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Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia).

AGENDA ITEM 17

The Korean question:

(a) Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/2711, A/2786, A/C.1/L.116, A/C.1/L.117, A/C.1/L.118, A/C.1/L.119) (*continued*)

At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Y. T. Pyun, representative of the Republic of Korea, took a place at the Committee table.

1. Mr. BRILEJ (Yugoslavia) said that he would like to explain his reasons for suggesting (739th meeting) that it might be possible to agree on a joint text. With certain variations the different texts tended generally to recommend that further efforts should be made to settle the Korean question. Thus, for example, the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/L.116) "Deems it advisable that the States concerned should continue their efforts to reach agreement on the peaceful settlement of the Korean question on the basis of the creation of a unified, independent and democratic Korean State"; and that was not incompatible with the basic idea of the other two draft resolutions (A/C.1/L.118 and A/C.1/L.119). As for the reference to the "conference of interested States", it would be inadvisable to insist on putting that proposal to the vote, since previous agreement was a prerequisite of such a meeting.

2. Since there should not be too much difficulty in combining the Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.118) with the other two, the Yugoslav delegation considered that there was a good chance of agreement on a joint text on the lines suggested by the representatives of Sweden and Peru (739th meeting), if the Soviet Union did not press its proposal that a conference should be called immediately.

3. Mrs. SEKANINOVA-CAKARTOVA (Czechoslovakia) considered that the armistice concluded on 27 July 1953 had opened the way to a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Such a settlement was of vital importance, not only for Korea but also for the maintenance of peace in that part of the world, and was desired by all peace-loving States. Czechoslovakia, for

its part, had in that spirit agreed to become a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. It was convinced that a settlement of the Korean problem had, above all, to respect the vital interests and national rights of the Korean people.

4. As in the case of the cessation of hostilities, a final settlement of the Korean question could arise only out of an agreement between the parties. The opponents of an armistice were, however, continuing in their efforts towards a resumption of hostilities and their extension to new areas. Thus, on 10 November 1954, Syngman Rhee's Ambassador at Washington had stated that his Government intended to resume operations against North Korea; that statement, as had been pointed out by *The New York Times* on 11 November, was in accordance with the ideas expressed by Rhee on the occasion of his visit to the United States during the summer of 1954.

5. Even the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea had admitted that the Syngman Rhee régime was opposed to the armistice. From the outset, the Commission, which had been established without the participation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at a time when the interventionist forces had believed that they would conquer the entire country, had, however, been a one-sided body. Its primary aim had been to justify that intervention, which was described as a United Nations action, although it had the effect of perpetuating the partition of Korea. The character of the Commission was clearly brought out by the fact that five of its seven members had participated in the military intervention in Korea.

6. Thus it was clear that the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/2711) reflected the character of that body. For instance, its paragraph 12 constituted a clear admission of Syngman Rhee's intention to thwart a peaceful settlement by rejecting, at the end of a stipulated time-limit, the armistice which, according to the terms of the Armistice Agreement, had been intended to remain in force until it was either amended or replaced. The joint communiqué of 8 August 1953 expressed United States support for Syngman Rhee's attitude in that respect, as shown in paragraph 13 of the report.

7. She then referred to paragraphs 16 and 18 of the Commission's report, relating to activities hostile to the neutral supervisory organs, and to a statement by Syngman Rhee, repeated in paragraph 19, which was tantamount to a rejection of the armistice. The Commission had done nothing to counter those threats to the peace.

8. Paragraphs 20 to 24 of the report gave an indication of the attitude of the Government of South Korea, an attitude which constituted a violation of the Arti-

cles of the Charter of the United Nations relating to the threat or the use of force in international relations. The fact that the report of a Commission which carried the name of the United Nations had not expressed any reaction to considered statements referring to action "by threat of strength" and to "direct military action" stressed the hypocritical attitude of the States which had chosen to use the defence of the Charter as a pretext for breaking off the negotiations at Geneva. Paragraph 21 of the report contained Rhee's statement on the hopes aroused in him by the failure of the Korean Conference at Geneva. Furthermore, paragraph 24 stated that Syngman Rhee counted on the co-operation of the United Nations in "pushing up to the Yalu River". Rhee was counting on a third world war, as was indicated in paragraph 22, and had stated that he would "categorically oppose any talks with the Communists in the future" (para. 23). There again it was legitimate to ask what the Commission had done to check those aggressive intentions.

