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Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia).

AGENDA ITEM 56

**The Morocco question (A/2682, A/C.1/L.122/
 Corr.1) (*continued*)**

1. Mr. BOROOAH (India) said that the question of Morocco was for the third time before the United Nations, and its presence constituted a solemn reminder that, notwithstanding the progress recently made in the settlement of international disputes, there still remained explosive problems likely to endanger peaceful and friendly relations between nations. Also, it was a reminder of the United Nations' collective failure to bring about any improvement in the situation or to contribute to its peaceful settlement. The problem involved the United Nations not simply regarding its conciliatory functions, but also regarding the basic principles and objectives on which those functions rested and from which they derived their authority, namely, self-determination.

2. Mr. Borooah wished to remind the Committee of the long history of the Moroccan people and nation, during which Morocco had preserved its sovereignty and had influenced the European Renaissance. In the circumstances, it was tragic to find Moroccans compelled to seek the assistance of the United Nations in implementing a right that was not only a basic principle of the Charter, but a cornerstone of international society. Moreover, the Moroccan people had shed their blood freely in two world wars to help preserve for others the freedom that was now denied them.

3. That denial was all the more indefensible when one witnessed what had happened to those territories which, in the Second World War, had been on the side of the vanquished: Libya, once an Italian colony, was now an independent nation seeking United Nations membership; Eritrea, in the exercise of her right of self-determination, had been joined in a federation with Ethiopia; and Italian Somaliland was under Italian trusteeship, with the specific guarantee of independence by 1960. Economically or socially, those territories were not as advanced as Morocco, and they lacked that long history of continuous nationhood which was the inheritance of the Moroccan people.

4. There was hardly any need to reiterate the competence of the United Nations to deal with the question, although that competence had once again been challenged. The Indian delegation believed that the mere

fact that the General Assembly had been considering that question for three successive sessions and had passed a resolution relating to it was sufficient to establish its competence automatically. Moreover, the inapplicability of Article 2, paragraph 7, had been demonstrated at earlier sessions, since even the Government of France had accepted the fact that the relations between France and Morocco were those between sovereign States. Mr. Robert Schuman, then the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, had stated before the General Assembly on 10 November 1952 that France had been bound to Tunisia and Morocco by treaties contracted between sovereign States. While it was true that some of the functions of the Moroccan State remained in abeyance by virtue of treaties entered into by it, or forced upon it, the performance of those functions by France in the name of Morocco did not have the effect of reducing Morocco to the status of a colony or dependency. Furthermore, the International Court of Justice in its judgment of 7 August 1952¹ affirmed the international personality of Morocco and stated that France had recognized that the characteristic of the status of Morocco as it had emerged from the Act of Algeciras had been respect for the sovereignty and independence of the Sultan, the integrity of his domains and Moroccan economic liberty without any inequality. Also, the International Court had pointed out that the Treaty of Fez of 1912 had not, in any way, affected the principles laid down in the Act of Algeciras. In such circumstances, it was hardly arguable that the situation in Morocco was a domestic French problem.

5. Resolution 612 (VII), which had been adopted almost two years ago, was the only resolution relating to Morocco that the United Nations had so far adopted. In the opinion of the Indian delegation, that resolution was sadly defective because it made no mention of the principle of self-determination and did not set up any machinery to achieve that principle. It called for continued negotiations between parties without specifying who those parties were and without even introducing the elementary safeguard that the parties negotiating under the name of Morocco should genuinely represent the Moroccan people. However, despite all those deficiencies, India had voted for that resolution in the hope that the consensus of conviction that had found expression in it would persuade the Government of France to a more liberal and realistic policy in Morocco, and to a speedy implementation of a right that France, of all nations, should be the last to deny.

