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Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia).

AGENDA ITEM 17

The Korean question:

**(a) Report of the United Nations Commission for
the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
(A/2711, A/2786, A/C.1/L.116, A/C.1/
L.117, A/C.1/L.118, A/C.1/L.119) (con-
tinued)**

*At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Y. T. Pyun,
representative of the Republic of Korea, took a place
at the Committee table.*

1. Mr. PYUN (Republic of Korea), after expressing his delegation's gratitude to the Committee for being allowed to participate in the debate, observed that it was proper and essential that the United Nations distinguish between the nation which contributed to the maintenance of world peace and order for the preservation of the free men and their ways and the nation which disturbed such peace and order, for failure to do so would undermine the very basis of the Organization. Thanks to the United Nations, the Republic of Korea had come into existence in a free and democratic manner more than six years ago, and it had preserved its democratic character through all the adverse circumstances that had intervened. The USSR representative had called the Republic of Korea a police state, but, in contrast to the Soviet Union, newspapers in his country were full of harsh criticism of the Government and its leaders. As for the allegation that his Government did not command the respect of the people, the presence of several million northern Korean refugees in the Republic testified to the fact that it enjoyed greater respect than the Communist puppet regime in northern Korea, which was supported by alien influence such as that of Communist China and of the USSR.

2. The President of the Republic of Korea, Dr. Syngman Rhee, enjoyed profound respect and the undivided support of the Korean people. The degree of support given Dr. Rhee precluded the risk of the election of any potential Communist puppet through a massive leftist vote over-riding a divided right-wing vote, a risk which would surely be involved in the retirement of the national leader. The National Assembly had therefore recently passed a constitutional

amendment under which the present incumbent of the presidency would be exempted from the restrictions on the length of the presidential term of office. Despite President Rhee's age and his avowed preference for retirement, the sad fact was that the nation could not afford the luxury of letting its renowned leader put down the burden of responsibilities, and Mr. Rhee would never shirk the responsibility entrusted to him.

3. The USSR representative had charged (737th meeting) that the United States and the Republic of Korea had deliberately wrecked the Korean Political Conference at Geneva by not agreeing to the Communist proposals, but the exact reverse was the case. The Communist proposals had been unacceptable to any people determined to preserve its freedom. Despite the great difference in number between the populations of the two parts of Korea, those proposals had provided for an all-Korean commission composed of an equal number of legislators from both parts of the country. This was designed to submerge or supersede the administrative as well as the legislative branch of the Government of the Republic of Korea. The fact that all the European Communist satellites had become parts of the global Communist empire through coalition governments had made it clear that acceptance of that plan would have placed the Republic of Korea on the same course. It was clear from the Communist proposals that the elections envisaged would be deliberately delayed until southern Korea was so helpless through subversion that the time would be ripe for the Communists to take over of the whole of Korea legally and peacefully. Indeed, their proposals to the effect that nationality would not bar citizens from nominating candidates to legislative bodies, would explicitly enfranchise the ever-increasing alien population which was streaming in from Communist countries to replace the ever-diminishing indigenous population in northern Korea. Finally, those proposals, by envisaging the inclusion of the USSR, Communist China and certain appeasement-minded Asian countries in an international body ostensibly designed to create conditions facilitating the peaceful unification of Korea, would have lead to a sort of Communist trusteeship over Korea to supervise the process of imposing communism on the country.

4. The free nations, which had participated in the Korean Political Conference had insisted on two broad principles, to the effect that the United Nations was fully and rightfully empowered to take collective action to repel aggression, to restore peace and security and to extend its good offices in seeking a peaceful settlement in Korea; and that, in order to establish a unified, independent and democratic Korea, genuinely free elections should be held under United Nations supervision for representatives in a National Assembly, in which representation would be in direct proportion to the indigenous population of all parts of Korea. Those were minimum requirements to create an atmosphere conducive to free elections. The Com-

munists, however, had endeavoured to exclude the United Nations from consideration of the Korean question on the grounds that it had been a belligerent, wilfully ignoring the fact that the United Nations forces had acted as a police force.

