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**Chairman:** Mr. Víctor A. BELAUNDE (Peru).

**AGENDA ITEM 62**

**Question of Algeria (A/3197, A/C.1/L.165,  
A/C.1/L.166) (*continued*)**

1. Mr. UMAÑA BERNAL (Colombia) observed that everything that could be said in the discussion of the question of Algeria had been said, as well as some things that should not have been said. A new atmosphere had prevailed in the General Assembly during the eleventh session, due primarily to the increased membership of the Organization, which had created what might be called a negative balance of power. It seemed improbable that the United Nations would, during the following few years, again be what it had been during its first ten years of existence. Whether that represented advance or retrogression, an assurance that the Organization would be able to fulfil its duties or a danger to such fulfilment, depended, of course, on the General Assembly and on the Members of the United Nations. It depended on the harmony of intentions and purposes in the Assembly and also on the strict observance of the principles of the United Nations Charter. It was gratifying that the Organization was approaching the universality of membership which its founders had intended. The intention had been that new peoples should come to the United Nations and, within the strict framework of the Charter, bring to it new problems and new aspirations.

2. The time at which the question of Algeria had come before the First Committee had not been the most appropriate, in view of the background of what had occurred in the previous months. By that background, he meant the problem of Hungary and of the refusal of a great Power to carry out ten resolutions of the General Assembly, and the problem of Egypt, in connexion with which France and the United Kingdom had given a great example of dignity and fidelity to their historical traditions, and had safeguarded the life of the United Nations. The General Assembly could not ignore that background and must not extend its habit of attempting to deal with questions in isolation. The Assembly must link and try to find joint solutions for all international problems and must submit them all to the same law. Obviously, the law must be applied to all, or be applied to none.

3. Since the question of Algeria had come before the First Committee, it was appropriate that it be discussed in a calm and tolerant atmosphere. Unfortunately, such an atmosphere had not obtained during the whole of the debate; and matters had gone so far that the French

Minister for Foreign Affairs had been asked publicly to fulfil on the international level his commitments as a participant in a national political party.

4. He had felt moved at times by the almost religious, if slightly irrelevant, fervour with which some representatives had spoken of the unity of their peoples. He wondered, however, if it was not appropriate, when others so emphasized where they wanted to be, for the representatives of the Latin American nations to state where they were and preferred to stay. To Latin America, Europe was not a geographical concept nor an association of imperialisms. It represented a civilization and a culture, a tradition under the sign of which the Latin Americans had been born, in which they lived and where they intended to stay. Latin Americans were proud of their own glorious national traditions, but did not want their life to be regarded as having begun only with their acquisition of political independence. They were irrevocably tied to the great currents of occidental culture, which was liberal and Christian. They recognized the right of peoples to self-determination and supported the efforts of peoples to achieve the independent life attained by Latin America a century before. By their very traditions, Latin Americans sought to avoid international demagoguery, the easiest and most dangerous of all demagogues.

5. A fundamental point in the debate was the one embodied in Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. His delegation, and the Latin American delegations generally, had been particularly interested in the discussion of that provision at the United Nations Conference on International Organization, held at San Francisco in 1945, for that provision was directly connected with the principle of non-intervention, a principle which was the cornerstone of international law in America. If that principle had not been included in the Charter, he believed that many countries of Latin America, and probably of the world, would not be represented in the Organization. The inclusion of that principle in the Charter had been essential for its signature and ratification, and the principle must be respected. Domestic matters could not be allowed to be discussed by frequently haphazard groups in the Assembly.

6. His delegation was well aware of the demands of the Algerian people and of how much that people desired independence. It was deeply touched by those matters. Nevertheless, Article 2, paragraph 7, must be taken into account over and above all other considerations. The delay of justice was preferable to the juridical disorder which must follow jeopardy to the principle of non-intervention. The right to self-determination, although the principal right that a people could enjoy, was one among many human rights. It would be very dangerous for the life of the Organization to open the way to the investigation by the United Nations of the application, or determination of the non-fulfilment, of the provisions of the Universal De-

claration of Human Rights in the eighty Member States of the Organization.

