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Chairman: Mr. Victor A. BELAUNDE (Peru).

AGENDA ITEM 63

**Question of West Irian (West New Guinea)
(A/3200 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.173)**

1. Mr. SUDJARWO (Indonesia) recalled that the question of West Irian had been submitted to the General Assembly by sixteen Asian and African States (A/3200 and Add.1), in the hope of finding a peaceful solution for it or at least preparing the way for such a solution.

2. Unfortunately, bilateral negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia had so far been unsuccessful, and the consequence had been a deterioration in the relations between the two States. The latest negotiations, which had taken place at Geneva from December 1955 to February 1956 had also failed, despite the hope expressed by the General Assembly in its resolution 915 (X) of 16 December 1955 that the negotiations would be fruitful. The question of West Irian remained a serious obstacle to good relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands and adversely affected international relations in South-East Asia.

3. At the ninth and tenth sessions of the General Assembly, the First Committee had dealt with the question and had adopted draft resolutions (A/2831, para. 9 and A/3093, para. 6) with a view to promoting negotiations between the parties concerned. Since no solution had been found, the Indonesian Government was therefore submitting the question once again for the Committee's consideration, since it was still anxious to find a peaceful settlement with the help of the United Nations.

4. The problem of West Irian was essentially a colonial problem which had arisen after the end of the colonial war between the Netherlands and Indonesia. The problem would never have arisen if the Netherlands Government had not attempted to withhold from the people of West Irian the freedom and independence gained by the Indonesian people.

5. On 27 December 1949 the Netherlands Government had unconditionally and irrevocably transferred complete sovereignty over Indonesia. Under the Netherlands Administration, New Guinea had been a residency, i.e., an administrative subdivision of Indonesia, forming part of a province under direct administration of the central colonial government at Batavia. At that time, West Irian had belonged to the province of the Great East, which also included the Moluccas and Celebes. Economically and socially, too, it had been a part of that Indonesian province. Before the Dutch

occupation, West Irian had been a part of the Indonesian sultanate of Tidore. Economic and social progress in West Irian was inconceivable without the co-operation of the adjacent islands. In religious affairs, the Christian community of West Irian was dependent on the Indonesian Moluccan Protestant Church.

6. West Irian was a part of Indonesia as it had been a part of the Netherlands Indies, for the simple reason that the term "Indonesia" corresponded to the former Netherlands Indies. The name "Indonesia" had appeared at the end of the period of Dutch rule, and the Netherlands Government had finally accepted it formally. In fact, the 1941 *Statistical Pocket Book of Indonesia*¹ stated that the territories previously known as the Netherlands Indies, including West Irian, would be officially called "Indonesia".

7. Again, in 1948 the Netherlands had amended its Constitution and officially recognized that the Kingdom henceforth included Indonesia—not the Netherlands Indies. Hence it was fantastic that the Netherlands Government should now claim that West Irian was not a part of Indonesia, since it was a matter of incontrovertible legal and historical fact.

8. It was the entire Indonesian people, from Sabang in Sumatra to Marauke in West Irian, who had proclaimed their independence on 17 August 1945. Indonesian nationalism was not based on race or religion, but was a reaction against Dutch colonial rule. When, after the Second World War, the Netherlands had attempted to re-establish colonial rule in Indonesia, including West Irian, the people of Irian had established the Irian Party for the Independence of Indonesia—and not for the independence of Irian. That was sufficient indication of the ties between the people of Irian and the Indonesian people.

9. In the negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands under the auspices of the Security Council in 1948 and 1949, after the Netherlands Government had attempted to re-establish its rule over Indonesia by force, the Netherlands position concerning the inclusion of West Irian in Indonesia had been perfectly clear. In reports to the United Nations in 1948 and 1949,² the Netherlands Government had in fact stated that Indonesia was made up of a series of island groups, including West Irian, while the Netherlands representative in the Security Council, Mr. van Royen, had stated on 22 December 1948³ that, as a product of Netherlands administration, the unity of Indonesia had developed to such an extent that its population, made up of about seventeen ethnic and linguistic groups, had acquired a sense of Indonesian nationality. He had also

¹ Department of Economic Affairs, Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Pocket Book of Indonesia* (Batavia, G. Kolff and Co., 1941).

