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*Chairman:* Mr. Victor A. BELAUNDE (Peru).

**AGENDA ITEM 55**

**Question of Cyprus (A/3120 and Add.1, A/3204 and Add.1, A/C.1/788, A/C.1/789, A/C.1/L.168 to A/C.1/L.171) (*continued*):**

- (a) **Application, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of the Island of Cyprus;**
- (b) **Complaint by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of support from Greece for terrorism in Cyprus**

1. The SECRETARY, with reference to the statements made by the representatives of Greece and the United Kingdom at the 849th and 850th meetings, respectively, said that the Secretary-General had been notified by the representative of Greece that his Government had agreed that the documents deposited by the Greek delegation would be held at the disposal of all delegations. For the time being, the documents might be consulted in Room 3528.

2. Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom) expressed his satisfaction with respect to the statement made by the Secretary of the Committee.

3. Exercising his right of reply, he recalled the Greek representative's allegations to the effect that the United Kingdom Government had deliberately tried to fabricate false evidence to prove the existence of Greek support for terrorism in Cyprus. The first two allegations contained in the Greek memorandum (A/C.1/789) were complete fabrications. Neither concerned people who were in any way connected with his Government. The third and fourth allegations involved members of the British Embassy in Athens. It was remarkable that both of those serious allegations depended upon the evidence furnished by one man, a Greek journalist, who had already published stories on the same lines as those contained in the Greek memorandum. That journalist had made other sensational allegations which the Greek delegation had not reproduced. That left-wing journalist had indeed offered the British Embassy allegedly valuable information concerning arms-smuggling to Cyprus, but had been advised to tell his story to the Greek

authorities. He had, in turn, replied that he did not want to do so, since the Greek authorities had been involved in the incident. Nevertheless, the British Embassy had reported the matter to the Greek authorities, a fact which the Greek representative had failed to mention. Furthermore, when the Greek journalist's sensational stories had been published in the Athenian Press, the British *Chargé d'affaires* had lodged a strong protest with the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

4. Mr. DE THIER (Belgium) stated that he intervened in the debate unwillingly, since the two questions before the Committee brought in opposition to each other three States with which Belgium enjoyed close ties and shared numerous essential interests. He wished to avoid anything which might aggravate the present dispute and jeopardize the solidarity and friendship uniting the peoples of the European and Atlantic communities. He intervened, however, since the issue involved principles to which Belgium had always attached great importance.

5. Belgium's position on the question of Cyprus would be in line with its position in similar matters, such as the question of Algeria. The Charter contained precise and limited commitments, and one of the limitations on the United Nations was Article 2, paragraph 7 which prohibited the Organization from intervening in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State. He agreed with other representatives that that provision was overriding and had priority over other provisions. Cyprus was legally under United Kingdom jurisdiction by virtue of a treaty freely entered into by the parties concerned. The United Nations was therefore not authorized to intervene.

6. His delegation was deeply devoted to the principle of self-determination, which his country had often claimed in the past. Moreover, that principle was contained in Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Charter, which Belgium had signed. He believed, however, that it was not possible for the United Nations to settle the exercise of that right in particular cases or to decide when the time and circumstances had come for a specific people to exercise that right. On the contrary, if the United Nations wished to intervene in that field, it would exceed its powers, would assume a task for which it was not qualified, and would embark upon a course dangerous to its cohesion as well as to the peace of the world.

7. The question of Cyprus was the second item during the present session which had come before the Committee in the name of the principle of self-determination. There were ethnic groups in many States, sometimes even armed, which claimed or might claim the right of self-determination. If the United Nations decided to intervene in Cyprus, it would have to intervene elsewhere as well. It would thus run the risk of undertaking a task which went beyond its strength the risk of awakening in some ethnic groups aspirations the

realization of which would encounter insurmountable difficulties, and hence the risk of creating new problems of violence in various regions of the world. That was precisely one of the dangers the authors of the Charter had wished to avoid by Article 2, paragraph 7.

8. The Belgian delegation believed that the question of the exercise of the principle of self-determination by a people must be settled between the spokesmen of the people concerned and the State under whose jurisdiction that people came. That was not only their responsibility, but also to their interest, because in that way, they would be able to work out a new political status which would permit the development of friendly relations between both parties. That method, moreover, had to its credit many successes which had led several States to independence. On the other hand, terrorism and outside interference were not only contrary to the rule of law and to the Charter, but could delay a settlement. For those reasons, such action should be condemned and might justify intervention by the United Nations.

