

United Nations
**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**

NINTH SESSION

Official Records



**FIRST COMMITTEE, 748th
MEETING**

Monday, 13 December 1954,
at 3 p.m.

New York

CONTENTS

	Page
Agenda item 56:	
The Morocco question (<i>concluded</i>)	537

Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia).

AGENDA ITEM 56

**The Morocco question (A/2682, A/C.1/L.122/
Corr.I, A/C.1/L.123) (*concluded*)**

1. Sayed ABOU-TALEB (Yemen) observed that it was the third time his delegation had joined with other delegations in submitting the Morocco question to the United Nations. It was doing so in the conviction that only under the auspices of the United Nations could the people of Morocco regain their right to human dignity, justice and freedom.

2. The French Government bore primary responsibility for the rule of illegality and violence that was being perpetuated in Morocco. That responsibility was also shared by those delegations which had argued that a peaceful settlement could be contemplated only outside the United Nations. By opposing the draft resolution (A/2526, paragraph 11) at the eighth session that recognized the right of the Moroccan people to self-government and calling for the relaxation of tension in Morocco, they had given France *carte blanche*. The result had been disastrous. The French Government had interpreted that negative position of the United Nations as an encouragement to continue its policy of repression and violence. Mr. Christian Fouchet, the Minister for Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs, had admitted that anarchy prevailed in Morocco. French troops were continuing their operations against a disarmed people, and France had made no efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement.

3. The Morocco question was an international dispute between the Sherifian Empire and the French Republic. It was true that, under the Treaty of Fez of 1912, the Sherifian Empire had yielded some of its sovereign prerogatives. However, the Treaty was not in conflict with the Act of Algieras of 1906, for in its judgment of 27 August 1951 the International Court of Justice had stated that Morocco, even under the protectorate, had retained its personality as a State in international law.

4. The French Government constantly invoked the Treaty of Fez in order to prevent United Nations intervention in the Moroccan question. But under the terms of the Treaty the Sultan had granted France the

right of military occupation, with a view to the maintenance of order, and the right of diplomatic representation. In exchange, France had undertaken to promote administrative, judiciary, cultural, economic, financial and military reforms and to keep the Sultan under constant protection against any danger to his person, his throne and his domains. The military occupation, instead of bringing tranquillity, had created a state of insecurity. The troops that had been operating recently in Morocco, largely with American arms, had been the enemies of the Moroccan people, its welfare and its freedom.

5. In 1912, France had alleged that anarchy prevailed in Morocco, in order to justify the forcible imposition of its protectorate. Although that argument had convinced nobody, it could not be denied that the current disturbances in Morocco were the result of the presence of the French. In Morocco, the protector had become the enemy, and the forces of security had become the forces of repression. So far as reforms were concerned, France had also failed to meet its obligations. It had simply established a colonial régime protecting the privileges of the French colonists and had dispossessed the Moroccan people. As early as 1934, the United States Chargé d'Affaires in Morocco, Mr. Paul T. Culbertson, had written in *Foreign Relations* that the French plan was to make Morocco a colonial possession.

6. Although the many military, political and economic abuses that had been committed had been contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Protectorate Treaty, the most serious violation of that Treaty had been deposition of the Sultan by the French Government. The unpopularity and injustice of that act were so blatant that even the Francophile sections of the Moroccan population had demanded its revocation. For instance, the reigning Sultan had asked the French Government to release him from a position he had never sought. It was clear, therefore, that all Moroccans desired the restoration of their legal sovereign. It was also clear that the Moroccan people was determined, at any cost, to secure the release of their temporal and spiritual leader.

7. On 21 January 1954, the Spanish Government, acceding to the will of the Moroccan people and conforming with the letter and spirit of the Franco-Spanish Treaty of 1912 concerning Spanish Morocco, had refused to recognize the new Sultan. Spanish Morocco continued to recognize the Sultan Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef as the legitimate sovereign. That situation was not only likely to cause serious friction between the Spanish Government and the French Government but was in itself a threat to the unity of the Sherifian Empire.