² *Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summaries and analyses of information transmitted to the Secretary-General during 1948 and ibid, 1949*. United Nations publications, Sales Nos: 1949.VI.B.1 and 1950.VI.B.1, Vol. II.

³ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, No. 132, 388th meeting*.

stated that his Government recognized that the former Netherlands East Indies should become an independent State as soon as possible. Again, at the Round Table Conference at The Hague in 1949, the Netherlands Government had unconditionally and irrevocably transferred sovereignty over Indonesia to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, and in so doing had recognized the latter as an independent and sovereign State. He wondered therefore how it could be maintained that the Netherlands retained sovereignty over West Irian, a part of Indonesia.

10. The problem of West Irian was a result of the Netherlands claim, made at the Round Table Conference, that its administration of the territory should be maintained temporarily. The Indonesian delegation to the Conference had reluctantly accepted that claim to the temporary retention of Netherlands administration in West Irian because it wished to avoid a deadlock on the problem as a whole. But that temporary arrangement in no way affected Indonesian sovereignty over West Irian. While article 1 of the Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty (S/1417/Add.1, appendix VII) provided for the unconditional and irrevocable transfer of sovereignty, article 2 of the same agreement provided that "the *status quo* of the Residency of New Guinea shall be maintained, with the stipulation that within a year from the date of transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia the question of the political status of New Guinea be determined through negotiations between the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands." The use of the word "residency" in the text clearly indicated that there had been no intention of excluding that administrative unit from the Government of Indonesia, since a residency was an administrative unit of Indonesia and not of the Netherlands.

11. Negotiations on the political status of West Irian had taken place from 1950 to 1952 and later, in 1955 and 1956. They had all failed, however, because the Netherlands Government wished at all costs to maintain its colonial rule over the Territory, although it had recognized the independence of the whole of Indonesia. From 1952 on, the Netherlands Government had refused to continue negotiations, claiming that it was no longer obliged to do so because the specified time limit of one year had elapsed. Such an interpretation had all the earmarks of bad faith. The dispute would inevitably continue so long as there was no solution acceptable to both parties.

12. The negotiations having failed, the Netherlands Government had annexed the Residency of New Guinea, and the Netherlands Constitution had been amended accordingly by unilateral Netherlands action. Nevertheless, the Netherlands Government, unable to justify its action, had proposed an additional article in the Constitution providing that the final political status of West Irian might be settled by agreement with the Indonesian Government. Explaining the constitutional change, the Netherlands Government had admitted that the uncertainty as to the future status of the Territory had made it desirable not to draft a detailed provision. Nevertheless, a member of the Parliamentary opposition, Professor Oud, had pointed out that from 1949, when Indonesia became an independent State, New Guinea was no longer part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

13. The dispute over West Irian had been partly responsible for the deterioration in the relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands, so much so that

after the breakdown of the negotiations at Geneva in 1956, the Indonesian Government found itself compelled to dissolve the Union with the Netherlands and also to abrogate the Round Table Conference agreements. It was clear, however, that the abrogation of the agreements had not eliminated the causes of the conflict over West Irian, and that the sovereign rights of the Republic of Indonesia over all parts of its territory, including West Irian, remained unaffected.

14. It was also clear that the uncertainty about West Irian's status had made the people of the Netherlands feel that their authority over the Territory was questionable and temporary. Evidence of that was given by Mr. Ronald Monson, an Australian journalist, in an article in the *Sydney Daily Telegraph* of 3 August 1956.

15. The Netherlands Government had advanced the fantastic argument that the termination of its colonial rule over West Irian and the re-establishment of Indonesian administration over the territory would mean that the United Nations would no longer receive information on West Irian. Thus apparently the Netherlands felt that the interests of the people of West Irian would be better served by the submission of information to the United Nations than by the attainment of freedom.