5. The USSR representative had also attacked the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), disregarding the fact that the Commission had been prevented by the USSR from supervising free elections in northern Korea. The USSR representative might be ready to allot a nominal role to the United Nations if UNCURK could be replaced by another international body composed to the satisfaction of the Communists. The United Nations should, however, strive to preserve intact the Commission to carry out the purposes to which it had been dedicated.

6. Failing acceptance of their proposals, the Communists had sought to make the armistice in Korea sacrosanct, so as to perpetuate the division of the country, to bind American military hands and to have any military measures to unify Korea condemned as aggression. But action taken to remove the effect of Communist aggression could not properly be called aggressive action.

7. Along with the perpetuation of the division of Korea, the Communists wanted to create an opening to legalize their intensive infiltration into southern Korea. It was in that context that their various proposals for establishing economic, cultural and other ties were to be understood.

8. To pave the way for taking over the control of all of Korea, the Communists sought to bring about a military vacuum or at least a state of military weakness in southern Korea, in addition to keeping it economically prostrate. The USSR representative had consequently attacked the plans for a reserve force of ten divisions, despite the fact that even fifteen new regular Korean divisions, which were unlikely to be raised, would hardly fill the gap left by the withdrawal of six United States divisions from Korea. Meanwhile, the Communists had been incessantly building up their striking force in northern Korea in violation of the armistice terms. They had deliberately hampered and stultified the functions of the so-called Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, in contrast to the freedom enjoyed by that Commission in southern Korea, where the Communist members could roam freely for espionage purposes. No nation could put up with such organized espionage.

9. The USSR representative had attempted to ridicule the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency. It was true that not all the contributions promised had been made available and that no considerable contributions were forthcoming to ensure real continuity and effectiveness of the programme, but human beings were fallible. The Korean people, however, were grateful for even a mere promise of help and for the help they received. Such criticism ill became the USSR, since that country had brought to the Korean people only devastation, slaughter and disruption. The blame for the insolvency and dependence upon foreign aid of the Republic of Korea should be laid upon the USSR, which had not only masterminded the unprovoked Communist aggression in 1950, but had also equipped the aggressors and had later contrived to get the Chinese Communists involved in

the war upon the rout of the northern Korean Communist army by the United Nations forces. The USSR had to be held responsible for cutting off northern Korea from southern Korea, thereby crippling the economy of the country. A large military establishment had been imposed upon the budget of the Republic of Korea by the Communist occupation of northern Korea and by the ever-growing Communist military build-up.

10. He then quoted the provisions of the proposal made at the Korean Political Conference at Geneva on 22 May 1954 by the Republic of Korea, which had later received varying degrees of support from all the free world delegations. He stressed that adoption of that proposal would ensure free elections, which would lead to the unification of Korea along democratic lines.

11. The new Communist slogan of "coexistence" had come into vogue since the Geneva Conference and he hoped that it would not prove as deceptive as the previous slogan of "peace". Korea had never carried out aggression against its neighbours and asked them only to practice the same virtue of letting it live. If the Communists really meant coexistence, Korea was the place in which they could demonstrate the fact and thus obtain the restoration of world-wide confidence. He appealed to them to make the attempt, which would relieve tension throughout the world and obviate a third world war.

12. The two fundamental principles set forth in the Declaration by the Sixteen (A/2786, Annex), if interpreted and implemented roughly along the concrete lines proposed at Geneva, would surely create a situation in which the USSR, Communist China and the Republic of Korea could coexist in peace. To prove the sincerity of its professed interests in coexistence, the USSR had only to say that it accepted those two principles.

13. In conclusion, he supported the statement made by the representative of the United States (737th meeting), as well as the fifteen-Power joint draft resolution (A/C.1/L.119), which was to be interpreted in the light of that statement.

14. Mr. MUNRO (New Zealand) said that New Zealand, along with the other States which had contributed armed forces in Korea, had made a prolonged and honest effort at Geneva to reach an agreement which would permit the reunification of Korea. Its interests in finding a solution remained undiminished, and its position in regard to the basic principles was unchanged.