7. Article 2, paragraph 7, was crystal clear and could not possibly be misinterpreted. Its inclusion in the Charter had represented a tremendous victory for the materially weaker nations. It was the pivot on which the Algerian question turned. On the basis of the purely juridical stand which his delegation must take, it was obliged to reject any motion or draft resolution which would threaten the application of that provision.

8. There was another danger involved in following the road that had been proposed. The General Assembly had not been established as a kind of international court or as a hall of miracles for curing all the ills of the world. The United Nations had a Charter which Member States had undertaken to carry out in a spirit of goodwill. It would not be in keeping with that spirit if, after having signed the Charter, nations were suddenly to find their domestic jurisdiction threatened.

9. Concerning the eighteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.165), he wished to raise certain questions: Did the joint draft resolution embody such unacceptable elements as the suggestion that the General Assembly could declare that a people should become a nation and even a State, or that the Assembly could declare and recognize that belligerency existed and that one of the belligerents represented a nation? He left those questions to the Committee and to the sponsors of the draft resolution.

10. The problem of the people of Algeria was deeply felt by his country and by Latin America in general. It was to be hoped that some solution could be reached which would in no way undermine the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The best possible solution for the moment was that proposed by France. An election was the democratic, liberal and just solution to that kind of problem and would constitute a realization of one of the ideals of the United Nations. By an election, it could be ascertained what the people of Algeria desired and who spoke for what they desired. The people of Algeria should elect their representatives, who could then consult and discuss with France.

11. The eighteen-Power draft resolution, despite its good intentions, did not set forth that desire and might give rise to new obstacles to a solution. He felt that the solution proposed by France was more constructive and more viable. The French proposal, coming from a great country with a great tradition, demanded the Assembly's faith and confidence and certainly could not be rejected out of hand. If the matter were considered in an atmosphere of greater tranquillity and greater tolerance, he did not think than any members of the Committee could possibly refuse to accept such a proposal.

12. Although he had not had time to study the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.166), he had the impression that, especially in its final paragraph, it raised unanswered questions similar to those he had voiced regarding the eighteen-Power draft resolution.

13. In conclusion, he said that his delegation hoped that the Algerian question would be solved not only in accordance with the right of self-determination of peoples, but also in keeping with the norms and principles of the Charter. Citing the example of France and the United Kingdom as perhaps the first nations in the history of the United Nations to bow freely and completely to the will of the Organization in a matter so vital to their economic and political life as the question

of the Suez Canal, he declared that the debate should be taken as an occasion to administer, not special justice to those countries, but the kind of justice to which, like the rest of the Members of the United Nations, they also had an equal right.

14. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) said that the question of Algeria was admittedly very complex and difficult. However, as many recognized—including to some extent the representative of France—it had been made so by the accumulation of mistakes and the obstinacy of certain circles in France and in Algeria which were interested in an indefinite prolongation of the occupation of Algeria. The great contributions made by France and the French people exercised a continuing effect on the minds of people throughout the world and made it difficult for those who had to express an opinion on a question in which current French policy was in contradiction with the traditions and principles of France. However, it was necessary to express disagreement with the views of the French delegation on the question of Algeria.

15. In his statement (830th and 831st meetings), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France had attempted to demonstrate that the United Nations was not competent to deal with the matter since France had declared that Algeria was an integral part of its territory and that it intended to undertake reforms to settle all outstanding questions. Many had demonstrated that thesis to be incorrect, and in any case the question had been made international by France itself. Not only did the situation in Algeria constitute, if not war itself, at least a real threat of war, but that situation had at least in part caused the war of France against Egypt. In that connexion, he cited a dispatch in *The New York Times* of 30 December 1956 to the effect that a major factor in the aggression had been the desire to overthrow the Egyptian Government in order to attempt to overcome the resistance of the Algerian people.

16. In the circumstances, the United Nations had not only the right but also the duty to deal with the question of Algeria and to make recommendations with a view to its solution. The course proposed by the French delegation would have been valuable had it not been overtaken by events in Algeria and made impracticable by the policy of the French Government. He recalled that on various occasions reforms announced in Algeria had been postponed because of the resistance of colonialist circles. Many possibilities and opportunities had thus been lost. That was not the fault of the present French Government, which had found the Algerian problem at its height. However, it was clear that there was no chance of success for the current efforts of the French Government to settle the problem by solutions which the new dimensions of the Algerian people's war for national liberation had rendered obsolete. Solutions imposed by force could not last very long.