16. The Netherlands Government also claimed to be concerned about the right of the people of West Irian to self-determination. If they had displayed such concern in the past, there would not have been a war between the Netherlands and Indonesia. Actually, the Netherlands was merely trying to maintain colonialism and to disguise it cleverly. The right of a people to self-determination meant that people's right to freedom and self-government. West Irian already had freedom and self-government under Indonesia. The former residency of New Guinea was today an Indonesian province, even though it was still occupied by the Netherlands. The right of self-determination was a means to an end. The Republic of Indonesia had already granted that right to all its people, including those of West Irian, whereas the Netherlands Government was still talking about the means of achieving that end.

17. West Irian was at present the victim of colonial oppression with all that implied; such as inequalities and discrimination, lack of progress and social welfare, repressive police measures. That unhappy situation had been recognized even by a Netherlands Parliamentary Mission to West Irian.

18. The exchange of letters which had taken place in connexion with article 2 of the Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty indicated that the *status quo* in the residency of New Guinea implied *de facto* administration and not *de jure* sovereignty over West Irian. That was confirmed by Dr. Leslie Miller, a Netherlands scholar specializing in Indonesian affairs and a member of the Netherlands Labour Party, who had written in his party's publication that the transfer of *de jure* sovereignty over the whole of the Netherlands Indies, including New Guinea, was fixed by article 1 of the Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty and that article 2 made an exception with respect to *de facto* sovereignty over New Guinea.

19. While the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands had its juridical aspects, and while on those grounds the arguments put forward by the Netherlands were unjustified, the problem was primarily a political one inasmuch as it represented a

struggle between colonialism and a people's aspirations to freedom. The question was whether the Netherlands had the right to maintain its colonial rule over part of an independent State, to stand between a people and its freedom, to divide a State that constituted a political unit, to violate the boundaries and sovereignty of a State, and to leave unsolved a problem which poisoned international relations. The statements by Mr. van Royen, the Netherlands representative in the Security Council, on 22 December 1948, and the statement by Mr. van Mook, Lieutenant Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies, at Bali in December 1946 to the effect that the Netherlands did not intend to exclude West Irian from Indonesia made it clear that the reply to those questions, both juridically and politically, must be "no".

20. It was encouraging to note that even in the Netherlands there was a movement in favour of Indonesia's case. In 1956 a Netherlands journalist, Mr. Droogh, had written in a booklet entitled *The Hand on the Knob of the Door* that agreement between the two Governments could still be hoped for if the Netherlands abandoned its policy based on strategic considerations. Then, and only then, could the commercial and economic interests of the Netherlands in Indonesia be preserved. Mr. Teeuw, Professor at the University of Leyden, asserted that Indonesia had the right to claim West Irian as part of its territory. In an appeal published in 1956, the General Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church had indicated its concern over the conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia with respect to West Irian and concluded that the Netherlands should seek a solution to the problem on an international basis. The Netherlands Quakers Association had sent a letter to the Netherlands Government in January 1957 requesting that sovereignty over West Irian should be ceded to Indonesia in order to pave the way for restoring good relations between the two States.

21. The Indonesian Moluccan Protestant Church had great influence in West Irian. Its headquarters were at Amboina, in the eastern part of Indonesia. The head of the Church had recently stated that it was solely the action of the Netherlands Government that had broken the link uniting the congregation of West Irian and that of the Moluccas. Recently 116 Netherlands intellectuals representing all shades of political opinion had addressed the six major political parties in the Netherlands to express their concern over the fact that the Netherlands Government and Parliament were not giving the question of West Irian the serious attention it deserved. They doubted whether the official Netherlands attitude was politically tenable and morally justifiable. During the debate in the Netherlands Parliament on the 1957 budget, Mr. J. in't Veld, a member of one of the Government coalition parties, had said that for the Netherlands to maintain good relations with the people of Asia, it must cast off all vestiges of colonialism.