15. The fifteen States Members concerned had every reason to expect that the General Assembly would take cognizance of the report on the Conference (A/2786) which they had submitted and would approve it. Those Members had acquired special responsibility when, at the request of the United Nations, they had contributed forces to the Unified Command in Korea, a special responsibility which the Assembly had requested should be maintained in respect of the political settlement. They had, in effect, represented the United Nations at the Korean Political Conference at Geneva and had endeavoured at all times both to protect and to further the United Nations interests and to find a solution which would be in accord with the Organization's purposes and principles. The joint draft resolution derived from that responsibility, and he hoped that the General Assembly would give it special con-

sideration, if necessary by taking it up ahead of other draft resolutions.

16. Turning to the Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.118), he emphasized that the United Nations owed India a debt of gratitude for the part it had played in the successful conclusion of an armistice and in the repatriation of prisoners of war. India had earned the right to be heard on the Korean question with sympathy and attention. His delegation felt that progress towards a Korean settlement could only be made on the basis of the objectives of the United Nations, and it would prefer that the statement in that respect be contained in the operative part of the draft, as was done in the joint draft resolution instead of in the preamble, as was the case in the Indian text. It also considered that those objectives could only be achieved if both sides accepted the fundamental principles contained in the report on the Conference and hoped, therefore, that the General Assembly would approve that document. That positive element of approval was lacking in the Indian draft resolution.

17. In that connexion, he said that the General Assembly would be failing in its duty if it passed over criticism of the report without itself making a determination, particularly in view of the USSR representative's statement (737th meeting). The attitude of the Communist delegations at Geneva, to the effect that the United Nations had lost its competence and moral authority to deal impartially with the Korean question, likewise had to be repudiated by the General Assembly. Approval of that report would entail approval of the principles supported by the fifteen Powers at Geneva.

18. If Korea was to be genuinely independent and democratic, its unification had to be carried out by way of free elections throughout the country. If those elections were to be genuinely free, they had to be carried out under truly impartial and effective supervision by an international body. The fifteen Powers had considered it appropriate that such supervision should be under United Nations auspices. They had not insisted on a given composition of the supervisory commission but had rejected a proposal for a commission on which each side would have a right of veto. The reason for that rejection was to be found in the experience gained in Korea, and in that connexion he recalled that the representative of Sweden, whose Government was a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, had testified (738th meeting) as to the inadequacy of the structure of that Commission by reason of its having only four members. The Swedish representative had further termed the commission proposed by the Communist side at Geneva unacceptable precisely because it would have the same structure. The form of supervision envisaged in the Communist proposals had thus in practice proved to be ineffective. His delegation did not insist on supervision by the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea or any other specified international body, but impartial and effective supervision was essential. Such supervision would receive the ready endorsement of the General Assembly, and would thus be brought under the auspices of the United Nations. That was a position which was both firmly based on principle and at the same time entirely reasonable and flexible. The Communist delegations, for their part, had not departed from their position of insistence on a form of supervision which they knew to be unworkable and which they had made un-

workable. The General Assembly therefore had to reject the assertion that the United Nations was attempting to dictate terms to the Communist side, since the exact opposite was true. As long as there was no change in the Communist position, no useful purpose would be served by resuming negotiations. If there was a change in their position, perhaps the USSR representative would so inform the Committee.

19. The joint draft resolution set forth the position which the General Assembly should take pending a revision of the Communist terms for a settlement. That text recognized the fact that the settlement of the Korean question, had to be brought about by peaceful means. It also recalled that the Armistice Agreement had to remain in effect until it was expressly superseded by mutually agreed amendments and additions or by a peaceful settlement between both sides at the political level. That meant that there was no justification for a unilateral abrogation of the Armistice Agreement in any circumstances. It did not mean that, in the absence of agreement, the United Nations had to abdicate its responsibility. Communist policies had changed before and they would change again if the United Nations continued to meet their rigidity with a firm and patient resolve.

