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Chairman: Mr. Victor A. BELAUNDE (Peru).

**AGENDA ITEM 55**

**Question of Cyprus (A/3120 and Add.1, A/3204 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.168 to A/C.1/L.170) (*continued*)**

- (a) **Application, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of the Island of Cyprus;**
- (b) **Complaint by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of support from Greece for terrorism in Cyprus**

1. Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom), resuming his statement which had been suspended at the end of the preceding meeting, recalled that he had tried to show that the *enosis* movement had been supported and financed by the Greek Government, in disregard of the welfare of the Cypriot people and of the maintenance of friendly relations between Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

2. It was true that great pressure had been brought to bear on the Greek Government in the matter. However, that could not be pleaded as extenuating circumstances, for a responsible Government should be able to resist such pressure. The United Kingdom Government was therefore entitled to ask the United Nations for redress against the Greek Government, particularly as it had long sought to find a satisfactory solution for the problem of Cyprus.

3. After the war, the United Kingdom Government had made liberal constitutional proposals in regard to Cyprus. The first of those proposals had made some progress, but in 1948 the Communist and Orthodox Church leaders in Cyprus had withdrawn from negotiations. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom had continued its efforts to bring about self-government in Cyprus. The latest proposal, in 1954, unfortunately had not received the welcome that might have been hoped for.

4. Despite those difficulties, the United Kingdom Government had taken measures to improve living conditions in Cyprus to a point well above the average for the eastern Mediterranean region. The fact that in

recent years many Cypriots had emigrated to the United Kingdom or to the Commonwealth countries, while none had emigrated to Greece, was significant.

5. At its ninth session the General Assembly of the United Nations had decided (resolution 814 (IX)) not to consider further the item which Greece had proposed for inclusion in the agenda, and at its tenth session (521st meeting) had decided not to include the question of Cyprus in the agenda. In the summer of 1955, the United Kingdom Government had invited the Turkish and Greek Governments to a tripartite conference in London,<sup>1</sup> during which it had proposed a system of self-government for Cyprus and the establishment of a tripartite control committee. When that proposal had been rejected, the United Kingdom Government had tried to reach an agreement with Archbishop Makarios and the Turkish leaders in Cyprus. Unfortunately, the negotiations had failed owing to the intransigence of Archbishop Makarios, who had refused to denounce terrorism and who, as certain documents proved, had supported the EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) and provided it with funds for the purchase of explosives. Furthermore, it should be noted that it was he who finally ordered Grivas to begin his campaign of terrorism. In those circumstances, his removal from Cyprus could not fail to contribute to the restoration of law and order in the Territory.

6. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom Government had continued its efforts to reach a solution. On 6 July 1956, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers had stated that they welcomed the unceasing efforts of the United Kingdom Government to find a solution acceptable to all concerned. Lord Radcliffe, after a careful study of the situation, had submitted a new constitutional plan for Cyprus,<sup>2</sup> which had charted a middle course in order to reconcile the conflicting interests involved.

7. On the basis of that plan, the United Kingdom had again tried to enter into contact with the Greek and Turkish Governments. The British Secretary of State for the Colonies had gone to Athens and Ankara in order to state his Government's wish to give Cyprus self-government at the earliest possible moment. He had also informed the Greek and Turkish Governments of the United Kingdom Government's intention to reach a final solution based on the self-determination of the Greek and Turkish communities, when international and local conditions permitted.

8. Before the publication of Lord Radcliffe's report, Radio Athens had abused him personally and had urged the Cypriots to reject all constitutions. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom Government had hoped that the Greek Government would consider the new proposals with the care they deserved and that it would not place

<sup>1</sup> Conference on Eastern Mediterranean problems and the Cyprus question, held at London from 29 August to 7 September 1955, between Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

<sup>2</sup> Lord Radcliffe, *Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), Cmd. 42.

obstacles in the way of their implementation. Unfortunately, less than twenty-four hours after Mr. Lennox-Boyd, United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies, had transmitted Lord Radcliffe's report to the Greek Government, that Government had rejected it. That rejection without any consultation of the Cypriot people and the Greek Government's effort, through Radio Athens, to influence public opinion in Cyprus against those proposals was, to say the least, a strange act on the part of a Government which proclaimed its support of the principle of self-determination of peoples.