22. As recently as 24 January 1957, a group of Netherlands intellectuals and businessmen living in Indonesia had approached the Netherlands Government pointing out that the continuation of the conflict over West Irian was a serious obstacle to Netherlands interests in Indonesia. They affirmed that the Netherlands position was not only undesirable but also questionable. They therefore appealed to the Netherlands Government to alter its negative attitude, and they declared themselves willing to intercede to help to bring about an agreement on the political status of

West Irian. Lastly, on 31 January 1957 the Apostolic Vicar of Central Flores stated that as far as the Catholic Mission was concerned, West Irian was without question a part of the territory of Indonesia. The Indonesian delegation highly appreciated all those expressions of good will and understanding on the part of the Netherlands people.

23. Thus the door was still open for constructive common efforts. The United Nations should endeavour to use its good offices towards that end with a view to a solution which would be advantageous not only to Indonesia, but to the Netherlands as well. It was noteworthy that on 9 January 1957 the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, while justifying his Government's policy on West Irian, had observed that it was extremely important for the West to adopt a policy which might create better understanding between the West and the African-Asian States, and that it was therefore necessary for the West to get rid of any thought of colonialism. It was also encouraging to note that the Australian Government seemed to have adopted a more broadminded attitude towards Indonesia. For example, the head of the Australian Parliamentary Mission to Indonesia had stated on 9 November 1956 that the mission, after holding conversations with the Indonesian authorities, had obtained a better understanding of the Indonesian point of view on West Irian.

24. All those encouraging signs fostered the belief that a way out of the impasse could be found. The United Nations could help to bring about a solution.

25. In that belief, the Indonesian delegation would accept any draft resolution likely to help in finding such a solution.

Mr. Gunewardene (Ceylon), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

26. Mr. SCHURMANN (Netherlands) said that he would not reiterate all the considerations which had been set forth in the official records of the General Assembly's ninth session. The important thing at present was to ascertain whether the Assembly had any reason to reverse the decision taken at that session, when it had rejected (509th Plenary meeting) the First Committee's draft resolution (A/2831, para. 9). To show that there was no reason to go against that decision it would suffice to recall the Indonesian proposals, the reasons for their rejection, the present basis of the Indonesian claim and, finally, the views of the Netherlands Government.

27. At the ninth session of the General Assembly Indonesia had introduced a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.109) by which the General Assembly would have called upon the two Governments to resume negotiations, without delay, as provided for by the Round Table Conference agreement, with a view to achieving an early agreement on the political status of West Irian, and would have invited the Secretary-General to assist the parties, and, if he deemed it appropriate, to appoint a person to render his good offices to them. That draft resolution had referred in its preamble to the decision adopted in 1949 to the effect that the *status quo* of the residency of New Guinea would be maintained, with the stipulation that within a year from the date of transfer of sovereignty the question of the political status of New Guinea would be determined through negotiations. The reason for that agreement, on which Indonesia had chosen to base its claim, was that the parties had not been able, at the Round Table Conference, to reconcile their viewpoints concerning West New Guinea. While Indonesia had held that transfer

of sovereignty should include all the territories formerly constituting the Netherlands East Indies, the Netherlands had seen no justification for ceding to Indonesia the Netherlands part of New Guinea, which was inhabited by Papuans, a people having no racial, cultural, or religious, much less national, affinity with the Indonesians and which therefore could not belong to the Indonesian nation. In order not to delay the transfer of sovereignty it had been agreed that New Guinea should remain under Netherlands sovereignty and that the parties should try to reach an understanding within a year. The Netherlands had accepted that arrangement, proposed by the United Nations Commission for Indonesia, because it would thereby retain its sovereignty over the island and because it had hoped that within the framework of the Union a status might be worked out which would safeguard the rights of Netherlands New Guinea and yet give Indonesia a share in its development. In that spirit the Netherlands, during the subsequent negotiations, had proposed that sovereignty should be vested in the Union, a suggestion which Indonesia had rejected.

28. In the beginning Indonesia had held that sovereignty over New Guinea should be transferred to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, and in a *note verbale* dated 7 December 1950 had called for the transfer to Indonesia of *de jure* sovereignty.

