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Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia).

AGENDA ITEM 17

The Korean question:

(a) Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/2711, A/2786, A/C.1/L.112, A/C.1/L.113, A/C.1/L.114, A/C.1/L.115, A/C.1/L.116, A/C.1/L.117) (*continued*)

Mr. SHUKAIRI (Syria) said that in view of the Committee's reactions at the 736th meeting to his suggested amendments, he had decided to submit a separate draft resolution (A/C.1/L.115) under which the Committee would, without implying any value judgment, invite all the parties directly concerned as signatories to the Armistice Agreement, to participate in its discussions aimed at reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

Mr. Yakov MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) pointed out, in reply to a remark made by the Turkish representative (736th meeting), that no one had suggested that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should become a member of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. What had been said was that, since that country's legitimate request to be permitted to send representatives to participate in the discussion of the Korean question had been rejected, it had only one what any other Government would have done in the circumstances and had refused to accept a resolution which had been adopted by a group of States without its own participation. For its part, the Soviet Union had always considered it unjustifiable to ask a country to carry out the terms of a resolution which it had no part in formulating. If, therefore, there was a desire to learn from the lessons of the past and to achieve concrete results, then no action should be taken without the participation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China, which, in any event, had already attended the Geneva conference.

The Soviet Union had no objection to the participation of the Republic of Korea as proposed by the Indian amendments (A/C.1/L.114). It therefore accepted those amendments on condition that the USSR draft resolution, as amended, was put to the vote only as

a whole. There had been an unfortunate precedent in that regard on an occasion when the Soviet Union had, in good faith, voted for a proposal that a Government, which had been supported by certain other delegations, be permitted to take part in the discussion; those delegations had, however, failed to honour their undertakings, with the result that part of the draft resolution had been adopted unanimously whereas the remainder had been rejected.

4. The CHAIRMAN said that the vote would be on the USSR draft resolution as modified by the amendments accepted by the Soviet delegation. As, however, the Soviet delegation objected to any request for division, any motion for division would be voted upon in accordance with rule 130 of the rules of procedure.

5. He announced that a division of the amended USSR draft resolution had just been requested by the Saudi Arabian delegation.

6. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) stated that he had never preached violence, as the USSR representative had seemed to imply, but had merely come to grips with a practical problem by pointing out that, as far as the great majority of the members of the Committee were concerned, Communist China and Communist Korea had been aggressors and that, since they had taken no notice of United Nations resolutions, there was no point in asking them to send delegations to the United Nations.

7. The USSR representative's reply had not been direct, but had gone into the question of the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. The real problem was to determine whether, without Communist China's admission to membership, the two delegations would observe United Nations resolutions once they had been invited. As it appeared that neither country was prepared to abide by such resolutions, the Iraqi delegation could not vote in favour of inviting the two Governments, and moved that priority be given to the Thai draft resolution (A/C.1/L.113).

8. Mr. AZKOUL (Lebanon) said that he would vote for the Thai draft resolution as there was no reason why a representative of the Republic of Korea should not be invited. On the other hand, he would not be able to support the USSR draft resolution. The report to the United Nations on the Korean Political Conference at Geneva contained a statement by Mr. Chou En-lai to the effect that the United Nations had been placed in the position of a belligerent in the Korean War and had lost its competence and moral authority to deal impartially with the Korean question; it also cited the following statement by General Nam Il: "We fail to understand the statement of some delegates who have called upon the Korean people to respect the United Nations actions and resolution on the Korean question" (A/2786, para. 2). As there was no sign of any change of attitude on the part of the two Governments, it might be asked why they wished to take

part in the Committee's work. For its part, the Committee was under no obligation whatever to issue an invitation to them, not only because there was a question as to whether any useful purpose would be served by doing so, but also because the point at issue was to safeguard the very authority of the United Nations, which those countries had challenged.

9. Mr. MIR KHAN (Pakistan) recalled the position taken by the Chairman of his delegation at the 511th meeting of the First Committee during the seventh session of the General Assembly. As the Syrian draft resolution conformed with that position, he would vote for that draft but would abstain from voting on the other texts.

10. Mr. BRILEJ (Yugoslavia) noted that, despite the armistice and the Korean Political Conference at Geneva, certain problems remained. Yugoslavia hoped that positive action would be taken to unify Korea and to establish an independent democratic republic.

11. Thus, in considering the proposals to invite the parties concerned, South Korea, North Korea and the People's Republic of China, to participate in the Committee's discussions without the right to vote, the Yugoslav delegation would maintain the attitude it had adopted from the outset of the conflict. Yugoslavia, it would be recalled, had suggested in the Security Council (473rd meeting) immediately after the outbreak of hostilities, that an invitation be sent to both countries. In any event, a decision to that effect would not create a precedent nor affect the relations of Members of the United Nations with the three Governments. On the other hand, the efforts of the United Nations would be facilitated by the presence of the three delegations, and that was enough to justify the decision. The Yugoslav delegation would therefore vote in favour of the Indian amendments.

12. Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) said that, in taking a decision on the various proposals submitted to the Committee, it was necessary to recall the attitude of South Korea, North Korea and Communist China as noted by the competent organs of the United Nations. According to the great majority of States Members, South Korea had been a victim of an act of aggression to which the People's Republic of China had subsequently become a party. It would therefore not be logical to give the two States on the opposing side an opportunity to discuss the policy to be adopted by the United Nations, for that, as distinct from the purpose of the Korean Political Conference at Geneva, was the matter under consideration.

13. That objection did not, of course, apply to South Korea, which having been established under the auspices of the United Nations and being considered by the Organization to be a victim of aggression, was, in the last analysis, an ally of the United Nations.

14. The delegation of El Salvador could support neither the USSR draft resolution, even as amended, nor the Syrian draft resolution, but only that submitted by Thailand.

15. Mr. MENON (India) said that it was only on the surface that the discussion appeared to be of a procedural nature, and in the light of past experience its result could be predicted. He therefore wished to state his position on the matter.

16. Once the question of inviting non-Member States was settled, the Committee would begin to discuss

the unification and rehabilitation of Korea, but no proposal had been made on that point. So far, the Committee had before it only a report on the Korean Political Conference at Geneva, which had been prepared by the members of the United Nations Command and referred only to the past.

17. Although the participation of the non-Member States was not required for the consideration of the question as defined in the agenda, a settlement of the Korean question as a whole was not possible without such participation, because a dispute could not be settled without hearing both parties. The Indian delegation, however, considered that at the present stage there was no need to modify the composition of the Committee in the absence of factors which would enable further progress to be made towards a Korean settlement. His delegation would have presented a motion to that effect if its point of view had generally prevailed. If, on the other hand, it was intended to allow additional delegations to take part in the debate all the parties concerned should be invited.

18. His delegation thought it unnecessary to state as was done in the USSR draft resolution, the reason why the various Governments should participate in the debates. Moreover, the USSR draft resolution, like that of Thailand, was incomplete, because, if it was decided to go beyond the membership of the United Nations, it was inadmissible to address invitations to some parties but not to others.

19. As his delegation was particularly anxious not to depart from the objective role which had enabled it to be of some use in connexion with the Korean question, it could give its approval only to a proposal inviting the three Governments concerned. That would be the purpose of the Soviet draft resolution, as amended by India, which, in substance, was a proposal for which India would be responsible. India, being anxious not to exclude any of the parties, would abstain in the votes on the other texts which it considered lop-sided.

20. Mr. SKRZESZEWSKI (Poland) said that he would vote in favour of the USSR draft resolution as modified by the Indian amendments which had been approved by the Soviet delegation. He did, however, have some misgivings concerning the procedure contemplated for the vote and proposed that in the second Indian amendment the words "the Republic of Korea" be inserted after and not before the word "the Democratic People's Republic of Korea".

21. Mrs. SEKANINOVA-ČAKRTOVÁ (Czechoslovakia) referred to the proposals which had been made concerning the vote on the draft resolutions. The Soviet Union had accepted the Indian amendments in spirit of co-operation, with the results that the new text constituted an organic whole and took care of the question of the participation in the debate of the parties directly concerned. To vote on the draft resolution by divisions would lead to discriminatory and undemocratic decisions. The same course would be followed by giving precedence to the draft resolution submitted by Thailand and there was no reason for departing from the principle set forth in rule 132 of the rule of procedure.

22. Mr. Yakov MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) thought that the various draft resolutions really raised a question of substance. It was regrettable that the representative of El Salvador had attempted to revive the dead past, for that was hardly the right

approach to the matter at a time when the noble initiative of the People's Republic of China and of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, supported by the Soviet Union, had made it possible to extinguish a smouldering fire. As the Indian representative had said, it was impossible to find a peaceful solution to the Korean problem without the participation of those two delegations. It would, moreover, be absurd to submit to the United Nations a report on the Korean Conference at Geneva and then to exclude North Korea and the People's Republic of China from the debates on that report. The truth was that certain delegations did not want an agreement and, having brought the Geneva negotiations to an end, wished to impose their views by depriving the other side of an opportunity to express its own.

23. Some facts, however, such as the existence of two Koreas and the impossibility of solving the problem without the participation of the People's Republic of China, could not be dismissed. The Soviet delegation had demonstrated its objectiveness by accepting the Indian amendments, but an attempt was being made, by means of a division, to separate the votes concerning South and North Korea respectively. The Soviet delegation was prepared to accept the Polish amendment, just as it had accepted the amendment submitted by India.