9. The Belgian delegation agreed with those who urged that negotiations between the Governments concerned would be the best way of arriving at a settlement which would take account of all the interests involved. He hoped that those negotiations would be successful and that calm would return to Cyprus.

10. In conclusion, Mr. de Thier felt that there was reason for optimism regarding the settlement of the question, because the three countries involved possessed qualities which could contribute to a peaceful settlement and because those countries were bound by so many common interests and so close a friendship.

11. Mr. LOUTFI (Egypt) recalled that the decisions regarding the Cyprus question taken at the ninth and tenth sessions of the General Assembly had been prompted by the hope that the parties would find an opportunity to seek, by means of peaceful negotiations, a just and equitable solution of the question.

12. The results had been disappointing. Instead of acting rapidly and equitably to settle the question, the United Kingdom had continued its policy of force and repression. The Cypriots had continued their fierce resistance despite the measures applied by the United Kingdom. The British authorities had arrested and exiled Archbishop Makarios, the valiant spokesman of the Cypriots, who had refused to submit to the conditions set by Field-Marshal Sir John Harding for the solution of the problem. The so-called negotiations conducted between the two had been based not on equality, but on a master-servant relationship, as stated by the representative of Greece (847th meeting). The exile of Archbishop Makarios resembled the exile of the Sultan of Morocco, and by taking such measures, the United Kingdom Government had returned to the methods of outdated colonialism. The behaviour of their Government had not been welcomed by the British public itself, as clearly demonstrated by the representative of Greece. It could lead to serious repercussions and to a further intensification of the Cypriot resistance to the British.

13. To justify its policy, the Government of the United Kingdom had submitted a complaint against Greece (A/3204 and Add.1) regarding the latter's support of terrorism in Cyprus. Having followed the statements of both the representative of the United Kingdom and the representative of Greece on that point, the Egyptian delegation found it very difficult to pass on the merits and the justification of the British complaint. To do so, it would be necessary to conduct an investigation to

determine the responsibility, as proposed in the Greek draft resolution (A/C.1/L.170).

14. Regarding the issue of the competence of the United Nations with respect to the Cyprus question, Mr. Loutfi recalled that he had always supported the inclusion of the issue in the agenda of the General Assembly. Indeed, by refusing to the Cypriots the opportunity to exercise their right of self-determination, as laid down in the Charter and as solemnly restated in numerous United Nations resolutions, the United Kingdom Government had not adhered to the provisions of the Charter. Concerning the question of human rights, including the right of self-determination, the General Assembly had always declared itself competent in view of its conviction that those rights could no longer be considered matters falling essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a State if their violation affected friendly relations among Member States. Precedents in that connexion included decisions taken by the United Nations regarding the questions of Indonesia, West Irian (West New Guinea), Tunisia and Morocco and the questions relating to the Union of South Africa. Moreover, Articles 10 and 14 of the Charter corroborated that view.

15. The current situation in Cyprus was such as to impair friendly relations between Member States, and consequently the United Nations was competent to make recommendations on the situation. Those who supported the view that Cyprus was part of the United Kingdom were in fact arguing that no colony could achieve its independence by claiming its right to self-determination.

16. The recommendation contained in the Greek draft resolution (A/C.1/L.168) appeared to be of a moderate character since its operative part expressed only the wish that the Cypriots be given the opportunity to determine their own future by the application of their right to self-determination, a wish which was in complete accordance with the Charter.

17. He noted that the representative of Greece had explicitly stated (847th meeting) that annexation was not involved. The Cypriots were free, and free to be independent. In that connexion, he recalled the statement of the representative of Turkey (848th meeting), who had said that Turkey was not opposed to the exercise by the Cypriot people of their right to self-determination.

18. Mr. Loutfi, expressing confidence that the minority question in Cyprus could be easily solved, recalled that the Greek and Turkish Governments had found in the past mutually acceptable settlements on much more complicated issues.