20. Mr. BRILEJ (Yugoslavia), explaining that he would not deal with the substance of the question, said that his delegation was under the impression that the discussion had taken a turn away from the atmosphere that had prevailed at the beginning of the session. That turn would not help to solve the problem and was particularly pointless when the General Assembly was, in fact, dealing only with procedural aspects of the matter.

21. Turning to the three main draft resolutions before the Committee, he urged the various sponsors to try to reconcile the differences between the various texts so as to produce an agreed text which could be unanimously adopted. Such unanimity would, in itself, foster a favourable atmosphere for future efforts to solve the Korean question. It was all the more desirable since the conditions for the early convening of a Korean conference did not at present exist. While he did not wish to deal with the specific proposals before the Committee, the Indian draft resolution came closest to the approach suggested by his delegation.

22. Sir Percy SPENDER (Australia) recalled the long-standing association of his country with United Nations work and action with regard to Korea.

23. He did not wish to go over the history of the question again, since the Committee's purpose was to consider the situation arising out of the failure of the Korean Political Conference at Geneva due to Communist intransigence and to reach agreement on a Korean settlement on principles acceptable to the United Nations. In that regard, he merely wished to refer to the report on the Conference as well as to the Declaration by the Sixteen, which set out the views of the Australian Government.

24. With regard to the joint draft resolution, he believed that its preamble was a simple and objective statement of the situation after the Geneva Conference from the viewpoint of the United Nations. There should be no attempt to interpret or to try to meet the Communist views on the basis of any hints that they might have given in one way or another. On the contrary, there should be a simple statement of what the United

Nations position had been and still was; the Communists could take it up from there if they felt like it.

25. The operative paragraphs of the joint text sought simply to give United Nations approval to the report of the Korean Political Conference, to reaffirm the United Nations general objectives in Korea, and to express the hope that progress towards those objectives would soon be possible; the last operative clause would bring the matter back to the attention of the tenth session of the General Assembly. In his delegation's opinion, the joint draft resolution by no means shut the door to future negotiations should the Communists feel that future negotiations would be profitable. He did not suggest, however, that the United Nations should expect complete advance espousal by the Communists of the United Nations principles, but they had to give reasonable indications that, should a conference be held, they would not again reject the United Nations principles. The Geneva Conference had shown the absence of any willingness on the Communist side to move towards the United Nations position. The strength and correctness of the moral position adopted at Geneva should not be weakened by holding out inducements, since such a course would only encourage the Communists to resort to empty negotiations with a view to whittling away the established principles of the United Nations side. If those principles were not firmly upheld, the United Nations would merely play into the hands of the aggressors, whose actions had already caused such great loss in human lives and such terrible suffering and devastation.

26. Mr. BOTHA (Union of South Africa), after recalling the chain of events which had led to the holding of a conference at Geneva to discuss the Korean question, pointed out that General Assembly resolution 711 (VII) had recommended that the side contributing armed forces under the Unified Command should have as participants, in the Political conference those among the Members contributing armed forces which desired to be represented. The Government of the Union of South Africa, while appreciating that invitation, had decided that it would not avail itself of that right. The reason for that action was that when the Union of South Africa had responded to the Security Council's appeal to repel aggression in Korea, it had done so in recognition of the obligations it had assumed as a State Member. When that objective had been accomplished by the signing of the Armistice Agreement, South Africa had felt that it should leave it to those countries more directly concerned to re-establish peace and normal conditions. It had recognized that certain countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, and others, had been more vitally concerned in the developments in that part of the world. His Government also believed that there would be a better chance of success if the membership of the Political Conference was as small as possible. Nevertheless, his Government had followed the developments at Geneva with the greatest interest and had regretted the fact that it had been impossible to arrive at a satisfactory solution of the Korean problem.

27. His Government fully supported the attitude adopted by the United Nations side at Geneva. It was also in agreement with those who felt that to embark on further, possibly endless, negotiations in the absence of any indication that a narrowing of the differences might result could do more harm than good. The frustrations involved in such endless negotiations and

their abortive results were not satisfactory substitutes for the frank acceptance of the fact that the problem was apparently not yet ripe for solution.