6. Unfortunately, the events of the succeeding two years were not encouraging. When the General Assembly had met last year, it had been faced with the deposition of the Sultan in direct contravention

¹ Case concerning rights of nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, Judgment of 27 August 1952: I.C.J. reports 1952, p. 176.

of article III of the Treaty of Fez. Although the deposition and consequent exile of the Sultan was an unhappy event, it should not be unduly depressing, because it had been the proud privilege of every patriot, like Bolivar, Zaghul Pasha and Gandhi, to wear the thorny crown of suffering at some time or other of his life. The deep upsurge of popular indignation to which such an arbitrary action had been bound to lead had become evident to all who had studied the Morocco problem and had been borne out by the tragic events that followed. The Council of Ulemas of Morocco, the only authority with power to elect a Sultan for the past twelve centuries, had solemnly reaffirmed its decision that the only legitimate Sultan was Mohammed V. The Council's decision was supported by the unanimous will of the people and by a popular movement unprecedented in the history of Morocco. Forbidden to pray in the name of their exiled monarch, the people of Morocco had refused to attend prayer at mosques, to make pilgrimages to Mecca, or to keep their traditional religious feast days.

7. The discontent of the people of Morocco as well as the increasingly forcible measures of repression that the French authorities had adopted there were evidenced in the writings of prominent people, such as the article written by Mr. Robert Schuman, the former Foreign Minister of France, in *L'Express* of 30 March 1954; the admission of Mr. Christian Fouchet, the French Minister for Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs, that anarchy was tearing Morocco apart; and the article of Justice William O. Douglas in the *New York Times* of 8 August 1954, wherein he declared that Morocco presented colonialism at its worst, predicting that the situation would soon explode a violence that would make Indo-China look minor. While his delegation hoped that the predictions of Justice Douglas would not come to pass, events in Morocco showed in their explosive implications that the consequences could not be territorially confined. For it should not be forgotten that Morocco was bound by ties of culture, religion and friendship with the great world of the Arabs, which, in its turn, was an integral part of the resurgent continents of Asia and Africa. Thus, a speedy solution of the problem was vital not only in terms of the basic rights of the Moroccan people to self-determination but also in terms of the preservation and strengthening of international peace and friendly relations in a vital area of the world. In the circumstances, the declarations of Mr. Mendès-France before the National Assembly during his investiture and before the General Assembly on 22 November 1954 (498th meeting) concerning his Government's policy in relation to Tunisia, which had given evidence for the first time of the renaissance of that sense of political liberalism combined with the sense of history that had so long been associated with the finest traditions of France, might lead to the hope that the conditions for the solution of the Moroccan problem were somewhat more favourable than they had been.

8. In its negotiations with the Government of France, the Indian Government had come to a just and friendly resolution of the problem of French settlements in India. He trusted that that spirit of realism, accommodation and understanding that prevailed during the negotiations would be applied to Morocco also. If the determination to find a solution existed, and if the right of the people of Morocco to self-determination

was respected, his delegation saw no reason why a solution implementing majority rights and protecting minority interests could not be reached.

9. Mr. Borooah said that his delegation had, along with other delegations, proposed the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/L.122/Corr.1) before the Committee. That draft resolution looked to the future and not to the past. Although the sponsors had been compelled to note that resolution 612 (VII) had so far not been implemented, they nevertheless had refrained from saying more because of the fresh and more hopeful circumstances that now surrounded the question. His delegation hoped, therefore, that France and Morocco would be able to give full and friendly expression to the principle of self-determination and that a free Morocco would take its place beside a free France in the community of nations.

10. Despite the non-co-operative attitude on the part of the French delegation, his delegation refused to surrender to despair, because it believed in the revolutionary idealism and progressive traditions of the French nation as well as in the sagacity of the French people to know that in times of national crisis a happy and friendly Morocco would be a great asset, while a discontented and embittered Morocco could prove to be a very heavy liability.