19. The Greek draft resolution (A/C.1/L.165), in its preamble, had rightly noted that an equitable solution of the Cyprus question would contribute to peace and stability in the eastern Mediterranean. The question was of considerable interest to Egypt on account of the strategic position of Cyprus. Recent events had justified the apprehensions of Greece regarding Cyprus. The island had served as a base for the Franco-British invading forces and the bombing of Egyptian territory. There was no doubt that the attack had been carried out without the consent of the Cypriots. It was equally certain that, if Cyprus had had an independent and free government, as Egypt desired, it would have opposed the launching of such an aggression upon Egypt. The use of Cyprus as a strategic base for premeditated and unprovoked aggression in violation of the Charter impaired peace and security in the region.

That was one reason why a satisfactory solution must be found for the problem, the international nature of which could not be disputed.

20. Meanwhile, it should be noted that the draft constitution<sup>1</sup> submitted to the Cypriots, which had been designed to bring about a solution to the Cyprus question and which had been the subject of some negotiations with Archbishop Makarios, had failed to secure the support of the Cypriots themselves, whose consent was a prerequisite for a settlement.

21. In conclusion, he expressed his conviction that a solution to the question might still be reached on the basis of negotiations with the Cypriots, implementation of their right to self-determination and, especially, discontinuance of the policy of force.

22. Mr. QUIROGA GALDO (Bolivia) said that his country was very far from Cyprus and that the interest of his Government in the question was due to the fact that all nations today constituted one great family whose members were intimately linked. Rather than to material interests or purposes, their links were due to their respect for the principles and concepts that proved the fundamental unity of humanity. The interdependence of peoples and nations, which had become the *raison d'être* of the United Nations, had marked the fulfilment of scientific progress which had reduced both time and distance of travel from one country to another. Thus, the earth had become a sounding board for the expression of aspirations and endeavours to satisfy the needs of all peoples. That phenomenon had led his delegation to participate in a debate dealing with the problems of remote peoples, such as the questions of the Middle East, Tunisia, Morocco and West Irian. Indeed, Bolivia believed in the indivisibility of peace and security in the world and was never guided by vested interests or selfish desires.

23. Bolivia felt extremely close and friendly to all parties in the question of Cyprus, and admired them for their outstanding national characteristics. Moreover, his delegation agreed with those who stated that each of the parties had put forth ideas that justified its position but also ideas that were inspired by feelings of political predominance and prestige. The question, however, contained one fact which could not be twisted or changed: that was the desire of the Cypriots for independence and freedom. A second fact was, on the one hand, the existence of a Greek desire, that of *enosis*, shared by the Greek population of the island, and on the other hand, the will of Turkey to maintain the *status quo* of the Turkish minority rather than to place it under Greek domination. A third fact was the decision of the United Kingdom to preserve its right under the Treaty of Lausanne,<sup>2</sup> by virtue of which Cyprus was a British dependency.

24. While his Government was not blind to the motives of the three Governments in their presentation of the problem, it felt that the reasons given by them had to be examined by the United Nations in the light of its Charter. He was referring primarily to the right of self-determination and the principle of non-intervention in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States. Both principles were embodied in American law and well known to the people of the hemisphere.

<sup>1</sup> Lord Radcliffe, *Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), Cmd. 42.

<sup>2</sup> Treaty of Peace between the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Roumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and Turkey, signed at Lausanne on 24 July 1923. League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XXVIII, 1924, pp. 11 ff.

They had been applied with respect to American countries, which therefore insisted on their application to others. He could conceive of no person on the American continent who would deny the importance of that principle, upon which the independence and sovereignty of the American States had been based.

25. The principle of non-intervention, on the other hand, which was essentially an American juridical concept, had prevented America from falling into anarchy and had saved it from the conspiracies of the Holy Alliance and of many foreign Powers.

26. Those two principles were not incompatible, but supplementary, inasmuch as the right to self-determination gave life to the principle of non-intervention.

27. In the light of the foregoing, it was necessary to consider the indisputable desire of the Cypriots to decide on their future; that question, however, was complicated because of the rights of the minority.