28. The joint draft resolution raised no false hopes. It went as far as its sponsors could go until there was some indication on the part of the other Governments concerned that further negotiations would be more fruitful. As regarded the Indian draft resolution, while it was very similar to the fifteen-Power draft resolution, it had the major defect of not endorsing the report on the Korean Political Conference at Geneva. The absence in a draft resolution of a suitable endorsement of the attitude expressed in that report might lead to an inference that the United Nations itself did not support it. He believed that there were very few Members who would wish to give even the remotest impression that the United Nations declined to approve the policy followed by the sixteen Powers at Geneva.

29. Mr. SERRANO (Philippines), after briefly recalling the events regarding Korea since the Cairo Conference of 1943, stated that whatever the Communists might now say of their peaceful intentions, they could never live down the deceit and perfidy which had characterized their unprovoked attack against the Republic of Korea.

30. The aggression had been halted and repulsed by armies fighting under the United Nations flag in the most striking demonstration of the effectiveness of collective action under the authority of the United Nations. But the problem of establishing a unified, independent and democratic Korea had remained unsolved. The report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/2711) showed that the unification of the country under the auspices of that Commission had not materialized because of a lack of genuine co-operation on the part of North Korea. That, however, did not justify scuttling the Commission, which had performed and was still performing useful work in connexion with the rehabilitation and the observation of political and economic development in the area. His delegation believed that the Commission should continue as a stand-by organ available at all times to lend its good offices to carry out any plan of unification that might be agreed upon as well as to supervise the withdrawal of troops should that be finally decided. The Commission should also be ready to consult with and, whenever appropriate, to assist the lawful Government of Korea. Its recent decision to authorize the transfer of the administrative control of areas north of the 38th parallel which had been under United Nations control since 1950, from the United Nations Command to the Republic of Korea provided further evidence of the necessity for the presence of a civilian United Nations body in Korea to serve as a liaison between the military command and the Republic of Korea. Thus there was no justification for disturbing the present structure of the Commission unless it was to change or to enlarge its composition, or to modify its terms of reference in the light of past experience.

31. The Korean Political Conference held at Geneva represented the most recent attempt on the part of the free world to explore the possibility of Korean unification by direct negotiation. The Conference had not achieved the desired result on the Korean question. Though it had afforded an ideal stage for Communist propaganda, the sixteen nations, being sufficiently fore

warned by the bitter experience of Panmunjom, had stuck to principles and had refused to be waylaid by flattery. The Philippine delegation, in common with the other Members of the United Nations, had felt that it should be guided by the principles set forth in General Assembly resolutions 112 (II) and 376 (V) on the subject of free elections throughout Korea under United Nations auspices. Those were the minimum conditions which had to be fulfilled if the objectives of the United Nations were to be achieved. While the Communist side had professed its adherence to those objectives, it had insisted on procedures which would negate, circumvent or nullify them.

32. On the issue of free elections, the divergence had not been so much on the principle of adult suffrage and secret ballot, as recommended in General Assembly resolution 112 (II), as on the principle of United Nations supervision, as recommended in the same resolution and reaffirmed by the General Assembly in resolutions 195 (III) and 376 (V). The proposal submitted by the Communist delegations at Geneva had been a rehash of draft resolutions previously submitted to the First Committee by the Soviet bloc in 1950 (A/C.1/567) and 1952 (A/C.1/729/Rev.1/Corr.1 and Add.1) with the difference that they now had completely ruled out the legitimate interest of the United Nations in the peaceful solution of the Korean problem and in ensuring that elections would really be free and in full accord with democratic tradition. At Geneva, the Communist delegation had adopted a policy of intransigence and had questioned the authority of the United Nations, not only to supervise Korean elections but also to intervene in the solution of the Korean problem. By repudiating those basic principles which they had previously adhered to, the Communist Powers had shown beyond doubt that they had no intention of reaching an agreement. Under the circumstances, the sixteen Powers had been compelled, reluctantly and regretfully, to conclude that further consideration and examination of the Korean question by the Conference would serve no useful purpose.

