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Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia).

AGENDA ITEM 67

International co-operation in developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy: report of the United States of America (A/2734, A/2738, A/C.1/758, A/C.1/L.105) (*continued*)

1. Mr. NUTTING (United Kingdom) stated that the item on international co-operation in developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy was one in which both the Government and the people of his country had a deep interest. The discussions would carry a new message of hope to the world. If the United Nations endorsed the enterprise and played its part in guiding it, the Organization would add immeasurably to its importance.

2. He was therefore disappointed that the representative of the Soviet Union in his speech of 12 November (715th meeting) had been unable to state clearly whether the USSR was prepared to join in establishing an international agency to facilitate the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. However, he still hoped that during the debate the Soviet Union would indicate its desire to participate, thereby demonstrating that it did, as Mr. Vyshinsky had stated, support the principle of international co-operation for the peaceful uses of atomic energy. He sincerely trusted that the doubts and fears which the representative of the USSR had voiced had been dispelled by the further explanations given by Mr. Lodge (717th meeting) of United States policy in the matter and by the willingness of the sponsors of the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/L.105) to consider the suggested Soviet amendments in a constructive spirit.

3. For his part, Mr. Nutting desired to remove any fears which might be felt anywhere in the Committee about the intentions of the draft resolution.

4. In particular, he hoped there would be satisfaction with the answer of the representative of the United States to the question raised by the representative of Sweden (710th meeting), and taken up by the representative of the USSR, in respect to what was inaccurately called the "denaturing" of fissionable materials. The representative of Sweden had also spoken of a link between the problems of the peaceful development of atomic energy and the control of atomic energy in the context of disarmament. He

had referred, in that connexion, to a speech made by Mr. Lloyd in the disarmament debate on 11 October (685th meeting) in which Mr. Lloyd had said that the atomic development division of the disarmament and atomic development authority proposed by the United States (DC/53, annex 4) would have to be correlated with any international atomic energy agency which might emerge from the proposals of President Eisenhower. But Mr. Lloyd had never suggested that efforts in international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy must be made dependent upon substantial progress in the disarmament field. That position had been confirmed by the current debate, where speaker after speaker had drawn attention to the progress which nations had already made in the peaceful development of atomic energy.

5. A number of representatives had referred to the two problems as the two sides of the same coin. The coin was indeed two-sided, but it seemed that the Soviet representative was somewhat mesmerized by one side of the coin—the prohibition of atomic weapons. If Mr. Vyshinsky were to look with equal attention at the other side, which depicted the ways and means of applying atomic energy to peaceful purposes for the benefit of the whole of mankind, he would no doubt agree that there was no reason why progress should not be made towards the solution of both problems concurrently and not consecutively.

6. The approaches to the problems of atomic energy had in the past led to deadlock for a variety of reasons. At present, there was renewed hope of less unfruitful discussions in the Disarmament Commission. Mr. Nutting asked the representatives to take advantage of that improvement and to seize the opportunity offered by President Eisenhower's proposal to approach the problem of atomic energy from the other side of the coin. If that were done, it might well be possible to fulfil the hope expressed by Sir Winston Churchill when he had said, with regard to the possibilities of reducing world tensions:

"We might even find ourselves in a few years moving along a broad smooth causeway of peace and plenty, instead of roaming and peering around the rim of hell."

7. That was one of the main purposes of President Eisenhower's proposals. If the major Powers, together with other nations, could but embark together upon that international enterprise, they might well be able to begin to break down the barriers of suspicion and distrust which at present divided the world; they might also be able to break through the difficulties which surrounded the disarmament discussions. Above all, they should be able to place atomic energy at the service of human progress and security.

8. That was also the spirit in which the United Kingdom approached the challenge of bending the forces of the atom to the benefit rather than to the

destruction of mankind. It would be recalled that Sir Winston Churchill on 17 December 1953 had welcomed the proposals of President Eisenhower because he thought that they might end a long period of deadlock. Perhaps, therefore, the representatives would understand Mr. Nutting's disappointment at the apparent wish of the Soviet Union to return to the position in January 1946, when the General Assembly established the Atomic Energy Commission, a body which had failed to achieve its objectives and which had since been abolished. It was not to the unhappy past but to the possibilities of a happier future that the Committee should look.

9. The belief that progress in the peaceful use of atomic energy could help the disarmament discussions had been supported by the General Assembly. In its resolution 715 (VIII) of 28 November 1953, the Assembly had said that progress in re-establishing confidence between nations and efforts to reach agreement on a comprehensive and co-ordinated disarmament programme could be made concurrently, and that progress in either field would contribute to progress in the other.