11. Mr. KYROU (Greece) said that the various representatives who had spoken before him on the question had exposed the facts very convincingly. The item before the Committee dealt with ideas of freedom, independence and self-determination, which were close to the minds and hearts of the Greek people. Moreover, it could not be forgotten that those ideas had found their most apt expression in the doctrines of the eighteenth-century philosophers and nineteenth-century poets of France. In the circumstance, the Committee could not but be convinced that, despite the vicissitudes of everyday politics, it could rely upon the unquestioned attachment of the French people to their liberal and democratic traditions. Also, it could not but express the confidence that France would fulfil its duty and complete its work of civilization by taking into account the legitimate aspirations of the Moroccan people, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter.

12. For those reasons, his delegation would vote in favour of the joint draft resolution.

13. Mr. VAVRICKA (Czechoslovakia) said that the question of Morocco was becoming one of the hardy perennials in the agenda of the United Nations because neither the General Assembly resolution nor negotiation between the parties had been able, as yet, to bring about a solution that would permit the people of Morocco to make use of their inalienable right to self-determination and that would do away with the dangerous situation at present existing in North Africa. He recalled that his delegation had, along with others, pointed out the urgency of the problem and the possible tragic consequences that might emanate from a continuation of the difficulties, as exemplified by the events that had occurred after the eighth session. In the course of the past year, Morocco had once more become the arena for trouble, and the situation that had obtained there, according to the memorandum submitted by the fourteen States (A/2682, paragraph 10), was absolutely contrary to the principles of the Charter and of the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights and was a constant threat to peace. Despite the recommendations in resolution 612 (VII), no efficient measure that might have relaxed the tension in Morocco had been taken; the development of free political institutions for the people of Morocco had been nothing but words on paper. The ever-increasing number of prisoners and political refugees proved irrefutably that the French Government had not endeavoured to solve those problems in an atmosphere of goodwill and mutual confidence but, on the contrary, by means of repression of all civic liberties. That repression was evidenced by an article published in the French newspaper, *Le Monde*, of 12 May 1954 and by the fourteen-Power memorandum (A/2682), wherein it was stated that Morocco had been transformed into a concentration camp and the inhabitants were exposed to indescribable tortures (paragraph 9).

14. The course of events in Morocco in 1954 had proved conclusively that the situation there was unhealthy and that it not only upset the domestic life in Morocco, but also had repercussions in the Arab and Asian countries, as well as in the rest of the world; the situation caused serious fear and concern in France itself. That was evidenced by the fact that the Foreign Affairs Commission of the French National Assembly had last March expressed fear with regard to the possible evolution of events there. The situation of the Moroccan people was also tragic in the economic and social fields; work control and control of salaries were non-existent; there were no laws safeguarding the workers and no provisions to force the employer to insure his employees against work accidents; and pensions and salaries were so low that they could not cover the cost of living. Eighty per cent of the workers had no social security whatsoever. The situation regarding hygiene and education were no more encouraging.

15. The people and Government of Czechoslovakia had always taken the side of oppressed peoples; that was the reason why his delegation had stated on a number of occasions its support of the justified national aspirations of the Moroccan people. His delegation was convinced that the Moroccan question could be solved by peaceful and democratic means in conformity with the spirit of the Charter, because the arbitrary repression of the movement of national liberation of the Moroccan people could only result in new troubles and threaten international peace.

16. For those reasons, his delegation would continue to give its support to any proposal tending towards realization of the rights of the people of Morocco to self-determination.

17. Sheikh AL-FAQIH (Saudi Arabia) said that the situation in Morocco had been deteriorating very rapidly and that the most direct cause for the increasing tension had been the exile of His Majesty the Sultan, Mohammed V, and the attempt on the part of the French authorities in Morocco to suppress the public sentiment on that sensitive nationalistic issue. The representative of Saudi Arabia recalled that two years ago the French Government had sought to find a good excuse for its failure to take any measures intended to develop institutions of genuine self-government in Morocco by claiming that the nationalist Istiqlal Party had formulated extremist demands and that the Sultan had sympathized with those demands. However, as the Sultan had refused to renounce the Istiqlal Party and their nationalistic demands, the French authorities had engineered his deposition and exile. In his stead,