9. The purpose of the British proposals was, on the one hand, to entrust all powers, except those of foreign affairs, defence and internal security, to an elected assembly and, on the other hand, to ensure that the powers of the majority community in Cyprus would not be used to the prejudice of the minority. It had been provided that the executive power would be in the hands of a cabinet responsible to the popular assembly. The British Governor would have retained competence in foreign affairs, defence and internal security. A joint council, presided over by the Governor, would have considered questions which could not be immediately determined as falling under one of the two fields of power. It was obvious that, with goodwill, agreement could easily have been reached on all the problems. The Turkish Cypriots would have had a proportion of seats guaranteed to them in the legislative assembly and a cabinet member to protect their interests. Moreover, freedom of religion and education and freedom from discrimination between the two communities would have been guaranteed by a supreme court and by a tribunal of guarantees. The proposals had likewise provided for an independent judiciary and a civil service appointed by an independent commission. The United Kingdom would have financed a system of education for the two communities, without racial distinction.

10. The Greek Government had objected that the United Kingdom proposals did not provide for the exercise of self-determination. That could not have been otherwise, since Lord Radcliffe's proposal had been for a system of self-government under the British Crown. But that proposal had not been intended to prejudice the ultimate future of the island. Mr. Lennox-Boyd had stated in the House of Commons on 19 December 1956 that the United Kingdom Government had recognized the principle of self-determination in regard to Cyprus and would review the question of its application when the international and strategic situation permitted, and provided that self-government was working satisfactorily. The United Kingdom Government would then seek to ensure that both communities might have the opportunity of deciding their future status.

11. The Greek Government had also asserted that the Radcliffe proposals gave the Governor unlimited powers. That criticism was hardly justifiable, as the Governor's powers had been carefully defined; in the field of self-government, he had no more power than a constitutional ruler. It was obvious that constitutional rule depended basically on good faith between the different organs of government. However, the criticism made by the Greek Government seemed to imply that that good faith would be absent. If the Greek Government had had doubts concerning the value of the Radcliffe report, it could have put them forward at any time, with a view to reaching an acceptable solution.

12. The Turkish Government, on the other hand, had considered the proposals with the care they deserved,

and had discussed them with the United Kingdom Government.

13. The United Kingdom Government would continue to search for a solution of the problem. However, such a solution would not be found so long as Greece supported the *enosis* movement and prevented the Cypriot people from expressing their opinions freely. If Greece would face its responsibilities, some solution could be found, but while the terrorist campaign continued, relations between the two communities, as well as relations between Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, would be subjected to a dangerous strain. In order to prevent the situation from deteriorating further, the United Kingdom appealed to the First Committee to call upon the Greek Government to desist from supporting the campaign of terrorism and intimidation in Cyprus.

14. Mr. SARPER (Turkey) said that world attention was centred on several vital problems concerning the general area of the Middle East and that goodwill, common sense and a determination to foster peaceful relations in the region should dominate the minds of statesmen. His delegation felt reluctance and sorrow in being compelled to state the facts and expose the truth concerning the artificially created question of Cyprus. It was obvious that only the forces which were seeking to promote their own selfish interests by creating hatred and dissension among the peoples of the region could feel happy at the fact that Greece had been placed in the position of having to make a claim for the annexation of Cyprus in which the United Kingdom and Turkey could not concur.

15. The question of Cyprus had been created by the wish of a small majority of Greek-speaking Cypriots—living on an island off the shores of Turkey, 700 miles away from Greece—to hand over to Greece the control of the entire region, strategically, economically and from the point of view of communications. That desire for annexation ignored the political realities of the region, brushed aside the policies of friendship and co-operation between Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, and violated international treaties that had been freely negotiated and signed.

16. On 15 November 1956, he had made a statement before the General Assembly (578th plenary meeting) to the effect that the United Nations was not competent to intervene in such affairs concerning Cyprus as were essentially a matter of domestic jurisdiction, or to modify, or attempt to modify, the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne.<sup>3</sup> Under that Treaty, there was no possibility for Greece to acquire sovereignty over Cyprus. It was true that the United Nations had a very considerable jurisdiction in international affairs, but there were certain reservations concerning its competence, and respect for international treaties was one. Consequently, his delegation would continue to oppose United Nations intervention in the question of the annexation of Cyprus to Greece by direct or indirect means.

17. At the ninth session, the General Assembly had decided not to consider further the question of self-determination for Cyprus (resolution 814 (IX)). At the tenth session, the Assembly had decided (521st plenary meeting) not to include the item on its agenda. It might have been hoped that that attitude of the General

<sup>3</sup> Treaty of Peace between the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Roumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and Turkey, signed at Lausanne on 24 July 1923. League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XXVIII, 1924, pp. 11 ff.

Assembly would have induced the supporters of *enosis* to moderate their activities, but unfortunately that had not been the case. Now, for the third time, Greece had requested that the United Nations should consider the question of the annexation of Cyprus. He felt it necessary to state the facts and dispel the confusion which had been created around that claim for annexation, since an abuse of lofty principles—such as the right of self-determination—to cloak selfish designs would do harm to the principles themselves as well as to the work of the United Nations.

