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**Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia).**

**AGENDA ITEM 17**

**The Korean question:**

**(a) Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/2711, A/2786, A/C.1/L.116, A/C.1/L.117, A/C.1/L.118, A/C.1/L.119, A/C.1/L.121) (continued)**

*At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Y. T. Pyun, representative of the Republic of Korea, took a place at the Committee table.*

1. Mr. Yakov MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that some delegations did not desire an early settlement of the Korean question; they opposed the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.116) and misrepresented the positions taken, at the Geneva Conference on Korea, by the delegations of the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Soviet Union.
2. The United States representative had again referred (737th meeting) to the so-called initiative of the Security Council on Korea, while in reality United States forces had been ordered to commence hostilities before the Council had been summoned to meet. Similarly the United States fleet had received orders to occupy Formosa for the purpose, allegedly, of preventing an attack. Those two actions had not been collective measures but acts of aggression against the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Furthermore, as collective measures could be taken only by an affirmative vote by all the permanent members of the Security Council, there was no legal decision on Korea, but simply measures taken without the participation of two permanent members of the Council; that was a violation of the United Nations Charter. It was common knowledge, moreover, that the United States had furnished 95 per cent of the war effort in Korea, using the name of the United Nations.
3. Some delegations had pretended to uphold the principle of collective security. The USSR, which had fought for that principle even before the Second World War, would be second to none in defending the authority of the United Nations and preventing it from being

- used for purposes incompatible with the Charter. Specifically, the USSR had offered to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which, in that way, would have become an organ of collective security instead of remaining an aggressive organization. Its offer had been rejected by the ruling circles of the United States and the United Kingdom.
4. The States which had joined in the Korean intervention were, on the grounds that the time was not ripe for practical measures and that the Korean question could be settled only under the auspices of the United Nations, dismissing the USSR latest draft resolution to convene a conference of interested States. Yet Article 33 of the Charter spoke, among other means of settling disputes, of "negotiations" between the parties, and hence the USSR draft resolution was in complete conformity with the Charter. As the Swedish representative had pointed out (738th meeting), the authority of the United Nations would not suffer if the task of solving the problem were entrusted to another organ; on the contrary, a conference, being conducive to an international *détente*, was bound to enhance the prestige of the United Nations.
  5. The USSR had always advocated the establishment of a united, independent and democratic Korean State, as well as free elections, and the proposals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (A/2833) which it had supported at the Geneva Conference on Korea contemplated effective action: the establishment of an all-Korean body to prepare and conduct free elections, and the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces. However, the South Korean régime had tried to insist on the enforcement of its anti-democratic laws and methods relating to elections and on the occupation of the country by foreign forces. In effect, an attempt was being made, "under the auspices of the United Nations" and in accordance with United States objectives, to extend the Syngman Rhee régime throughout Korea by means of elections carried out in an atmosphere of terror.
  6. The United States representative had tried to misrepresent the position of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by alleging that General Nam Il had proposed that the idea of international supervision over the elections should be abandoned; it would be interesting to know where that alleged North Korean proposal had been found. In reality, General Nam Il had insisted, in his statement at Geneva on 5 June, that the elections should be supervised by a truly impartial body composed of States which had not taken part in the hostilities.
  7. How then could the United Kingdom representative claim that the Communists had rejected every plan for really free elections? Admittedly, to some delegations impartial supervision meant supervision by one of the belligerents. Unfortunately experience had shown that the States which had participated in the hostilities had never been impartial toward the Democratic Peo-

ple's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China. The countries in question and the States allied to them by political and military agreements occupied a dominant position in the United Nations, where they prevented the achievement of an objective solution of the Korean question.

8. It should be noted that from the very outset of the Conference, the United States and United Kingdom points of view had not been shared by some other delegations. For example, on 11 May 1954, the Belgian representative had stated that the body responsible for supervising the elections should enjoy the equal confidence of all the parties concerned, and it was precisely in that spirit that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union had proposed the establishment of a neutral body. However, the United States and the United Kingdom had made clear their concern to prevent really impartial elections.

