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 at 10.30 a.m.

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CONTENTS

	Page
Agenda item 56:	
The Morocco question (<i>continued</i>)	521

Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Johnson (Canada), Vice-Chairman, presided.

AGENDA ITEM 56

**The Morocco question (A/2682, A/C.1/L.122/
 Corr.1) (*continued*)**

1. Mr. MIR KHAN (Pakistan) said his delegation had always regretted the refusal of the French delegation to be present at the discussions. Its absence had not been conducive to the interests of the Committee or of France itself.

2. At its seventh session the General Assembly had adopted resolution 612 (VII), which referred to the development of "the free political institutions of the people of Morocco". At the eighth session, however, the Assembly had felt unable to reiterate that idea and had rejected the draft resolution recommended by the First Committee (A/2526, para. 11), which had appealed for the reduction of tension and affirmed the right of the people of Morocco to free democratic political institutions. At the 455th plenary meeting of the General Assembly the representative of Pakistan had expressed surprise at the General Assembly's decision, which had been a backward step. Pakistan had, however, waited without too much optimism until August 1954: then, as the Government of France had taken no effective steps to further the fundamental interests of the Moroccan people, and representations in favour of the return of the deposed Sultan had been answered with force, fourteen delegations had been constrained to approach the United Nations once again.

3. The appointment of a new Resident-General, a person who had at one time served as representative of the United Nations and who therefore was familiar with the debates on colonialism, had been welcomed, as had the steps that the new Prime Minister of France had been said to be taking. His early statements had indeed reflected a greater awareness of the danger. Unfortunately, although common sense and moderation had won a victory in Tunisia according to *The New York Times* of 9 December 1954, Morocco had not even been mentioned in the statement of Mr. Mendès-France before the General Assembly on 22 November 1954 (498th meeting). According to a French Minister, anarchy reigned in Morocco: if the worst type of colonialism continued to delay the solution of the Morocco question, and if violence broke out all the

benefits of whatever progress had been made in Tunisia might be lost.

4. The representative of France had announced during the recent general debate that France was intending to summon Morocco progressively to the management of its affairs within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty. However, that sovereignty would have to be transferred fairly soon or else despair might drive the Moroccan people to senseless and irrational action. A widely respected newspaper had recently said that the French settlers, some of the banking interests involved and the ruling classes in the colonies were preventing France from showing sufficient flexibility to make the change from colonialism to a policy in conformity with the high ideals of the French people. He hoped that before long France would announce that another great chapter of its glorious history had been written.

5. The root of the evil was an overestimation of the immediate interests of the French settlers in Morocco and Tunisia to the detriment of the larger interests of France. The *Economist* had pointed out on 4 December that there would be many compensations for the metropolitan country if France clarified its policy in the French Union and concentrated less on assimilation and more on self-government. If France recognized the right of self-determination in North Africa, French commercial and financial interests could be preserved. The time had gone when political and military power alone could serve that purpose, for colonialism was either a thing of the past or an object of violent dislike.

6. In the colonies that had achieved independence at an early stage, the former colonial Power had been able to expand commercial and financial relations; he quoted the example of the United Kingdom in its relations with India and Pakistan. On the other hand, the more persistently a colonial Power clung to its hold, the less kindly the colony would later be disposed towards it. France should not delay if it wished to avoid creating dislike among Moroccans, a dislike that would later spread to countries that were suspected by Moroccans of favouring the continuation of colonialism.

7. Financial interests in mining, commerce and industry in Morocco could be classified into three groups: the Protestant Banks, including the Banque de l'Union Parisienne and its subsidiary, the Compagnie Marocaine (industry, mining, electric power, railways and ports, agriculture and the wine industry) and the Banque Industrielle de l'Afrique du Nord (domestic and foreign trade); the Rothschild group, represented by the Société Pennaroya and its subsidiary the Société des Chemins de Fer du Nord, (lead-mining, shipping and other industries); and finally, the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, through its subsidiaries, (cobalt and asbestos, metallurgy, agricultural machinery and general commerce).