24. Sheikh AL-FAQIH (Saudi Arabia) pointed out that he had proposed the division of the Soviet draft before the Syrian draft resolution had been submitted, but as the aims of the Syrian draft resolution coincided with those of the Saudi Arabian delegation, he would withdraw his proposal.

25. The CHAIRMAN stated that he would put to the vote the motion of the Iraqi delegation to give the Thai draft resolution (A/C.2/L.113) priority over the Soviet Union draft (A/C.2/L.112).

26. Mr. Yakov MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) opposed that motion. Under rule 132 of the rules of procedure, a committee should vote on the proposals in the order in which they had been submitted. The Soviet Union draft resolution had been submitted first. Moreover, as a result of the Indian amendments (A/C.1/L.114), South Korea had been included among the delegations to which an invitation would be sent.

27. The CHAIRMAN noted that the USSR delegation objected to putting the Thai draft resolution to the vote first. He would therefore put to the vote the Iraqi motion to give priority to the draft resolution submitted by Thailand (A/C.1/L.113).

A vote was taken by show of hands.

The Iraqi motion was adopted by 39 votes to 9, with 9 abstentions.

28. The Chairman put the draft resolution submitted by Thailand to the vote.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

The draft resolution submitted by Thailand was adopted by 43 votes to 5, with 10 abstentions.

29. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.112) as amended by the Indian (A/C.1/L.114) and Polish delegations.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

The Soviet Union draft resolution was rejected by 39 votes to 9, with 10 abstentions.

30. The CHAIRMAN put the Syrian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.115) to the vote. He stated that Syria had requested a vote by roll-call.

Argentina, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen.

Against: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Abstaining: Argentina, Bolivia, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Mexico, Poland, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan.

The Syrian draft resolution was rejected by 37 votes to 5, with 16 abstentions.

At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Y. T. Pyun, representative of the Republic of Korea, took a place at the Committee table.

31. Mr. MENON (India) recalled that, in accordance with a previous decision, the verbatim records of meetings should be made available to all delegations.

32. Mr. PROTITCH (Secretary of the Committee) explained that it had previously been decided to make the verbatim records of the debate on the question of disarmament available to delegations as an official record and those of the debate on the question of the peaceful uses of atomic energy as an unofficial record. Without consulting the Secretary-General, he would be unable to say whether the Secretariat could also supply the verbatim records of the debate on agenda item 17 (a).

33. Mr. MENON (India) said that the General Assembly had decided that the record of the First Committee would be the verbatim record if appropriate provision had been made in the budget. Delegations were therefore entitled to receive the verbatim record unless the General Assembly in plenary session decided to the contrary by a two-thirds majority.

34. Mr. PROTITCH (Secretary of the Committee) recalled that, in previous years, the General Assembly had always taken the same decision, according to which the verbatim records were made available to delegations but were not distributed as official documents.

35. Mr. HANIFAH (Indonesia) reminded the Committee that his delegation had always thought that the views of all the parties concerned should be heard. As the representatives of the People's Republic of China and the representatives of North Korea and South Korea had participated in the Korean Conference at Geneva it seemed all the more proper that those parties should be heard.

36. He recalled that the Geneva Conference had come about as the result of the proposal made on 18 February 1954 by the four Foreign Ministers at Berlin that a conference be held in which the People's Republic of China as well as North Korea and South Korea

would participate. The United Nations should make as great an effort as had been made at Geneva to find a solution to the Korean question. That was why his delegation had voted in favour of the amendments proposed by the Indian representative and why it had abstained from voting on the draft resolution submitted by Thailand and Syria and would have abstained from voting on the original Soviet Union draft resolution.

37. Mr. Yakov MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) pointed out that precedents had been set with regard to verbatim records, for on several occasions in the past the verbatim records of the debates had been kept. In view of the international significance of the question under discussion, it was advisable that a decision be taken immediately.

38. The CHAIRMAN said that, according to a decision of the General Assembly at the second session (121st plenary meeting), delegations had to be given access to the verbatim records, in other words, those documents would not be distributed, but the delegations could consult them and, if they particularly required it, procure a copy.

39. A general distribution of those records would entail considerable expense. The question should therefore be examined carefully.

40. Mr. WADSWORTH (United States of America) said that the United Nations now had to face a threat in the form of a challenge to its right and authority to take collective action.

41. On 27 June 1950, the Security Council had determined (474th meeting) that the armed attack by forces from North Korea constituted a breach of the peace, and, recalling General Assembly resolution 293 (IV) of 21 October 1949 declaring that the Government of the Republic of Korea was the only lawful Government based on free elections, it had recommended that the Members of the United Nations should go to the assistance of the Republic of Korea. Later, on 1 February 1951, the General Assembly had found under resolution 498 (V), that the Communist Chinese régime had itself engaged in aggression by giving aid to those who were engaged in hostilities against United Nations forces.

42. Thus, for the first time an international organization had, in implementation of the principle of collective security, marshalled forces to repel aggression.