8. The delegation of Yemen wished to express its gratitude to the Spanish Government for the position it had taken in the matter. Spain, which was not a Member of the United Nations, was unfortunately the

¹ Case concerning the rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, Judgment of 27 August 1952: I.C.J. reports 1952, p. 176.

only country that had remained faithful to its obligations under the Act of Algeciras. Other signatories of the Act had recognized the French *fait accompli*, in violation of their obligations and of the principles of the United Nations Charter.

9. If the situation was not remedied, the friends of Morocco would have no choice but to submit the question to the decision of the competent organ of the United Nations. The French Government should recognize that the deposition of the Sultan had, in law if not in fact, voided the provisions of the Treaty of Fez. It was a recognized principle in international law that the violation of an essential condition of a treaty gave the offended party the right to consider itself released from the obligations of the treaty. Article III of the Treaty of Fez provided that the French Government would lend constant support to the Sultan against any danger threatening his person or domains. That provision, which France constantly invoked to justify the treaty, had been violated by the French themselves. Thus the Moroccan people could legitimately claim that the Protectorate Treaty had been nullified by that arbitrary act.

10. Of course, the French Government claimed that it had deposed the Sultan in order to protect him from alleged rebels and to forestall the threat of civil war. That argument was obviously fallacious, for in March 1953 Mr. Edgar Faure, the French Minister for Finances and Economic Affairs, had said that any change of dynasty of persons in Morocco would be the work of the French. And in 1951, General Boyer de Latour du Moulin, then Secretary-General for Political and Military Affairs of Morocco, had sent a report to the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs stating that plans had been considered to remove a sovereign whose resistance was every day becoming more embarrassing. According to Mr. Laniel, then Prime Minister of France, the deposition of the Sultan had been the work of Marshal Juin. That act not only represented a violation by France of its obligations; it also prevented any resumption of negotiations for the settlement of the Morocco question, for if the French Government should agree to co-operate with the United Nations to give effect to the General Assembly's recommendation, it would have to be determined with whom France was to negotiate. The delegation of Yemen felt that such negotiations must be carried on with the legal Sultan of Morocco. That was also the feeling of the Moroccan people and of the Istiqlal Party, whose General Secretary had recently written that the Moroccan people and its political leaders would never enter into negotiations with the French so long as the Sultan had not been restored to his throne.

11. The restoration of the Sultan would be in accordance with the principles of justice and international law, and was a *sine qua non* for the re-establishment of peace and order in Morocco and the resumption of negotiations. Such a restoration of legality in Morocco should be particularly welcome to the signatories of the Act of Algeciras, and especially to the United States of America, which by an agreement signed with France in 1951, had obtained the right to establish air bases in seven strategic areas of Morocco. In that connexion it should be noted that the agreement between France and the United States had not been approved by the Sultan—who had not even been consulted, although the United States recognized him as the ruler of Morocco. That agreement was a fresh violation of the

Act of Algeciras and the Protectorate Treaty, for the Treaty of Fez had recognized the Sultan's rights to be consulted and to give his approval to any international treaty while the Act of Algeciras affirmed his independence and sovereignty. It was to be hoped that the United States Government would use its good offices with the French Government to put that arbitrary act right. Only by restoration of the legal Sovereign could the agreement on Moroccan air bases be legalized.

12. It was clear that, military considerations apart, the people of the United States had a natural interest in the re-establishment of legality in Morocco. That was certainly the feeling of the 8 million workers organized in the American Federation of Labor, whose representatives had stated that the recognition by the United States Government of the Sultan imposed by France was particularly regrettable since it was a repudiation of the anti-colonial traditions of the United States of America. It was to be hoped that the United States Government would adopt a policy that would disappoint neither its Moroccan friends nor its own people.

13. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon) said that the Moroccan question had been on the Assembly's agenda for three years. Lebanon had always supported the national aspirations of the Moroccan people. It continued to maintain friendly relations with France, but at the same time, having itself fought for its independence, it was particularly well able to understand the present sufferings of the Moroccan people.