18. In the explanatory memorandum attached to the Greek request (A/3120/Add.1), the word “colonial” and the term “self-determination” appeared several times, obviously in an attempt to show that the interest of the Greek Government in Cyprus lay in its eagerness to fight colonialism and seek the further application of the principle of self-determination. However, the agitation organized in Greece over Cyprus had nothing to do with “anti-colonialism” or “the principle of self-determination” but was aimed solely at the territorial aggrandizement of Greece. The truth of that statement would appear from an examination of the juridical status of Cyprus and the attitude of the Greek Government in connexion with that status.

19. The Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923, had put an end to a period of war and bloodshed between Greece and Turkey. In that Treaty, Turkey had made great concessions and sacrifices for the purpose of establishing harmonious, peaceful and friendly relations in the region. Western Thrace and the Aegean Islands were ceded to Greece. As a result of that Treaty, there had been a considerable exchange of population between the two countries. Cyprus, which had been under Turkish sovereignty for 352 years up to the signing of the Treaty, had been excluded from the exchange of population, because, under the Treaty, sovereignty over it had been transferred to the United Kingdom. As a result, the Greek Cypriots had remained in a territory forming a geographic and strategic part of the Turkish mainland when both Turkish and Greek populations in the rest of the area had been exchanged to increase the ethnic homogeneity within the geographical and political boundaries of the two States.

20. Under article 20 of the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey had ceded sovereignty over Cyprus to the United Kingdom. Under article 21, the Cypriots could opt for either British or Turkish citizenship. The last paragraph of that article allowed the exclusion from British citizenship of those Cypriots who, before the transfer of sovereignty, had acquired Greek citizenship. It was thus clear that Turkey had ceded the sovereignty over Cyprus to the United Kingdom, specifically to that country and under specific conditions. Moreover, the cession had been made on the basis of acceptance of a proclamation made by the United Kingdom on 5 November 1914. On that date, the British Government had proclaimed that Cyprus was to be annexed to, and thereafter form part of, the British dominions.<sup>4</sup>

21. At the ninth session of the General Assembly, the representative of Greece had suggested that the cession of sovereignty over Cyprus to the United Kingdom by Turkey, by virtue of article 20 of the Treaty of Lausanne, had been a matter between Turkey and the United Kingdom and did not imply Greek acceptance

(750th meeting). However, the preamble and the Final Act of the Treaty of Lausanne left absolutely no doubt of the fact that all the stipulations had been accepted by all the signatories, including Greece. Further, if Greece considered that article 20 was not valid, it would as a result be obliged to admit that Cyprus was still under Turkish sovereignty. In either case, Greece had no right to make a claim for the annexation of Cyprus.

22. It had recently been claimed that the Convention of 1878,<sup>5</sup> under which Turkey had ceded to Great Britain the administration of Cyprus, while retaining sovereignty over the island, had been conditional, and that, the conditions not having been fulfilled either by Great Britain or Turkey, it was not valid. Taking that argument at its face value, it was obvious that, if that cession had not been valid, Cyprus would still be an integral part of Turkey and Greece could still have no claim over it whatsoever.

23. Although the juridical status of Cyprus was covered by articles 20 and 21 of the Treaty of Lausanne, the Greek Government had made reference to article 16 of that Treaty, under which Turkey renounced all rights over the territories and islands situated outside its frontiers, in an attempt to prove that Turkey had renounced all rights over Cyprus and that therefore it could not be regarded as a “party concerned”. It also alleged that Greece was a “party concerned” within the meaning of article 16.

24. In the first place, it should be pointed out that the original draft of article 16, providing for the recognition by Turkey of dispositions which had been or might be made concerning the attribution or independence of certain territories and islands, had been rejected by Turkey. Those territories and islands had been detached from the Ottoman Empire one or two years before the Lausanne Conference, and their status had not been specifically settled in the Treaty. Cyprus had not been among those territories, as its status had been settled by articles 20 and 21 of the Treaty. In addition, article 16 provided that the status of the territories and islands in question was to be settled by the parties concerned. The parties concerned in the settlement of the status of Cyprus were Turkey and the United Kingdom, just as, in the articles relating to the cession of Turkish territory to Greece, the parties concerned had been Greece and Turkey, and in the article concerning the Dodecanese, the parties concerned had been Turkey and Italy. It was therefore clear that the term “parties concerned” with regard to the status of Cyprus undeniably denoted Turkey and the United Kingdom, and no other State, within the meaning of the Treaty of Lausanne.

