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Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia).

AGENDA ITEM 17

The Korean question:

(a) Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/2711, A/2786, A/C.1/L.119) (concluded)

At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Y. T. Pyun, representative of the Republic of Korea, took a place at the Committee table.

1. Mr. MENON (India) explained that his delegation had abstained in the vote on operative paragraph 1 of the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.119), because it had felt that approval of the report on the Korean Political Conference at Geneva (A/2786) would complicate matters. It had also abstained in the vote on the draft resolution as a whole, because that paragraph had been included.

2. At the same time, his delegation was gratified to note that the draft resolution adopted by the Committee incorporated its entire submission (743rd meeting) and, in particular, that mention was made of paragraph 62 of the Armistice Agreement. He expressed satisfaction at the assurances given on behalf of the sixteen Powers and hoped that a resumption of negotiations would open the way to reconciliation.

Mr. Y. T. Pyun, representative of the Republic of Korea, withdrew.

AGENDA ITEM 56

The Morocco question (A/2682, A/C.1/L.122/Corr.1)

3. Mr. SHUKAIRI (Syria) said that the problem before the Assembly concerned the people and territory of what had once been an independent and sovereign empire. It was only at the beginning of the present century that imperialist intrigues had brought into being the great-Power lust, rivalry and balance-of-power interests to which that unfortunate country had fallen victim.

4. In January 1906, His Sherifian Majesty, the Sultan of Morocco, had convened an international conference relating to the affairs of Morocco that had concluded with the signing on 7 April 1906 of the treaty known as the General Act of Algeciras, recognizing three principles: first, the sovereignty and independence of His Majesty the Sultan; secondly, the integrity of his domains; and, thirdly, economic liberty without any inequality. Such had been the charter of that international conference, among the participants of which had been the United States, Belgium, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Russia, Sweden and Morocco, all of which, with the exception of Morocco, were represented in the First Committee.

5. In 1912, Morocco had become a French protectorate, after an armed invasion that had ended in the Protectorate Treaty (Treaty for the Establishment of a Regular Régime and the Introduction of Necessary Reforms), signed at Fez on 30 March 1912. Generally speaking, the objectives of that treaty had been similar to those of the United Nations technical-assistance programmes, the only difference being that the latter were not imposed by force of arms.

6. While he would not enter into a detailed analysis of that treaty, he felt it was necessary to point out that the nine provisions of the Treaty had left the internal sovereignty of Morocco intact: France was to suggest reforms and Morocco to accept them if it saw fit. By definition, the system of protection was based on a single premise: the existence of two States, the one protecting and the other protected. Thus, quite apart from the general principles of international law, the First Committee should recognize the existence of Morocco as a State, if only on the basis of that treaty.

7. The present position of Morocco was very grievous. Forty years before it had been an independent State in fact and in law. Today, its external as well as its internal sovereignty had disappeared. The executive, judicial and legislative powers had been seized by the French Administration. The reforms, the security and the economic development that had been the *raison d'être* for protection had all become a dead letter. There were at present 15,000 political prisoners, and the number was mounting. Concentration camps had become a permanent institution. Whole areas were in a state of siege. Repression was provoking retaliation and fomenting hatred. The French Minister for Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs himself had said in a recent statement: "Anarchy is tearing Morocco apart". A French journalist, Mr. Claude Bourdet, had reported that Mr. Mendès-France, upon his return from North Africa, had apparently realized that what he had not thought possible was true: the French colonial police was a Gestapo in French uniform.

8. Freedom of the press existed only for the French Press. French colonists, who represented 4 per cent of the population and possessed not only the funda-

mental human rights and liberties but also a privileged status, enjoyed freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, trade-union freedoms and, even, freedom to murder. That last statement was based on the observation by Mr. Neigel, a French jurist, that "the main feature of the present régime in Morocco is a complete disregard of individual liberty: Moroccan subjects can be imprisoned at anybody's pleasure. The judges do not administer the law; they condemn". Again, Mr. Bonnet, the president of a bar association, had declared at a gathering of jurists in Casablanca that there were no law courts, no magistrates and no laws, that the rights of defence were non-existent, individual liberty nil and abuses of authority uncontrollable.

9. In mentioning those facts, the Syrian delegation was prompted by two noble motives: defence of the dignity and worth of the individual, and respect for what France stood for in the history of the world. The French Revolution, through its struggle against torture, persecution and repression, had become the cherished possession of all humanity. No one could doubt that a national movement for liberty and independence, such as that developing in Morocco, was, essentially, a new French Revolution.

10. The parallel between the two movements, however, stopped at the monarchy. The Moroccan revolution, for its part, deplored the dethronement of its Sultan. That act, which was a clear violation of article III of the Protectorate Treaty, had allegedly been prompted by considerations of security. Events had shown how false the pretext had been. Insecurity had increased, and Mr. Mendès-France himself had told the National Assembly on 27 August 1954 that it would be futile to underestimate the importance of the wave of public opinion in favour of Ben Youssef. Mr. François Mauriac had painted the same picture when he had said, referring to the Sultan, that the French might hold his body captive but that he held the spirit and the heart of his people.

11. The Syrian delegate himself could bear witness to the Moroccan people's devotion to their monarch; he had been in Spanish Morocco early in the year and had seen people of all classes sighing and weeping for their Sultan. He had seen the insecurity to which the colonists and the indigenous inhabitants alike were prey since the Sultan's banishment. Yet no protest had been raised abroad except by Spain, through the voice of its great leader, Generalissimo Franco. Not one voice had been raised in the United States of America or in what was known as the free world against the overthrow of a Sultan who had given repeated proof of his devotion to the cause of the allies and of his friendship for the United States of America.