43. That collective action had been successful, and an armistice agreement had been signed a year and a half ago. Not only had the Republic of Korea been saved, but all nations had been made more secure.

44. As, however, North Korea continued to be held in the grasp of the forces of aggression, the United Nations had a continuing responsibility to restore peace in that area and to achieve its objective of a united, independent and democratic Korea on a just basis and by peaceful means. Unfortunately, the efforts made to that end by the nations that had taken part in the collective action had been frustrated by the intransigence of the very Communist Powers that were now speaking of relaxing international tensions.

45. He then referred to the preparations for the Korean Political Conference, as described in the report to the United Nations on that Conference. The Communist side had used delaying tactics before agreeing to discuss these preparations and had then adopted

a rigid position at Panmunjom, where Mr. Dean, the United States Ambassador, had with the utmost patience sought to find a reasonable basis for convening a political conference. It had not been until 18 February 1954 that the deadlock had been overcome through an agreement among the four Foreign Ministers proposing that a conference should meet at Geneva on 26 April 1954.

46. The Communist attitude afforded little ground for optimism. Nevertheless, the Republic of Korea and fifteen of the allied Powers that had contributed troops at the call of the United Nations had patiently attempted to secure agreement on the unification of Korea on the basis of the General Assembly resolutions. Those sixteen nations had made a number of proposals and suggestions consistent with the two principles reaffirmed in the Declaration by the Sixteen (A/2786 annex) on the last day of the Conference: firstly, the right of the United Nations "to take collective action to repel aggression, to restore peace and security, and to extend its good offices to seeking a peaceful settlement in Korea"; and, secondly, the need for holding "genuinely free elections ... under United Nations supervision for representatives in the National Assembly, in which representation shall be in direct proportion to the indigenous population in Korea". That was, in fact, the only basis for a settlement of the Korean question.

47. The failure of the Korean Conference at Geneva had resulted directly from the refusal of the Communist side to accept those principles as a basis for a settlement. The Communist side had gone so far as to attack the very foundations of the United Nations. Using political means to press their war against the United Nations, Mr. Molotov, General Nam I and Mr. Chou En-lai, who was apparently speaking as a Minister of Foreign Affairs and not merely for the so-called Chinese volunteers, had repeatedly asserted that the United Nations had been a belligerent and had therefore lost its competence and moral authority to play a part in the settlement of the Korean question. That was something which the United States, for its part, refused to concede, adhering as it did to the first of the two principles previously quoted, which asserted the authority of the United Nations in the matter, the validity of the Charter, and the legality of the collective action undertaken in Korea and reaffirmed by General Assembly resolution 711 (VII) of 28 August 1953. The principle of collective security proclaimed in Article 1 of the Charter would have been undermined if the repudiation of the authority and competence of the United Nations in Korea had been accepted.

48. As for the second principle, the Korean people could not freely decide its future without impartial elections, and it was the view of the United States that the United Nations should supervise them.

49. The United Nations had a unique interest in Korea; it had recognized the Republic of Korea, condemned the aggression of June 1950, called for military forces to repel the aggression and declared the Communist Chinese to be aggressors. If the authority and competence of the United Nations were now called in question, the sacrifices of sixteen nations whose soldiers had died in Korea during the United Nations collective action would have been in vain.

50. At Geneva, the Allied delegations had put forward various proposals in conformity with the two principles:

nolved. On 27 April 1954, Mr. Pyun, then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, had submitted a proposal based on General Assembly resolution 376 (V) of 7 October 1950 and providing for the holding of elections under United Nations supervision in North Korea, as had recently been done in South Korea. Mr. Pyun had asked that the Republic of Korea should not be put on the same plane as a régime that had no legal basis and had demonstrated its aggressive character. Mr. Dulles, who had represented the United States at the outset of the Conference, had, at the time that that proposal was made, pointed out that the resolution of 7 October 1950 already constituted a workable plan for unifying Korea. He had requested that the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea resume its work and that the Chinese Communists withdraw their forces from North Korea so that the United Nations could complete its task in an atmosphere free of menace. That proposal had, however, been rejected by the Communist delegations.

1. In a further effort to achieve a peaceful settlement, Mr. Pyun had, on 22 May 1954, submitted a complete proposal providing for first, elections to be held within six months in North Korea and, in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, in South Korea, the elections to be supervised by the United Nations; secondly, a census under United Nations supervision to determine the apportionment of representatives in the national legislature; thirdly, freedom of movement for United Nations personnel and freedom of movement and of speech for candidates; fourthly, maintenance of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, subject to amendment by the new legislature; fifthly, completion of the withdrawal of Communist troops one month before the election date; in the sixth place, commencement of the withdrawal of United Nations forces before the elections, the withdrawal to be completed when the United Nations had certified that the unified Government had achieved control throughout Korea and in the seventh place, guarantee of the territorial integrity and independence of a unified Korea by the United Nations.