14. It had been urged that nothing should be done that might weaken France. It should be pointed out in that connexion that a peaceful settlement of the Moroccan problem between France and the true representatives of the Moroccan people would consolidate France's international position.

15. When the Moroccan question had been discussed in the Security Council, Lebanon had done its utmost to obtain justice for the Moroccan people. However, the situation had not improved; on the contrary, it had deteriorated as a result of the deposition of the Sultan. The situation had been described, and there was no purpose in describing it again. The description, of course, would have been more complete if the French delegation had been present in the debate and had communicated its point of view.

16. The following propositions seemed to sum up the situation accurately:

(1) Moroccan nationalism was a real and deep-rooted sentiment and was on the increase.

(2) The Sultan Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef was and remained, even in exile, the symbol and embodiment of that nationalism.

(3) Istiqlal was the organized movement through which that nationalism was expressed. It held the exiled Sovereign in the highest esteem.

(4) All that the movement demanded was to be given the opportunity to form a truly representative Moroccan Government that could negotiate with France for a just settlement on a footing of equality, in the spirit of the letter addressed by the Sultan to the President of the French Republic in August 1953. In that letter, Sidi Mohammed had stated that he had no intention of severing all ties with France and that in a world in which interdependence had become an ineluctable necessity he was fully aware that the countries needed each other more than ever.

(5) The Moroccan nationalist movement was supported by the Asian and the Arab States and by the Communist bloc, whatever might be the motives in each case.

(6) The nationalist movement had won increasing sympathy in the Latin American countries, in certain circles in the United States of America and even in certain French quarters—and not only among the French Communists.

(7) It was unlikely that it would be possible to suppress a movement that enjoyed so large a measure of support throughout the world.

(8) Such a movement could be kept temporarily in check, but repressive measures would ultimately only increase tension between the Western Powers—particularly France—and the peoples and Governments of Asia and Africa.

(9) It was unlikely that the nationalist movement would agree to any settlement, even of a peaceful nature, unless something was done about the exiled Sultan.

(10) The only way out of the deadlock appeared to be the opening of negotiations between the true representatives of the Moroccan people and the Government of France.

(11) If negotiations were undertaken, there was reason to believe that they would in time lead to a settlement favourable to both the interests of the Moroccan people and the long-term interests of France.

(12) There were two obstacles to a just settlement: the attitude of the French colonists and the question of French prestige.

(13) The Moroccan question raised a number of issues of fundamental importance, which could not be passed over lightly, regarding the connexions between North Africa and Europe and the relationships between European and non-European cultures.

17. Those thirteen points represented an attempt to define the situation in Morocco in an objective manner. They differed only very slightly from the conclusions that the Lebanese representative had reached in the previous year.

18. With regard to the sympathy that the nationalist movement had aroused abroad, it was interesting to note the position taken in certain French Catholic circles that had endeavoured to rise above particular interests in order to take an objective view of the situation. That position was a striking illustration of the respect in which freedom of the Press and freedom of opinion were held in the Western world.

19. Thus, an article by François Mauriac in the March 1954 number of *France-Maghreb* had referred to the return from Morocco of a number of French parliamentarians, including Mr. Roland de Moustier. They had described the difficulties confronting the French Government. In Mr. Roland de Moustier's view the deposition of the Sultan had been inevitable, and all the difficulties had arisen from the fact that reforms had not been carried out after his exile. In reality, Mr. Mauriac had continued, the origin of the difficulties had been the deposition itself. Since the Sultan had not abdicated, the best reforms would be useless. What counted was not the Sultan's personal merit but what he represented for his people. There was no doubt that Sidi Mohammed was the religious

head of the Moroccan people and the incarnation of its hopes. Since his deposition, Sidi Mohammed was stronger than ever, and France was more dependent on him than he was on France.

20. In the journal *Témoignage Chrétien* of 15 August 1954, Robert Barrat had written, in an article entitled "The Sultan's return is the only solution", that Morocco was torn by terrorism and that the deposition of the Sultan had aggravated the crisis. He observed that all Moroccans were unanimously in the struggle for the return of the Sultan and that the opposition consisted solely of El-Glaui and a few collaborating *caid*s. He added that Sidi Mohammed had been popular even in 1953, but was today a martyr.