9. The South Korean representative had tried to make the discussion acrimonious by slanderous attacks on the USSR; he did not want to achieve an agreement but instead wished to forestall any interference with the activities of the United States forces and wanted to ensure the election of Syngman Rhee to the future Government of united Korea. The implication was that the idea of evacuating foreign troops and of holding really free elections, was being dropped and that instead it was proposed to force on the whole of Korea a régime which suited the United States and would perpetuate United States occupation.

10. The United Kingdom representative had stated that the all-Korean commission provided for in the USSR proposals had been modelled on the organization whose establishment at Berlin, where it would be responsible for preparing the German elections, had been recommended by the Soviet Union. In fact, the USSR favoured free and democratic elections both in Germany and in Korea, to be held in the absence of foreign occupation troops. That was why the States which had taken part in the Conference of European countries on safeguarding European peace and security, held recently at Moscow, had expressed the hope that an agreement could be reached on the holding of elections in 1955, with a view to the formation of an all-German Government. Unfortunately, certain Western countries were trying to create a new *de facto* situation by the remilitarization of Western Germany.

11. The Powers which had participated in the Moscow Conference had emphasized the danger of war and the threat to Germany's neighbours inherent in the ratification of the Paris Agreements, for the remilitarization of Germany was the principal obstacle to unification. Accordingly, they had announced that if the Agreements were ratified they would reappraise the situation with a view to taking the collective measures necessary for strengthening their defensive forces, and safeguarding the peaceful work of their peoples and the integrity of their frontiers. That attitude was consistent with the right of self-defence and with existing treaties which condemned the remilitarization of Germany. It was an attempt to mislead public opinion to argue that negotiations with the USSR could not take place until after the Paris Agreements had been ratified.

12. In Korea, too, the United States was attempting to establish permanent military bases and, through purportedly free elections, to safeguard its freedom of

action. The treaty which the United States had concluded with South Korea gave it the right to occupy the country for an indefinite time, in the same way as the object of the Paris Agreements was to prolong the occupation of Germany until 1998. Against that background, it was easy to understand why the United States rejected all proposals for the withdrawal of foreign troops.

13. The only way in which the Korean question could be settled was through negotiations unfettered by prior conditions. That was why the USSR had proposed that a conference should be convened. The settlement of the Korean problem could not be postponed. The Geneva Conference on Korea had shown that certain points were not in dispute; it was agreed that free elections for a National Assembly should be held which, under the USSR proposal, were to take place six months after an agreement had been reached. It was agreed that voting should be by secret ballot and universal suffrage in the elections for a legislative body, with provision for representation in proportion to the population, and under impartial international supervision. The USSR had in vain proposed that the agreement reached on the establishment of such an international body to supervise the elections should be recorded in writing, on the understanding that its composition would be determined at a later date; but the United States had hastened to break off the negotiations.

14. Those points of agreement, however, represented a sufficient basis for the resumption of negotiations. Many delegations in the First Committee had stated that they were in favour of making fresh conciliatory efforts. In that spirit the USSR delegation proposed the convening of a conference to settle a problem which was ripe for settlement through the restoration of the national unity of the Korean people.

15. Mr. PYUN (Republic of Korea) said that the Communist delegations had magnified out of all proportion some remarks made by the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea concerning so-called irregularities that had occurred during the elections of 20 May 1954 in the Republic of Korea.

16. He himself had been in Geneva at the time, but at all events certain exceptional cases could not justify the conclusion that the Republic of Korea was a police State. While it was the Commission's duty to report irregularities, whether real or imaginary, it certainly had not expected that such a monstrous conclusion would be drawn, for the person who had made the loudest protests against the intervention of the police had been elected and in the Republic of Korea there existed a small but vocal opposition, often supported by a section of the Press.