17. While imposing severe restrictions throughout Algeria, the French Government sought to deny the existence of the Algerian people and nation. But at the same time, recognizing the flimsiness of its arguments, the French delegation had launched a full-scale attack on nationalism. In that connexion, he observed that the French, like the other peoples of the world, had never been imperialistic; they had fought for causes which were not their own only because forced to do so by imperialistic groups interested in obtaining monopolistic profits. The inaccuracy of the assertion that nationalism was no longer a sign of progress had been demonstrated by previous speakers. Moreover, it contradicted the

other French assertion that there was no such thing as an Algerian people or an Algerian nation. Indeed, the existence of a people and a nation in Algeria had been recognized by the delegates to the Congress of the French Radical Party in 1956. Thus, according to the organ of the Socialist Party *Le Populaire*, a delegate representing a region of Algeria, in reviewing events in Algeria, had declared that there were no more Berbers or Arabs, there were only Algerians, and that any solution must take account of that. He had also declared that the 15,000 combatants were supported by the quasi-unanimity of the population.

18. Another argument used by the French delegation was the claim that the uprising of the Algerian people against national oppression was the work of a vast Communist conspiracy. It was true that the Algerian Communists considered the national liberation of a colonial and oppressed people as an important step towards the emancipation of men from exploitation and as a sign of progress, and were taking an active part in the struggle. It would be inaccurate, however, to attribute to them all the merit for the existence of those movements of national liberation crowned by success since the Second World War. That powerful movement of the oppressed peoples of Asia and Africa, which had created the necessary conditions for the appearance of many States now Members of the United Nations, and of which the national liberation movement in Algeria was an integral part, could not be stopped by debate in the Committee on the reality and significance of certain facts in the history of Algeria and its occupation by France. The historical arguments of the French delegation could not disguise the existence of a strong national liberation movement in Algeria, the power of which was clearly indicated by the size of the military and police forces deployed.

19. It had been affirmed that Algeria was a poor country requiring outside help and that France was making tremendous financial sacrifices to meet its needs. But the Algerian people did not ask for such sacrifices; they asked only for the right of self-determination. The occupation of Algeria certainly meant great sacrifices in human lives and in money on the part of the French people, who also spent enormous sums to purchase Algerian products at prices higher than those on the world market. The French colonialists were the ones who profited, because all the production in Algeria belonged to them and to those who upheld French colonialism. He wondered whether it would not be more profitable for the French people and their Government to satisfy the legitimate demands of the Algerian people. The Algerian people would certainly do everything necessary, once liberation had been achieved, to safeguard the legitimate interests of the French minority, the greater part of which comprised intellectuals, manual workers and middle-class elements who were not all ill-disposed towards the Algerian national liberation movement. Those people would certainly find appropriate ways and means of adapting themselves to the new situation and would work side by side with the Algerian people in developing Algeria. The examples of Morocco and Tunisia, where there were also large French minorities, supported that view.

20. The danger to peace in the Mediterranean basin which the disturbing situation in Algeria constituted should lead the General Assembly to contribute to a solution of the problem as soon as possible, in conformity with the principles of the Charter, particularly the principle of the self-determination of peoples. The

self-determination and national liberation of the Algerian people would promote international peace, create wide possibilities for the development of the Algerian people, furnish a sound basis for fruitful relations between Algeria and France, and ensure better co-operation between the European minority in Algeria and the Algerian people. There was no possible alternative except a ruthless and endless war.

21. Mr. RAJAN (India), observing that the chairman of his delegation was not in a position to take part in the debate at the present time, reserved the right of his delegation to discuss the item during the consideration of the draft resolutions.

22. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon) said that he would make only a general statement without entering into any of the details already dealt with by others. He would await the comments of the Indian representative on the draft resolutions submitted to the Committee before giving his own. In that connexion, he observed that Lebanon had co-sponsored a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.165) which it strongly supported and urged upon the Committee. However, he emphasized that the Lebanese delegation would be guided by the general expressions of opinion of the members of the Committee. His delegation was exceedingly flexible as to means, provided that the end—which was that the people of Algeria had a natural right to self-determination—was kept steadily in view.