21. *Le Monde* of 7 December 1954 had reported a statement by Cardinal Gerlier, the Archbishop of Lyons, that it was necessary to rid oneself of certain prejudices against the Moroccan people that were neither humane nor Christian and should be replaced by feelings of fraternal sympathy with the suffering.

22. That newspaper had published in the same issue a statement by Monsignor Chappoulie, the Bishop of Angers, reminding Christians that in the eyes of God there was no such thing as an inferior race and adding that, even though the French settlers might have benefited the indigenous inhabitants, they had done so on the latter's territory and had not been invited to settle there. The rights of the indigenous inhabitants were therefore inviolable, and the repressive measures that had been taken in those territories were assuredly not a manifestation of the Christian spirit.

23. *Le Monde* had also published a speech by Mr. François Mauriac, of the French Academy, to the International League against Racism and Anti-Semitism, in which he had observed that the struggle against racism was a burning question in North Africa and that it had taken on a particularly odious form there because it was racism enforced by police action. No one, Mr. Mauriac had declared, was more our brother than the Jews who had suffered under the occupation and the North Africans who were suffering today.

24. Both the Resident-General of Morocco and the French Prime Minister had taken part in the work of the United Nations and had won the esteem of their colleagues. Their good intentions and their will to achieve an acceptable solution could not be doubted. A newspaper in the United States had reported the debate in the French National Assembly on the North African question. The statements made had not been in the least surprising; most States had, in their emergence from dependence, passed through a similar stage of deadlock between the policy of the foreign administrators and the will to independence of the dependent people. The important thing was that the parties should come together and join in free negotiations. The Sultan of Morocco had shown that he had the highest intentions with regard to France. It was therefore to be hoped that negotiations would be begun and that the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.122/Corr.1) would be adopted.

25. Some advances had been made in Tunisia, and it was to be hoped that similar advances would be made in Morocco. In view of the almost superhuman challenges that Mr. Mendès-France had already overcome on a multitude of fronts, he should be given the necessary time in the hope that there would be some progress to report by next year.

26. The Lebanese delegation was not prepared to harass the French Government until it had had an opportunity to prove its good intentions. He therefore hoped that the Committee would take a position that would help the French Government rather than hinder it in carrying out its task.

27. Mr. SHUKAIRI (Syria) pointed out that twelve delegations had proposed a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.122/Corr.1) that they had already regarded as an attempt at a compromise. After noting the reaction of certain delegations, however, the twelve Powers felt that there were a number of ideas that might help the Committee in its work and create an atmosphere conducive to negotiations between the parties for a peaceful settlement of the question.

28. He read the text of a new draft resolution² and said that the twelve Powers who sponsored it would be ready to present the text formally after they had heard the views of the various delegations.

29. Mr. TRUJILLO (Ecuador) proposed that the meeting should be suspended for half an hour.

30. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the meeting should resume at 5.15 p.m.

It was so decided.

The meeting was suspended at 4.40 p.m. and resumed at 5.15 p.m.

31. The CHAIRMAN said that the sponsors of the new draft resolution (A/C.1/L.123) had asked that the operative part be amended to read: "*Decides* to postpone for the time being the further consideration of the item."

32. Mr. SHUKAIRI (Syria) said that the twelve Powers withdrew the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.122/Corr.1.

33. Mr. FRANCO Y FRANCO (Dominican Republic) said that his delegation was prepared to vote for the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.123).

34. With regard to the second paragraph of the preamble, however, most of the delegations that had spoken had been delegations of Arab countries. It would therefore be better to avoid the use of the expression "many delegations" and to draft the paragraph to read: "*Expressing* the confidence of the United Nations in the recently confirmed intentions of the French Government".

35. Mr. MIR KHAN (Pakistan) said that his delegation would accept the amendment just suggested by the Dominican representative.

36. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) suggested that the draft resolution should, in the second paragraph, express the hope that negotiations between France and Morocco would be undertaken.