they installed a puppet Sultan who was as incapable as he had been illegitimate and unconstitutional. In him the French had found the perfect agent, since he had abdicated even the sovereign rights and prerogatives that had been reserved to the Sultan in the treaties of Fez and of Algeciras. That action by the French authorities had aggravated an already tense situation. That fact was evidenced by various articles and statements, such as the statement made by Mr. Robert Verdier, representative in the French National Assembly, in the Report on the Parliamentary Mission to Morocco, dated March 1954; the speech made by Mr. Daniel Mayer, president of France's Foreign Affairs Commission, at Brest on 10 May 1954; and an article by Mr. J. A. Jaeger in *Le Monde* on 6 May 1954.

18. His delegation was aware that the present French Government, under the premiership of Mr. Mendès-France, had shown a keen desire in the standing problems of North Africa. The number of steps he had taken with regard to Tunisia had generated some goodwill and confidence among the Tunisian people and their leaders. It was regrettable, however, that in Morocco, where the situation had been deteriorating very rapidly, no steps had been taken by French authorities with a view to creating a similar atmosphere. Indeed, for every step forward taken by the French with respect to Tunisia there had been a step backward in the case of Morocco. Such course of action was neither the right nor the proper one, since it could not lead to satisfactory results and its consequences would harm the interests of all parties concerned. If the French Government seriously wished to create the proper atmosphere and to start successful negotiations, it would be essential that His Majesty the Sultan, Mohammed V, be restored to his throne. Any negotiations with the puppet Sultan or with Moroccans other than the true representatives of the people would lead to no result and could not acquire any legal validity. The only excuse the French Government had given for the deposition of the Sultan was that he had continued to refuse disavowing the demands made by the people's representatives for freedom and complete self-government. France had thought that by banishing him and substituting a puppet in his place they could promulgate the administrative set-up that they had been parading under the label of reform.

19. The representative of Saudi Arabia recalled that, in the course of his speech before the Committee at the eighth session (633rd meeting), he had dealt in great detail with the legal implications under the treaties between Morocco and France, particularly with regard to the deposition of the Sultan. He did not propose to recall those details, but he wished to point out that France itself had admitted the complete sovereignty of Morocco. France could not have it both ways: it could not rely on the treaties when those treaties served its own interests and ignore them when they did not. Although it was not the task of the Committee to decide on the legality or the illegality of the acts of the parties involved in the question, it could not ignore the direct relationship that existed between the action of the French authorities and the chances of successful negotiations between the parties, as contemplated by General Assembly resolution 612 (VII). It was quite evident that France's action in deposing Mohammed V amounted to a flagrant violation of the most important provision of the Treaty of Fez. Moreover, it was a violation of the Act of Algeciras of 1906, the binding character of which had been em-

phasized by the International Court of Justice in its judgment of 27 August 1952. That judgment showed beyond any shadow of doubt the binding character of the triple principle — sovereignty and independence of the Sultan, integrity of his domains, and economic liberty without any inequality — on the signatories, particularly on France. It was regrettable that only one State signatory of the Act of Algeciras—Spain—had protested, as a violation of that treaty, the action of the French Government in deposing the Sultan and had refused to recognize the authority of the new Sultan. Finally, the obligations of the other signatories of the act had been cogently explained in a letter to the editor, in the *Washington Post* of 4 September 1953, by Mr. Adrian Sanford Fisher, who had been the principal agent of the United States Government in arguing the case before the International Court of Justice.

20. Now that fifteen months had elapsed since the French had enthroned the puppet Sultan, it had conclusively been proved that time could not sever the attachment of the Moroccan people to their beloved and popular Sultan, Mohammed V. It was ironic that French judicial traditions and concepts were contradicted and trampled upon as French authorities attempted to lay down new judicial principles and norms to meet the wishes of the colonists in Morocco. In the circumstance, the French Government could do no better than ponder the words of François Mauriac, in an article on the situation in Morocco published in *France Maghreb*, issue of March 1954. Even Mr. Robert Schuman, former Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, had acknowledged in a statement published by *L'Express* on 20 May 1954 that the deposition of the Sultan had been a grave error. However, it was not disgraceful to admit or rectify mistakes. On the contrary, any rectification in that respect would be widely acclaimed in and outside of Morocco and would serve as the best and most complete proof of the good intentions of the French Government concerning Morocco.