25. During the Lausanne Conference, Greece had made no reservations on the status of Cyprus but had accepted it unconditionally. In 1931, the Greek Prime Minister, Eleutherios Venizelos, had reiterated the position of his Government with regard to Cyprus. The attitude of the Greek Government had not changed until long after the Second World War. In 1946, for instance, the Greek Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Dragoumis, had made in London a public statement of his Government’s territorial claims in which four territories had been mentioned, but Cyprus had not been included.

26. It was true that throughout that region, minor groups of individuals had, for more than a century,

<sup>4</sup> Order in Council relative to the Annexation of the Island of Cyprus to His Majesty’s Dominions, London, 5 November 1914. See *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CVIII (1914) (Part II), pp. 165 ff.

<sup>5</sup> Convention of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and Turkey, signed at Constantinople on 4 June 1878. See *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 69 (1877-1878), pp. 744 ff.

been theorizing, on the pretext of nationalism, about claiming parts of territories. Those claims, however, had been purely platonic, and friendly relations had been maintained between the nations concerned. Cyprus had been no exception to that general pattern. Greek-speaking Cypriots, especially members of the Cypriot Orthodox Church, had expressed themselves in favour of the annexation of Cyprus by Greece, while Cypriot Turks had expressed the desire that Cyprus should be returned to Turkey. However, in the absence of propaganda, terrorism and agitation supported from the outside, those movements had not prevented the Cypriots from living in peace.

27. The turning point had come in 1948-1951, with the victory of the Greek people over the Communist insurrection in their country and the accession of Greece to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Then the extreme left, as a counteroffensive against the blows which it had received had for the first time espoused the cause of *enosis*, or union with Greece. All attempts at constitutional reform in Cyprus had been turned down by the extremists of the left and the right. A press campaign had been started and organizations created to promote the annexation of Cyprus by Greece. Recently, nearly all those organizations had replaced the word "*enosis*" in their titles by the term "self-determination". Thus, the Pan-Hellenic Committee for the Union of Cyprus with Greece, under the chairmanship of Archbishop Spyridon of Athens, had been changed to the Pan-Hellenic Committee for Self-Determination in Cyprus. The idea of linking up the demand for the annexation of Cyprus with the principle of self-determination was a recent one. It had been adopted for reasons of expediency in the United Nations and only after a strong minority of annexationists had gained the upper hand in Cyprus.

28. It was on 15 February 1951 that the Greek Government had for the first time officially proclaimed its desire to unite Cyprus with Greece. Later, in seeking the support of the Members of the United Nations, the Greek Government had continued to present its claims in terms of annexation. The principle of self-determination had been added only for reasons of political opportunism. In fact, Archbishop Makarios had stated that the principle had become the rallying-cry of the Greek Cypriots, adding that although the tactics had changed, the aim of union with Greece remained unchanged. Another Cypriot prelate had said that the danger of the British offer of self-government was that it would dampen the ardour of the Greek Cypriots in demanding union with Greece. It was therefore evident that any act of self-determination which would have enabled the inhabitants of Cyprus to express their opinion freely in opposition to annexation had been discarded as dangerous. The tactical change had been so rapid that when, in 1954, the Greek Government had asked the United Nations to intervene, its explanatory memorandum (A/2703) had used the expressions "union with Greece" and "self-determination" interchangeably.

29. Thus the Greek Government claimed that Cyprus belonged to Greece. However, geographic, ethnic, historical and juridical facts and figures disproved that contention. Geographically Cyprus was an off-shore island of Turkey, a part of Asia Minor lying forty-three miles off the coast of Turkey and 683 miles from Greece. Historically, from the remotest periods down to 1923, the island had always belonged to the Powers that ruled over Asia Minor. Cyprus had never belonged

to Greece, either modern or ancient. During the period of Greek colonization of the Mediterranean area, there had been some minor Greek settlements on Cyprus, but nevertheless, the island had belonged successively to the Assyrian, Persian, Arab and Eastern Roman Empires as long as those Empires had ruled over Asia Minor. The kingdoms established in the area by the Crusaders had also extended to Cyprus. The supporters of *enosis* claimed that the Eastern Roman Empire, also called the Byzantine Empire, was Greek and that Cyprus therefore belonged to Greece. That was a singular argument, to say the least, since the Greeks were only one among the many peoples under the domination of the Eastern Roman Empire. Moreover, in the administrative subdivision of the Eastern Roman Empire, Greece had been placed in one province and Cyprus in another along with the territories of Asia Minor. The strategic importance of Cyprus in the defence of Asia Minor had always been recognized and for that reason they had always been connected.