2. That proposal would have made possible the unification of Korea on a just basis in conformity with the principles laid down by the General Assembly, and the Korean people would have been able to express their will in freedom, with impartial safeguards against undemocratic electoral practices. By rejecting that proposal, the Communist rulers of North Korea had revealed their fear of honest elections and their intention of maintaining an illegal hold on part of the Korean nation in preparation for a new attempt to bring all of Korea under Communist control.

3. In essence, the Communist counter-proposals had provided for, first, the establishment of an "All-Korean Commission", which would prepare and conduct the elections and could function only by agreement between the two parties, which would have equal representation in it; secondly, international supervision of the elections by a "Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission", composed of an equal number of Communist and non-Communist nations, which could function only by agreement between the two components and thirdly, the withdrawal of all non-Korean forces from Korea before the elections, no distinction being made between the aggressors' forces and those of the United Nations. That last proposal would enable the Communist forces

to remain nearby, whereas United Nations forces would be dispersed. Those proposals had failed to provide any guarantee that the elections would be carried out in freedom or even that they would take place at all, since the North Koreans would have a veto in the All-Korean Commission and the so-called "Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission" would come into operation only if the other commission had reached agreement on the conduct of the elections. Moreover, the provision for unanimity in the second commission would have prevented any effective supervision of the elections.

54. The Communist delegations had to the very end persisted in their repudiation of the authority of the United Nations and in their insistence on a veto over the conduct of the elections, for free elections would liberate North Korea from Communist domination, whereas the Communists had no intention whatever of altering the *status quo* in Korea except on the basis of conquest by political means of the whole of Korea, which they had not been able to gain by military aggression.

55. Finally, the Communist delegations had sought to exploit the failure to reach agreement for propaganda purposes. General Nam Il had proposed that the idea of impartially supervised elections should be discarded and that the Republic of Korea should work out measures for economic and cultural relations with the North Korean régime, but only after the withdrawal of foreign forces and after the reduction of the Republic of Korea's forces to a level equal to that of North Korea. In order to confuse the debate in the General Assembly, North Korea had recently made a similar proposal to the Republic of Korea, which had naturally refused to accept that proffered Trojan horse.

56. The proposal which Mr. Molotov, the representative of the Soviet Union, had made on the last day of the Korean Political Conference at Geneva had, similarly, been deceptive in intent. It had provided that both sides should agree on a set of general objectives, while the basic issues would be left to further examination. He had not, however, abandoned in the slightest degree the Communist position that had made any agreement impossible.

57. As appeared from the report on the Conference, those proposals could only have served to conceal the continuing disagreement and to mislead the peoples of the world. For that reason the Declaration by the Sixteen had concluded that as long as the Communist delegations rejected the two fundamental principles which the Allied delegations considered indispensable, further consideration of the Korean question by the Conference would serve no useful purpose.

58. Mr. Bedell Smith, the United States representative at the Conference, had rejected a final propaganda gesture by the representative of Communist China, who had called for a resumption of the Korean Political Conference at some future date; he had pointed out that the Conference was not a permanent body but had been given a specific mission and that, moreover, the Communist side could resume negotiations at any time simply by accepting the two fundamental principles without which negotiations would be fruitless.

59. The United States delegation considered that to undertake further negotiations in the absence of a change in the Communist position would be merely

to court a new failure that would be a blow as damaging to the United Nations as to the morale of the Korean people.

60. What was being discussed was the fate of 30 million Koreans who lived in the shadow of Communist tyranny and claimed the right to shape their own destiny. Many of them had already fallen in the cause of freedom. To cast their future repeatedly on the conference table even when there was no hope of agreement might make them lose their faith in the United Nations and in the very process of negotiation. There therefore had to be some assurance in advance that they would not be subjected to pressure to yield on matters affecting their very existence. There could be no settlement unless their freely-expressed will was taken into account.

61. The settlement of the Korean question should be worthy of those who had died to defend the Republic of Korea and the United Nations. The United States alone had suffered 130,000 casualties, among them 34,000 persons killed or missing. Fifteen other Members of the United Nations and the Republic of Korea had likewise suffered heavy losses.

62. Until the Communists ceased their attacks on the principles of the United Nations, all discussion would be futile. The negotiations should be carefully prepared and carefully timed. Communist China had just furnished fresh evidence of its brutal and illegal treatment of personnel of the United Nations Command in violation of the Armistice Agreement. Present conditions were not favourable to negotiation.

63. While the hope of a settlement should not be abandoned, loyalty to the principles of the United Nations had to be maintained; that was the only course that would eventually lead to a unified, independent and democratic Korea.