8. Those financial interests, while making profits themselves, had brought a measure of economic and commercial development to Morocco, as well as to Tunisia and Algeria. No one knew whether the participation of those financial interests in the economic life of the country would be acceptable to an independent Moroccan people; but in an under-developed country, even in Pakistan, capital was always welcome and was entitled to its share of profits. In that connexion, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development might play a part in the dissociation of the financial interests of France from French political control and so establish them on a more stable basis: if all the parties concerned agreed, the capital involved could be handed over to the International Bank as a loan and so would cease to have a political significance. In that way the industrial and commercial investments would come under the control and administrative machinery of the Bank, which would transfer profits and dividends to the French banks, whose prospects would no longer be dependent on the political control of France over Morocco.

9. Such an arrangement, which would certainly be more acceptable to the Moroccans and might also be considered in the case of Tunisia and Algeria, presupposed that the Bank and the British and American banks that supplied it with capital would agree to study a new venture of that kind. The venture would not only assist in the development of an under-developed country but would help to improve the political situation to the mutual benefit of both France and the countries of North Africa. He hoped that some vested interests would ultimately realize that such an arrangement would make for the stability of investments and of profits. Secondly, the conclusion of a long-term agreement by which French capital in Morocco or Tunisia would be placed on a non-colonial basis, through the intervention of the International Bank, could not be achieved without consultations with the true representatives of the population, who should be associated with the venture.

10. His delegation hoped that the idea would appeal to the French, to the Moroccans and to the Bank. A free Morocco, under the control of its true representatives, would one day develop its economic resources in accordance with its national genius. He hoped that a free Morocco would find it useful to form an association with France, based on mutual goodwill and on freedom, by which France could play an important part in the economic development of Morocco.

11. In his recent address to the General Assembly, Mr. Mendès-France had described the United Nations as the cradle of peace. That was the reason why the Morocco question had been brought before the United Nations; those in whose power it lay to bring peace to the Moroccan people in the near future should accept the solemn exhortations of the General Assembly and show Morocco the way to independence and progress. By accomplishing in Morocco what he believed it was endeavouring to do in Tunisia, France would earn the gratitude of 10 million Moroccans and be true to its great traditions.

12. Mr. RAMADAN (Egypt) said that his delegation had hoped to see a tendency in French policy that would lead to the settlement of the Morocco question in an atmosphere of goodwill. But France had not even respected the fundamental freedoms mentioned in resolution 612 (VII).

13. Admittedly, the accession to power of Mr. Mendès-France had given rise to some hopes, for, in an article in *Le Figaro* of 12-13 June 1954, Mr. Mendès-France had stated that through police violence the claims of the more advanced sections of the population had taken on a rebellious tone and nationalist passions had been aroused in the masses. Furthermore, after the bloodthirsty repressive measures of August 1953, the appointment of Mr. Lacoste, a liberal, as Resident-General had appeared to be a favourable sign. On 2 August 1954, Mr. Mendès-France had said that disorder must not be used as a pretext for avoiding a political settlement of the problem.

14. Unfortunately, the hope that there would be no need to take the Morocco question up again had been disappointed. Egypt had been compelled to remind France of its promises. It was necessary to follow a constructive policy of agreement with the true representatives of the country; any delay would be prejudicial to France's own interests.

15. It was a fact that the influence, the pressure and the demands of the French settlers were steadily increasing, and in the defence of a system of privilege infinitely more scandalous than the system of capitulations, they were opposing every liberal policy, to the detriment of Franco-Moroccan co-operation and hence of the higher interests of France.

16. In an article published on 21 May 1954 in *Paris-Presse-L'Intransigeant*, Mr. Jacques Chastenet had explored the fact that too many Frenchmen considered Morocco as a colony to be exploited and the Moroccans as an inferior race incapable even of producing good skilled labour. Marshal Lyautey had stated that French institutions had no place in Morocco and that the French could have only professional representatives in that country.

17. Mr. William O. Douglas, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, in an article published in *Look* magazine of 19 October 1954, had stated that Morocco's entire economy was based on discrimination and that there were, for example, only about two dozen primary schools for the Moors in Morocco.

18. A study of that deplorable situation had to take into account certain essential facts: the Act of Algeciras and the Treaty of Fez; France's violation of the obligations undertaken in Article 2 of the Charter and, lastly, the violation of the individual rights and fundamental freedoms of the Moroccan people by the French Administration.