9. Chapter V of the report gave yet another indication of such aggressive intentions. In fact, according to paragraphs 92 and 93, the cost of maintaining the armed forces was about \$600 million, while expenditure for civilian purposes was about \$130 million. The Republic of Korea could not, therefore "from its own resources, support" more than a fraction of its military expenditure, as shown in paragraph 94. From paragraph 111 of the report it appeared that the maintenance of so large an army seriously jeopardized the reconstruction of Korea, and that its economy was thus made wholly dependent on foreign aid.

10. It was obvious that the United Nations Command was directly responsible for the activities of the South Korean régime. On 11 July 1953, General Harrison had stated that his command included South Korea; and on 16 July, in reply to a question regarding the intentions of South Korea, he had confirmed that the United Nations Command was prepared to abide by all the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, including paragraph 62, which provided that the Agreement should be valid for an unlimited period.

11. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China, which, supported by the Soviet Union, had taken the initiative in the matter of the armistice negotiations, had not merely respected the terms of the Armistice Agreement but had also made repeated efforts to secure the convening of a political conference on the basis of reasonable and just proposals. Unfortunately, the General Assembly had not been in a position to convene that conference. It had taken decisions which were incompatible with the Armistice Agreement and which could thus not serve as a basis for convening a political conference; the United States, for its part, had frustrated the direct negotiations at Panmunjom. Instead of the patience of which the United States claimed to have given proof, Mr. Dean, the United States Ambassador, had displayed such nervousness that *Le Monde* of 5 January 1954 had drawn its readers attention to it.

12. The Indian delegation had not succeeded in its efforts to have the eighth session of the General Assembly reconvened. The United Nations had failed in its efforts to call a political conference.

13. In the end, with a view to improving the international situation, the Soviet Union had taken the initiative for a meeting of the five great Powers, the

Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, and of other countries concerned. There again, however, the efforts of the three Governments which had striven to secure the application of democratic principles and respect for the national rights of all Koreans had been doomed to failure. The fifteen States had, in fact, broken off the negotiations at Geneva and, in their report to the United Nations (A/2786), had distorted the views of the other side, as the United States representative had done in his speech at the 737th meeting of the First Committee.

14. The question arose as to the real meaning of the two fundamental "principles" enunciated by the fifteen Powers in paragraph 1 of their report. Instead of stressing the need for the peaceful unification of Korea, the report spoke in vague terms of the United Nations objectives in Korea in order to meet the position of South Korea, which, as an article in *The New York Times* of 28 November 1954 confirmed, feared that a peaceful solution of the problem would tie its hands in the event of another war. The first principle was based on the fallacy that collective action by the United Nations to repel aggression in Korea had taken place, despite the fact that it had been repeatedly shown that the war had been imposed on the Korean people from the outside and that the United States had transformed it into a case of military intervention under the cloak of the United Nations. Moreover, the United Nations flag had been used for purposes of unlawful interference in Korean affairs even before the outbreak of hostilities. Then, as a result of the illegal decisions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly, the United Nations had become one of the belligerents, thus forfeiting the possibility of acting as an international organ which might solve the Korean problem objectively. That fact was also demonstrated by the activity of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and by the fact that the United Nations was a party to the armistice. For that reason, the Armistice Agreement had entrusted the task of supervising the implementation of the armistice to international organs composed of neutral countries.

15. The United Nations had always shown bias, adopting its unlawful decisions in the absence of representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and of the People's Republic of China. Moreover, in disregard of the facts, the United Nations had designated China as an aggressor and had imposed an illegal embargo on shipments to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and to the People's Republic of China, to the detriment of peaceful international relations and of international peace. Finally, the First Committee had now once again barred the representatives of those two countries from participating in it debate.

16. Those facts revealed the absurdity of a "principle" under which an offer of good offices was made to both belligerents by one of the parties to the conflict.