29. Nevertheless, one year later, the Republic of Indonesia, a unitary State, had sought to argue that *de jure* sovereignty over New Guinea had already been transferred to it and that it remained only to transfer to Indonesia the *de facto* administration. The note of 10 November 1951 had set forth the new Indonesian concept in accordance with which West New Guinea had been covered by the Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty (S/1417/Add.1, appendix VII), article 2 of which had referred only to the *status quo*, that is, in the view of Indonesia, the authority to be exercised by the Netherlands for the duration of one year.

30. Indonesia itself had been so well aware of the weakness of its new argument that it had rejected the Netherlands proposal to ask the International Court of Justice for a decision in the matter.

31. Indonesia had then requested the inclusion of the question in the agenda of the General Assembly's ninth session (A/2694), in the course of which Mr. Sudjarwo had stated, on 29 November 1954 (726th meeting), that article 2 had authorized only *de facto* Netherlands control. Indonesia had not, however, dared risk a vote on its draft resolution and the eight-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.110) had not mentioned negotiations, and especially not negotiations "as provided for by the Round Table Conference agreement", in the words of the Indonesian draft; but had merely expressed the hope that the two Governments would pursue their endeavours in respect of the dispute to find a solution in conformity with the principles of the Charter.

32. That text had been rejected by both the Netherlands and the General Assembly, for Indonesia had repeatedly stated that it would not accept any solution of what it called the problem of West Irian other than the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia.

33. Indonesia had first adopted that inflexible attitude, in April 1950, at the beginning of the negotiations, as noted by the United Nations Commission for Indonesia in its report of 13 April 1951 (S/2087, para. 57). On 9 January 1951 the Prime Minister of Indonesia, Mr. Mohammed Natsir, had told the Parliament that negotiations based on any other principle, even in

the presence of a third party, would have no result. When the Australian representative had asked the Indonesian representative on 24 November 1954 whether he was prepared to say that transfer of sovereignty was not necessarily involved in such discussions, the answer had been that West Irian formed part of Indonesia.

34. In those circumstances, it would have been futile to call for negotiations or ask the parties to find a solution. Furthermore, any solution acceptable to Indonesia would have been contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, for a recommendation would have been made to a Member State that it should give up a part of its territory. Such a recommendation would have violated both the concept of respect for the territorial integrity of Member States and the right of self-determination of peoples, for the inhabitants of the territory to be transferred would not have been consulted but would have been disposed of as though they were cattle.

35. After the question had been placed on the agenda of the General Assembly's tenth session, the two Governments had decided to confer at The Hague. Consequently, in resolution 915 (X), unanimously adopted at that session, the Assembly, noting the joint statement of 7 December 1955, had merely expressed the hope that the negotiations would be fruitful. In other words, by that resolution, the General Assembly had recognized that the real question of New Guinea had been excluded from the agenda of the Conference, since in the joint statement it was said that the question of sovereignty over West New Guinea would not be discussed.

36. At The Hague and later at Geneva, between December 1955 and February 1956, Indonesia had refused to accept the principle of international arbitration with regard to the interpretation of its agreements with the Netherlands.

37. Shortly thereafter Indonesia, in a communication dated 13 February 1956, a note dated 21 February 1956 and the Indonesian law of 21 April 1956, had unilaterally dissolved the Union and abrogated all the agreements entered into at the Round Table Conference, including the Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty.

38. While the Netherlands representative would not seek to pass judgment on that violation of the principle of respect for the obligations arising from international law, as laid down in the preamble to the United Nations Charter, he could not help wondering on what foundation the Indonesian argument now rested. Indonesia had previously maintained that the Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty had conferred upon it *de jure* sovereignty and that the Netherlands should negotiate the *de facto* transfer. Now, however, Indonesia was putting forward two contradictory claims. The first was that the transfer which had taken place by virtue of the Charter signed at the Round Table Conference on 27 December 1949 was an established fact and that the transfer had covered West New Guinea.

39. In that connexion, it was necessary to ascertain what the intention of the parties had been at the time of signing of the agreement. That intention had been set forth in the Charter of Transfer itself, which had provided that West New Guinea was not to be included in the transfer of sovereignty and that the *status quo* of the Residency of New Guinea should be maintained, an agreement confirmed by an exchange of letters dated 2 November 1949 (S/1417/Add.1, appendix XXIV, A) which had specified that the island would

continue to be governed by the Netherlands. In other words, the transfer of sovereignty of 27 December 1949 did not extend to West New Guinea and it was useless to try to invoke the effects of an agreement which Indonesia, moreover, had refused to recognize.