30. From 1571 to 1923, Cyprus had been an integral part of Turkey. In 1878, in the framework of a defensive alliance against Russia, Turkey had turned the administration of the island over to Great Britain, along with the right to erect military bases there, but had retained sovereignty over it until 1923. In that manner, Asia Minor's defence requirements had been safeguarded.

31. Today still, Cyprus was of primary importance to the defence of Turkey, which had only two open areas of communication with the rest of the world. If the country which held all the islands to the west of Turkey should also extend its authority to Cyprus, which controlled the routes of communication to the south, that country would encircle Turkey. It was obvious that no country could allow itself to be so completely encircled and to leave its entire security at the mercy of another country, no matter how great a friend or ally.

32. Regarding the population of Cyprus, specialists agreed that it had varied considerably throughout history. Of its present 500,000 inhabitants, 100,000 were Turkish in origin and about 386,000 belonged to the Greek Orthodox faith and spoke a Greek dialect which incorporated a large number of non-Greek words. The Greek Orthodox population of Cyprus had no racial connexion with Greece. It was universally recognized, even by the supporters of *enosis*, that the predominance of the Greek Orthodox faith was a direct result of the Turkish administration of Cyprus for more than three centuries. Under the rule of the descendants of the Crusaders, the Orthodox religion had been suppressed and instruction had been given in Latin or Italian. The Turkish administration had restored the Orthodox faith and reopened the churches, which had been closed for four centuries. Thus, the religion and language of the Greek-speaking Cypriots had been preserved not because of efforts made by Greece, which had never ruled over Cyprus, but because of the liberal Turkish administration.

33. Although the Greek-speaking Cypriot population constituted a majority at the present time, that had not always been the case. During the eighteenth century reliable authorities had pointed out that the Turks had been in the majority. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the difference in numbers between the two communities had been very slight, despite large-scale emigration to Turkey following the treaties of 1878 and 1923. At present, there were 300,000 descendants of Cypriots in Turkey.

34. There were over 100,000 Turks living in Cyprus: most of them were farmers and they owned 42 per cent of the land. In addition, there were Turkish religious foundations estimated in value at \$28 million—a considerable sum for the island.

35. The question of Cyprus should also be considered in the context of the applicability of the right of peoples to self-determination. It had already been shown that what Greece wanted, in reality, was nothing less than the annexation of Cyprus for its own benefit and in contradiction to the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty. The history of the Turkish people was evidence of the high value they placed on the principle of self-determination. But whatever the opinion held about that basic principle, it was certainly not applicable to the Greek claim on Cyprus.

36. It was not the independence of a nation which was being claimed, but the revision of frontiers established by an international treaty freely negotiated and signed by the parties concerned. The principle of self-determination was not the only criterion on which frontiers could be delimited: historical, geographical, strategic and economic factors were also involved, as well as the stipulations of existing treaties. If self-determination were an overriding principle for the exact tracing of frontiers, asserting itself over and above all other considerations—such as geographic, strategic unity, economic and historical reality as well as the pledge of nations consecrated in international treaties—we wondered how Hitler's actions in the Sudetenland and Danzig, which had been the causes of the Second World War, could be condemned. Moreover, the wishes of the people of the Aaland Islands, where the Swedish population had voted by a majority of 90 per cent for union with Sweden, had not been granted by the League of Nations, which had recognized Finnish sovereignty on the strength of geographic and strategic considerations.<sup>6</sup>

37. Again, there were precedents in international law which set limits on a people's right to exercise the right of self-determination in order to unite with other countries. Austria, for example, had voluntarily undertaken never to form a union with Germany, and that was confirmed by the Austrian State Treaty.

38. In cases where there existed geographic separation, the application of self-determination would be likely to cause further complications. For example, if "majority pockets" which might exist in certain parts of the New World, because of immigration or other causes, should demand their territorial incorporation to other countries, such claims would be hardly admissible in international law.

39. It might be worthwhile to consider the Greek Government's attitude toward the principle of self-determination during the negotiation and signing of the Lausanne Treaty. Among the many concessions which that Treaty required of Turkey, the incorporation of Western Thrace into Greece should be borne in mind. When Greece had made a claim on that territory, which was contiguous to Turkey and had a predominantly Turkish population, Turkey had proposed that a plebiscite should be held, in application of the right of peoples to self-determination. The Greek delegation had opposed such a step, asserting first that the principle of self-determination could not be applied to territories whose fate had been settled by international treaties and secondly, after the Turkish delegation had

pointed out that that was not the case with Western Thrace, that the principle did not constitute the only relevant factor in the solution of questions relating to territories inhabited by populations of different origin.