17. Among the consequences of the fallacious version of the nature of the act of aggression in Korea and of the so-called collective action on the part of the United Nations was the difference in the status accorded by the sixteen Powers to the Government of the Republic of Korea and the United Nations forces in Korea on the one hand, and the North Korean régime and the Chinese People's Volunteers on the other. The pro

posals for the withdrawal of foreign troops from North Korea and the maintenance of such troops in South Korea might also be cited, as well as the attempt to impose the General Assembly's illegal decision under resolution 376 (V) of 7 October 1950 on the Korean people. That was tantamount to saying that the basis for a peaceful settlement would be the extension of Syngman Rhee's régime to cover the whole of Korea, which would then become subject to the control of the armed forces of the United States, an objective which had not been achieved by three years of war. But it was useless to try to impose a solution upon the Korean people which would arbitrarily deprive it of the right to decide upon its own affairs.

18. The second basic principle enunciated in the fifteen-Power report on the Korean Conference was also based on the fallacious argument that the United Nations was an impartial body which should be entrusted with the supervision of the elections.

19. Having rejected the counter-proposals made by the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Soviet Union for the establishment of an impartial international organ consisting of neutral countries, the sixteen Powers had gone so far as to demand the continued presence of interventionist troops after the elections until such time as they might deem fit, as appeared from paragraph 10 of the report. In violation of the Armistice Agreement, which provided for the withdrawal of all foreign troops, the United States had already concluded a mutual defence treaty with South Korea, thus jeopardizing the unification of the country and the possibility of holding genuinely free elections, by foreign interference in Korean affairs.

20. Despite the disastrous experience of the elections held in South Korea in 1948 in violation of the Moscow Agreement of 1945, and of the elections held on 20 May 1954, the sixteen Powers were demanding that new elections be held in accordance with the constitutional rules of South Korea. Yet, even the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea had been compelled to admit that the elections of 1948 had not been democratic, and the same conclusion had to be drawn from paragraphs 58, 68, 69, 70, 71 and 75 of the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, which stated, *inter alia*, that "the long practice of police interference has clearly not yet been overcome" (A/2711, para. 75). Those were the "free elections" which, according to the sixteen Powers, were a pre-condition for negotiations, according to the statement of the United States representative at the 737th meeting.

21. The entire range of activity of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea was proof that that body was no more than a tool in the hands of the States which had taken part in the military intervention in Korea. In its lack of impartiality, the Commission had gone so far as to identify itself with the position of the South Korean régime in speaking of the threat of further aggression. Moreover, the Commission had itself admitted that it was unable to contribute to the unification of Korea. That was self-evident in view of the origin, the mandate and the composition of the Commission. The Czechoslovak delegation therefore fully supported the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.117) to discontinue an organ which it had opposed from the outset and

which constituted an obstacle to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

22. The report of the fifteen Powers distorted the proposals made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, claiming that they had rejected proposals for "honest and free elections, adequately and impartially supervised" (A/2786, para. 8). In actual fact, the three delegations had asserted that the Korean people should solve its affairs freely, without any foreign interference whatsoever, and had proposed that a truly impartial international organ, composed of neutral countries, should supervise the elections.

23. In this connexion the report made unjustified attacks on the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission which was now in operation and of which Czechoslovakia was a member. The Swedish representative, speaking of certain difficulties encountered by the Supervisory Commission (738th meeting), had referred to its composition. But the fact was that the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, in spite of the fact that it had been composed of five members, had encountered difficulties which arose from the refusal of the United Nations Command to carry out its decisions, even those which had been adopted unanimously, which did not suit it. The truth was that, while the Supervisory Commission operated undisturbed in the North, it was subject to restrictions in the territory occupied by the United Nations Command, where its members were the targets of threats and attacks.

24. With regard to the question of ports of entry, also raised by the Swedish representative, she noted that the number of ports used in connexion with the rotation and replacement of military personnel was in keeping with the fact that that operation was limited to the minimum extent that was strictly necessary.

25. For its part, Czechoslovakia was determined to overcome, in co-operation with the other members, all the difficulties which hampered the work of the Supervisory Commission.