17. The Republic of Korea welcomed the presence of the Commission, whose legitimate activities were designed to unify Korea on a democratic basis. He added, in reply to the Indian representative's statements concerning the Republic of Korea (743rd meeting), that no organ of the United Nations supervised the elections in India.

18. The CHAIRMAN invited the representative of the Republic of Korea to refrain from involving members of the Committee in the question.

19. Mr. PYUN (Republic of Korea) said that, according to the Indian delegation, the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.119) hampered progress

towards a settlement of the Korean question, because in approving the report of the Korean Political Conference at Geneva (A/2786) it reaffirmed the two principles set forth in the Declaration by the Sixteen (A/2786, annex). The Indian representative had pointedly ignored the report in his own draft resolution and had invited the Committee to be flexible, but flexibility could not be the prerogative of the free world alone, without threatening its very existence.

20. The Indian representative had criticized Mr. Syngman Rhee's statements that war would be a means of unifying Korea. But the Republic of Korea had been led to entertain such ideas owing to Communist intransigence which in the First Committee had again been reflected in the refusal to accept the two democratic principles the acceptance of which would alone make it possible to resume negotiations.

21. The Armistice Agreement, it was true, provided in paragraph 62 that it would remain in force until superseded, but that paragraph took it for granted that a peaceful settlement would be possible, since at the time Communist intransigence had not been expected. That new factor was bound to affect the duration of the Armistice, more especially as the Communists were taking advantage of the weakness of the terms of the Agreement in order to perpetuate the division of the country and to consolidate their conquests in the North.

22. Hence, if the free nations were not prepared to reopen hostilities in order to unify Korea, they should at least sympathize with the Koreans in their plight and refrain from criticizing the statements of their leader.

23. The United Nations could not accept a condemnation of collective security which would mean the ruin of all its efforts. On the contrary, it should inform the Communist dictators that it was prepared, as it had been in 1950, to take collective measures if necessary.

24. He referred to a remark by the Swedish representative (738th meeting) concerning the unexpected duration of the work of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Actually, that Commission no longer had any work to do, since it could not function in North Korea where supervision would be useful, whereas in South Korea, the bulk of the United Nations forces had already been withdrawn. The presence of the Commission therefore merely enabled some of its members to engage in espionage.

25. The Bolivian representative had proposed the establishment in Korea of a super-federal government composed of an equal number of representatives of both parts of Korea in order to deal with problems common to the Republic of Korea and North Korea. That super-federal government would be superimposed on the two Governments concerned but would not interfere with their autonomy. Such a step would, however, constitute *de jure* recognition of the Communist régime in North Korea, against the wishes of the Republic of Korea and the United Nations. Moreover, a federal government usually presupposed a similarity of interests, culture and philosophy of life between a number of States wishing to become federated; actually, nothing in the Korean situation would justify the establishment of a federal government. The Bolivian representative had drawn a comparison between Bolivia and Korea. In fact, however, there was no true analogy, for no part of Bolivian territory had ever been occupied by a foreign Power seeking to dominate the world by conquest and aggression.

26. Mr. QUIROGA GALDO (Bolivia) said he had been misinterpreted by the representative of the Republic of Korea; he had referred neither to a super-federal State nor to joint representation in a diet. Such ideas were incompatible with the traditions of international law. If, on the other hand, in his speech at the 743rd meeting, he had referred to Bolivian history, his only purpose had been to show, by a particular example, that with goodwill and honesty disagreements could be smoothed out and a nation could become a psychological and political whole.

27. Mr. ENGEN (Norway) said the Indian draft resolution and that of the fifteen Powers were very similar. The main difference between them rested in paragraph 1 of the operative part of the fifteen-Power resolution under which the General Assembly would approve the report on the Korean Political Conference at Geneva. The Norwegian delegation saw no objection to taking a decision on that point. It would therefore support the joint draft resolution.