23. The approach of his country and delegation, was that of a country and a delegation eager to see friendship and harmony prevail in the relations among nations. It was the approach of a country firmly convinced that force and repression could bring no durable or equitable solution to political problems. Finally, it was the approach of a country deeply attached to law and order and to the noble principles of the Charter.

24. Thus, his delegation had welcomed the decision of the General Assembly to include the question of Algeria in its agenda (654th plenary meeting). That decision could only add to the prestige of the Organization because the Algerian problem, due to the magnitude of the fighting raging in Algeria, constituted a serious threat to international peace and security and to friendly relations among nations. It was also a problem involving such fundamental issues as basic human rights and freedoms, particularly the right of self-determination of peoples. Therefore, it was not only natural for the United Nations, but also incumbent upon it, to consider the problem seriously and to attempt to find a peaceful solution.

25. His delegation believed that Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter was not applicable to the Algerian problem. Recalling that that paragraph precluded the United Nations from intervening in matters which were essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, he emphasized the importance, in that context, of the word "essentially". By the insertion of that word, those who had drafted the Charter had sought to establish a distinction between two categories of matters which could be considered as falling within the domestic jurisdiction of a State.

26. The first category consisted of problems which, being essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a State, were its sole concern, and in which the United Nations had no right to interfere. The second category of questions consisted of those which, though also falling within the domestic jurisdiction of a State, were of vital importance to the world community and were therefore of direct concern to the United Nations. Questions in

the second category obviously did not fall within the purview of Article 2, paragraph 7. They were questions which could, and indeed should, be discussed by the General Assembly. It was inconceivable that the provisions in Article 2, paragraph 7, had been intended to become a legal curtain behind which the aspirations of peoples for independence could be stifled or shattered, especially when they had reached such magnitude as in Algeria.

27. Turning to other limitations to the applicability of Article 2, paragraph 7, he referred to its provision for cases in which there existed a threat to the peace. Since the fighting in Algeria had attained such proportions as to constitute a real threat to peace and security, it was of direct and immediate concern to the United Nations. Furthermore, the Algerian question had given rise to international implications and developments of greatest importance which had outrun the mere legalism of the Charter. On a regional level, the issues affected the relationships between Tunisia and Morocco on the one hand, and France and the rest of the West on the other. In addition, they involved the relationships between the Arab world on the one hand, and France and the West on the other. On a global level, the issues involved the relationships between Asia and Africa, and the Western world. Therefore, the Algerian question had been lifted from the realm of pure domestic jurisdiction and placed among the principal problems of prime international concern.

28. Observing that the Algerian problem was essentially a political problem and not a juridical problem, he explained that his delegation had joined others in submitting the question to the General Assembly (A/3197), not with the intention of pinning the blame on any party, but out of a desire to find a peaceful solution. Declaring that the parties had reached a stage in their relationship at which force was the only means they recognized to resolve differences, he warned that, if left unsolved for long, the problem of Algeria was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

29. Examining the facts of the case, he emphasized that in Algeria a people were seeking to recover their freedom, to exercise sovereignty over their own land, and as an independent nation, to promote their own culture and religious tenets. Realizing that sheer force could not offer a durable solution, they had appealed to the United Nations.

30. It would serve no useful purpose to argue that the National Liberation Front could not speak on behalf of the Algerian people. It was difficult to believe that a nationalist movement which had sustained heavy fighting for nearly two and one-half years did not command wide-spread support among the Algerian people. The struggle of Algeria was pre-eminently a nationalist struggle, and since force was not an answer to nationalism, the sooner both parties realized that force offered no solution to the Algerian problem, the closer would a happy solution be.

31. There were elements of hope in the situation. He counted the following as constructive achievements: first, the debate on the thorny problem of Algeria had been thorough; secondly, the tone of the debate had been, on the whole, fairly restrained; thirdly, France had actively participated in the debate; fourthly, the new Members of the United Nations, especially Morocco and Tunisia, had made a great contribution to the debate; fifthly, for the first time the French Government had spoken of such things as elections, negotiation,

and a distinct personality and status for Algeria; sixthly, both sides were anxious for a cease-fire; seventhly, the Algerian representatives had stated repeatedly their most sincere desire not to hurt or alienate France or in any way to undermine its legitimate interests; eighthly, everyone in the First Committee desired to find a solution acceptable to both sides.