26. The Czechoslovak delegation could not accept the objection raised by the representative of the United Kingdom (738th meeting) to the principle that the "all-Korean Commission", which was already the object of unfounded criticism by the fifteen Powers, as appeared from paragraph 6 of their report, should function by agreement between the two parties. The purpose of the proposals made by the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Soviet Union was to prevent any one of the parties from imposing its will on the others. The fifteen-Power report, like the course of the Korean Conference at Geneva, showed that the States which had taken part in the hostilities refused to contribute to a settlement based on the principles of democracy and on the national rights of the Korean people. Indeed, during the last days of that Conference, the three delegations had proposed that agreement be reached on at least some of the fundamental principles, but that proposal, which also covered the principle of further negotiations, had been rejected without consideration although, according to the words of the representative of Belgium, Mr. Spaak, they were in no way contradictory to the Declaration by the Sixteen. Although the United States representative in the First Committee had argued that the Soviet proposals of 15 June 1954 were unacceptable to the sixteen Powers, Mr. Spaak had said, according to the summary record of the meeting

held at Geneva on that date, that he had noted the Soviet Union's supplementary proposal with real satisfaction, and that it would make a good impression in the world. With reference to the proposal of the People's Republic of China, which the United States representatives at Geneva and in the First Committee had described as "a propaganda gesture", Mr. Spaak had said that he had no objection to its spirit, that he thought the United Kingdom representative and his other colleagues shared that view, and that he was ready to affirm by a vote that he accepted the proposal. Finally, Sir Anthony Eden, representative of the United Kingdom, who had been in the chair on that day, had summarized the situation by recalling that the Belgian representative had said, he thought rightly, that the proposal of the People's Republic of China had expressed the spirit of the work of the Conference. But the United States representative had prevented the adoption of a proposal which called for further endeavours to seek a solution of the problem.

27. It had been shown at Geneva that important international problems could be resolved, given goodwill on the part of all participants. The restoration of peace in Indo-China had already contributed to a relaxation of tension. Consequently, the Korean question could also be settled peaceably through the constant and patient endeavour of all the participants.

28. After the Conference, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union had continued to strive for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korean State, based on the vital interests and national rights of the Korean people. The Czechoslovak delegation fully supported those efforts. It also considered that the latest proposals of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to bring the two parts of the country closer together through economic, cultural and political exchanges were conducive to a peaceful settlement based on mutual consent.

29. It was up to the parties concerned to help the Korean people to transform the armistice into a true peace and to restore unity. The Czechoslovak delegation supported the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.116), which aimed at achieving those objectives.

30. Mr. SMITH (United States of America) said that his delegation had been interested to hear the Swedish suggestion (739th meeting), endorsed by Peru, that an attempt should be made to combine the Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.118) with the fifteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.119). He paid tribute to the efforts of delegations which had tried to make it possible to reach a just and honourable settlement of the Korean question.

31. The fifteen Powers had considered it appropriate to submit a joint draft resolution expressing their views clearly. The draft resolution was, of course, subject to amendment to bring it into line with the suggestions of members of the Committee. The fifteen Powers, together with the Republic of Korea and the Union of South Africa, had resisted aggression at the call of the United Nations and had taken part in the Korean Political Conference at Geneva, and therefore considered that the General Assembly should have the benefit of their common experience.

32. It was true that the two draft resolutions were similar in a number of respects. There was, however, one particularly important difference; whereas the In-

dian draft resolution merely noted that the General Assembly had "received the report (A/2786) on the Korean Political Conference", the fifteen-Power draft resolution called upon the General Assembly to approve that report. The fifteen Powers which had taken part in the Conference had submitted a formal report in accordance with General Assembly resolution 711 (VII), and the General Assembly could scarcely do less than to approve that report.

33. Despite one point of fundamental difference between the authors of the two draft resolutions, the Indian representative, like the United States representative, and indeed like all members of the First Committee, had the same objective in mind, the creation of a unified, independent and democratic Korea. The fifteen nations and India wanted a just and honourable settlement of the Korean question.

34. Mr. JOHNSON (Canada) said that General Assembly resolution 711 (VII) had recommended that the States participating in the Korean Political Conference on behalf of the United Nations should report back to the United Nations when agreement had been reached or as might be appropriate. Thus the problem remained one for consideration by the United Nations. Canada was interested in the Korean question as a Member of the United Nations, aware of its responsibilities, which had sent its men to Korea to fight aggression and had participated in the Korean relief programme by means of gifts in cash and in kind. Similarly, when the Korean Political Conference at Geneva had seemed to provide an opportunity of achieving a peaceful and lasting settlement in accordance with United Nations objectives, Canada had accepted the invitation to participate.