10. The representative of the USSR had conjured up differences between President Eisenhower's original proposals (470th plenary meeting) and Mr. Lodge's statement on 5 November in the Committee (707th meeting). If Mr. Vyshinsky studied the statement which Mr. Jackson had made on 15 November (716th meeting), he would see that the plans announced by Mr. Lodge were a genuine effort to expand the idea originally put forward by President Eisenhower. Mr. Lodge and Mr. Jackson had shown how that idea had been translated into working proposals. If the Soviet Union did not like them, that was one thing, but it was not fair to say, without any evidence, that the statements of Mr. Lodge and Mr. Jackson had narrowed down the original plan simply because the present proposals concerned the practical and feasible means of achieving the original objectives suggested by President Eisenhower.

11. There had been no change in the views of the United Kingdom Government regarding the objectives of the agency. Those objectives should be, first, to encourage world-wide research and development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy; secondly, to arrange for the provision of nuclear materials to meet the needs of research, development and practical applications to medicine and other peaceful activities, including the eventual production of power; thirdly, to foster the interchange of unclassified information; fourthly, to conduct its activities in such a manner as to prepare for the time when the use of atomic energy for peace became the predominant and perhaps the exclusive use of atomic energy.

12. An ultimate objective was certainly to help provide power for those countries where there was a shortage. It was, however, quite apparent that, in dealing with the question of establishing the proposed agency, the nations concerned were dealing with something relatively new, and the experience gained through co-operation between States during the current year had helped towards a better appreciation of how to tackle that novel problem. As a result of the knowledge gained, they now advocated a different method for achieving the same ends.

13. The co-sponsors of the joint draft resolution wished to establish an agency which could fulfil now the

tasks which needed to be fulfilled now. When it became possible to carry the application of atomic energy further, in particular to the production of power on a large scale, the agency could be developed so that it could render the necessary assistance. Perhaps at that time it might seem better that the agency should be in the nature of a bank rather than a clearing-house. At that stage, further aspects of the matter would have to be considered, for instance the need for help in financing atomic power projects.

14. It was clear that, because atomic projects of any kind were very costly, no State would be able to proceed without careful thought and preparation. A State would not, for instance, try to finance large and expensive research establishments if the agency could provide the knowledge for it. Nor would it wish to establish an atomic power plant before it was certain that it would fit into its economy. When the time came, arrangements could be considered for making use of, for instance, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in the financing of those projects.

15. The main difficulty in seeking means of achieving the stated objectives was the relative absence of foundations on which to build. Therefore it was essential for the agency in its first years of existence to lay foundations upon which it could hope to build, in the future, projects which applied atomic power to peaceful uses. The first essential was the thorough training of technicians and the very complete study of all that was involved.

16. That was why, on 5 November (707th meeting), the representative of the United Kingdom had explained the various steps which had to be taken before atomic power could be used for peaceful purposes. That was why the United Kingdom Government had offered facilities for training and had offered to contribute information. Mr. Nutting was authorized to add that his Government was prepared to hold available, as an initial contribution earmarked for agency projects, 20 kilogrammes of fissionable material to serve as fuel in experimental atomic reactors. That contribution could be made available as required.

17. Once an easy and safe process of applying atomic power had been found, and once the foundation had been built, then the way would be open for the agency to help establish atomic power plants.

18. Mr. Nutting did not see how the Soviet Union could object to so sensible a way of approaching the subject. If the Soviet Union had ideas about the form which the agency should take, he hoped it would express them in due course, but he appreciated the view that no State should be able to delay indefinitely the establishment of the agency. The States negotiating its establishment would undoubtedly wish to consider the views of other Member States indicating an interest before any convention was finally drawn up. That was certainly true of the United Kingdom. There was no question of presenting Member States not presently taking part in the negotiations with a *fait accompli*.

19. The relationship of the agency to the United Nations was a matter for negotiation, and when the agency was established it would be easier to envisage what that relationship should be. It must, however, be such as not to hamper the effectiveness of the agency. The tasks of the agency were essentially peace-

ful and technical, and they should not be pursued in an atmosphere made difficult by the interplay of politics. That human venture must not be subjected to the frustrations which had so tragically marred the political endeavours of the United Nations.