32. A projection into the future permitted six determinants to be seen on the horizon. First, the people of Algeria would, sooner or later, exercise their natural right to self-determination. Secondly, they would work out for themselves, with or without the help of others, a form of constitution giving full satisfaction to the diverse interests involved. Thirdly, in time, the evident community of destiny of all the people of North Africa would give rise to a special arrangement among Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco to which others might also accede. Fourthly, such a North African arrangement, by reason of history, of strategy and of economics, would be closely linked to France and through France to Europe and the West. Fifthly, the North African world would most certainly also be linked to the rest of the Arab world; and by reason of that double linkage, North Africa would help significantly in the important and urgent task of mediating, moderating and modulating between East and West. Sixthly, when all that had happened, France would be proud of the new world that it had helped to create.

33. Observing that a great new day was coming to the North African region, he recalled such great names as Saint Augustine, Ibn Roshd and Ibn Khaldoun for the purpose of illustrating what might flow from the application of patience and understanding to the problems of North Africa.

34. Mr. PINEAU (France) observed that his statement would refer not to the events of the past, but only to the possibilities for the future. It would probably be his last intervention, since the French delegation, consistent with the position that it had taken, could not participate in the preparation of or vote on any draft resolution.

35. The Committee's discussion had shown that the Algerian problem was tremendously complicated and could not be solved merely by the application of a principle or the satisfaction of a desire, and certainly not by violent acts or language. The French delegation would hold against no one the unpleasant things that had been said at times, and leaving aside polemics, addressed itself exclusively to the constructive question, namely how to settle the Algerian problem in realistic terms and how to avoid making existing difficulties insurmountable.

36. The stand which the United Nations should adopt was, in the first place, to refrain from intervening in a situation in which it had, neither in law nor in practice, effective means of action. To ask the Secretary-General to participate in the preparation of negotiations and to make a report to the twelfth session of the General Assembly in a field where the Charter conferred no rights upon him would not only be a useless gesture, but would compromise the authority of a man who ought to be reserved for other tasks. In that connexion, the representative of France termed paragraph 3 of the eighteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.165) dangerous to the very authority of the United Nations.

37. The other paragraphs of that draft resolution were, in his view, hardly more felicitous. For example, the recognition of the right of the people of Algeria to

self-determination seemed to be the simple application of a very general principle of the Charter to the Algerian question. But the application of that principle required at least caution and prudence, because there were risks involved. If, in order to respect that principle, the Assembly swept aside the concept of national sovereignty, movements of public opinion hostile to the United Nations would be created in the countries involved and the search for compromise solutions would not be made easier. Offhand treatment of the problem of minorities involved the risk of discouraging them or driving them to assert their rights by violence.

38. He asked the Committee to imagine for a moment that there existed that which he denied, namely, two Algerian peoples or populations which wanted two mutually exclusive solutions of the problem. One answer to the dilemma would be the departure of the minority. While such a solution of ethnic problems in Eastern Europe had been carried out by Hitler, Mr. Pineau did not consider that a good enough reason to resign oneself to such an inhuman procedure. There was also partition, a solution which some people had envisaged, but to which the present French Government was firmly opposed. Observing that there were regions in Algeria where the population of European origin constituted a majority and that consequently that solution would not strictly speaking be contrary to the right of people to self-determination, he declared that it would be none the less catastrophic for the future of Algeria and of peace in that part of the world. France desired to avoid the creation in North Africa of problems as delicate as some of those presently confronting the United Nations in the Middle East.

39. France was compelled by the very nature of things to seek an original solution, that of coexistence, which would be more a solution of fact than of principle. Until the opposite was demonstrated, he would remain convinced that most of the Moslem population of Algeria understood that necessity.

40. Both draft resolutions before the Committee (A/C.1/L.165 and A/C.1/L.166) requested France to begin negotiations. But he asked with whom and on what; whether France should recognize from the outset that the terrorists were the only ones qualified to carry out such negotiations; and whether it was enough to organize a rebellion to become the only valid spokesman of the people. He felt that that would be a strange conception of democracy and of the free expression of peoples.