35. At Geneva, the other side had proposed a plan for the unification of Korea requiring a repudiation of the United Nations objectives and excluding the United Nations from playing a part in the settlement of the problem. The aggressor and the victim of aggression were to have had equal representation in the all-Korean commission, despite the unequal numbers of people involved. The idea was, therefore, not to assist the whole Korean people to express their free will, but to provide the North Koreans, who had failed to gain control of the country by force of arms, with the means to implement their programme.

36. The delegations of North Korea, Communist China and the Soviet Union had also called for an international commission to supervise the elections. Although that principle was acceptable, the Commission would have been inhibited by so many restrictions that it would have had little real power. The two commissions would have been so composed as to ensure that there would have been a permanent deadlock in their work, similar to the discouraging experience of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission which the Swedish representative had mentioned (738th meeting).

37. As the Canadian delegation at Geneva had stated the elections to bring about the unification of Korea would have to be supervised by an international agency genuinely neutral and acceptable to the United Nations that is, composed of nations not belonging to the Communist bloc and which had not taken part in military operations in Korea. However, the other side had not been prepared to accept a supervisory commission which would be truly impartial and capable of taking and carrying out effective decisions.

38. When it had become clear that the other side was opposed to the unification of Korea under conditions of freedom, the sixteen Powers had agreed that it would be useless to hold further meetings. That failure had, unfortunately, been inevitable as the North Korean proposals had fallen far short of the minimum conditions required for the genuine protection of democratic rights in the process of unifying the country. Certain concessions had been made during the Conference, but the North Korean conditions had remained unacceptable, and it had therefore been better not to mislead public opinion by merely suspending discussions or by pretending that there had been agreement in principle.

39. The Canadian delegation considered that the Korean Political Conference at Geneva had lasted longer than the North Koreans had had any right to expect. The democratic countries had shown infinite patience in considering all the proposals of the Communist delegations. The Canadian delegation, among others, had done its utmost to explore all possible methods of conciliation in accordance with its responsibility under General Assembly resolution 711 (VII). As the report on the Conference showed, the sixteen Powers had in no way been responsible for the failure. Nevertheless, the Canadian delegation was prepared to make further efforts aimed at the unification of Korea and to undertake any negotiations which might have some chance of success. It would be useless, however, to resume the Korean Political Conference at the present time, and perhaps in any event the best method of renewing negotiations would not be to reassemble that particular conference. In its draft resolution, the Soviet delegation called for another conference similar to the Geneva Conference, to be convened in the immediate future. Those responsible for the last failure, however, had shown no signs of a change of attitude on the question of free elections, failing which genuine negotiations would not be possible.

40. The Canadian Government and people were trying to assist Korea along the road to peace and unity with-

in the framework of a free and democratic State. Having shed its blood for the unfortunate and valiant Korean people when it had been the victim of aggression, Canada had been among the earliest and largest contributors to the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency. Canada still had soldiers in Korea, and wished to ensure that its great effort had not been in vain.

41. In the light of those considerations the Canadian delegation had joined with the other authors of the joint draft resolution; the countries which had taken up arms in defence of the United Nations principles and under its flag could do no less than to ask the General Assembly to approve their report, to reaffirm United Nations objectives and to express the hope that it would soon prove possible to make progress towards attaining those objectives.

42. Like the United States delegation, the Canadian delegation favoured the idea of reconciling the draft resolution submitted by India and that submitted by the fifteen Powers as the respective texts were not too far apart; it was regrettable that it had not proved possible, despite patient efforts, to resolve the disagreements entirely. However, as the fifteen Powers could do no less than to ask the General Assembly to approve the text of their draft resolution in its present form, the Canadian delegation stood by that draft and reserved its right to indicate its stand with regard to other draft resolutions at a later point.

43. The Canadian delegation regarded the Korean Political Conference at Geneva as having ended in failure and would therefore oppose, in present circumstances, the Soviet Union's draft resolution under which a conference of the same kind would be convened at an early date.

The meeting rose at 4.20 p.m.