28. The application of the principles upheld at the Conference, which meant the unification of Korea through genuinely free elections under impartial international supervision, should remain the principal aim of the Assembly. Nevertheless, the principle of supervision should not be interpreted too narrowly.

29. On the other hand, the Norwegian delegation refused to accept the argument of the Communist countries that the United Nations had forfeited its authority to deal with the Korean question.

30. Mr. SMITH (United States of America) said that the discussion on the Korean question could be summarized in five conclusions: firstly, the Geneva Conference had not settled the Korean question; secondly, the Geneva Conference had failed because the Communists had refused to accept genuinely free elections in Korea and had rejected the authority of the United Nations; thirdly, the Communist position had not changed: the Communists had not given any evidence that they were prepared to accept the authority of the United Nations and free elections in Korea; fourthly, the Soviet Union proposed another conference on Korea at an early date on the same basis as the Conference that had just failed; and fifthly, because the Communist position had remained unchanged, the United States delegation considered that such a conference would be futile.

31. The Committee should deal with the draft resolutions in the light of those conclusions. The Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.116), the sole purpose of which was to awaken false hopes in fresh negotiations, was a stratagem and should be rejected. The abolition of the Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, proposed in the second Soviet draft (A/C.1/L.117), reflected the Communist rejection of the authority of the United Nations. In fact, the report submitted by the United Nations, from which the Communists only quoted the passages that suited them, showed that on the whole, the Commission had done useful work. If it enjoyed the same working facilities in North Korea as in South Korea, that would provide a solid basis on which to judge what was happening north of the 38th parallel. The Commission, which was the symbol and instrument of the United Nations in Korea, should not be dissolved.

32. The Indian draft resolution and the fifteen-Power draft resolution, which viewed the same problem in a

different light, were chiefly at variance over the question of the report on the Conference of which one text merely took note while the other proposed that it should be approved. Moreover, the joint draft resolution revealed more clearly than the Indian text the role of the United Nations in Korea. The sponsors of the joint draft thought it essential to reaffirm the responsibilities and aims of the United Nations in the Korean question. That issue, which had been the central issue in the Committee and during the whole discussion at Geneva, was still the decisive issue in the question of the unification of Korea. The adoption of the Indian draft resolution might be taken to signify that the United Nations would be prepared to consider the unification of Korea on some other basis. Although that was not of course the intention of the Indian representative, the Indian text might be misinterpreted and for that reason the United States would not be able to vote for it. It would support the proposal of the Turkish representative (743rd meeting) that priority be given to the fifteen-Power draft resolution.

33. The United States was not in any way closing the door to further discussions with the Communists on the peaceful unification of Korea, but considered it pointless to engage in fresh negotiations so long as the other party did not show willingness to negotiate on the sound basis of moral principles and the responsibility of the United Nations.

34. Mr. NUTTING (United Kingdom) rendered homage to the Indian Government and its representatives for the important part they had played throughout the history of the Korean question and in particular in the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

35. In his statement at the 743rd meeting, the representative of India had said that he had been unable to find anything in the records of the Korean Political Conference at Geneva to show that the Communist side had taken a firm position regarding the composition of the proposed neutral commission to supervise the elections. Yet on 5 June, the Soviet Union Minister of Foreign Affairs had supported a Chinese proposal that the Commission should have the same composition as the Commission of Neutral Countries for the Supervision of the Armistice in Korea. The USSR proposals, as contained in document A/2832, and the USSR representative's recent statements in the Committee, suggested that the position of the Communist delegations remained unchanged. The Swedish representative had explained in the Committee (738th meeting) why an organ like the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission would be ineffective and would not be able to guarantee free elections.

36. The Swedish representative had suggested (739th meeting) that the fifteen-Power draft resolution and the Indian draft might be merged. Although both drafts endeavoured to leave the door open to future negotiations and recognized that no positive action could be taken at the current Assembly session to solve the Korean problem, they differed basically as to methods and procedure. The fifteen Powers, which in a sense had represented the United Nations at Geneva, considered that the General Assembly should define its attitude to their report which had been challenged in the First Committee. Moreover, the United Kingdom delegation believed that the fifteen-Power draft, sponsored as it was by the delegations which had served the United Nations at Geneva and in Korea, deserved some degree of priority.