64. Mr. Yakov MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stressed that the Korean question constituted one of the most important problems awaiting solution by the General Assembly. Discussions had extended over a number of years but, despite the Korean people's aspirations to unification and independence, the country remained divided. Those States which desired an improvement in the international climate were striving to find a solution of the problem. The USSR had consistently striven to bring about the unification and independence of Korea under a democratic system which would guarantee the legitimate rights of the Korean people. It was convinced that the Korean problem was essentially the concern of the Koreans, and that the United Nations should assist them in finding the solution they demanded. No peaceful settlement of the question could be obtained if the wishes of the Korean people were disregarded.

65. It was consequently regrettable that the Committee had rejected the draft resolution to invite representatives of North Korea and China to take part in the discussions. The Committee had thereby rendered any objective consideration impossible and had precluded any binding or practical decision. In fact, instead of examining the question of the unification of Korea, the Committee would only consider the strictly formal report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/2711), and the report of the fifteen Powers on the Korean Political Conference at Geneva (A/2786).

66. Both those reports were biased and one-sided. They could not, therefore, serve as a basis for a solution of the problem. The same biased attitude was noticeable in the United States representative's statement. Moreover, every time that the question had been discussed, the United States had sought to shift the responsibility for the suffering endured by the Korean people through the armed intervention of the United States in Korea on to innocent parties.

67. There was no need to recall all the facts and unrefuted documents which showed where the real responsibility lay. It was enough to refer to the statement made in December 1949 by President Syngman Rhee, that one of the objectives of South Korea was to conquer North Korea the following year. It was therefore clear that he had been preparing aggression against North Korea. In that connexion it was significant that he had again affirmed, in a speech made on 15 August 1954, that the South Korean Army wished to advance to the Yalu River to drive the Communists out of Korea.

68. The attempt to represent the United States armed intervention in Korea as a collective United Nations action had long been refuted by the fact that 95 per cent of the military expenditure had been borne by the United States. That was, indeed, only fitting, as the intervention had furthered the strategic plans of the United States in the Far East and had enabled it to seize Taiwan, which it still occupied.

69. The report of the fifteen Powers on the Korean Conference at Geneva attempted to justify the United States intervention in Korea and the failure of the Conference. It was not only biased in its general content, but also in its definition of the Conference. The Geneva Conference had not been convened pursuant to a United Nations decision; the meeting had been agreed upon in Berlin on 18 February 1954 by the four great Powers. The lessons to be learnt from that Conference were very useful if the present negotiations were to achieve success; its purpose had been to prepare a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The Governments of the USSR and of the Chinese People's Republic had made every effort to find a solution. The North Korean Government had presented a comprehensive and constructive programme designed to ensure, first, free elections in the whole of Korea on the basis of an agreement between North Korea and South Korea which could have been concluded at an All-Korean Conference; secondly, the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea before the elections, in order to preclude any pressure on the voters; thirdly, an undertaking by the States most interested in the maintenance of peace in the Far East to promote Korean economic recovery. The USSR and Chinese delegations had supported that programme, but had made every effort to reach an agreement. The Chinese delegation had suggested the establishment of an international commission to supervise the elections. That amendment had cleared the path to a solution guaranteeing the unification and independence of Korea on a democratic basis through the removal of all outside pressure and intervention.

70. Nevertheless, the Geneva Conference had failed to come to any decision. The proposal of the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the unification of Korea on the basis of free elections had encountered the opposition of the United States and of South Korea, who had themselves failed to submit

any constructive proposal and had confined themselves to preventing any solution.

71. On 22 May 1954, the South Korean delegation had submitted a proposal for all-Korean elections, but that proposal was in fact designed to bring about a unification of Korea under the auspices of the Syngman Rhee Government with the assistance of United States forces. Its actual purport had been that the Chinese People's Volunteers should be withdrawn from Korea while United States forces remained there during the elections. That proposal clearly indicated that the South Korean Government feared the people's verdict and desired the assistance of foreign forces. That fact disposed at one fell swoop of the United States allegation that the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea feared free elections. The true nature of that proposal became even more apparent in the light of the fact that the proposed supervisory commission was to have consisted of seven members, five of whom had taken part in the war on the United States side. The question of an all-Korean body responsible for the preparation of the elections had been passed over in silence. The South Korean Government had, in fact, attempted to bind the future all-Korean National Assembly to accept the existing South Korean Constitution as the fundamental law of the future unified State. In that connexion it was worth recalling that *The New York Times* of 25 May 1954 had said that the sponsors of that proposal must have been well aware that it would not be accepted.

72. At the beginning of the Conference, the United Kingdom delegation had stated that it was necessary first to reach agreement on the essential prerequisites of a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. It had formulated the following five fundamental principles: elections to an all-Korean Assembly; proportional representation; freedom of elections on the basis of universal secret suffrage; international supervision of the elections; and the specification of conditions for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea.