37. Mr. SHUKAIRI (Syria) said that the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.123 was very conciliatory as it stood. He therefore appealed to the Dominican representative to accept the present wording.

38. Mr. FRANCO Y FRANCO (Dominican Republic) thought that the words "for the time being" would be too vague; if the text was worded in that way, consideration of the question could be taken up on the following day. In any event, he thought that the phrase "to the forthcoming session" should be deleted.

39. Mr. LEME (Brazil) suggested that the Latin term "*sine die*" might be used to avoid translation difficulties.

40. Mr. SHUKAIRI (Syria) said that the idea of the term "*sine die*" was implied in the present text.

41. Mr. LEME (Brazil) said that in that case he would not insist on his suggestion being put to the vote.

42. Mr. FRANCO Y FRANCO (Dominican Republic) repeated that most of the delegations that had taken part in the discussion had been those of Arab countries; the Dominican delegation had never declared that negotiations would be initiated. It would therefore be better to adopt the wording he had previously suggested.

43. Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) thought that the attitude of the twelve Powers, which had already agreed to accept the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.123 in place of the original text, was quite understandable. His delegation would be prepared to vote for the new draft resolution. The word "many" in the second paragraph might perhaps be replaced by "some".

44. Mr. SHUKAIRI (Syria) said that the word "certain" would be preferable, as it did not imply either that the delegations were many or that they were few. He therefore appealed to the delegations of El Salvador and the Dominican Republic to consider that amendment.

45. Mr. FRANCO Y FRANCO (Dominican Republic) said he preferred the text he had suggested and asked for his amendment to be put to the vote.

46. Mr. ORTEGA (Chile) pointed out that the Dominican amendment did not specify the French Government's intentions. The wording suggested by the Iraqi representative was therefore more precise.

47. Mr. SHUKAIRI (Syria) said that the twelve Powers might have accepted the drafting Iraq had suggested to meet the Dominican delegation's wishes; but since that delegation insisted on its amendment, there was no point in adopting the Iraqi representative's suggestion.

48. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) confirmed that he would ask for his amendment to be put to the vote.

49. Mr. JOHNSON (Canada) thought that before choosing between the words "many", "some" or "certain" in the second paragraph, it would be useful to know exactly how many delegations had made the declaration in question.

50. Mr. SHUKAIRI (Syria) thought the use of the word "certain" would meet the objections that had been raised. The Syrian delegation and a number of Asian and African delegations had referred to the negotiations, the fact of which had not been denied by anyone, even France. It was not possible at the present stage of discussion to enumerate the delegations that had made such a declaration.

51. Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) said the use of the word "some" or "certain" should allay the misgivings of the representative of the Dominican Republic, who had stated that his delegation had made no declaration concerning the negotiations.

52. So far as concerned the Canadian representative's remarks, the delegation of El Salvador agreed with the

² Subsequently issued as A/C.1/L.123.

Syrian representative that it was impossible to say which delegations had made the statement in question.

53. Mr. SHUKAIRI (Syria) said that, to meet the objections that had been raised, the twelve Powers would agree to replace the word "many" by "some" in the second paragraph of the preamble.

54. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the amendment proposed by the Dominican Republic that the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.123) should be drafted as follows: "*Expressing the confidence of the United Nations in the recently confirmed intentions of the French Government*".

A vote was taken by a show of hands.

The amendment was rejected by 26 votes to 19, with 11 abstentions.

55. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.123), as amended.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Nicaragua, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico.

Against: Norway, Sweden, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand.

Abstaining: Turkey, Canada, Haiti, Honduras.

The draft resolution, as amended, was adopted by 39 votes to 15, with 4 abstentions.

56. Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom) said that, although it was opposed to the draft resolution, his delegation was glad that its sponsors had recognized the general feeling of the members of the First Committee that a resolution of substance on the matter would not be opportune. It would have been wiser, however, not to have passed any resolution at all. The main thing was to allow time for the situation to improve. It was Mr. Mendès-France's intention to attack the Moroccan problem as soon as the Tunisian question had been settled. The results already obtained by the new Prime Minister showed his courage and imagination.