37. It would of course be a temptation to try to reconcile the Soviet draft resolution with the fifteen-Power text, as the Yugoslav representative had requested (740th meeting). But if an agreement was to inspire confidence, intentions as well as texts had to be reconciled. To say that was not to lay down a *diktat*. Every possible concession had been made to meet the other side, but to make concessions on the principle of free elections would be to ask that there should be half-free elections, which would be meaningless.

38. Mr. SOURDIS (Colombia) said that the fifteen-Power draft resolution was in effect an amendment to the Indian draft resolution even though, technically, it had been presented in a somewhat different form. His delegation would vote for the fifteen-Power draft resolution on that understanding.

39. Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) said that the fifteen-Power draft resolution covered the problem more completely than the Indian draft inasmuch as under it the General Assembly took note of the report on the Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/2711), thereby recalling the work done by that Commission and bringing the question into line with the terms of the item on the agenda of the General Assembly.

40. Further, the joint draft proposed approval of the report on the Korean Political Conference at Geneva, whereas the report was not mentioned in the operative part of the Indian text. The General Assembly was under a duty to define its attitude to the content of the report. In the first place, the countries which had contributed armed forces to the fight against aggression had done so under the resolution the Security Council had adopted in 1950 (S/1511). Secondly, the same Member States had participated in the Korean Political Conference provided for in the Armistice Agreement, and had reported to the United Nations on its progress, in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 711 (VII). The part those States had played at Geneva had been in harmony with the principles affirmed by the General Assembly in the matter, and consequently their report should be approved by the General Assembly.

41. The fifteen-Power draft resolution was satisfactory. It might perhaps be desirable to change the word "objective" in the third and fourth paragraphs of the preamble to the plural. That slight change would bring the preamble more into conformity with the operative part, in particular paragraph 2, which mentioned the objectives the United Nations had pursued in Korea.

42. His delegation could not support the Soviet draft resolutions, because it was not satisfied that the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea should be dissolved or that a new conference was desirable.

43. Mr. BARRINGTON (Burma) said that it was unlikely that a prompt solution to the Korean problem could be achieved so soon after the failure of the Korean Conference, but that the General Assembly should at least do its best to avoid any action that might prejudice the situation. In the circumstances, the Indian draft resolution seemed most likely to favour future negotiations without sacrificing any points of substance. It was better not to mention the competence and authority of the United Nations, the manner in which the free elections should be carried out in Korea or the

nature and composition of the body responsible for supervising them.

44. For those reasons he would vote for the Indian draft and abstain on the fifteen-Power draft resolution; he would also oppose priority being given to the fifteen-Power draft. For the same reasons he would abstain on the first USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.116), and would vote against the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.117 because it was at present undesirable to make any change in the *status quo* in Korea.

45. Mr. THORSING (Sweden) said that, as had already been stated by his delegation, the Indian draft resolution was the one which his Government considered to be the most appropriate at the moment. In that connexion, he wanted to subscribe to the Norwegian representative's statement.

46. Since the fifteen-Power draft resolution, however, would obviously carry considerable weight in the Committee, he wished to support it but with certain reservations. He was thus interpreting the report on the Korean Political Conference at Geneva as not tying the hands of the Members of the United Nations when entering into new discussions with the People's Republic of China about the fate of Korea. The approval applied to the two principles stated in the report. He understood the second principle to mean that the commission to supervise the elections should be impartial and effective and, without prejudging its position in other respects, fully acceptable as far as the objectives of the United Nations were concerned. In that context, he considered that the USSR proposal seemed to be both impractical and entirely unacceptable; it would only lead to frustration. As to the first principle, the Swedish Government gave it its full support, as an expression of its conception of the problem in its capacity as a Member of the United Nations. The Swedish Government did not understand it to imply anything besides what was expressly stated regarding the role of the United Nations as seen by a Member of the Organization.

