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Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia).

AGENDA ITEM 17

The Korean question:

(a) Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/2711, A/2786, A/C.1/L.116, A/C.1/L.117, A/C.1/L.118, A/C.1/L.119) (*continued*)

At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Y. T. Pyun, representative of the Republic of Korea, took a place at the Committee table.

1. Prince WAN WAITHAYAKON (Thailand), after recalling the background of the Korean question, said that he wished to point out that the problem of Korean unification had been before the United Nations even prior to the communist aggression in 1950. He further recalled the participation of his country in the joint effort to repel aggression by furnishing military as well as economic assistance, and his country's membership in the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. As a member of that Commission, Thailand had taken part in observing the national elections of 20 May 1954 in the Republic of Korea. It was the opinion of his delegation, after reading the report of the Commission (A/2711), that the Commission should be allowed to enter North Korea in order to fulfil its task of bringing about the unification of the country and the establishment of a democratic government.

2. Referring to the Korean Political Conference at Geneva, he stated that the membership of the Conference and its purpose were in accord with the recommendations laid down in paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement and in General Assembly resolution 711 (VII). The Geneva Conference was thus, in fact, he political conference mentioned in the Armistice Agreement and in the General Assembly resolution in question. His Government, which had contributed military forces to the United Nations Command in Korea, had attended the Conference moved by a sincere desire to seek a peaceful settlement of the Korean question together with the other participants. It had, at the time, stated that the key to a peaceful solution of the Korean question might be found in the text of

General Assembly resolution 376 (V) of 7 October 1950; its recommendations should be adapted and applied to the situation as it now existed, in order that elections might be held under United Nations auspices and the establishment of a united, independent and democratic Korea might be achieved. In view of the existing cleavage between North Korea and South Korea, truly free elections could not be carried out throughout the country without proper international supervision. That supervision should obviously be carried out by the United Nations in the light of the part it had played in the Korean question since 1947. The Communist delegations at the Conference, however, not only had rejected any form of election supervision by the United Nations, but had also denied the competence of the United Nations to take collective action or to pass resolutions on the Korean question.

3. He cited the two fundamental principles which must constitute an indispensable basis for any peaceful settlement of the Korean question, and which had been laid down in paragraph 1 of the report on the Korean Political Conference at Geneva (A/2786). Those two fundamental principles had been adhered to by the fifteen nations taking part in the Conference, as well as by the Republic of Korea, but they had been rejected by the Communist delegations; the Conference had thus broken up.

4. He was confident that the Committee would find those principles, as well as the stand taken by the fifteen delegations on them, just and reasonable, and would therefore approve the report on the Conference.

5. As there was at present no indication that those principles would be accepted by the Communist Governments concerned, the Thai delegation was of the opinion that the General Assembly should review the situation again at its tenth session.

6. Mr. PALAMARCHUK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that, as far as could be judged on the basis of statements made by delegations of countries which had taken part in the Korean War, one might come to the conclusion that those Governments had no interest in a speedy achievement of Korean unification on a democratic basis. The trend of the discussion in the Committee, as well as the attitude at the Korean Conference at Geneva of the countries which had intervened in the Korean war, had strengthened his belief that some delegations were trying to obviate a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. They justified that by saying that, in their opinion, an agreement between the parties concerned was at present impossible.

7. In that connexion he referred to the statement (738th meeting) of the United Kingdom representative to the effect that he believed that the Korean question was now not as acute as it had been in the past and that the General Assembly should let time play its part in the hope that the future might offer more fruitful

opportunities for a solution. It thus appeared that some delegations preferred to avoid the solution of urgent problems under the benevolent pretext that time should play its part; he thought that to be a strange situation.

8. With reference to the statement (738th meeting) by the representative of Sweden to the effect that the membership of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea should be increased to five, and that its decisions should be taken on the basis of a majority vote, he stated that his delegation would not agree to any attempts to postpone a settlement of the Korean question or to make it impossible for the Supervisory Commission to function in an appropriate manner.

9. He noted that there had been distortion of the facts concerning the position taken at Geneva by the delegations of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the subject of holding free elections in Korea. The proposals put forward by those delegations had provided for effective and free elections, while the representatives of the United States and of South Korea and those who had supported them had opposed those principles and had, further, insisted that conditions which would, in fact, make it impossible for the Korean people to express their free will through elections should be maintained in that country.

10. Under the proposal submitted by the delegation of South Korea at Geneva, elections were to be held in the presence of foreign occupation troops and in accordance with the "constitutional procedures" of the Syngman Rhee régime. The experience of the elections of 1948 and 1954 in South Korea indicated that those so-called constitutional procedures represented nothing but the gross suppression of democratic freedoms in Korea. It was characteristic that that proposal was not even mentioned in the report of the fifteen nations on the Conference. The authors of the report had apparently not seen fit to submit the proposal to public opinion. Nevertheless, it was obvious that what had been sought was freedom for the occupation troops to be masters in Korean territory. The countries which had participated in the Korean intervention had said in so many words that they would not admit that all-Korean elections should take place in the absence of foreign troops, whereas the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, supported by the People's Republic of China and by the Soviet Union, had proposed that all foreign armed forces be withdrawn from Korean territory within six months. That proposal served as a yardstick as to who was in favour of free elections and who was not.