21. Aside from regarding the question of constitutionality in the deposition of the Sultan, and taking the allegedly practical place of the question into consideration, the French Government and the French authorities in Morocco had an entirely free hand to set up the stage for the long-promised and overdue reforms; the alleged obstacles had been removed. The Government machinery that had been set up soon after the exile of the legitimate Sultan had been so organized as to afford absolute support to all plans or legislation that might be proposed by the French for Morocco's administration and development. Now that it was almost a year and a half since the French had deposed the Sultan, it was evident that the French authorities had done nothing in that respect, in response to the public demand for self-government, in discharge of their contractual obligations, in recognition of the right of the Moroccans to self-determination as prescribed in the Charter, or in keeping pace with the march of time relative to the attainment of complete independence and sovereignty by the people of the so-called dependent territories — least of all in response to the mild resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1952.

22. The French Government had had its own way. Those representatives who had been confident that France had been planning, if left unmolested, to satisfy

the national aspirations of the Moroccans, had had enough time to ponder France's actions and policies. All indications pointed to the fact that no French Government was prepared to take any measures that would reduce or check the unreasonably excessive powers of the French colonists in Morocco. Thus, if those French colonists were to continue to exercise a kind of veto power over all attempts at working out reasonable plans that would secure for the Moroccan people the rights guaranteed them in the Charter; if all plans were to be worked out on the basis of serving primarily the interests of that group of French colonists, there was neither hope nor justification for the expectation that that question could be solved by negotiations in a peaceful atmosphere.

23. The representative of Saudi Arabia said that he had purposely refrained from dealing with the brutal and oppressive measures that the French authorities had been using in order to suppress the national feelings and aspirations in Morocco as well as in the neighbouring territories in North Africa under French control. While his Government and people had been very seriously disturbed and alarmed at the excessive wholesale abuses inflicted by the French authorities on the people of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, they still hoped that France would have learned by that time that it was in her interests to mend her ways in North Africa and that her administrative and colonial policies must be subjected to a complete overhaul if peace and tranquility were her objective in the whole of that region. Such advice had been offered by many French citizens and friends of France. A good example could be found in the article written by Justice Douglas in *Look* magazine of 19 October 1954.

24. It was in the hope that the French Government might still be willing to entertain such bold political action that his delegation had joined with others in submitting the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.122/Corr.1). It sincerely appealed to the Committee to support that mild resolution, as it appealed to the French Government to reconsider its present policy in Morocco with a view to seeking a just and fair solution to the problem, along the lines of resolution 612 (VII) and the present joint draft resolution.

25. Mr. BARRINGTON (Burma) said that the Moroccan question had become a hardy perennial. Each year it could be concluded that no progress toward its solution had been made. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to take the attitude that there was no use in going over it again. Morocco represented a human issue, the desire of millions for freedom and self-government. Although there had been no progress in the General Assembly, the situation in Morocco was not static. The drive for independence there was growing, and the failure of the Assembly to take note of the trend would not prevent the onward march of events.

26. It appeared from the attitude of the French that the lesson of Indo-China had not been learned. The Moroccan question concerned not only France and Morocco, but also the whole world, as had been the case for Indo-China. Accordingly, quite apart from legal considerations, the matter was not one of domestic jurisdiction.

27. The absence of France represented a refusal to try to settle the dispute by peaceful means. France had much to gain and nothing to lose by co-operation. How-

ever, any sympathy for France caused by criticism in the absence of its delegation was misplaced, for France was absent through its own choice. It claimed the protection of Article 2 (7) of the United Nations Charter. Burma regarded that claim as invalid and suspected that France was absent because the Moroccan case was unanswerable.