19. Morocco's sovereignty and legal capacity in international law had been recognized by the Treaty of Fez in 1912 and reaffirmed by the decision of the International Court of Justice of 27 August 1952, in the case concerning the rights of United States nationals. France did not dispute that Morocco had retained its personality in international law and had remained a sovereign State under the protectorate. Yet France had deposed the Sultan, in such flagrant violation of article III of the Treaty of Fez that one of the Ministers, Mr. Mitterrand, had felt it his duty to resign. The Sultan was so well beloved by his subjects, to whom he symbolized their national aspirations, that in France itself many protests had been made, in particular by François

¹ Case concerning rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, Judgment of 27 August 1952: I.C.J. reports 1952, p. 176.

Mauriac and Professor Massignon, against that misdeed and act of injustice, which was bound to breed violence. In spite of the hopes placed in it, the Mendès-France Government had used force to put down the demonstrations of August 1954. Nevertheless, Sultan Mulai Ben Youssef continued to hold temporal and spiritual power, as the council of the Ulemas had affirmed in a letter to the new Resident-General. On 26 October 1954, *Le Monde* had reported that the Minister for Tunisian and Moroccan Affairs had received Dr. Du-bois-Roquebert upon his return from Madagascar, where he had met the Sultan—who purportedly continued to refuse to abdicate, even as he had refused to do at the time of his deportation, maintaining that he had a divine and temporal mission recognized by the people. According to Mr. Douglas' article in *Look* magazine, the Moroccan people had been outraged by the long-premeditated plot against the Sultan, especially as the break had occurred over reforms to be introduced in Morocco.

20. France's main obligation under the treaties was to help Morocco to govern itself. Mr. Charles-André Julien had recently expressed regret that direct rule had taken the place of supervision (*Le Monde*, 20 July 1954). As early as 1920, Lyautey had condemned that deterioration of the protectorate, although he himself had left his successors a country under French authority rather than under French trusteeship. In an article published in the *Revue Politique et Parlementaire* (July 1954) Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil had written that, though technically advanced, Morocco had remained at the mediaeval stage politically, and that centralization frustrated all the efforts made at the beginning of the protectorate to enable the youth to participate in the administration. It was clear that drastic and prompt changes were needed.

21. Another feature of French policy had been the establishment of an artificial division between the Arabs and the Berbers. It was true that the Berbers were the original inhabitants of the country, but after living together for a thousands years Arabs and Berbers were closely connected. As *Le Monde* of 24 August 1954 had written, although there might be a Berber soul, there was no such thing as a Berber political consciousness. Morocco had been the crucible in which the national consciousness had been formed, and it was not in France's interests to exploit internal divisions, particularly as any such attempt was doomed to failure.

22. The Moroccan people had been deprived of the most elementary democratic rights, in particular the freedom of expression. In the bloody repression that had followed the demonstrations of August 1954, during which the chiefs of the Istiqlal party had been exiled, the sole concern of the Mendès-France Government had been to restore order and to protect the Europeans. Fifteen thousand political prisoners were being held in Morocco. Yet, as seventy-five Frenchmen in Morocco had stated in a letter to the President of the Republic, repression alone would not solve the problem (article by Mr. Sellier in *Actualités* of 19 May 1954).

23. Reporting on the Oujda trial, Mr. Maurice Garçon had written in *Le Monde* of 7 December 1954 that he had learned that forty-five Moroccans had been imprisoned in a cell of nine square metres without being charged with a crime and that fourteen of them had died. He had added that if those facts were true, those responsible should be brought to justice.

24. In France itself, protests had been heard against the repressive measures, which were contrary to the policy of collaboration with the population and mutual trust on which French achievements in Morocco had been based. The Archbishop of Lyons had recently stated that the people should rid themselves of prejudices that were unworthy of human beings, especially Christians.

25. A radical solution was needed since the unrest might have serious consequences. The United Nations could play an important part in that regard by recommending that negotiations should be undertaken in a favourable atmosphere. France should abide by its own principles. In a recent speech before the National Assembly, Mr. Mendès-France had stated that the situation had eased in the rural areas and in almost all the towns of Morocco. In view of its close ties with Morocco, Egypt hoped that as a result of the statement a favourable atmosphere for negotiations between France and the true representatives of Morocco would be created.

26. All nations that supported the principles of the Charter, and in particular the right of peoples to self-determination—to which so many references had been made in the recent discussion—would surely support the draft resolution before the Committee (A/C.1/L.122/Corr.1).