12. As for the United Nations, the General Assembly had, on 19 December 1952, adopted resolution 612 (VII), whereby it expressed the confidence that the Government of France would endeavour to further the fundamental liberties of the people of Morocco, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter; expressed the hope that the parties would continue negotiations towards developing the free political institutions of the people of Morocco, with due regard to legitimate rights and interests; and appealed to the parties to conduct their relations in an atmosphere of goodwill and confidence and to settle their disputes in accordance with the spirit of the Charter, thus refraining from any acts likely to aggravate tension.

13. Although the situation had further deteriorated during the months that followed, the General Assembly, having taken up the question again at its eighth session, had rejected on 3 November 1953 the draft resolution submitted to it by the First Committee (A/2526, paragraph 11). Some of the delegations that had opposed that draft resolution had maintained that the provisions of resolution 612 (VII) were still valid and needed no reaffirmation and that they thought it preferable to await the result of the negotiations recommended the previous year. In actual fact, despite the General Assembly's recommendations, the policy followed by the French Government had served only to aggravate the situation in Morocco.

14. After deposing the Sultan and suppressing all freedom, the French authorities had attacked the innocent population and subjected it to the most cruel ill-treatment. All the large towns were under military occupation, and each district was periodically cut off from the rest of the world for a period of three weeks to allow full scope for the commission of atrocities. As the French Press itself admitted, Morocco had been transformed into a concentration camp and its inhabitants were subjected to indescribable tortures.

15. The Syrian delegation was in no way trying to cast a slur on the dignity of France. France was undoubtedly one of the great Powers of the modern world, and history had placed it in the very first rank. To the world at large, France embodied the love of freedom. That was why the dignity and honour of France were besmirched when Morocco was tortured, threatened and persecuted.

16. In bringing the question to the General Assembly's attention, his intention had not been to slander France but to help the Moroccans to enjoy human rights and fulfil their national aspirations. The policy of the past had proved a failure and had impaired the friendship between the Arab world and France. That friendship must be restored.

17. If that was to be achieved, French policy must change. The Sultan must be freed, repatriated, and restored to his throne, and the integrity, independence and sovereignty of Morocco must be recognized and reaffirmed. An international conference might be convened to consider the measures and safeguards necessary to uphold the principles that had been expressly recognized in the Act of Algeciras. Moroccan territory was at present divided into three parts: the French zone, the Spanish zone and the International zone; by its very nature, that division was a source of danger and unrest. The States to be invited to take part in the proposed conference should be those which had taken part in that of Algeciras, namely, the United States, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Belgium, Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, the Soviet Union, Sweden and Morocco.

18. France should be asked to open negotiations with the true representatives of the country. Accordingly, the delegations of Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Pakistan and Yemen, were submitting a joint draft resolution (A/C.1/L.122/Corr.1) designed to lead to a satisfactory settlement of that dispute.

19. Under the preamble to that draft resolution, the Assembly would first of all reaffirm resolution 612 (VII), which was not a controversial question; it would note that the resolution had not so far been imple-

mented, which was an indisputable fact; and it would express the belief that any further delay in the settlement of that question might impair the friendly relations between nations. That preamble should not raise any controversy. The operative part of the resolution recommended that an atmosphere conducive to a peaceful settlement of the question should be created in Morocco, which was undoubtedly in accordance with the wishes of all the Members of the United Nations; it recommended further that negotiations take place between the true representatives of the Moroccan people and the French Government for the realization of the legitimate aspirations of the Moroccan people, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter.

20. It would seem difficult to oppose such a provision: the Moroccans were a people; they had national aspirations; the United Nations Charter existed, and its purposes and principles had been determined. The national aspirations of the Moroccan people should therefore be realized in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter, through negotiation.

21. The sponsors of that draft resolution had different social, cultural and religious conceptions, but they had in common respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter. They were prompted to act by their love of freedom, and on that common basis all Member States should support the draft resolution.

22. Coming as it did after the eloquent speeches by Mr. Lodge and Mr. Nutting on the question of the release of the eleven American airmen, such a draft resolution could not fail to find favour, since it called

for the liberation of 11 million people who had been tortured for forty years. A few days earlier, the Committee had discussed the question of West Irian, and on that occasion the United States, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Australian and other representatives had spoken of the right to self-determination. It was, in fact, that same problem that was being discussed today, and, while it was possible for a representative to change his position from one session to another, it would be illogical to defend entirely different principles at one and the same session.

23. A peaceful settlement of the question was possible. The anachronistic treaty between France and the State of Morocco should be replaced by an honourable agreement that would recognize the independence of Morocco as well as the legitimate interests of both countries. France's legitimate interests would be recognized and respected provided, above all, that the freedom, independence and sovereignty of Morocco were also recognized and respected. That would benefit the French colonists themselves, for in a free Morocco they could live in peace, but in a tortured Morocco they would always know insecurity, hatred and bitterness.

24. If France opened negotiations and if, at the next session of the General Assembly, it submitted not only a report on their successful conclusion but also a request for the admission of a free and independent Morocco to the United Nations, it would have carried out a new glorious and noble French Revolution.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.