20. In connexion with the scientific conference, Mr. Nutting said that it was the view of the co-sponsors of the joint draft resolution that there should be no distinction between officials and scientists. It was the hope of his delegation that the conference would be a congress of those persons who were most knowledgeable in matters of atomic energy. It would, he hoped, be a forum for a real exchange of information on the many problems connected with atomic energy. It was preferable that it should not be a conference on restricted lines. The conference should not, however, deal with the organization of the agency. It was the clear view of the sponsors that there was no organic connexion between the conference and the agency. Their functions were separate and different. The agency was to be a functional international body which would be given permanent status; the conference was to be purely consultative, a scientific congress of experts to provide a forum for the exchange of the maximum amount of information available on that subject.

21. None of the sponsors looked upon the project in any pessimistic light. If they uttered words of caution, it was because they did not want to imply that as soon as the agency was created any need for power would be met by the provision of atomic power plants. They did not want the debate to lead to a facile belief that the era of plenty was within early reach, but rather to the belief that the shroud of secrecy, mistrust and horror enveloping the discovery of the atom was lifting, and that ordinary men and women could look to the discovery as a healer of disease and a generator of light, power and plenty.

Mr. Johnson (Canada), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

22. Mrs. SEKANINOVA-CAKRTOVA (Czechoslovakia) observed that the practical utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes had opened new prospects for the well-being of mankind. The importance of those possibilities had from the beginning found reflection in the United Nations. The first resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1946 (resolution 1 (I)) had been a resolution on the peaceful utilization of atomic energy adopted unanimously on the recommendation of the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom. Since 1946, however, the United Nations had made no progress towards its implementation.

23. The hopes of mankind for the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful ends had for years been overshadowed by fears of its destructive force. The inauguration of the world's first industrial atomic power station in the Soviet Union in June 1954 had again reaffirmed the conviction that that great discovery could be used for other purposes than war.

24. Czechoslovakia, which possessed atomic material, was greatly interested in the peaceful utilization of atomic energy. It was well known that radium and polonium, discovered in 1898 by Marie and Pierre Curie, had been derived from uranium which they had obtained from the Czech mines at Jachymov. Czechoslovakia was directly interested in further progress in that sphere and had an important part to play in

that respect. The Czechoslovak Government and delegation had therefore at all times supported the idea of international co-operation in the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

25. The Czechoslovak Government, whose entire policy was aimed at increasing the welfare of its people, was developing the peaceful utilization of atomic energy, with the assistance of Soviet science, in industry, agriculture, medicine and other fields. Particular attention was being devoted to the production of atomic power.

26. In Czechoslovakia, the utilization of radio-active materials for peaceful purposes had become an object of national interest and of co-ordinated research. Radio-phosphorus and radio-bismuth were being used in metallurgy, and radio-cobalt in engineering. Extensive research work was being carried out in the utilization of the radio-active properties of radio-phosphorus and radio-sulphur in agriculture and in the physiology of plants. Remarkable achievements had been recorded in the utilization of radio-active materials in medicine and in biology, both in the diagnostic and the therapeutic sphere. Radio-phosphorus, radio-iridium, radio-caesium and radio-sulphur were being used in the treatment of tumours, thyroid disorders and blood diseases. Research work was being conducted in the High Tatra Mountains in the field of cosmic radiation.

27. Great attention was being given to the training of scientific and technical cadres in the realm of atomic energy. A basic cadre had been trained at the Laboratory for Nuclear Physics, at the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences and at Charles University, both for theoretical and experimental work.

28. The first conference of Czechoslovak nuclear physicists, held in September 1953 at the Centre of Scientific Workers at Liblice, had shown that those scientists had attained important results in that field.

29. It had been pointed out by some representatives that the shortage of power resources in certain parts of the world stood in the way of the industrial development of a number of countries and had an adverse effect on living standards. Even in countries possessing a sufficiency of power resources there was considerable danger of the exhaustion of those resources in the not too distant future. In their statements, the representatives of France and Belgium (708th meeting) had welcomed the possibility that the peaceful use of atomic energy would remove the danger of the exhaustion of existing power resources which threatened the economic development of industrially advanced countries.

30. Figures from various parts of the world indicated that the levels of national income, and therefore also of the industrial development and the living standards of the populations, were determined by the quantity of energy produced. It was a known fact that in industrially under-developed countries the increase of power production constituted one of the fundamental prerequisites to industrialization. Therefore the peaceful use of atomic energy, especially the production of electric power, was of particular importance to those countries.