27. The ten sponsoring delegations would give favourable consideration to any suggestion designed to make their draft resolution as widely acceptable as possible.

28. Mr. HANIFAH (Indonesia) expressed the hope that the United Nations would not fail to reaffirm its principles in response to the appeal that the people of Morocco, fighting for their fundamental rights and freedoms, had addressed to it for the fourth consecutive year.

29. At its eighth session the United Nations had not recognized the right of the Moroccan people to self-determination; it had refused to reiterate its appeal for a relaxation of tension and denied the Moroccans the right to free democratic political institutions. It was to be hoped, however, that such a repudiation of the Charter would not be repeated. As the Syrian representative had stated at the 745th meeting, the right of peoples to self-determination had recently been vigorously defended by those delegations which in the preceding year had not been able to recognize that the people of Morocco had that right.

30. Although the situation in the General Assembly had improved, Morocco itself was caught in a vicious circle of repression and terror. At the 455th plenary meeting, on 3 November 1953, after the resolution concerning Morocco (A/2526, paragraph 11) had been rejected, Mr. Zafrullah Khan had predicted that attempts to block the aspirations of a people would lead only to violence.

31. So long as Morocco, a sovereign State, continued to be treated as a French colony, the United Nations would remain responsible for the situation. No negotiations had been held with the true representatives of the Moroccan people. Sultan Mohammed Ben Youssef remained in exile, against the wishes of his people. Martial law, proclaimed forty years earlier, was still in force. There were fifteen thousand exiles and political prisoners held without trial, and their number was constantly increasing. An unarmed population was

being subjected to military repression. Hence, the situation in Morocco had changed only for the worse.

32. France's continued absence reflected no credit on that traditional champion of the very ideals to which the First Committee was now appealing. Perhaps the "disgust" felt by Mr. Mendès-France on his return from North Africa would lead to positive results.

33. The Syrian representative had again surveyed the well-known background of the Moroccan question, which remained intimately linked with the maintenance of peace and security. In an article in the 19 October 1954 issue of *Look*, Justice Douglas had stated that Morocco was another Indo-China in the making, and that, unless the policy was reversed and drastic reforms introduced, Morocco would explode with a violence that only Africa knew. He had added that, although French military might could keep Morocco under control for long, only bold political action could save the day.

34. Confronted with the danger of a conflagration that would sweep not only over Africa and Asia but over Europe as well, a situation that constituted a threat to peace and security, the United Nations had to act before it was compelled to deal with an actual breach of the peace. The Charter called for evolution, not revolution, and the United Nations was an instrument for preserving peace and not for restoring it. The lessons of Geneva afforded ample evidence for that fact.

35. Moreover, human rights and fundamental freedoms were also involved, for Moroccans were denied the freedom of speech, of assembly and of the Press. Justice Douglas, in his article in *Look*, after paying a tribute to the material accomplishments of France in Morocco, affirmed that the French had fastened a milking machine on Morocco and that, except for a few pashas whom the French had corrupted, the Moroccans derived no profit from the development programme of which the French were so proud. The industrial power, the choice lands and the mines—except for the nationalized phosphates—were in French hands. In the villages, the Moors were serfs living in misery, and in the cities the slums were in sharp contrast with the modern apartments into which the bulk of the housing funds had gone. Similarly, the industrialization programme was designed for the exclusive benefit of the French. The nationality of the worker determined his wage, and education was reserved for the French while the schools for Moroccans were miserable. Justice Douglas had thus learned in Morocco the meaning of colonialism and of a racial discrimination designed to exalt the French "protectors" at the expense of the Moroccans. According to Justice Douglas, the lash was the symbol of French rule, and the torture of prisoners was a common practice. It was therefore hardly surprising that Mr. Mendès-France felt disgusted. The French frequently opened fire on peaceful Moroccans, thousands of whom were in prison without ever having been charged.

36. In view of those facts, recounted by an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court and by many other visitors, the States Members of the United Nations had to express their concern by acts. The Moroccan question was not only an item that appeared regularly on the agenda; it involved the rights of human beings and could not be approached from any allegedly "practical" angle.

37. Moreover, the question was a colonial problem that would inevitably impede the promotion of friendly relations between nations on the basis of mutual understanding and co-operation. Colonialism always bred unrest and dissension.