28. By the Treaty of Algieras France had recognized the sovereignty and independence of the Sultan but had, in violation of that treaty, imposed a protectorate. By the Protectorate Treaty France agreed to protect the Sultan and his successors and to keep internal sovereignty unimpaired. In violation of that treaty, France had converted Morocco into a colony and proceeded to govern for the benefit of the French colonists rather than for the indigenous population. At that time such practices were normal among colonial Powers. It was startling, however, that the French Government at present continued such policies. The Sultan had been deposed and banished because of his desire to see reforms introduced and the right of self-determination assured to his people. It should be no surprise that as a result Morocco was in a state of ferment. Continuance of the situation would result in a threat to the peace and security of the whole area. Those who claimed that France had the situation under control should remember what had happened in Indo-China, where France supposedly had had the situation in hand.

29. The human aspect of the Moroccan question was most distressing, for it was clear that in Morocco France was pursuing the opposite of the liberal concepts of liberty, equality and fraternity. That policy was based on discrimination and was designed to perpetuate domination by the small French minority over the majority of the indigenous population. Normally, when colonial questions were discussed before the United Nations, the principle of self-determination had been accepted by all as the ultimate objective; only the timing had been questioned. However, in the case of Morocco, the French Government did not wish the Moroccans to advance politically, because that would endanger the position of the colonists.

30. The problem had something in common with the case of the racial situation in South Africa, which the General Assembly had affirmed its competence to deal with; it had even appointed a commission in the hope of finding a solution for it. A commission was not sought in the case of Morocco. The draft resolution (A/C.1/L.122/Corr.1) merely asked France to seek to create an atmosphere conducive to peaceful settlement and to take part in negotiations. There could hardly be any other way of dealing with the situation in order to find a solution conforming to the purposes and principles of the Charter.

31. Mr. ALEFI (Afghanistan) said that the question of Morocco concerned the desire of a people for liberty and self-determination. That desire had the sanction of world public opinion and of the United Nations Charter. It was to be hoped that the French Government and people would take appropriate measures in time to avoid much misery.

32. The Moroccan people were not backward politically or socially, and it could not be argued that they were unable to manage their own affairs. The argument that Morocco needed guidance for the technical development of its human and economic resources should

not deprive the people of their liberties. If that argument were to be accepted, it would follow that only economically developed and technically advanced countries would have the right to independence and, further, that such advanced countries would have the right and responsibility to manage the affairs of the backward areas. That argument had already been used dangerously, and the people of France had themselves been its victims. The sacrifices of the Second World War had not, however, been in vain, and a new era had arrived. Many new nations had been born in Asia and Africa, and it would be unwise to resist the tide of freedom.

33. It could not be argued that Morocco was politically immature. It had one of the longest histories of political independence in the world quite apart from its social and cultural achievements. At the end of the nineteenth century, if a country was socially and politically developed but technically backward, it could fall victim to colonialism. At the turn of the century, Morocco had been a widely coveted prize. The external conflicting interests had brought pressures to bear on the social, political, economic and financial structure of Morocco and caused it to fall.

34. Nations interested in commerce in Morocco had had special treaty relations under which their merchants and citizens enjoyed special privileges, including exemption from taxes, and their own civil and criminal courts. Indeed, even Moroccan citizens could obtain such privileges by purchasing consular protection from treaty powers, thereby diverting moneys that should have gone to the public treasury. As a result, the public services suffered and the machinery of state was weakened. French diplomacy had sought to isolate Morocco by making deals with other interested Governments. The Sultan had then accepted the protection of France, which, as far as he was concerned, proved to be illusory: his outraged people forced him to abdicate. The people of Morocco never ratified the treaty nor accepted the spirit of the protectorate.

35. Whatever might be the economic and other benefits conferred by the protectorate on Morocco, they would not be reason to deprive the people of their right of self-determination. No such argument had been made by the British in the case of India, where their material achievements had been monumental. Doubtless there were legitimate French interests in Morocco about which the French were anxious. But there was no reason to suppose that such interests would not be compatible with aspirations of the people. They could be given due consideration in negotiations for a just settlement. Such settlements had been made in the cases of other interested countries.