40. It seemed clear that the arguments put forward by Greece to justify its claim for annexation of Western Thrace were in contradiction to its present claim to Cyprus. In fact, the Greek claim amounted to a request for modifying one provision of the Lausanne Treaty on the basis of a principle the application of which was denied to Turkey in another provision of the same Treaty. Furthermore, the General Assembly could not be seized with one simple provision from among a great number included in a general international settlement and asked to discuss and modify such a provision without considering the general context and the balance which was achieved through the interplay of the various parts of the Treaty.

41. It might also be noted that self-determination as conceived by the partisans of the *enosis* movement had nothing to do with that principle as normally accepted in the democratic countries. The pressure exercised by the Cypriot Orthodox Church dated from before 1947, when the first signs of political violence had occurred. That pressure had taken various forms, including excommunication on political grounds. For example, when the Governor of Cyprus had proposed constitutional reforms, Archbishop Makarios II, before even seeing the proposals, had called upon his religious followers to refuse to discuss them and to demand the union of Cyprus with Greece. Despite his stand, the Consultative Assembly of Cyprus which met that year had decided by 11 votes to 7 to accept the proposed constitutional reforms. The majority vote had consisted of the Turkish votes and four of the Greek negative votes; the seven negative votes had been cast by the leftist party. That had doubtless been the last occasion on which Greek-speaking Cypriots could express their opinion freely.

42. Today the *enosis* movement was the monopoly of a small but militant minority, sustained from the outside, whose only purpose was to make it impossible for any Cypriot to express his free opinion and in that way to establish the very opposite of self-determination. To achieve that end, immoral and unworthy methods had been used—from physical terror and even assassination to religious pressure, including excommunication and hence the refusal of the sacraments. In view of those facts, when the Greek delegation called the deportation of Archbishop Makarios, as it did in its explanatory memorandum of 12 June 1956 (A/3120/Add.1, para. 12 (c)), a heavy blow to the religious heritage of the world, it might be recommended to refer to the views expressed by newspapers like the *Christian World*, which in its issue of 30 August 1956 had commented on the Archbishop's duplicity.

43. The terrorists, under the direction of the Greek Army Colonel Grivas who had entered Cyprus clandestinely, had murdered more Greek Cypriots than Turks and British combined. Although one of the murders had been committed in a monastery and another in a church during a religious service, there had been no protest by the religious authorities.

44. Not only was the terrorist action in itself contemptible, but the very concept of self-determination had been based on false grounds from the outset. The partisans of *enosis* had always conceived the expedient of self-determination together with the use of force in order to intimidate those of their compatriots who did

<sup>6</sup> See League of Nations, *Minutes of the Council, 1921, thirteenth session*, p. 42.

not share their views. Proof of that could be found in the statements made by certain members of the Greek Chamber of Deputies to the effect that if the Cypriot organization obtained from the United Kingdom the right to a form of self-government suitable to its aims, it would be able through the police, the courts, the prisons and the Customs to achieve *enosis* under the cloak of self-determination within two or three years.

45. Another example of that same conception of freedom was furnished by the procedure adopted in the so-called plebiscite of 15 January 1950. The village priests of the Cyprus Orthodox Church had told their parishioners in advance what was expected of them. On the day of the so-called plebiscite two books had been placed in the churches. The voters had been told that if they wanted union with Greece they had to sign one book; if they opposed it, the other. The ceremony of signature had taken place in public. Messengers had been sent to call in those who had not presented themselves. The books had been taken by the Archbishop of Kyrenia to the Chamber of Deputies in Greece, which had then been able to proclaim to all the world that 95 per cent of the Greek Cypriots had voted in favour of union with Greece.

46. He must, however, dwell further on the deplorable subject of terrorism. There was irrefutable evidence of the support it received from Greece. First, the Greek terrorists in Cyprus had killed more Greek Cypriots than Turks and British combined. That proved that the primary aim of the terrorists was to exert pressure on the Cypriots themselves. Secondly, the head of the terrorists, Colonel Grivas, was a regular officer of the Greek Army detached by the previous Greek Government. Thirdly, among the many Greek ships that had secretly smuggled ammunition to Cyprus, at least one, the *Hagios Georgios*, had been acknowledged by the Greek Government, which had called the operation "unofficial action". Fourthly, the government radio stations of Greece were continually encouraging and glorifying acts of terrorism. Fifthly, in Athens and other Greek towns, streets had been named after terrorists convicted of murder. Sixthly, Greek statesmen and government officials had made official statements in praise of violence, instigating and encouraging terrorism in Cyprus.