40. Nevertheless, Indonesia had now taken a new stand which contradicted its earlier position in that it based Indonesian sovereignty on the Declaration of Independence of 17 August 1945, as though the State as then envisaged had included New Guinea.

41. In the first place, it could not be said that the sovereignty of Indonesia had been established by the Declaration of Independence. In the Linggadjati agreement of 25 March 1947 the Netherlands had recognized Indonesia's *de facto* authority over Java, Madura and Sumatra, while the Indonesians themselves had recognized that Netherlands sovereignty remained in force during the transition period, as stated in the Indonesian note dated 6 July 1947 in reply to an aide-mémoire from the United States. Moreover, the first of the six additional principles for the negotiations towards a political settlement submitted by the Committee of Good Offices at the fourth meeting with the parties on 17 January 1948 and accepted at the fifth meeting of the Committee with the parties on 19 January 1948 had stipulated that "Sovereignty throughout the Netherlands Indies is and shall remain with the Kingdom of the Netherlands until, after a stated interval, the latter transfers its sovereignty. . ." (S/649/Rev.1, appendix VIII, para. 1). Consequently, the Round Table Conference agreements concerned not the relinquishment or recognition of sovereignty but its transfer. Mr. Natsir, then Prime Minister of Indonesia, had stated on 9 January 1951 that Indonesian sovereignty had been "obtained" at the Round Table Conference and Mr. Wibisono, former Indonesian Minister of Finance, had written on 27 January 1951 that the independence proclaimed in 1945 had not found international recognition. On 24 August 1951 Professor Supomo, special envoy, had written in a memorandum to the Netherlands Government that the Round Table Conference had brought about the sovereignty and independence of Indonesia. General Assembly resolution 301 (IV) welcomed the forthcoming establishment of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia as an independent, sovereign State. Furthermore, in 1948 and 1949 the Netherlands had submitted reports on Indonesia to the United Nations, but in 1950 it had announced that it would henceforth report only on Netherlands New Guinea, a fact which had been noted by the Assembly with satisfaction in resolution 448 (V).

42. With regard to the second part of the argument, it was contrary to the facts to state that the sovereignty created by the Declaration of Independence included West New Guinea. During the latter part of the Second World War, New Guinea had been entirely cut off from Indonesia, and not a single Papuan had taken part in the Indonesian independence movement. As the Indonesian leader, Mr. Mohammed Hatta, had stated on 25 November 1949, the population of West New Guinea as a whole was incapable of expressing its political will; those who had proclaimed Indonesian independence had no right whatever to speak for the inhabitants of West New Guinea. Moreover, there had been no such intention on their part. On 19 August 1945 an addition to the Constitution had described the territory of the Indonesian Republic as being composed of eight provinces which had not included New Guinea. On 23 August 1945 President Sukarno had

spoken to the Indonesian people "from Achin to Amboina". But Amboina was to the west of New Guinea.

43. Indonesia's claim was therefore without foundation, as was the request that the General Assembly should lend its authority to that claim by asking the Netherlands to discuss it with Indonesia.

44. While it was maintained that disputes should always be settled by peaceful means, it should not be forgotten that quite recently a spokesman of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had confirmed that the only settlement satisfactory to Indonesia would be the unconditional transfer of sovereignty.

45. In those circumstances any recommendation whatsoever would constitute an unwarranted and illegal interference by the General Assembly and an unlawful attack on the territorial integrity of the Netherlands. Even if the territorial claim were legally justified—which was not the case for West New Guinea—the General Assembly would have no right to support a Government which, desiring to annex the territory of another State, asked the United Nations to recommend negotiations.