28. Regarding the accusation levelled by the United Kingdom against Greece with respect to the support given by Greece to the Cypriot rebellion (A/3204 and Add.1), his delegation, without denying or affirming the veracity of such an accusation, felt that the characteristics of the rebellion were such that external support would not in any way alter the fact that such a rebellion existed. That did not mean that his delegation would not censure any Greek intervention in the Cypriot rebellion if that fact were proven. However, an analysis of the military situation in Cyprus, where a strong and large army was confronted by a few thousand rebels, supported his viewpoint. The Cypriot rebels carried out guerrilla warfare tactics which sometimes assumed the form of terrorism, which had characterized the past struggles for independence in other countries. Warfare in Cyprus meant the existence of a belligerent and determined opposition to the present rule. The rebellion, if continued, could become a focus of agitation and struggle in the strategic zone of the eastern Mediterranean as well as a danger to international peace and security. Therefore, the situation fully justified a study by the United Nations with a view to making recommendations conducive to satisfying the aspirations of the Cypriots as well as safeguarding the interests of Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom, without overlooking the ethnic, political and strategic situation in the island.

29. One main consideration in that regard was to ensure respect for the rights of the Turkish minority. However, the interests of Greece and of the Greek population were as important as those expressed by the Turkish delegation (848th meeting) for the Turkish minority. Moreover, it was inadmissible to consider any efforts by Greece or Turkey to annex Cyprus, if that proved to be a violation of the will of the Cypriot people. Indeed, the most important factor in the situation was the desire of the Cypriots.

30. With regard to the right claimed by the United Kingdom under the Treaty of Lausanne, all that could be done was to recognize the validity of that argument from a juridical point of view. However, it was necessary also to stress that treaties were unchangeable only so long as they respected and reflected a living political reality. Treaties aged with the passing of time and with the change of circumstances. They became obsolete at times, and their revision became imperative in order to eliminate situations of injustice that might endanger international peace. Such treaties had to be revised or replaced by other international instruments that would truly reflect the new reality. Although the Lausanne Treaty might have been excellent at some time, it was

no longer so, and the duty of the Organization was to help to replace that obsolete instrument.

31. Regarding the draft resolutions before the Committee, he believed that the first Greek draft (A/C.1/L.168) warranted his support, since it mentioned the need to give the Cypriots the opportunity to determine their own future by the application of their right to self-determination. However, his delegation felt that it was drafted in such a way that it did not provide the most adequate way of achieving the end that the Committee should endeavour to achieve, namely the renewal of the interrupted negotiations between the United Kingdom and the representatives of the insurrection.

32. His delegation could see no advantage in the adoption of the other two draft resolutions (A/C.1/L.169 and A/C.1/L.170). It felt the necessity for achieving a moderately drafted, compromise solution which would lead to a renewal of negotiations and the achievement of a peace settlement. The Committee should act in the same way it had acted in the case of Algeria and should implicitly set forth the idea that the General Assembly trusted the good will and the common sense of the parties to solve the problem in the light of the fundamental principle of self-determination. His delegation would find it impossible to support any draft resolution which said anything else, but would support any draft that contained that idea. He believed that the draft resolution that would be adopted on the question of Cyprus would, like the resolution regarding Algeria (General Assembly resolution 1012 (XI)), consist of recommendations which tacitly gave the parties a time limit of six months to inform the General Assembly of the results obtained. If one of the parties were to accept such compromise solutions with mental reservations, intending to gain time to continue repressions, the result would be harmful. If either party continued its activities of oppression and rebellion, the consequences for the guilty party would be dire, since the General Assembly would at its twelfth session consider the fact of violations of its recommendations. At any rate, mental reservations, no matter how fitting they might appear, were incapable of stopping the process of the liberation of peoples.

33. Mr. MAHGOUB (Sudan) stated that his country was pledged to the cause of freedom in every country. His main concern regarding Cyprus was that it should be liberated and that the just and legitimate aspirations of the Cypriots should be given full recognition.

34. Referring to the recent history of the island, he observed that the Lausanne Treaty had been concluded between the triumphant and the defeated in the First World War and therefore did not result from the free volition which was essential to any treaty. Moreover, the Cypriots had not been a party to the Lausanne Treaty and therefore were not bound by it. They were not chattels to be exchanged by conquerors without being accorded the right to regain their freedom.

35. The Greek Government, basing its position on the fact that the majority of the inhabitants of Cyprus were Greek, had brought the question before the General Assembly (A/3120 and Add.1), but had not claimed any right to annex Cyprus. Likewise, the Turkish Government, relying on its historical occupation of Cyprus and on the large Turkish minority on the island, had made itself a party to the dispute, however, also not asserting any right to annex the island. He felt that, given the right of self-determination, the Cypriots would not choose to be annexed to Greece or Turkey, but

would choose to remain an independent country, united in harmony as a homogenous nation.