11. The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom had not produced any evidence to support the fabrication that the delegations of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had ruled out the possibility of international supervision of such an election. A study of the documents submitted by the three latter delegations showed clearly that, far from rejecting the idea of such elections, they had proposed the establishment of an international commission to supervise the elections. It was obvious that any international body given the task of supervising the elections would have to enjoy the confidence of both parties concerned. It was natural that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should find it difficult to have confidence in the United Nations which had ac-

tually been used as a tool of intervention at the behest of a minority of its Members and had become a bel-ligerent.

12. The Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had proposed at Geneva that the States most interested in ensuring peace in the Far East should assume the obligation to secure a peaceful settlement of the Korean question, and to that end all-Korean elections had to be held under unbiased international supervision. Having refused to accept that obligation, the United States and its allies at the Conference had declared that agreement on the Korean question could become possible if the other side would simply accept two fundamental principles which the United States had proclaimed. The United States and its allies had said, in effect, that they would agree to enter into negotiations if the other side accepted their conditions. Unfortunately, the position of the United States and its allies had not changed for the better at the present session. However, to impose one's will in international affairs was never a suitable method.

13. The countries which had intervened in Korea wanted to transform the meeting of Foreign Ministers at Geneva, *ex post facto*, into a United Nations political conference on Korea. The fact was, however, that neither the *communiqué* issued at the close of the Berlin Conference (A/2640) which had included the decision to call the Geneva Conference, nor the statement of the USSR representative, Mr. Molotov, on 11 May 1954 at Geneva, to which the United States had agreed indicated that that was the case. However, that had not prevented the United States from stating immediately afterwards that what had taken place at Geneva had not been a conference of the Foreign Ministers of States interested in the settlement of the questions of Indo-China and Korea, but the political conference on Korea. Despite the explanations that had ensued, the representative of the fifteen Powers had nevertheless deemed fit to include that false version in their draft resolution (A/C.1/L.119), thus arbitrarily converting the Geneva Conference into the United Nations Political Conference on Korea.

14. His delegation was convinced that the solution of the Korean problem could be found by way of direct negotiations between the States concerned. The restoration of peace in Indo-China provided evidence to that effect, and for that reason his delegation supported the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.116). It would also vote in favour of the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.117) for discontinuing the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. All the activities of that Commission during the past two years had shown that it had served only as a tool of the country which had occupied South Korea and had hampered the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. In its reports (A/2711), the Commission had itself admitted its utter impotence by saying that at the present time it was still unable to do anything to bring about the unification of Korea.

15. The unification of Korea on a lasting basis with lasting peace in that sorely tried country was necessary in the interests of the Korean people itself and the interest of peace and security among all people.

16. Mr. LEME (Brazil) recalled that Brazil had been one of the co-sponsors of resolution 376 (V), adopted by the General Assembly on 7 October 1950, which

established the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. However, in spite of the best efforts of the Commission, the task of unification had not yet been achieved.

17. The Korean Political Conference at Geneva had worked unceasingly for almost two months. While the question of Indo-China had been solved satisfactorily, the question of Korea remained unsettled. The report on the Conference submitted by the fifteen Powers had shown that the Western Powers were in no way responsible for the failure of that Conference.

18. The joint draft resolution recognized that the negotiations in Geneva had not resulted in agreement on a final settlement of the Korean question in accordance with the United Nations objective in Korea, which should be achieved by peaceful negotiations between the Governments concerned. In the face of this failure, the Armistice Agreement would remain in force. The Brazilian delegation was, however, confident that the general desire for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question would prevail and that a solution would be found.

19. With that hope in mind, his delegation would vote in favour of the joint draft resolution.

20. Mr. SOHLMAN (Sweden), referring to the question of the Ukrainian delegation as to whether Sweden would be prepared to submit to the judgment of a five-nation commission similar to the one envisaged by the Swedish delegation to supervise free elections in Korea, stated that his country did not expect other countries to accept anything that it would not be prepared to accept itself.

21. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) declared that Korea was the first place where Communist aggression had successfully been stopped by the collective action of the United Nations. Without that action, many other countries along the borders of the Communist world would have fallen victims to Communist aggression. His delegation expressed its gratitude for the sacrifices of those nations which had borne the brunt of the war in Korea on behalf of the United Nations. His delegation also expressed sympathy for the people of Korea who, like the Arabs of Palestine, had had their country partitioned because of blind circumstances. Like the Arabs of Palestine, they had not wanted warfare, but it had been imposed upon them by Communist infiltration and subversion. There was, however, one main difference between the two cases; while, in Korea, the United Nations had acted in accordance with the terms of the Charter, it had not done so in the case of Palestine.