36. In the opinion of the delegation of Afghanistan, there were certain steps preliminary to a settlement. The Sultan should be brought back from exile to resume his spiritual and temporal leadership. There should also be an amnesty for all political prisoners and exiles and the restoration of civil liberties. Such actions would create a climate conducive to further negotiations.

37. The delegation of Afghanistan had therefore cosponsored the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.122/Corr.1), which it commended to the Committee.

38. Mrs. WIERNIA (Poland) said that repression had been unable to inhibit the legitimate aspirations

of the Moroccan people for independence, and it was the duty of the United Nations to contribute to the fulfilment of those aspirations. It was particularly necessary because the situation continued to deteriorate and French policy took no account of the rights of the people or the recommendations of the United Nations. Although it had been repeatedly stated that France intended to negotiate with a view to introducing reforms, the reforms contemplated were designed to strengthen the position of the French colonists. Such a settlement would not bring about a relaxation in tension or serve to restore friendly relations. The responsible authorities were not trying to settle the problem in a manner that would respect the rights of the Moroccan people to self-determination. They continued to treat Morocco as a colony, and the result was serious friction.

39. The Moroccans wished to regain the independence they had lost by the Treaty of Fez. The French Administration had prevented them from taking part in the government of their country and had based its policy on the exploitation of the economy of Morocco. Such economic and political conditions had given rise to growing opposition, which had been met by increased repressions.

40. One aspect of the problem that had contributed to frustrating any settlement in conformity with the interests of these nations was the network of United States bases in North Africa. The airfields in Morocco were regarded as able to control regions of great strategic importance such as the Ukraine because bombers based there could deliver bombs on Soviet territory.

41. One of the tasks of the United Nations was to encourage conditions in which peoples could acquire independence. The Moroccan people's rights should therefore be supported. The Polish delegation would support any resolution that would endeavour to improve the situation in Morocco and give support to the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.122/Corr.1).

42. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) said his delegation believed that the peaceful development of free political institutions capable of fulfilling the aspirations of the Moroccan people would benefit both France and Morocco and promote the principles of the United Nations. The Assembly ought, however, to consider what it could do to facilitate reaching that goal and avoid defeating its own purpose. In the United States view, that goal would best be obtained through co-operative efforts of the peoples and the Governments of France and Morocco. The United States therefore did not intend to support a draft resolution at this time. Although there was some language in the twelve-Power draft (A/C.1/L.122/Corr.1) that would hinder progress in negotiations, there were also sentiments that the United States approved.

43. There was no hesitation about answering affirmatively the question of the representative of Iraq (746th meeting) as to whether the United States still adhered to President Eisenhower's declaration of 29 June in support of the principles of self-government. Nevertheless, passage of resolutions would be inadvisable at the present. The United States believed that the French Government was making a sincere effort. While there might come a time when a resolution might be appropriate, the present appeared to be an era of action rather than exhortation.

44. The United States believed that progress toward self-government for Morocco could best be achieved by direct negotiations, as recommended by General Assembly resolution 612 (VII). That method was being applied with great promise of success in the case of Tunisia, where negotiations were taking place in an atmosphere of conciliation and confidence. Evidence of the ability of the two sides to act together had recently been shown by the joint initiative inducing rebel elements to lay down their arms. Matters were moving more slowly in Morocco, because the situation was much more complex. Terrorism and violence were to be deplored, for they made progress difficult. However, the United States believed that the example of Tunisia would commend itself to both France and Morocco, and it also seemed to be the best approach for advancing the United Nations principles.