57. The delegation of the United Kingdom had voted for the amendment proposed by the Dominican Republic in the conviction that the French Government would be in a better position to settle the Moroccan problem after it had succeeded in Tunisia. Furthermore, the United Kingdom delegation had often indicated its attitude on the Moroccan problem: it was not an international problem, and therefore the General Assembly was not competent to discuss it. But the operative part of the draft resolution, while postponing consideration of the question, implied that the Assembly would examine it again. The United Kingdom had therefore voted against the twelve-Power draft resolution.

58. Mr. QUIROGA GALDO (Bolivia) said his delegation had listened carefully to the statements made on behalf of the Moroccan people. On the other hand, Bolivia admired France, had always stood shoulder to shoulder with it in the hour of danger, and was aware of its contribution to politics, art and culture. The draft resolution just adopted did not dispute France's civilizing mission, and it expressed the idea that the other nations associated themselves with France in defence of the right of peoples to self-determination and the hope that in the course of the year the problem would be settled by mutual agreement for the greater welfare of the Arab and French peoples, whose culture had always been an inspiration to the Bolivian nation.

59. Mr. LORIDAN (Belgium) said the draft resolution implied that the General Assembly was competent to deal with the question. At the two preceding sessions, however, Belgium had always maintained that the United Nations was not competent to discuss the Moroccan question, which, being a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a State, came under the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter.

60. It was a matter of principle with Belgium to try to avoid any action overstepping the limits of the Charter; such action could only harm the United Nations, and it could not help to bring about a solution, because a solution required the consent of the two parties.

61. In the present case, it was France's intention, as Mr. Mendès-France had said in his speech to the French National Assembly on 27 August 1954, to lead the Moroccan people towards the democratic management of its own affairs. That being so, action by the General Assembly could only impede that process.

62. In accordance with that general position, the Belgian delegation had not taken part in the discussion and had voted against the draft resolution.

63. Mr. DE LA COLINA (Mexico) said his delegation had always desired a constructive solution of the Moroccan problem in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. Furthermore, it was confident that Mr. Mendès-France's dynamic leadership would bring about a relaxation of tension in North Africa and would ensure the progressive satisfaction of the legitimate aspirations of the people. That being so, the Mexican delegation had voted for the temporary postponement of the question.

64. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) said his delegation had hoped to be able to vote for the draft resolution but had been unable to do so after the rejection of the amendment proposed by the Dominican Republic. The United States had confidence in the French Government, and particularly in Mr. Mendès-France, who should be given the opportunity to bring matters to a successful conclusion.

65. Mr. TRUJILLO (Ecuador) said his delegation had voted for the amendment proposed by the Dominican Republic because it was constructive and expressed confidence in the intentions of the French Government instead of merely noting declarations—that is, opinions. By adopting the amendment, the First Committee would have placed France under the obligation to prove itself worthy of the confidence expressed.

66. Mr. LEME (Brazil) said that although his delegation had voted for the amendment proposed by the Dominican Republic, it had seen no objection to voting

for the draft resolution after the amendment had been rejected.

67. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) said that his delegation's vote against the amendment proposed by the Dominican Republic must not be construed as a vote of no confidence in the good intentions of the French Government, and of Mr. Mendès-France in particular. The very presentation of a conciliatory draft resolution such as the one in document A/C.1/L.123 was a sign of optimism. However, the twelve Powers had considered their text preferable, because it did not appeal to either of the parties unilaterally.

68. Mr. BLANCO (Cuba) said he had voted for the amendment proposed by the Dominican Republic for

the reasons already advanced by the representative of Ecuador. However, he had been able to vote for the draft resolution because it expressed the hope of negotiations between France and Morocco and because it provided, to repeat the expression used by the representative of Brazil, for the postponement *sine die* of the General Assembly's consideration of the problem.

69. Mr. DE LAVALLE (Peru) said that his delegation had already indicated its position. In accordance with that position, and in view of its confidence that the head of the French Government would be successful, it had voted for the amendment proposed by the Dominican Republic.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.