36. Regarding the question of domestic jurisdiction, he believed that it was often cited improperly, particularly in the case of possessions or colonies. If under Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter it had been the intention to debar the United Nations from discussing any question of subject peoples who aspired to and were denied independence, then the Organization would have set itself up as a protector of colonialism and imperialism. The drafters of the Charter had clearly indicated that the right of self-determination must be granted to all peoples, which included colonial peoples, peoples who had been under foreign rule. Indeed, the right of self-determination was meant for subject peoples alone, since it could not have been meant for sections of an independent country. He would refer, in that connexion, to Article 73 of the Charter, which supported his view.

37. Every country which dominated another people had a dual mandate: towards subject peoples on the one hand, and towards world public opinion on the other. The United Kingdom was the foremost proponent of that theory, since it had been originated in Africa by Lord Lugard, former Governor-General of Nigeria. In accordance with that theory, the United Kingdom had done its best to act not only to the satisfaction of the people concerned, but also to the satisfaction of the world. It had granted the people the rights of self-government and self-determination as soon as they attained an adequate level of political maturity.

38. The jurisdiction of the United Nations in questions regarding the political aspirations of subject peoples must be established conclusively. It was necessary to confine the concept of domestic jurisdiction within the national limits of a State and not apply it to the dependencies ruled by that State. Any other interpretation would preclude the liquidation of colonial possessions and the granting of fundamental rights, such as the right of self-determination, to their inhabitants.

39. While his delegation considered the main issue to be the liberation of the Cypriots from foreign domination, it was aware of the difficulty of the majority and minority problems involved. It was necessary to remove any shadow of reasonable doubt which might be felt by the minority by according to it all opportunities and safeguards to develop and to participate in national affairs. That should include the political, social, economic and religious aspects of their lives as a separate ethnic group, and in that respect the minority should have the support and protection of the majority. If, upon attaining their independence and establishing a democracy, the Cypriots acted in that spirit, there would be no fear on the part of the Turkish minority. Indeed, the right of self-determination was not without its difficulties, as well as its defects. It would, however, not be logical to disregard the rights of the majority for the sake of the minority, as it would be equally unjust to do the opposite.

40. Any delay, on whatever grounds, in granting the right of self-determination could not be tolerated by the people concerned. On the other hand, terrorism and violence were expressions which he did not approve of, since he believed that independence and self-determination could be achieved peacefully. While he regretted the current acts of violence in Cyprus, he equally regretted their causes.

41. There had been accusations on both sides and suffering in all communities, and it was difficult to

ascertain where justice lay. The main concern of the United Nations was to remove the political causes which had led to such suffering and to use its good offices with a view to effect a wise and just solution without giving preference to the rights of the majority or the minority. While he sympathized with both sections of the Cypriot population, whose division might be attributed to the policy of divide and rule, he believed that their interests demanded that they should come to an understanding with each other and that the foreign influences, now working as a divisive factor, should cast aside all self-interest and help in removing the obstacles to a solution instead of creating new ones.

42. He had no intention of going into the details of the history of Cyprus, but it had been the British themselves who had encouraged the Cypriots to unite with Greece. In support of his contention he quoted statements by William Gladstone, Winston Churchill, and David Lloyd George. But union with Greece did not suit the British fancy today. The fact that Cyprus had never belonged to Greece was not relevant to evaluating the wishes of the Cypriots to associate themselves with Greece. The British were clever administrators, and they always set self-determination as their main target in their colonies. Furthermore, the British always realized the psychological moment for granting self-government. He hoped that Cyprus would not be an exception and that Britain would maintain its record of granting self-determination or independence. His delegation did not see why Cyprus could not exercise now its right to self-determination.