41. Moreover, apart from the agreement on a cease-fire, which had necessarily to be concluded with those who were fighting, he asked what guarantees to France would be offered by negotiation on the future status of Algeria with a group which had not demonstrated its representative nature. It was not fantastic to think that such agreements might be denounced as inadequate or unacceptable by other groups which wished to take the place of the National Liberation Front in the favour of the most excited elements of the rebellion.

42. The eighteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.165) was therefore not only contrary to the Charter, but was also unacceptable and dangerous. It could only increase the intransigence of the National Liberation Front, offend French public opinion and delay a cease-fire, the urgency of which was obvious to all. The draft resolution submitted by Japan, the Philippines and Thailand (A/C.1/L.166) was less objectionable but was still very dangerous. He contended that the solutions proposed by France were more in conformity with

present realities and were the crux of the debate. He asked that everyone, including even those most opposed to the French ideas, understand that those solutions had been the subject of thorough consideration of the situation. The possible and the impossible had been carefully weighed, and it was not only anxiety respecting the debate in the United Nations that had determined the choice.

43. Recalling that France had proposed a cease-fire, free elections and negotiations on the new structure of Algeria with elected representatives of the populations concerned, he asked whether a cease-fire was not a prior condition to any peaceful solution. Emphasizing that there was no question of a surrender or of the imposition of prior conditions, he said that a cease-fire would be followed by free elections on the basis of a single electoral college. France would accept international supervision of the elections and would invite a certain number of countries to send observers in adequate numbers so that no doubt would later be possible as to the regularity of those elections.

44. The elections would be of two kinds: first, municipal elections designed to furnish the local cadres for Algeria; and secondly, the election of thirty representatives to the French National Assembly, who, without discrimination, would be the spokesmen for Algeria in negotiations regarding the new structure of Algeria. The status of those elected representatives would be more difficult to dispute than that of the chiefs of the gangs who derived their authority only from themselves. Moreover, the elected representatives would be able validly to commit the populations which they represented. As to the objection that those elections should be for an Algerian assembly, he said that, unless France re-established an Algerian assembly with the same status as that of the Assembly recently dissolved, the action would be contrary to the French Constitution. Moreover, he questioned whether such elections could be carried out before agreement had been reached on the composition and powers of an Algerian assembly. Observing that those were questions which would have to be taken up at a later stage, he said it would be impossible to deal with them without considerable discussion on the substance of the problem.

45. Therefore, the solution envisaged by the French Government was the only one which could reconcile the free expression of popular feeling with the need not to prejudice on either side the results of the subsequent negotiations.

46. The French Government sought a negotiated, and not an imposed, solution of the problem. That was why he did not wish to develop before the Committee a specific plan concerning the new structure of Algeria. But Mr. Guy Mollet, Prime Minister of France, had laid down the following principles. The first was the strict equality of rights of all the inhabitants of Algeria whatever their origin or religion. The second was to ensure the coexistence of the communities which made up Algeria in respect of their legitimate rights. The third was to establish the personality of Algeria while maintaining the necessary links with the metropolitan country. The second and third principles showed the wish of France to achieve a considerable decentralization of power, taking account of the nature and specific needs of Algeria. Observing that important reforms in that direction had been started, he declared that, in any case, that subject would be discussed with the elected representatives of the Algerian population.

47. He found strange the *a priori* doubts concerning the success of such negotiations and the affirmation that they would be more difficult in a climate of peace and legality than in the present atmosphere.

48. Referring to the action in the economic and social field which the French Government had undertaken and wished to develop, he emphasized the importance of problems affecting the every-day life of peoples and the improvement of their standards of living.

49. He considered the plan of his Government an immense advantage over all others in that it was practicable immediately. Moreover, it offered a greater chance for peace and happiness to the populations concerned than the arbitrary pretensions of those who wanted everything immediately by any means whatever.

50. In conclusion, he recalled that, in agreeing to discuss its ideas and its objectives at length and sincerely before the United Nations, France had not thereby renounced the right conferred upon it by Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. The French delegation continued to believe that the discussion should be concluded without the Committee adopting any draft resolution. If the Committee nevertheless felt it necessary or advisable to discuss one or more texts, he could not stress enough that the Committee's chief concern should be to do nothing which would, by exciting the minds of people once again, contribute in any way to the maintenance or aggravation of present tensions. It was not a matter of giving superficial satisfaction to either side or of a victory by either side. A discussion in the United Nations should not be an episode in a conflict, but a means of bringing views closer together and calming people's minds. He trusted not only the Committee's sense of respect for the rights of each Member State, but also its common sense, prudence and wisdom.

51. Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria), exercising his right of reply, thought that the debate had been in general kept on a high level with a view to helping both Algeria and France to arrive at a solution of their difficulties.

52. The issue of Algeria was undoubtedly an issue of national liberation. It should be dealt with in the spirit of trying to serve liberty and the general evolution of mankind in that direction.

53. Observing that it had been said that liberty for the Algerians would have been an easy thing were it not for pan-Arabism, he contended that pan-Arabism was really non-existent in the sense in which the term was sometimes used. Pan-Arabism did not seek to occupy the lands of others; it was a liberating nationalism seeking to realize the liberty of the Arab nation. For the Arabs to try to work for their union was also an element of the right of self-determination. Both goals were in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

54. With respect to the French solution, he stated that a peaceful solution safeguarding the positions, claims and rights of both sides was one that could only be arrived at through free and genuine negotiations. That was the essence of any effort to arrive at a durable, just and real solution.

55. Assuring the Committee that the Arabs had nothing whatsoever against the French people, he stated that their policy was one of coexistence. He pointed out that the situation in the Middle East was not static; change was to be seen on all horizons. Mighty ideologies and forces made of the Arab East an arena in the struggle and effort to fashion a future. International

tensions were reflected upon the Arab East and were reflected back by the people of that area. However, there was one mighty ideology which could turn the masses in one direction or another. That supreme political fact was liberating nationalism.

56. It was the masses rather than a few leaders who were in the forefront of the movement for change. More than any other force the common man in the Arab East was able to make or unmake policies and leaders. The growth of liberating nationalism in the Middle East was the supreme reality in that area, and the Syrian delegation called upon the Committee, and particularly the French delegation, to realize that fact.

57. Noting that there was a community of destiny for the peoples of the world, he hoped that the previous good relations between France and its neighbours would return and that the coexistence of which the French representative had spoken would take into account the realities and would be based on the aspirations of the peoples concerned. Not only would it be futile to press the future into the mould of the past, but it might also make the whole mould break into pieces under pressure, with the possibility of explosions.

58. He appealed to the French soul, which he considered humane in essence; to the French mind, to see the logic of development in that area; and to legitimate French interests, which made it essential to unite rather than to alienate the French and the Arab peoples. He also appealed to other nations and particularly to the United States, whose interests, he felt, would be served, not by taking one side against the other, but by trying to act in accordance with true American principles of liberty. Above all, he wished to appeal to the United Nations to safeguard its Charter, for the policy of the Syrian Government was based on co-operation rather than on domination, on orderly evolution according to the Charter rather than on upheavals. The United Nations could not itself provide a definite solution, but the United Nations could facilitate such a solution by allowing the two sides to enter into fruitful negotiations which ultimately would lead to a peaceful settlement.

59. Mr. KASE (Japan) said that his delegation had the honour of sponsoring a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.166) together with the delegations of Thailand and the Philippines.

60. The Japanese delegation endeavoured to discover a constructive solution. It thought that the preparation of a draft resolution at the present juncture in the debate was the appropriate thing to do. He was fully convinced that the Committee must do something in order to assist the parties to the conflict to settle their dispute quickly. The Japanese delegation was not among the African-Asian delegations which sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/L.165, not because it differed with them about basic objectives, but because it felt that a different approach might yield a better result.

61. The sponsors of the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.166) tried to accommodate the positions of the parties to the conflict, in particular the position of France, as much as possible under the circumstances. In doing so, they believed that they had gone far indeed; that had been possible because their Arab friends had been good enough to co-operate with them.

62. There were considerable differences between the two draft resolutions. Recalling the Japanese delegation's statement (840th meeting) in support of the principle of self-determination of dependent people, he stated that there had been no change in that position.

Nevertheless, the three-Power draft resolution did not contain a specific reference to the principle of self-determination. It simply stated the belief that France and the Algerian people would find by their joint efforts "an equitable solution in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations". He felt that, if any country found it difficult to accept that broad reference to the Charter, it certainly would hardly qualify as fit for membership in the United Nations.