33. With regard to the question of the withdrawal of troops, the Communist delegations had insisted on the withdrawal of all foreign forces before all-Korean elections were held. That had been unacceptable to the sixteen Powers at Geneva, which had remembered that the previous withdrawal of the United States forces had precipitated Communist plans for committing aggression against the Republic of Korea. The Philippines Government, along with other Governments which had contributed forces, stood fast by the mandate of the General Assembly, expressed in resolution 376 (V), to the effect that United Nations troops should not remain in Korea for purposes other than were necessary to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea and to establish a unified, independent and democratic Korea. Moreover, in its resolution of 27 June 1950 (S/1511), the Security Council had not only called for the repulsion of the armed attack on Korea but also for the restoration of international peace and security in the area. Although the United Nations troops now stationed in Korea represented but a token force, they remained the best guarantee that peace in that area would not be breached again by the North Korean or Chinese Communist armies.

34. The Declaration by the Sixteen of 15 June 1954 made it clear that there was no intention of closing the door to further negotiations under more favourable conditions. It should be noted, however, that those con-

ditions would obtain only upon acceptance by all parties of the two fundamental principles set forth in the declaration. It would seem, therefore, that there was no other course left to the United Nations than to express the hope that it would prove possible to make progress towards those objectives. That was, in fact, the purport of the joint draft resolution.

35. The representative of the USSR had declared in his statement at the 737th meeting that agreement had been and was possible. While not wishing to dwell on the past, he would take the declaration that agreement was possible at its face value. Indeed, the same USSR representative had once stated that an agreement on a cease-fire in Korea had been possible. It was true that that hope had been realized two years later, but only by the exercise of utmost patience by the negotiators of the Unified Command. If negotiations were to be resumed again on the Korean question, assurances should be given that the same obstacles to an early agreement would not again be raised by the Communist negotiators as had been the case at Panmunjom and Geneva. Finally, such negotiations should be premised on the acceptance by the Communist Powers of free elections in Korea under the auspices of the United Nations. Once those principles were accepted, there was broad leeway left for negotiations as to the actual terms of the agreement, for instance on the form, scope or extent of United Nations participation, or on the membership, composition and precise terms of reference of the United Nations body called upon to supervise the elections.

36. Mr. SOHLMAN (Sweden) felt that it would be to the advantage of all concerned if a merger could be effected between the fifteen-Power and the Indian draft resolutions. When his delegation had first studied the Indian text, it had found it quite acceptable and had been prepared to vote for it. However, the fifteen-Power draft resolution included the ideas contained in the Indian text it was true that the joint draft resolution also expressed approval of the report of the fifteen Powers, on the Korean Political Conference at Geneva. Though his delegation would like to have further clarifications on the implications of such approval, it still believed that a merger was possible.

37. Mr. MENON (India) said that his delegation had, in error, circulated the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.120 and requested the Chairman to withdraw it.

38. He also requested the members of the Committee not to make up their minds about either the joint draft resolution or the Indian draft resolution before his delegation had had the opportunity to present the respective backgrounds of the two texts and the relative positions of the authors to the Committee. His delegation would lend whatever support was necessary to keep the temper of the debate free of acrimony in order to achieve results that would assist in finding methods of getting to the root of the problem at some future time.

39. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) said that the joint draft resolution and the Indian text contained identical concepts, though expressed in different language. The actual difference between the two texts had been referred to by the representative of the Union of South Africa when he had said that the Indian draft resolution had not taken account of the report of the sixteen Powers present in Geneva. In the circumstance,

he wished to support the Swedish proposal and make a fervent appeal to the sponsors of the joint draft resolution as well as to India to present the Committee with one merged text. Moreover, he supported the view of the representative of India to the effect that recrimination in debate would be entirely useless. The need for a merged draft resolution was all the greater when one remembered that the position now reached was due to two obvious factors; namely, the attitude of the United Nations as expressed in the courageous

action undertaken by the sixteen countries to repel aggression and the contribution of India to the solution of the most delicate and complex question of the prisoners of war. In conclusion, he appealed to the delegations concerned to make an extra effort in order that the omission which was found in the Indian draft resolution and which was unwarranted would be overcome.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.