46. The draft resolution (A/C.1/L.173) contained the same elements as had been proposed in the draft submitted by Indonesia at the ninth session (A/C.1/L.109) which had not even been put to the vote, namely negotiations—without any reference to the agreements torn up by Indonesia—and good offices. However, there had already been a Committee of Good Offices and the United Nations Commission for Indonesia, which had been unable to do more than report the failure of negotiations, as Indonesia had maintained its claim. On 9 January 1951 an official Indonesian statement had affirmed that negotiations which were not conducted on the basis of transfer of sovereignty would have no result even with the participation of a third party.

47. There could be no question of a transfer of sovereignty over Netherlands New Guinea to Indonesia without consultation of the inhabitants. Such a procedure would violate the principles of the United Nations Charter regarding the inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing Territories.

48. The Netherlands representative hoped that the General Assembly would reject a draft resolution which his delegation considered unacceptable.

49. The Netherlands Administration in New Guinea was based on the principles set forth in Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter and was designed to bring progress to the Papuan population, which was one of the most primitive in the world today, only one-half of the people having ever had any contact with the outside world. The interior of the jungle was accessible only by air and was very sparsely populated; only 700,000 to 800,000 persons inhabited an area equivalent to that of the United Kingdom.

50. Plans had been drawn up to reach, to educate and to bring medical care to those people and each year the Netherlands Government reported to the United Nations on the progress it had made with that task. The Netherlands would not hesitate to allow the Papuans to choose their own régime, but Mr. Mohammad Hatta had himself admitted that it was not yet possible for them to do so. The Netherlands had confirmed in the most solemn way its decision on that point, for on 16 September 1952, long before the matter had been raised in the United Nations, the Queen of the Netherlands had stated that her Government would promote the development of West New

Guinea so that in due course the population would be enabled to decide on its future. In October 1956 the Government had stated that the Netherlands, on the basis of the existing legal system, would promote the development of the territory to such an extent that the application of the principle of self-determination would be accelerated. The Netherlands Government intended to keep that promise and therefore could not entertain any thought of an agreement with Indonesia by which it could be annulled.

51. As for the position of Indonesia, it was enough to recall the statement made by Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo, Prime Minister of Indonesia, on 2 September 1953 in which he had expressed his disagreement with Mr. Burhanudin, a member of the Provisional Indonesian Parliament, who had felt that Indonesia should first consult the population of West New Guinea on whether it was really prepared to accept association with Indonesia.

52. In view of Indonesia's attitude, it was impossible for the Netherlands to negotiate with Indonesia on the future of Netherlands New Guinea. Delegations respecting the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination should understand that it could only be safeguarded in the present case by the rejection of all Indonesian claims for transfer, negotiations or mediation.

53. Mr. SUDJARWO (Indonesia) stressed that the phrase "from Sabang to Marauke" was the national slogan of Indonesia.

54. The territory of Indonesia comprised 3,000 islands so that it was impossible to enumerate them each time

the country was mentioned. Clearly, Indonesia was the same as the former Netherlands East Indies. If West Irian was not included in the provincial division to which the Netherlands representative had referred, it was because, in conformity with the Netherlands administrative divisions, West Irian was part of the Province of the Moluccas. The *Statistical Pocket Book of Indonesia* of 1941 stated that one of the provinces of Indonesia was that of the Moluccas, which included New Guinea. It was the Netherlands administrative division which Indonesia had taken over in 1945.

55. Mr. SCHURMANN (Netherlands) recalled that the representative of Indonesia had himself enumerated the Moluccas and West New Guinea separately, a fact which proved that New Guinea was not included in the territory proclaimed independent, since on that occasion the Moluccas only had been mentioned. Furthermore, President Sukarno had stated that Indonesia ended at Amboina, i.e., to the west of West New Guinea.

56. Mr. SUDJARWO (Indonesia) said that in Eastern Indonesia administrative divisions had varied. Thus, in 1941 the Netherlands Government had included West Irian in the Province of the Moluccas. Later, it was made a residency and later still a part of eastern Indonesia. If reference was made to provinces, it was always certain to which province West Irian belonged; if reference was made to islands it was necessary to mention Amboina and West Irian. What was certain was that West Irian had belonged and continued to belong to Indonesia as every statement and every atlas proved.

The meeting rose at 2.5 p. m.