63. The three-Power draft resolution expressed the hope that France and the Algerian people would "endeavour, through appropriate negotiations, to bring about the end of bloodshed and the peaceful settlement of the present difficulties." He believed that the draft resolution contained nothing that could possibly hurt the susceptibilities of either France or Algeria or that could not promote a cease-fire and amicable negotiations.

64. While aware that some delegations were of the view that the United Nations should refrain from doing anything about Algeria at the present time, he wondered whether it would be right for the United Nations to take such an attitude. While not suggesting that the United Nations should actively intervene in the Algerian dispute, he believed that the Algerian war had become the concern of all the peace-loving peoples of the world. Since the United Nations was the last hope of mankind for peace, its honour and prestige must be jealousy protected. If nothing tangible emerged from the debate he asked whether the United Nations would not present a sorry spectacle to those who placed their trust in it. The prestige of the United Nations would be at stake, and the common man would seriously doubt the efficacy of the United Nations.

65. In submitting the draft resolution, the Japanese delegation tried to meet the French desire and the Algerian requirement. In its view, the result was a reasonable proposition in complete harmony with the United Nations Charter.

66. In conclusion, he appealed to the Committee to face the issue of Algeria squarely and to facilitate its peaceful solution with good will towards both France and Algeria.

67. Mr. SERRANO (Philippines) stated that the brief draft resolution which the delegation of the Philippines had co-sponsored with the delegations of Japan and Thailand (A/C.1/L.166) represented days of sustained efforts by its sponsors to delineate a position with candid regard for the realities and the most sympathetic consideration for the conflicting interests and points of view of the parties concerned. At every stage of their endeavour, they had sought to meet with the parties, and it could be reported that the draft resolution presented to the Committee was free of the major obstacles. If complete agreement had not been achieved on every detail, it was because any attempt totally to satisfy one party would invite total rejection by the other.

68. He felt that there were three alternatives open to the Committee on the question of Algeria: first, to take note of the debate and abstain from any action

thereon; secondly, to uphold the contention of one of the parties as against the other, and to act accordingly; thirdly, to provide a bridge by which both parties might be encouraged to cease hostilities and to utilize the procedure of peaceful negotiations for the settlement of their differences.

69. In the view of the Philippine delegation, the first alternative was neither wise nor proper. The Committee could neither honestly nor successfully avoid any situation which actually or potentially came to grips with the basic principles of the Charter. The second alternative was premature. Moreover, the question was not of a justiciable nature which called for abstract definition of right or wrong. The third alternative, however, commended itself to the Philippine delegation because it sought, not to judge, but to reconcile.

70. The three-Power draft resolution, he emphasized, did not seek to intervene. Encouragement, not intervention, was the approach which the draft resolution asked the Organization to take. It was the hope of the Philippine delegation that other delegations would not find it difficult to bring the weight of their approving judgement behind it and that the parties would receive it with the same good will that inspired it.

71. Mr. KHOMAN (Thailand) associated himself with the explanations of the purpose of the three-Power draft resolution made by the representatives of Japan and the Philippines. He stated that the draft embodied the views previously expressed (841st meeting) by his delegation to the effect that the Committee had to take into account the fact that the situation in Algeria was grave. If the Assembly were to pass over the Algerian situation after such lengthy and detailed expositions, that might be interpreted by the people of Algeria as meaning that the United Nations was indifferent to their suffering and to the grave situation which still might endanger international peace and security.

72. That was why the delegation of Thailand felt that the Assembly had the duty to express itself in such a way as not to interfere in the difficulties in Algeria, while at the same time respecting the provisions of the Charter. The sponsors of the draft resolution had tried very hard not only to meet the wishes of France, the Algerians and the other delegations, but also to embody the principles of the United Nations. He commended it to the Committee as embodying nothing more than the facts of the situation and the principles of the Charter.

73. Mr. ENTEZAM (Iran) observed that the Committee had before it two draft resolutions (A/C.1/L.165 and A/C.1/L.166) and that despite apparent differences all members of the Committee were seeking the same goal. He therefore asked that the Committee reconvene later than usual in order that there might be a little extra time for consultation, which might enable it to avoid a long debate.

74. The CHAIRMAN, in acceding to the request of the representative of Iran, pointed out that a third draft resolution would be circulated shortly.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.