38. The Moroccan people had awakened and knew that sooner or later, with the support of over half of the world's population, their rights would be recognized. By contrast, those who opposed their aspirations would only incur hatred. Unfortunately, the problem divided the entire world into the foes of colonialism and those wishing to preserve it or consenting to its preservation.

39. It was unnecessary for the Indonesian delegation to appeal for an end of colonialism, as that system was in any case doomed. The only question was whether it would end while some goodwill subsisted or only after revolution and suffering. Unless wiser counsel prevailed in France, Morocco might become another Indo-China. That was why France should act in conformity with its won liberal tradition and with the Principles and Purposes of the United Nations Charter.

40. It was because of its conviction that the appeal would not be in vain that the Indonesian delegation joined in the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/L.122/Corr.1), which was a moderate proposal asking only for the indispensable minimum: negotiations between the representatives of the Moroccan people and the Government of France for the realization of the legitimate aspirations of the Moroccan people.

41. The Indonesian delegation hoped that the First Committee, in step with the spirit of the times, would adopt that reasonable and just recommendation by an overwhelming majority and that France would take due cognizance of the legitimate aspirations of the Moroccan people; those aspirations would be attained in any event, but only France could ensure a peaceful solution.

42. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) said that France could no longer claim that the Morocco question was exclusively within its domestic jurisdiction. Morocco's sovereign rights were recognized by international law. The International Court of Justice, in its judgment of 27 August 1952, had ruled that the Act of Algiers of 7 April 1906, which recognized the sovereignty and independence of the Sultan, the integrity of his domain and the principle of economic liberty for all the Powers, was still binding on the signatories.

43. Moreover, the Morocco question had acquired such an international character that ten Member States had felt impelled to place it on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly. It was a source of regret that France was not represented in the debate, which, he hoped, would assist the French Government in finding a solution. It was better to attend United Nations debates and reach a peaceful solution based on the principles of the Charter than to engage in active repression that might lead to an outcome akin to that reached at Geneva on the question of Indo-China.

44. The lesson of Indo-China was certainly bitter and should not be repeated in Morocco. In that connexion, it was interesting to read the report of an interview given by Mr. Malcolm Macdonald, the United Kingdom Commissioner-General in South-East Asia, which had appeared in the issue of *U.S. News & World Report* published on 3 December 1954. Mr. Malcolm MacDonald had said that Anglo-American support for Asian nationalism had led the people of that area

to regard the United States and the United Kingdom as much better friends than the Communist States.

45. Mr. MacDonald had added, however, that Indo-China had been lost because France had not succeeded in winning over the nationalist movement of the country. The loss of Indo-China had been due not to a military but to a political defeat. Concessions to Indo-Chinese nationalism had not been made soon enough. If they had been, the nationalists would not have been subjected to Communist domination. If the French had adopted the necessary political measures and had taken sufficient military action they could have been victorious in 1953.

46. Two conclusions could be drawn from that interview: first, that by granting independence to India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, the Philippines and Indonesia, the Western world had ensured its own good relations with those free and independent States. The second conclusion was that delay in making political concessions in Indo-China had thrust France into a tragic enterprise that had ended with the loss of an important part of Indo-China to the free world. Justice Douglas of the United States Supreme Court had stated in that connexion that Morocco was another Indo-China in the making, and that, unless French policy was reversed and drastic reforms were introduced, Morocco would explode with unprecedented violence. It was plain that reactionary policy inevitably led to revolution, whether in Indo-China or in Morocco.

47. Morocco was one of the most ancient and civilized nations of the world. It had been independent for over a thousand years. The Moroccans had contributed to the development of science, art, philosophy and literature, and had played an important part in international relations. Morocco had been one of the first States to recognize the independence of the United States of America.

48. Marshal Lyautey had expressed his esteem for the Moroccan qualities of capacity for hard work, intelligence and pride. He had often said that in Morocco France found itself face to face with a people jealous of its independence and hostile to any form of submission. Until a short time previously Morocco had been considered a duly constituted State, with its hierarchy of government officials, its foreign diplomatic missions and its religious, social and economic organizations, which still existed despite the collapse of the central Government. Marshal Lyautey had concluded that the French should take into account the existence of those political, religious and economic groups and should treat them as partners in the task France had undertaken in Morocco.