47. Mr. MENON (India), replying to the United Kingdom representative's statement at that meeting, said that it was clear from the records of the meetings held at Geneva that no party had taken a final stand on the type of supervision of elections acceptable to it.

48. It was regrettable that the report on the Conference should contain something which had nothing to do with the United Nations resolutions and the Armistice Agreement. The United Nations had never decided that it would itself deal with all the phases of the negotiations. Its function was to approve the agreement at might be reached. Moreover, it was wrong to say that the Indian draft would undermine the authority and prestige of the United Nations. Efforts to enforce respect for its Charter by seeking to reconcile divergent views could not harm the United Nations.

49. Nothing in the records of the Conference excluded the possibility of agreement on universal suffrage, a secret ballot and impartial international supervision. Moreover, his delegation had never subscribed to the idea that the elections should be supervised by the same organ and in the same way as in the case of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Whatever findings there were in the supervision procedure, however, the armistice was a fact. Its weaknesses were therefore due not to violations of the armistice but to

the Armistice Agreement itself, as signed by both sides.

50. His delegation would oppose the motion for priority for the joint draft resolution. Rule 132 of the rules of procedure, which provided for a reversal of the order of voting, was only an exception to the general rule.

51. Speaking on the joint draft resolution, he said his delegation had no objection to the first paragraph of the preamble, which referred to the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea; the Indian draft did not mention that report simply because that was the practice in connexion with the matter at issue. With regard to the second discrepancy — that relating to the approval of the report of the fifteen Powers — between the two drafts, it should be noted that none of the authors of the report had commented on the reservations suggested by the Norwegian and Swedish representatives. Consequently, approval of the report would be tantamount to accepting elections supervised directly by the United Nations as the only kind of elections possible in Korea. It was possible, however, to envisage other arrangements under which international and impartial supervision could be effectively exercised. Similarly, the questions of proportional representation, the kind of national assembly and the election procedure could be settled by negotiations between the two sides, possibly with the good offices of other States, including the fifteen Powers. The joint draft resolution was actually contrary to General Assembly resolution 711 (VII). He would, however, continue as in the past to seek to assist the cause of negotiation.

52. He requested that the fifteen-Power draft resolution should be put to the vote paragraph by paragraph.

53. Mr. Yakov MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that, contrary to what the United States representative had said, the Communist States were not opposed to free elections and in no way disputed the role of the United Nations in the matter. His delegation would, therefore, vote in favour of operative paragraph 1 of the Indian draft resolution.

54. What his delegation objected to was the attempt to use the principles of the United Nations for purposes of aggression. If the United States representative upheld those principles it would be possible to adopt a joint text on the basis of the Indian proposals. In fact, however, that representative was merely trying to impose on the Committee a biased and inaccurate text concerning the results of the Geneva Conference on Korea. That report gave a one-sided account of the Conference's work, and it was for that report that approval was being sought by having the draft resolution referring to it put to the vote by priority.

55. With reference to the question of free elections, he could hardly believe that the United States representative would consider that such elections could be held in Korea under present conditions, in view of the United States occupation and after the conclusion of a military treaty between the United States and South Korea. It was equally unthinkable that free elections could take place under the supervision of an organ five of whose seven members represented countries that had taken part, with the United States, in the Korean War.

56. It was over those points, and not over the principle of United Nations authority or the principles of the Charter, that opinions differed. His delegation would support all those paragraphs in the Indian draft resolution that referred to the principles of the United Nations. It would likewise vote in favour of the principles referred to in operative paragraph 2 of the fifteen-Power draft resolution. It was not with the principles as such, but with their application, that his Government took issue.