43. He was sure that the United Kingdom was sacrificing the moral and legal right of self-determination for strategic considerations. The fact that Cyprus had been used as a base for the aggression against Egypt was a further reason for the United Nations to intervene in order to see that the people of Cyprus obtained their independence and to prevent the future use of Cyprus as a stepping-stone for aggression. The best way to accomplish that aim would be the complete neutralization of Cyprus: it should neither be linked with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nor with the Baghdad Pact. The concern of the Cypriots was freedom first—they were not interested in a regional organization or the conflicting policies of the Powers. The intervention of Greece and Turkey complicated the matter. The main dispute should have been confined to the United Kingdom and to the two communities in Cyprus. Negotiations between the British and the Cypriot representatives should never have been broken off. The deportation of Archbishop Makarios had led to more bloodshed and violence. Efforts should be made to find a workable formula which would allay all the doubts and apprehensions of neighbouring countries in order that independent, neutralized Cyprus could live in harmony with all its neighbours.

44. Mr. ILLUECA (Panama) expressed the hope that some just and satisfactory solution could be reached on the question of Cyprus. For many reasons the question would be studied with the greatest of care, as it affected the interests of friendly nations. In his opinion, it was basically a problem concerning a people living in a Non-Self-Governing Territory, Cyprus. In document ST/TRI/B 1956/9, among others, there could be found the summarized information submitted by the United Kingdom to the Secretary-General in 1956 in accordance with Article 73 *e* of the Charter. That document gave statistical information, as well as information of other character, on the state of the Cypriot people. He re-

viewed the Charter provisions, particularly Articles 73 and 74 of Chapter XI, relating to Non-Self-Governing Territories such as Cyprus.

45. Mr. Illueca then submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.171) under the operative part of which the General Assembly would, first, establish a committee composed of five Member States to investigate the situation, report to the General Assembly at its twelfth session upon the results of its work, and make appropriate recommendations; secondly, request the Governments of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey to give all the necessary help and facilities to the Committee for the execution of its tasks; and thirdly, request the Secretary-General to provide the Committee with the necessary staff and facilities for the discharge of its functions. The delegation of Panama felt that that draft would be conducive to a peaceful and conciliatory solution to the problem.

46. Mr. BOLAND (Ireland) expressed the view that the case of Cyprus was a tragic one, though not, perhaps, the most difficult to solve. The Greeks of Cyprus were ready to suffer and to die in order to unite with Greece. All those nations represented in the United Nations who traced the origins of their culture to the Hellenic world ought to sympathize with the Greeks of Cyprus.

47. The Treaty of Lausanne might have transferred sovereignty over Cyprus from Turkey to Great Britain, but the people of Cyprus had never been asked their wishes about Turkish rule any more than about British rule. That was why the people of Cyprus do not feel morally bound by those arrangements. The desire of the Cypriots to unite with Greece was understandable as it was based on race, religion, language and culture. No purpose was served by expatiating on atrocities committed by either side. An authority not based on the consent of the governed sooner or later came to be regarded as morally void. Although the struggle in Cyprus was grim, the situation presented certain features which gave ground for hope of a peaceful solution, notably the moderate attitude of the Greek Government and the broad and generous movement of public opinion in the United Kingdom itself in favour of the Cypriot claim. And the most encouraging feature of all was the willingness of the United Kingdom Government to concede the principle of self-determination for Cyprus.

48. But the difficulty was that the United Kingdom Government had not yet found itself able to announce a date by which the people of Cyprus could determine their destiny. His delegation could understand British insistence that any settlement in Cyprus should be one that would not weaken the defence of the free world. The example of Hungary indicated that if the USSR succeeded in extending its power throughout Europe, there would be no Cypriot liberty. But the offer of Greece to make a permanent base for NATO on the island in case of its union with Greece seemed to provide the foundation for a settlement far more secure than the present system.

49. The second difficulty was the existence of the Turkish minority, which was cited as an obstacle to the exercise of the right of self-determination by the people of Cyprus. Mr. Boland recalled that, during his country's struggle for freedom, certain British politicians had succeeded in stirring up similar trouble by inflaming the Protestant minority in the northern part of Ireland and thus destroying the prospects of a settlement for the time being. It seemed that the Turkish minority now feared for its security under Greek rule. His delega-

tion felt that those fears were illusory for it seemed that the Greek majority was willing to give any necessary guarantees for the continued security and welfare of the minority and to have those guarantees enforced by an international authority, such as NATO.