22. His delegation believed that the United Nations, having created the Republic of Korea and having defended it against aggression, had to complete its task by achieving an independent, united and democratic Korea. His delegation was in full agreement with the two fundamental principles enunciated by the sixteen States whose forces had fought in Korea, that the United Nations was fully empowered to take collective action in Korea and that, in order to establish a unified and democratic Korea, free elections to a National Assembly, in which representation should be in direct proportion to the indigenous population in all parts of Korea should be held under United Nations supervision. No infiltrating foreign elements should be allowed to take part in the elections.

23. His delegation considered that the States whose forces had taken part in the Korean war on behalf

of the United Nations had also represented the United Nations at the Korean Political Conference at Geneva, and it would therefore support the stand they had taken and the report they had submitted. The Iraqi delegation would also support the joint draft resolution, but would appeal to the sponsors of that resolution and to the delegation of India to amalgamate their two texts.

24. If the USSR sincerely believed in co-existence, it should accept the decisions of the majority on the question of Korea and should let the United Nations establish an independent, united and democratic Korea in accordance with the wishes of the majority of States Members. Such a course of action on the part of the USSR would provide the first practical evidence of its newly-claimed policy of co-existence.

25. Mr. HOPPENOT (France) referred to the efforts made to call a political conference in accordance with paragraph 60 of the Korean Armistice Agreement. The Korean Political Conference at Geneva which had ultimately met on 26 April had adjourned on 15 June without success and the Committee had before it a report on the causes of that failure. While some slight adjustments had been made at Geneva, the gap between the two parties remained. The fifteen States Members which had provided forces in Korea had upheld the legitimacy of the United Nations action in Korea and had insisted on the need for free elections under United Nations supervision. The other side had never accepted those two principles. The Conference had failed because a spirit of compromise had been lacking. Of course, the margin of compromise was narrower on the side of those who fought only to uphold principles than on the side of those who had started aggression. His delegation regretted that the statement of the USSR representative on this question had shown no sign of willingness to come to an agreement. Under the circumstances, there would be no use in calling a political conference, as suggested by the representative of the USSR. It would unnecessarily raise the hopes of the peoples of the world, especially of the Korean people, and might increase the prevailing tension. His delegation would therefore suggest that the General Assembly should adopt the joint draft resolution submitted by the fifteen Powers. Such an action would be the best course in the present situation because the joint draft resolution, while objectively taking note of the failure of the Korean Political Conference, and reaffirming the objectives of the United Nations in Korea, did not at the same time close the door to any expression of goodwill or willingness to compromise.

26. The disagreement on the Korean question related less to the objective than to the methods, and the United Nations had rejected the methods proposed by the other side because their application would have defeated the objective itself. In this context, he referred to the speech at Geneva by Mr. Georges Bidault, the French representative at the Conference, on 12 June 1954, in which the objective before the United Nations and the methods for its achievement had been defined.

27. In conclusion, he stated that the hope expressed in the joint draft resolution of achieving a united, independent, democratic Korea would soon be realized.

28. Mr. VON BALLUSECK (Netherlands) said that his country had been one of those States Members which had responded to the United Nations request for co-operation in resisting aggression in Korea; it was also a member of the United Nations Commission for

the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, and a co-signatory of the report of the fifteen nations on the Keorean Political Conference at Geneva. His delegation regretted the fact that no just and peaceful solution of the Korean question had so far been found. That failure was in no way due to the lack of effort on the part of the United Nations and of those Members which had taken part in the Conference on its behalf. The fifteen nations which had represented the United Nations at the Conference had based their stand on the principles and resolutions agreed upon and repeatedly reaffirmed by the General Assembly. Thus, their stand at the Conference had been the natural sequence of their earlier actions on behalf of the United Nations in the Korean war. The fifteen nations had submitted a report on the Conference and an endorsement of that report was clearly in order. It was for that reason that his delegation was co-sponsoring the joint draft resolution.

29. With regard to the future, the Netherlands delegation believed that, unless the political or military position changed fundamentally, no specific action was called for at present, except the reaffirmation of the United Nations objectives and the expression of the hope that progress could be made. In this respect, it

agreed with the representative of the United States who had pointed out (737th meeting) that further negotiations, in the absence of a change in the rigid position held by the Communist States, would be useless, and that there could be no settlement of the Korean question unless it was based upon the freely-expressed will of the people of Korea.

30. The draft resolution submitted by the representative of India (A/C.1/L.118) bore great similarity to the joint draft resolution. However, the omission of any reference to the specific approval of the fifteen-Power report on the Conference was significant. The General Assembly would fail in its duty if such an endorsement were not given, because those fifteen nations had, after all, represented the United Nations at the Conference.

31. The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea was serving a useful purpose as the representative body of the United Nations in Korea and was promoting its aims. He was therefore opposed to the discontinuation of the Commission. His delegation had, however, an open mind as to exactly what form of United Nations representation would be best suited to present circumstances.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.