31. Different organs of the United Nations had been dealing with the question of the economic development of the industrially under-developed countries. The General Assembly, therefore, in its consideration of the present question should not disregard the pos-

sibilities for economic development offered by the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

32. It had been emphasized throughout the discussions that there was a close connexion between the unprecedented perspectives afforded by the peaceful use of atomic energy for the well-being of mankind, and the equally unprecedented threat of its misuse. The representative of the United Kingdom, for instance, had just spoken of it, and the representative of Australia had spoken of it on 10 November (712th meeting). The discovery of atomic energy imposed two urgent problems: first, how to eliminate the danger which threatened the very existence of mankind by its misuse for purposes of war; secondly, how to ensure its fullest peaceful use for the benefit of man. It had been explained that the plan submitted to the General Assembly for the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy was not a plan for disarmament and for the prohibition of atomic weapons. Yet, when discussing the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the danger of its misuse must not be ignored.

33. Mrs. Sekaninova-Cakrtova agreed with the representative of the United Kingdom that the experience gained in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and the plans made for such further uses, were most alluring. But it would be impossible for the Czechoslovak people to forget that units of atomic artillery were being dispatched to Western Germany, a country bordering on Czechoslovakia. Nor could the Czechoslovak people disregard the fact that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, into which a renewed *Wehrmacht* under the leadership of Hitlerite generals was to be integrated, was basing all its plans on the use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons.

34. It was in the interests of mankind that the possibility of the use of atomic energy for the mass extermination of peoples and the destruction of economic and cultural values might be eliminated once and for all. The representative of Syria had spoken (714th meeting) advisedly when he noted that the greatest of the objectives declared by President Eisenhower on 8 December 1953—the disallowance of nuclear energy as a destructive force—still remained to be achieved.

35. The representative of Czechoslovakia then quoted from a letter from Japan to the editor of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* recalling the horrors of Hiroshima and concerning the recent hydrogen bomb tests in the Pacific.

36. The close link between the question of the peaceful use of atomic energy and that of the prohibition of atomic weapons had been clear from the outset. The first report of the Atomic Energy Commission contained the statement that there was "an intimate relation between the activities required for peaceful purposes and those leading to the production of atomic weapons".¹ As the destructive power of atomic energy increased with the new discoveries and technical developments, it became more urgent to prohibit its use for purposes of war. It was obvious that only by such prohibition and by halting the stockpiling of atomic weapons would it be possible to make full use of atomic energy for the well-being of mankind.

37. It had been clear from the time the United Nations first considered the problems relating to the discovery of atomic energy that they affected international

security. Therefore it was important that the negotiations on the creation of the international agency should take that factor into account.

38. During the discussion, a number of representatives had said it would not be appropriate if the relationship between the proposed agency and the United Nations were to be that of a specialized agency. There could be no doubt that the functions of the international agency were fundamentally different from the tasks of any of the specialized agencies. The agreement on its establishment should, in determining its nature and relationship to the United Nations, take into account the significance of the problems within its terms of reference—problems which were so closely linked to the security of nations. The relationship of the agency to the United Nations, and in particular to the General Assembly and the Security Council, should be determined in accordance with the Charter.

39. Recent developments have proved that negotiation and agreement were the road which led to the solution of important international issues. That same road would lead to international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Czechoslovakia would bring its contribution to that goal.

40. Mr. QUIROGA GALDO (Bolivia) observed that, since the time of Pythagoras, it had always been impossible to keep the discoveries of science secret. History had now repeated itself in the case of atomic energy, and it was regrettable that that new discovery should have served in the first place for the fabrication of weapons.

41. The representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union, in presenting their points of view with regard to methods of using atomic energy for peaceful purposes, had shown that their countries were working along parallel lines in using atomic energy to improve man's lot. They had been in agreement, together with the representative of France, both regarding the fact that atomic energy was no longer a secret, and regarding the possibilities offered by the use of atomic energy in medicine, industry and agriculture. That being the case, Mr. Quiroga Galdo wondered why certain differences of opinion still remained between the representatives of the great Powers.

42. While Bolivia had not as yet sufficient scientists or technicians in the atomic field, despite the interest of its universities in nuclear physics, it possessed great uranium deposits. For four centuries, Bolivia had been primarily a mineral-producing country, under conditions of exploitation, and wondered whether that situation was to continue.

43. Although it was a small and under-industrialized country, Bolivia could not stand aside in a debate of such importance for humanity. The proposed agency could not achieve the aims envisaged by President Eisenhower if one part of humanity were absent from it. All representatives, and particularly those from Latin America, had the duty of making the greatest efforts to ensure that the agency procured the welfare of all peoples.

