc could play a helpful role by assisting the great Powers to modify their more extreme opposing viewpoints. The objection that those countries were not sufficiently aware of all the technical implications of the various solutions should not divert them from the useful endeavours which precisely the smaller countries were in the best position to make. Their alleged lack of competence might even be an advantage in view of the difficulties arising from the tendency to assess even minor points in terms of the technical advantages they might yield to either side. His delegation therefore favoured the expansion of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission and felt that in the event of such an expansion the greatest contribution was to be expected from the countries which did not belong to any of the existing alignments. Moreover, those countries had a direct interest in disarmament, like all the nations of the world, and should have a direct voice in the settlement of the problem.

13. Perhaps one of the difficulties which stood in the way of an agreement and which contributed to the momentum of the continuing armaments race was that there were still in the world today advocates of the old dictum: Si vis pacem, para bellum. But the history of the last centuries had made that dictum untenable: preparations for war had never led to peace, but to new and ever more destructive wars. The doctrine of retaliation or deterrence, which was nothing but the old formula in a new guise, was equally untenable. The objective effect of the theory that one must increase one's armaments systematically in order to ensure the security of one way of life or another was merely to cloak the armaments race with a mantle of legality. The truth, however, was exactly the opposite: genuine security could be achieved only through the reduction of armaments. Moreover, how

could the doctrine of retaliation be reconciled with the proclaimed readiness to renounce nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons? It was naïve to believe in a type of security which was based on the possibility of all-out destruction. The theory regarding measures designed to prevent surprise attacks was equally unrealistic. Yugoslavia was not, of course, opposed to such measures; however, no war could be prevented by aerial inspection. The possibility of an attack could be forestalled only through the prevention of war. In that context, inspection and control obviously had an important place, but they should not be assigned in advance a function that they could not perform.

14. It should be realized that the very process of solving the problems of disarmament would make those problems appear in a different light and put them in a different context. Unless negotiations were approached in that spirit the parties would be drawn into a vicious circle with the result that the possibility of agreement on immediately practicable measures would be jettisoned for the sake of some ultimate goal.

15. It was for that reason that Yugoslavia favoured the immediate prohibition of tests of nuclear weapons. Any step that constituted an advance in relation to the present state of affairs was both acceptable and desirable in principle. According to The New York Times, the highest permissible level of fall-out resulting from tests had already been exceeded twice in recent years. Even from the point of view of present international law, those tests were absolutely unlawful and impermissible, particularly because the effects of such tests could not be confined to the territory or the inhabitants of the country in which they were carried out.

16. No real reason had been advanced for the continuation of the tests; on the contrary all the evidence went to show that the cessation of tests would not alter the balance of forces, and agreement appeared almost to have been reached regarding the necessary measures of control.

17. The demand for the cessation of tests was sometimes countered with the argument that it was not really a disarmament measure or the contradictory argument that such a step could be neither discussed nor settled except as part of the disarmament problem as a whole. Those who were not prepared to accept a more effective and far-reaching disarmament programme might well be criticized, but that was no reason to discard a positive measure which, although more modest in scope, was nevertheless of tremendous significance.

18. As a result of the stubborn and protracted struggle for advantage in the sphere of disarmament, a number of pseudo-problems had emerged, among them the question whether nuclear and thermo-nuclear armaments should remain in the hands of a few great Powers or should become the possession of a widening circle of other countries. Such an alternative was very unrealistic, for if the armaments race continued the world would be confronted with both situations. The same was true of the question of making further progress in the disarmament process dependent upon the settlement of political questions. It was only reasonable to suppose that progress towards the strengthening of peace would not be confined to the field of disarmament alone, but it was quite another matter to turn that observation into a pre-condition

for further advance in the field of disarmament and thus to render more difficult even that measure of agreement which was now possible. The point of view was part of the vicious circle which resulted from approaching disarmament negotiations more in terms of achieving an advantageous position in the event of war than in terms of common efforts to prevent war. Such an approach was obviously untenable because it was, in fact, based on an attitude which was hostile a priori both to disarmament and to the easing of tension in general, and was due to the fallacious assumption that it was still possible to approach the settlement of international problems from positions of strength. That approach was all the more unrealistic because it was becoming increasingly clear that the basic balance of forces in the world could no longer be altered to any substantial or lasting extent.

19. His delegation reserved its right to state its position with regard to the specific draft resolutions before the Committee, but would make some comments immediately. It considered the basic purpose of the Belgian draft resolution (A/3630/Corr.1) to be constructive although it could not endorse the explanation of it, which had placed the entire emphasis upon control. It supported the suggestion made by the representative of Mexico (699th plenary meeting) to set up an ad hoc committee, although it thought that such a committee should also be enlarged along the lines proposed for the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee. It favoured the full prohibition and elimination of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons and considered that, in order to achieve that goal, agreement should be reached on the measures which would contribute to the cessation of the armaments race in such weapons. Those measures might include an undertaking not to transfer nuclear weapons or fissionable materials for military use to other countries; the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes; and arrangements whereby fissionable materials now stockpiled for military purposes should gradually be taken over for peaceful use. It also

considered that renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons, as proposed in the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/L.175/Rev.1) would facilitate the efforts towards attaining the goal of prohibition and elimination.

20. It was possible to disengage certain fundamental principles on which an agreement could be based. They were as follows: first, while a general disarmament agreement was desirable, only an initial and partial one was possible at the present stage. Secondly, progress could be achieved only through a readiness to compromise and on a basis of unanimity. In that connexion, it was obvious that the future work of the Sub-Committee could not be envisaged in terms of insistence on any of the existing plans, even if such plans were to obtain the endorsement of the General Assembly. Thirdly, any disarmament plan must necessarily include both conventional and nuclear armaments and provide for the necessary measures of control. Fourthly, the questions of disarmament and control should be dealt with side by side—without forgetting, however, that controls should exist for the sake of disarmament and not disarmament for the sake of controls. The question of controls should not be made into an absolute principle or an ultimate goal. Fifthly, it should be observed that no useful purpose could be served by making certain points conditional upon others and least of all upon the settlement of other political problems.

21. The application of those principles should, in his delegation's view, facilitate the adoption of steps which would constitute an advance from the present situation.

22. His delegation did not advocate the abrogation of all the measures which had been taken up to now in the name of defence. But it did not wish to see those measures harden into a lasting reliance on force, which, as a long-term policy, must necessarily lead to an obliteration of the distinction between aggression and defence.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.