50. He felt that the basic conditions for a settlement in Cyprus which would satisfy the legitimate claims of Turks and Greeks alike as well as the needs of Western defence were within reach. He hoped that the fatal expedient of partition would not be adopted. Greek Cypriots would feel frustrated of their rights; the minority, on the other hand, behind its new and artificial border would feel permanently insecure, and out of that would arise not moderate statesmen, but bitter men who would intensify distrust; there would inevitably be a trend towards violence along the border lines. Partition would create a permanent bone of contention between Greece and Turkey, and would be a disaster for Cyprus. It would be not a solution, but a political breakdown, he warned. He cited the Bible story of King Solomon and the two women, each of whom claimed to be the mother of a certain child, as a warning that any other solution would be preferable to partition.

51. He hoped that the opinion of the Assembly, made known in reasoned debate and without bitterness, would weigh on the subsequent development of the problem. He hoped too that the words of his delegation might not be in vain and that its warning might be heard and bring some help in settling the problem of Cyprus. The important thing was not resolutions or majorities but that the Members of the General Assembly should seek to evoke that spirit of moderation which alone could achieve a settlement.

52. Mr. HAYMERLE (Australia) spoke of the immense complexity of the problem. But he could not believe any problem was so complex that it could not be solved. He expressed concern that the problem of Cyprus was dividing Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. He praised the political wisdom of their leaders and expressed the confidence of his delegation in their ability to find a peaceful and mutually acceptable solution. He felt that it was premature to enter at the present stage into the merits of the case. The parties themselves should seek conciliation by whatever means they considered appropriate. In accordance with Article 33, paragraph 1 of the Charter, the General Assembly should try to facilitate conciliation by expressing its hope and conviction that a solution in the spirit of the Articles 1 and 2 would be found. He felt that any ambitious action by the First Committee might complicate, rather than ease, matters.

53. Mr. GARIN (Portugal) considered that part (a) of the item constituted interference in the internal jurisdiction of a Member State, and moreover concerned a question which could best be settled by the parties concerned. He would refrain from discussing the first part of the item, since it fell outside the competence of the Organization, and would not deal with the substance of the matter. He expressed the hope that the Committee would carefully consider the implications of the

adoption of any draft resolution. It seemed to his delegation that the attitude of the United Kingdom Government was the best guarantee for a just solution of the question of Cyprus. The Committee must be extremely careful in seeking a solution that would not aggravate the situation. What was at stake was the future of two different racial groups, which must find an appropriate pattern for living together peacefully in a mixed society. Self-determination, if hastily granted, would leave an important part of the population inadequately protected. It would then be self-determination for some at the price of denying self-determination to others. From that he deduced that the question could not be reduced to terms of ideology alone without the risk of causing much injustice and consequent suffering to a substantial part of the population involved. Violence did not solve problems, but rather magnified them in such a way that on occasion it seriously jeopardized the attainment of the desired goal. The creation of a peaceful atmosphere in that troubled area should be the main concern of the world at large and could best be achieved if the Assembly were to recognize that any discussion of the substance of the problem was exclusively a matter for the parties concerned, the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and the two major sections of the population of the island.

54. With regard to part (b) of the item, he pointed out that a population living in an atmosphere of terror was not likely to know its own true desires. Accordingly, terrorism must be concluded at once. He expressed the opinion that, if passion and emotion were encouraged and fanned, there would be little justification in the subsequent excuse that public opinion could not be controlled. He regretted the assistance and help that terrorism in Cyprus was receiving from the outside. His delegation believed that the parties directly concerned should be those mainly responsible for finding a solution bearing in mind their own interests, the strong and ancient ties which linked them, and the great, common danger facing the world. In conclusion, he requested the Greek authorities to advise restraint.

55. Mr. AVEROFF-TOSSIZZA (Greece) in reply to the charges of the representative of the United Kingdom stated that his country continued to maintain that the British Secret Intelligence Service had carried out reprehensible manoeuvres which perhaps should not be discussed in the First Committee, but should be studied by a neutral committee. That study would show who was the victim of false information and who was not.

56. In reply to Mr. Noble's question about why he, knowing of those manoeuvres, had not brought them to the attention of the British Embassy in Athens, he stated that he had not done so because he had felt that the British Embassy had certainly not been aware of them and would not have believed them; consequently it would have been naïve of him to reveal such things to the British Ambassador. His Government continued to believe in the authenticity of the information.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.