47. Incidentally, the explanatory memorandum sent by Greece to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and circulated on 13 June 1956 (A/3120/Add.1), also praised violence. It sought to justify terrorism as a response to violence, but that hardly explained the fate met by Greek and Turkish Cypriots who had been murdered simply because their opinions were at variance with those of the Greek annexationists.

48. The memorandum stated that Greece was against the use of violence (para. 9), subject to what might appear to be certain conditions. It was to be hoped that that statement did not imply any attempt to exert pressure on the Members of the United Nations, and his delegation would welcome any other interpretation.

49. Apparently no thought had been given at any time in the dispute to the fate of the over 100,000 Turkish Cypriots who were at present living in Cyprus. No one could deny that it had not been necessary to resort to assassination to make the Turkish Cypriots unanimously determined not to agree to the annexation of Cyprus by Greece. Throughout the history of the terrorism which had reigned and continued to reign in Cyprus, there had not been a single case of a Turk murdering another Turk for his political beliefs or of Turkish

religious officials threatening their followers with excommunication for a political end. Recently, the Greek Government had stated that if Cyprus were annexed to Greece, it would be willing to give guarantees to the Turkish Cypriots. However, as that statement had been made by a Government which had hitherto refused any kind of internal self-government which did not include a loophole for *enosis*, it would imply that any kind of guarantee given by any other Government was unacceptable to Greek Cypriots, while Greek guarantees should be considered satisfactory for the Turkish Cypriots. Furthermore, a campaign of hatred and vilification conducted in Greece against Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish nation in general was not of a nature to build confidence and dispel doubts in the minds of the Turkish Cypriots.

50. That campaign, the sole aim of which was to create and sustain in Greek public opinion hatred for everything Turkish and to turn world opinion against Turkey, was continuing with ever-increasing intensity. It had reached an extreme degree of violence in the Greek newspapers, some of which belonged to members of the Greek Cabinet. Some confined themselves to hurling gross insults at the Turks, while others incited their readers to annex parts of Turkey by conquest and launched undisguised appeals for war.

51. In addition to the campaign of slander, lies and incitement to violence, the Greek newspapers were endeavouring to distort the facts in order to stir up hatred against their neighbour in the minds of their readers.

52. Nor was the Press the only weapon used to encourage hatred. The official government radio station had taken part in the campaign by distorting the news, creating false rumours, and encouraging and glorifying terrorism and bloodshed by other means.

53. The campaign of hatred against the Turkish nation had one particularly tragic aspect—the efforts made to poison the minds of schoolchildren in order to instill and sustain in them implacable national hatred. Schoolbooks in Greece were chosen by the Ministry of Education. After the Treaty of Friendship concluded between Greece and Turkey in 1931, and the signature of the Balkan Pact in 1953, it had been mutually agreed to delete from the schoolbooks passages which might create or foster hatred between the two nations. Turkey had abided by that agreement. Greece, on the other hand, had intensified, rather than otherwise—especially since the emergence of the Cyprus question—a campaign designed to perpetuate hatred in future generations.

54. In the light of such a situation, the anguish felt by the Turkish Cypriots, despite the assurance of protection given them by the Greek Government, was understandable. The incitement to hatred had produced tragic results. Many Turkish Cypriots had been assassinated, and villages had been attacked; Colonel Grivas had ordered an economic and social boycott of the entire Turkish population, threatening Greek Cypriots who did not obey with death.

55. The deeds of certain Greek governmental institutions were also not of a nature to build confidence among the Turkish Cypriots. On 6 June 1956 the Greek Chamber of Deputies had sent a telegram to all the Parliaments of the world stating that the Turkish Cypriots were killing the Greeks on the island and destroying their property with the aim of the complete extermination of the Greek population of the island. A mere glance at the headlines of American newspapers during the weeks which had preceded the sending of

the telegram would be enough to show that, on the contrary, it was the Turkish Cypriots who were being continually attacked and murdered and that not a single Greek was killed or seriously injured during the incidents referred to by the Speaker of the Greek Chamber of Deputies. Such tactics had not been limited to a single isolated case.

56. The Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Averoff-Tossizza, had attempted to explain the campaign in question by taking refuge behind the freedom of the Press. The best comment on that was the case of the newspaper *Astinomika Nea*. When, in its issue of 20 October 1954, it had expressed opposition to the Greek Government's policy, the owners of the newspaper had been sentenced to four months' imprisonment for collusion with foreign Powers.

57. To sum up: First, Greece had no justification whatsoever for making an issue out of a question which it had created artificially. Its claim to annex Cyprus was completely unjustified.