49. Yet the Moroccan people had been conquered by France, according to the most refined classical methods of imperialism, by means of secret agreements and the application of the maxim *divide et impera*. Six years after the Act of Algenciras, by which the independence and sovereignty of the Sultan had been recognized, Morocco had been invaded and occupied and the Sultan had been forced to sign the Protectorate Treaty of 1912. The signatory Powers of the Act of Algenciras had made no opposition, because they had granted one another, under secret treaties, reciprocal compensation at the expense of weaker States. In return for a free hand in Morocco, France had made concessions to Spain, Germany, Great Britain and Italy in other territories. The Sultan's sovereignty had become nominal, and his empire had been divided into three parts, while

the commercial equality stipulated by the Act of Algenciras had given way to French domination.

50. The United States of America had instituted proceedings before the International Court of Justice concerning that commercial equality, which had ceased to exist as a result of the Protectorate Treaty of 1912. The Court had stated in its judgment of 27 August 1952 that the principle of commercial equality had been intended to be of a binding character and that the establishment of the French Protectorate over Morocco had not involved any modification in that respect. The Court had added that Morocco even under the Protectorate had retained its personality as a State in international law. In arriving at those conclusions the Court had upheld the contentions of the United States, which meant that France, in abolishing the principle of commercial equality between the Powers, had violated the provisions of the Act of Algenciras.

51. Speaking on the scope of French reforms in Morocco, he also referred to the article that had appeared in the periodical *Look* on 19 October 1954. Justice Douglas had stated in that article that the French had done good things in Morocco: they had built highways and railways and had installed the telephone and telegraph. There were good French hotels almost everywhere. Factories had been built and public health measures introduced. Malaria had been eradicated. Lastly, the French had developed agriculture and reafforestation. But those accomplishments had rooted the French in Morocco so deeply that they were determined never to leave. Furthermore, the Moroccans had not benefited from the progress achieved. On the land, they worked as manual labourers, earning the equivalent of 50 cents a day and living in mud huts. They were undernourished, and the incidence of tuberculosis was so high that the French did not dare to publish the figures. The town of Casablanca had grown very rapidly. The French inhabitants of the town lived in modern apartments, while the Moroccans lived in slums locally known as *bidonvilles* or "oil-can towns". Apart from a textile mill in which the Moroccans received the same wages as French workers in France, Moroccans and Jews were usually paid less than French workers for equal work.

52. Justice Douglas had found that the French had established in Morocco an economic system based on discrimination. Education was also reserved for the French. In all Morocco, there were only about two dozen primary schools for Moroccans. France did not want them to be educated. The French employed children, who were forced, on pain of whipping, to do piece-work for between 20 and 50 cents a day. Lastly, he had added that the torture of prisoners was a common practice in Morocco.

53. In those circumstances it was not surprising that the peoples of Morocco, led by their Sultan Mohammed Ben Youssef, were demanding reforms and independence. The case had been brought before the United Nations nearly four years previously. At that time Mr. Robert Schuman, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, had asked the United Nations not to intervene so that France might be left free to carry out reforms. A year had passed, but nothing had been done. In 1952 the Asian-African group of States had again raised the issue. A resolution had been adopted expressing the hope that the parties concerned would solve the problem by negotiation. France, however, had taken no positive steps. Instead, it had deposed the

Sultan of Morocco in August 1953, in violation of article III of the Protectorate Treaty, which provide that France should in all circumstances lend the Sultan constant support. By that act, France had also interfered with the religious life of the Moroccan people, for the Sultan was his people's spiritual as well as temporal leader.

54. He considered the motives for the Sultan's deposition. Justice Douglas, in the article published in *Look*, had said that the Sultan had had a programme for the independence of his country—a programme safeguarding the French settlers against expropriation—to come into force after a certain lapse of time, about twenty years. In the meantime, the Sultan had intended to develop education, to build up a free press and to establish freedom of association. He had called for a parliament composed of Moroccans and Frenchmen who were Moroccan citizens. He had planned free municipal elections, with French representation in the towns where the French had made large investments. The programme had called for the separation of the judicial and legislative powers and for the formation of free trade unions uninfluenced by the Communists.