57. The United Kingdom representative had contended (738th meeting), mistakenly, that the Soviet Union and China had adopted an unbending attitude at Geneva on the question of the commission to supervise the elections. As was proved by document A/2832, his delegation had not in any way attempted to prescribe that commission's membership. His Government sought agreement on that point also, but opposed any formula that would not ensure the commission's impartiality.

58. While for the reasons given his delegation would vote against the fifteen-Power draft resolution, the Indian draft resolution seemed to offer a possible basis of compromise. It would be desirable simply to delete the reference to the so-called report on the Conference, as the one-sided document submitted was in no way a genuine report on that conference. That was why it was impossible not only to approve the document as a report, but even to acknowledge its receipt. Furthermore, the approval of such a one-sided document would inevitably complicate future negotiations.

59. The discussion on the various draft resolutions had shown that an attempt was being made to bring pressure to bear on the Indian delegation, which was steadfastly seeking a peaceful solution. From the discussion he also gathered that some countries which had taken part in the Korean War opposed the convening of a conference. Lastly, the fifteen delegations which had submitted the joint draft resolution showed clearly that they were opposed to impartial supervision, for they held that supervision could be carried out only by a commission appointed by themselves.

60. The proposal that priority should be given to the fifteen-Power draft resolution was nothing but a manoeuvre to secure the predominance of the views of one group of States.

61. The CHAIRMAN, referring to the remark of the representative of El Salvador concerning the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.119), proposed that the word "objective" in the third and fourth paragraphs of the preamble of the English, Spanish and French texts and in operative paragraph 2 of the French text should be put in the plural.

*It was so decided.*

62. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Turkish proposal (743rd meeting) that the fifteen-Power draft resolution should be voted upon first.

63. Mr. YAKOV MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he would not press for a vote on his draft resolution, and that he supported the Indian draft, to which he intended to propose a slight amendment (A/C.1/L.121).

*The Turkish proposal was adopted by 37 votes to 11, with 11 abstentions.*

64. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) requested that the fifteen-Power draft resolution should be put to the vote paragraph by paragraph.

*The first paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 54 votes to 5.*

*The second paragraph of the preamble was adopted by 53 votes to 5.*

*The third, fourth and fifth paragraphs of the preamble were adopted unanimously, 1 member being absent when the vote was taken.*

*A vote was taken by roll-call on paragraph 1 of the operative part.*

*Egypt, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador.

*Against:* Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia.

*Abstaining:* India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Burma.

*Paragraph 1 of the operative part was adopted by 46 votes to 5, with 8 abstentions.*

*Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the operative part were adopted unanimously, 1 member being absent when the vote was taken.*

*Paragraph 4 of the operative part was adopted by 54 votes to none, with 5 abstentions.*

*The draft resolution as a whole, as amended, was adopted by 50 votes to 5, with 4 abstentions.*

65. Mr. HOPPENOT (France) said that in view of the many resemblances between the draft resolution adopted and the Indian draft, to put the Indian draft to the vote might give prominence to the only point on which they diverged and obscure their common ground.

66. Recalling the distinguished part played by Mr. Krishna Menon in settling the question of the prisoners, which had enabled an armistice to be signed and paying a tribute to his constant endeavours for conciliation and moderation, which placed him far above the attacks which a delegation that had been invited had seen fit to make, he appealed to him not to press for a vote on his draft resolution.

67. Mr. MENON (India) felt that it would be better not to put his delegation's draft resolution to the vote, as it recapitulated, in effect, almost word for word all that his delegation had voted for in the draft resolution adopted. His Government would pursue to the best of its ability the path of negotiation in conformity with the objectives of the United Nations.

In that spirit of conciliation, his delegation preferred that its draft resolution should not be put to the vote.

68. Mr. Yakov MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he for his part would not press for a vote on the USSR draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.116.

69. The CHAIRMAN put the second draft resolution proposed by the Soviet Union (A/C.1/L.117) to the vote.

*The draft resolution was rejected by 50 votes to 5, with 1 abstention.*

The meeting rose at 1.40 p.m.