58. Secondly, Turkey's concern over the status of Cyprus was natural and self-evident. It was mainly due to two considerations: in the first place, at present over 100,000 Turks lived on the island, and Turkey could not help but be deeply concerned over their fate; in the second place, there were geographical, historical, political and contractual reasons which made the island's status of vital interest to Turkey. The position of the island off the coast of Anatolia affected the defence and security of Turkish territory.

59. Thirdly, despite those facts the Greeks, who were after all Turkey's allies, had attempted to reverse their positions. In order to curry favour, they had endeavoured to pose on the one hand as the only party interested in the question and on the other hand as the disinterested defenders of the principle of self-determination. Furthermore, they had attempted to exert pressure for a solution in accordance with their wishes by openly organizing and encouraging terrorism in Cyprus and by trying to vilify Turkey in the eyes of world opinion through malicious propaganda. Such activities were not only incompatible with the established norms of friendly relations among nations; they were also in flagrant contradiction to the obligations assumed by Greece under the United Nations Charter.

60. Fourthly, despite those activities carried out by various governments in Greece, Turkey had done its utmost to make the spirit of moderation prevail and to prevent the question from deteriorating to its present tragic state.

61. Fifthly, Turkey was actually the plaintiff. It had complaints to make against terrorist acts; it protested against the campaign of hatred and vilification Greece had launched against Turkey, and it complained against the attitude Greece had taken in contradiction to the moral and contractual obligations it should honour at a time when the world had a greater need than ever for peace.

62. By a false use of the principle of self-determination, the Greek Government laid claim to an island, geographically part of Turkish territory and nearly 700 miles from Greece, on which two different communities lived. That was not defence of the right of peoples to self-determination, but merely a manoeuvre to impose a *diktat*.

63. When Greece had first raised the Cyprus question, Turkey had done its utmost to prevent a possible deterioration of relations between three friendly countries. It was then alleged that Turkey's attitude was a negative one, merely opposing the Greek claims. Whereas actually Turkey's attitude was constructive as it was attempting to preserve the balance which had been established by the Treaty of Lausanne and which formed the basis of very important and valuable alliances between the parties concerned. It was also insinuated that Turkey sympathized with colonialism. Turkish history bore witness to the falsity of that allegation. It was alleged by some that Turkey was interested in Cyprus only in order to render assistance to the United Kingdom. Turkey and the United Kingdom were undoubtedly friends and allies. But a mere glance at the map made it clear that Turkey was interested in Cyprus not by virtue of any friendship or alliance, but rather as a result of geological and geographical phenomena. Lastly, it had been alleged that Turkey was opposed to self-government in Cyprus. Such an allegation was obviously groundless as it would also imply opposition to the progressive development of the 100,000 Turks on the island. What the Turkish Government opposed was that self-government should be used as a stepping-stone for *enosis* and as a manoeuvre to subjugate the Turkish population of the island. As long as terrorism continued to prevail and as long as certain factions on the island were determined to achieve *enosis* at all costs, self-government could not operate in Cyprus, for all possibility of one community dominating the other must first be eliminated.

64. With full awareness of the facts and following closely all developments regarding the situation in Cyprus, Turkey carefully studied any positive proposals. It was in that spirit that the Turkish Government had accepted as a reasonable basis for negotiation the statement made in the House of Commons on 19 December 1956 by Mr. Lennox-Boyd, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies, and also the report of Lord Radcliffe, the constitutional expert. According to Mr. Lennox-Boyd's statement, the application of the principle of self-determination would be reviewed at the proper time when the international and strategic situation permitted, and provided that self-government worked out satisfactorily, and it would take place in such a way that the two opposing communities could each freely decide on its own future status.

65. The application of such a measure to a population which was so clearly divided into two separate communities was in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter and with the general rules of justice and equity, while it took account of the undeniably special circumstances and particularities of Cyprus.

66. The Turkish delegation felt that the General Assembly, within the limits of its competence as defined in the Charter and in conformity with the principles of justice and equity, could make a valuable contribution on the subject, first of all, by requesting Greece to cease supporting terrorism in Cyprus and secondly, by encouraging the resumption of negotiations between the parties directly concerned, with a view to arriving at a rapid and peaceful solution of the question, while refraining from attempting to formulate concrete solu-

tions, which could, in fact, come about only through negotiations by the three countries concerned.

67. Mr. HAYMERLE (Austria), in reply to a remark Mr. Sarper had made with reference to Austria, stated that, the independence and sovereignty of Austria

being an unquestioned fact, the Austrian case could in no way serve as an example to illustrate the question before the Committee.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.