55. The tactics employed by the French against the Sultan before the latter's deposition had been not only unjust but illegal. They had employed puppets who had stirred up a movement of agitation against the Sultan himself. In August 1953 the Sultan had therefore written to the President of the French Republic to draw attention to the serious consequences that such manoeuvres might have on Franco-Moroccan relations. He had stated that the reprimand of a pasha accused of extortion in December 1950 had led to intrigues that, encouraged by some French authorities, had resulted in the establishment of an artificial and allegedly Francophile opposition to the Sultan. He had pointed out that it was strange that the members of that opposition should enjoy wide support among the local press and be able to organize public demonstration while the French authorities were still maintaining martial law in Morocco. He had said that the self-avowed aim of the opposition was to oblige France to violate its undertakings and had added that such a situation was likely to endanger peace. He had accordingly asked the French Government to put an end to such a state of affairs and to stop a campaign whose unavowed aim was to overthrow the legitimate authorities and evade the real Moroccan problem, for that campaign was interfering with the efforts, dating back to 1950, to reach an agreement with the French Government on the structural reforms necessary for the evolution of Morocco.

56. In his letter, the Sultan had shown that he was very favourably disposed towards France and had mentioned the sacrifices Morocco had made for the cause of the free world in the hope that independence would be its reward. The French Government's reaction had been to depose the Sultan. As a result of that deposition, the disturbances in Morocco had increased. No positive action had yet been taken by France. The Government of Mr. Mendès-France continued to make promises but did not keep them. Mr. Lacoste, the Resident-General, also seemed to have good intentions, but the reactionary French elements in Morocco were opposed to action that would restore peace and harmony between France and Morocco. The French settlers, civil servants and industrialists were incapable of understanding that it was in their own interest and in the interest of France, Morocco and the whole free

world that France should reach a friendly settlement with the Moroccan people.

57. In debate in the French National Assembly, a former Prime Minister, Mr. René Mayer, had said that Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco were the only non-independent Arab States and that that state of affairs should continue. That was a regrettable statement. It was also regrettable that Mr. Mendès-France should have expressed opposition to the independence of Tunisia and of all the other French territories in North Africa. Those affirmations by responsible statesmen were hardly compatible with the obligations France had undertaken to respect in signing the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

58. The United Nations had a great responsibility in that matter. It should give its moral support to any positive action that the French Government might consider in Morocco. The first measure, of course, was to restore Sultan Mohammed Ben Youssef to the throne. The second was to negotiate with the true representatives of Morocco, namely the nationalists.

59. A great deal was at stake: internal peace in Morocco, the freedom and self-government of a people, friendly relations between France and the peoples of Asia and Africa, the observance of the Charter and contractual obligations and, lastly, the confidence of Asian and African peoples in statements made by the leaders of the free world.

60. In that connexion, he referred to the joint declaration of President Eisenhower and Sir Winston Churchill of 29 June 1954, to the effect that they both recognized the principle of self-government and undertook to promote the independence of all countries whose peoples desired and were capable of sustaining an independent existence. The two statesmen had added that they would not be a party to any arrangement that would confirm or prolong the subordinate status of formerly sovereign States. If the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America considered themselves bound by that declaration and if they meant it to be universal they should help the Moroccan people, who desired their independence and were capable of sustaining it. Moreover, since the International Court of Justice had recognized that the signatory States were still bound by the Act of Algiers of 1906, they should be prepared to respect their undertakings.

61. It had been said that France was a leading member of NATO and that that organization should not be weakened by any weakening of France. But nothing weakened the free world more than the reactionary forces it sheltered. France would become much stronger if it settled the Moroccan problem in a liberal spirit by recognizing the rights and the legitimate aspiration of Moroccan nationalism. Moreover, it should do so without delay, as time was getting short.

62. Sultan Mohammed Ben Youssef, in his letter of August 1953 to the President of the French Republic had said that France and Morocco should combine their efforts in order to complete the work of France in Morocco in an atmosphere of agreement and calm. That statement showed that it would not be difficult for France to solve the Moroccan problem without prejudice either to its own or to Morocco's interests.

63. The draft resolution of which the Iraqi delegation was one of the sponsors (A/C.1/L.122/Corr.1) recommended that France and Morocco should undertake

negotiations in a friendly and calm atmosphere, in accordance with the spirit of the Charter. The Moroccan Nationalists should represent their country in those negotiations. He hoped that the draft resolution,

which was moderate and consistent with the spirit of the Charter, would be adopted by a very large majority.

The meeting rose at 1. p.m.