45. Mr. ZARUBIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation could not share the view that the United Nations ought not to deal with the Moroccan question, which had been included in the agenda of the seventh session by a large majority. The Treaty of Fez of 1912 might have limited the action of Morocco in its external affairs, but it made no mention of means to settle disputes between Morocco and France. Under the Act of Algeiras of 1906, Morocco had retained its sovereignty, and indeed the International Court of Justice in its opinion of 27 August 1952 stated that even under the protectorate Morocco retained the characteristics of State sovereignty. In addition to France and Spain, other Governments, including those of the United States, Great Britain and Russia, signed the Act of 1906, which thereby became a multilateral agreement binding Morocco to several States. The Treaty of 1912 did not strip Morocco of its sovereignty nor preclude United Nations discussion. Moreover, the United Nations could derive the right to examine the Moroccan situation from the provisions of Chapter XI, which permitted intervention whenever there were violations on the part of Powers administering Non-Self-Governing Territories, especially when there might be a threat to the peace. The assertion that the question of Morocco was a domestic affair was intended only to divert attention.

46. The resolution passed at the seventh session called for negotiations and appealed to the parties to refrain from measures that might aggravate the situation. Events since that time had culminated in the deposition of the Sultan, and the situation had become more acute. In August 1953, fifteen States had requested the Security Council to examine the situation as a threat to peace and security, but, because of the support given to France by the United States and the United Kingdom, the Security Council was unable to take any notice of the plea. At the eighth session of the General Assembly the matter had been discussed but the resolution submitted by the First Committee (A/2526, paragraph 11) was not adopted because some delegations claimed that resolution 612 (VII) was still in effect and that the results of the negotiations should be awaited. That position had proved unjustified. Tensions in Morocco had grown, and France had disregarded the resolution. The evidence showed that the situation in Morocco had reached a point where its continuance might threaten the peace.

47. The French Administration was frustrating the rights of the Moroccan people to self-determination

and was strengthening its economic domination. Rather than promote the political advancement of the Moroccan people, the French administration resorted to repression. Mr. Lacoste, the Resident-General, had announced some new measures for the participation of Moroccans in municipal government, to be extended to wider areas later, and the establishment of a council of Moroccans to study reforms. Such measures would not fulfil the aspirations of the people for sovereignty and independence. They were merely concessions in municipal, education and similar matters that would really strengthen the position of the colonists. Moreover, the Moroccans to be consulted would be appointed and not elected. Even when making the announcement, Mr. Lacoste had drawn attention to the repressive measures and indicated that they would continue.

48. The Soviet Union delegation, in accordance with the policy of the Soviet State, which recognized the rights of all peoples to self-determination, supported the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.122/Corr.1) because it made recommendations for negotiations that would safeguard the legitimate rights of the Moroccan people.

49. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) expressed his appreciation of the answer made by the United States representative to the question he had raised at the previous meeting. There remained, however, a number of points in the United States attitude. The Moroccan question had first been brought up three years ago, and since then it had always been said that France should have time for reforms. Time had been allowed, but in three years no positive steps had been taken; the situation

had worsened particularly since the deposition of the Sultan. If assurances could be given that France would take positive steps, that would be satisfactory, for that was what was desired. The French intentions, however, seemed to be rather different, for when Mr. René Mayer said in the French National Assembly that Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco would continue to be the only Moslem areas without independence, he was widely applauded by the non-communist members of the National Assembly, including the Prime Minister. Assurances were needed that that attitude would be given up. Some cause for hope was necessary.

50. The Sultan should be restored and negotiations should be started. Repression should be brought to an end. Otherwise the prestige of the United Nations would be damaged and there would be a risk that the Moroccans would lose all hope and turn to violence. A favourable atmosphere was needed, but all the effort could not come from one side. The only way out was for France to take positive steps, and she had shown no intention of so doing.

51. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) said there was no question of a lack of consideration for the Moroccan people. Far from being hopeless, the situation seemed one in which there was a lot of hope. While Mr. Lodge believed that the report of the French debate did not fully reflect the true situation, he could not give assurances concerning another Government's position. The United States, however, had been greatly impressed by the vigour of the Prime Minister of France, both in other problems and in connexion with Tunisia.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.