73. The USSR delegation had supported the United Kingdom delegation's views on the need of agreement, at the very outset, on a number of essential principles for a peaceful settlement of the question. It had submitted a proposal, also based on approval of five principles: firstly, free all-Korean elections within six months, on the basis of proportional representation for the whole of Korea; secondly, the establishment of an all-Korean commission to prepare for the elections; thirdly, the withdrawal of foreign forces before the elections; fourthly, the establishment of an international commission to supervise the elections; and, in the fifth place, an undertaking by the States most interested in the maintenance of peace in the Far East to ensure the peaceful development of Korea. Unfortunately, the USSR proposal, designed to bring the various viewpoints closer together, had not been accepted by the Western delegations.

74. On 15 June 1954, the delegations of the USSR, China and North Korea had submitted new proposals. The delegations of the sixteen States which had taken part in the intervention in Korea had jointly refused to consider those proposals and had made a unilateral statement announcing that the negotiations on the Korean question had come to an end. Yet the proposals submitted on 15 June had constituted a valuable contribution towards a solution of the problem. They had provided for the gradual and proportional withdrawal

of foreign troops; for a reduction in the armed forces of both North Korea and South Korea; for measures calculated to terminate the state of war; for the subsequent establishment of economic and cultural relations between North and South Korea; and for an undertaking by the States parties to the Conference to promote the peaceful development of Korea.

75. The Soviet delegation had also submitted a draft declaration whereby the States parties to the Conference would have undertaken not to take any action prejudicial to the maintenance of peace in Korea. The delegation of the People's Republic of China had proposed that the parties declare their readiness to persevere in their efforts to achieve agreement on a peaceful settlement of the question.

76. However, all those proposals had been rejected by the United States and South Korean delegations, although certain other delegation—such as those of the United Kingdom and Belgium—had expressed their agreement with the Chinese proposal, which, in their view, had reflected the spirit of the Conference. The United States delegation had opposed the adoption of that proposal and had insisted that the negotiations cease.

77. That policy of opposing any peaceful settlement of the Korean question was still being pursued. The rejection of the draft resolution to invite the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and of the People's Republic of China to participate in the Committee's discussions was an example of that attitude. Moreover, South Korean leaders were openly stating that they opposed the resumption of peaceful negotiations and demanded the unification of Korea by force. The report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea referred to one such provocative speech by President Syngman Rhee (A/2711, paragraph 24). Encouraged by the bellicose policy of the United States, he was contemplating no less than a military crusade up to the Yalu River. His statements were openly supported by certain public figures in the United States, such as Senator Alexander Wiley, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator George. It was thus clear who were the instigators of the South Korean Government's policy. In that connexion, it was interesting to note that the British Press had adopted a very different attitude towards the President of South Korea.

78. The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea had stated that the South Korean armed forces numbered more than 750,000 men, although the country's economy could not sustain more than 200,000. At the Conference, the North Korean delegation had proposed that the armed forces of North Korea and South Korea each be reduced, as speedily as possible, to 100,000 men. However, that proposal had been rejected by the United States and South Korea, who had decided to form in South Korea, ten more divisions which would be paid for out of the \$450 million furnished by the United States to South Korea as military assistance.

79. Western demands at the Conference had been based on two fundamental themes: firstly, that only the United Nations was competent to decide on a settlement of the Korean question, and secondly, that Koreans should renounce their lawful right to prepare and conduct all-Korean elections on their own.

80. Clearly that insistence on the role of the United Nations had been only a pretext for breaking off the negotiations on Korea at Geneva. Had it not been for the determined opposition of the United States delegation, the Geneva Conference could have solved the Korean question just as it had solved the question of Indo-China. By asking for the discussions on the Korean question to take place within the United Nations, the United States wished to create an illusion that it desired a solution. That device, however, did not deceive anybody, as it was clear that the question could never be solved without the participation of representatives from the People's Republic of China and from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

81. The United Nations interest required settlement of the Korean problem as soon as possible. It should consequently encourage the resumption of direct negotiations between the parties, in accordance with the principles of the Charter.

82. At Geneva, Mr. Molotov had rightly recalled that, although it was possible to hold different views regarding the best means of upholding United Nations prestige, the USSR Government still believed that the best course to that end was the one followed by the Soviet Union in resisting violations of the Charter.

83. By maintaining that the United Nations had jurisdiction in the Korean matter, the Western Powers sought to disguise their real intentions, which, as paragraph 10 of their report (A/2786) showed, were to avoid arriving at any solution and to maintain armed forces in Korea. Moreover, the report of the fifteen Western Powers on the Geneva Conference was biased and did not seek to solve the problem.

84. The same applied to the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. That Commission had been established illegally under resolution 376 (V) of 7 October 1950 which had been adopted in the absence of representatives of the Korean people and in contravention of their rights.

85. The Commission was useless, and incapable of advancing the unification and rehabilitation of Korea. After the military plans of the United States had failed it had made no effort to reach a peaceful settlement of the question. It was entirely lacking in objectivity; for example, it described the elections which had been held in South Korea on 20 May 1954 as democratic, whereas they had been held in an atmosphere of tyranny and terror. Indeed, the Commission's report (A/2711) could not entirely conceal that fact, as paragraphs 69 to 71 showed.

86. The Commission had been no more successful in the rehabilitation of Korea. Neither the Commission nor the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency had been able to put into effect the assistance programme which had been planned. The 1953-1954 programme had not been put into operation by the middle of 1954, and, as paragraph 110 of the Commission's report showed, the application of the 1955 programme, in a considerably reduced form, had become more than hypothetical.

87. Economic conditions in South Korea had deteriorated considerably. In 1953-1954 the deficit had reached \$150 million, and it was estimated at \$250 million for 1954-1955. The currency had depreciated considerably, and extreme poverty prevailed in the country. As paragraph 94 of the Commission's report

stated, the Republic of Korea from its own resources could barely support the costs of its own administration and support an army even on a reduced scale.

88. By way of contrast, the Government and people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had made considerable efforts to rehabilitate their country's economy. Notable results had been achieved; 232 State industrial undertakings had been established, as well as hydroelectric power stations, metallurgical factories, irrigation works, housing projects and schools. The cost of living was declining and wages had doubled since 1953. The Soviet Union had appropriated 1,000 million roubles for assistance to the Korean people, and the People's Republic of China had provided 8,000,000 million yuan. Democratic countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and the Democratic Republic of Germany had supplied North Korea with machinery and goods, and were building factories there.

89. On comparing the progress achieved in North Korea with the economic chaos prevailing in South Korea, the only possible conclusion was that the economic failure of South Korea was due to the domination of foreign capital and the extent of the military effort required of the country. The programme of assistance to the Republic of Korea, therefore, was merely a pretext to enable the armed forces to be maintained on an artificially large scale. The Commission itself admitted, in paragraph 136 of the report, that the maintenance costs of the army militated severely against plans for reconstruction in Korea, but it repeated that South Korea had to maintain large armed forces in view of the tense state of international relations and the division of the country.

90. The question thus arose as to who was responsible for the persistence of that division and that world tension. At Geneva, the North Korean delegation had stated that it desired cultural and economic co-operation with South Korea, and had proposed a reduction of armed forces. Those overtures had been rejected.

91. The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea had ignored those proposals, but had suggested no alternative to them. As the Commission itself stated in paragraph 5 of its report, it remained unable to contribute to the realization of the unification of Korea. There seemed no reason at all to extend its mandate any further, and the Soviet delegation would accordingly submit a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.117) to discontinue it.

92. It should also be pointed out that resolution 500 (V) of 18 May 1951, concerning the embargo on exports to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China, was a serious obstacle to the strengthening of international peace. Those illegal measures should be ended immediately.

93. The examination of the Korean question by the United Nations could not lead to any practical solution, though the peaceful settlement of that question brooked no further delay. It was possible and necessary, however, to find a way to an agreement which would assist the Korean people in their efforts for unification and rehabilitation. In that connexion, mention had to be made of the joint statement by the Governments of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China on 12 October 1954, concerning the need to convene a conference on the Korean question in the near future in which the States concerned would participate.

To that end the USSR delegation would submit a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.116) under which the General Assembly would recommend that the States concerned should continue their efforts to reach agreement on the peaceful settlement of the Korean question on the basis of the creation of a unified, independent and democratic Korean State, and, to that end, should convene a conference of interested States at an early date.

94. The method of direct negotiation between the States concerned was the only way to reach agreement. The international situation had become favourable to the settlement of the Korean question as a result of the Geneva Conference. Useful preparatory work had been done; both sides had been able to state their positions more clearly; identity of view had emerged on some questions, and, lastly, it had been possible to decide on the best approach to the solution of important problems.

95. At the end of October, the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had addressed an appeal to the National Assembly and the people of South Korea for the peaceful unification of the country. That appeal had contained a proposal for a conference, to be held at Pyongyang

or Seoul, to be attended by representatives of political parties and of social and other organizations in South Korea and North Korea or, failing such a conference, a joint session of the two National Assemblies, to examine the question of the peaceful unification of Korea in 1955. In this appeal, the North Korean Assembly had also proposed that a conference of representatives of North Korea and South Korea should be held at Panmunjom or Kaesong in February 1955 to examine the question of convening the conference of unification, and the question of establishing economic and cultural relations. Lastly, the appeal had proposed that the authorities of North Korea and South Korea should guarantee complete freedom of action to political parties and to social organizations in their respective territories. If South Korea and the forces which supported it did not reject them, those proposals would provide a firm foundation for the settlement of the question.

96. The Soviet Government desired a peaceful solution to the Korean question and would support every genuine effort made to that end.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.