44. The small and middle-sized nations could not remain indifferent to the question, but instead of adopting attitudes of admonition or censure, which would be childish given the insufficient development of their economic potential, they should rather adopt the role of amicable arbiters, harmonizing the views of the great Powers.

¹ Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, First Year, Special Supplement, p. 11.

45. While the plan offered by the United States and certain other countries was generous, that did not mean that there should be any refusal to examine the suggestions or amendments of the Soviet Union. Though the world was divided, the representative of the Soviet Union held the view that coexistence was possible, and such coexistence, Mr. Quiroga Galdo said, must be based on inviolable and reciprocal respect for the self-determination of peoples. It was not logical to cling to the prejudice that a great people was seeking the annihilation of the other half of mankind. Faced by the hydrogen bomb, the men of the East and of the West needed to find some solid basis for peaceful coexistence.

46. Differences of viewpoint regarding the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes appeared to be more of form than of substance. The Soviet Union wished to link the proposed agency to the Security Council, which was governed, basically, by the principle of unanimity. The United States and the other sponsors of the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/L.105) considered that the agency should be similar in character to the specialized agencies, so that it should not be subject to a unilateral decision on the part of any of the great Powers.

47. The Bolivian delegation considered the joint draft resolution logical and practical. Nevertheless, given the preponderantly political character of the proposed agency, the point of view of the Soviet Union should be carefully examined. The principal obstacle in the way of Soviet Union acceptance of the joint draft resolution seemed to be the fear that the fissionable material made available to the agency might at any moment be transformed into weapon-grade material.

48. The Bolivian delegation believed that that fear might be overcome if a combined system of control were worked out. Under that system, the Security Council would supervise the agency's activities during the first phase of its development, during, say, the first five years; then, once confidence among the great Powers had been restored, the Security Council could withdraw and allow the agency to become a specialized agency. That five-year experiment would greatly clarify the differences and also reveal the intentions of the great Powers. At the end of those five years, world public opinion would have proof as to which countries were motivated by good faith and which had hidden motives. It would be possible, in that way, to end the existing stalemate. During the five-year period, a series of scientific and political international meetings could take place, in addition to the general conference proposed. Those meetings could be held in Moscow, New York, New Delhi, Paris and in some Latin American capitals. That would convince the world of the universal and peaceful character of the agency. Moreover, such a course would in no way hamper the progress of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, for the experts believed that the practical benefits of the peaceful uses of atomic energy would not immediately be felt.

49. In conclusion, Mr. Quiroga Galdo said that a psychological crusade should be undertaken immediately in order to free the world of the fear that an atomic war was inevitable, and to implant the idea so brilliantly expressed by the President of the United States before the General Assembly, that everything should be done to ensure that atomic energy was not dedicated to man's death but consecrated to his life.

Mr. Urrutia resumed the Chair.

50. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon) said that President Eisenhower's speech on 8 December 1953 (470th plenary meeting), offering to share the benefits of the secrets of the atom under wise and reasonable limitations, represented a new and generous approach, worthy of the highest statesmanship. When Sir Winston Churchill had described the speech as one of the most important events since the end of the war, he had spoken for all. Since 8 December 1953, five things had happened.

51. First, confidential negotiations had been conducted between the United States and the Soviet Union. The account of those negotiations, submitted to the Assembly in document A/2738, did not cause undue pessimism that the two points of view could not be reconciled. It revealed a sustained probing by both sides for some modicum of common ground—each, of course, holding fast to its fundamental point of view.

52. Secondly, negotiations among a number of Western Powers had culminated in the seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.105) calling for the establishment of an international atomic energy agency and the convening of a conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

53. Thirdly, the speech of the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, on 23 September (475th plenary meeting), supplemented by statements of the United States representative in the Committee, culminating in the announcement of the allocation of 100 kilogrammes of fissionable materials, showed that United States thinking was crystallizing into three main lines of action: the establishment of an international atomic energy agency with the Soviet Union as a founding member if possible, but, if it was not possible, with provision that the Soviet Union might join at any time it wished; the calling of a scientific conference by the Secretary-General with the assistance of an advisory body; the offer of fissionable materials and of scientific and educational facilities in that field on a bilateral basis to countries and agencies. It was unnecessary to enlarge on the significance of that offer for the good name of the United States, for the future of international co-operation and of science, for the development of the less developed countries and for the cause of peace. For the Near East in particular, with its problems of the desert, the proposal was almost a godsend. If the new force could beat back the desert, seemingly insoluble problems would yield to reason and bonds of friendship would spring up among the peoples of the Near East and between them and those who knew the promise of that great force.

54. Fourthly, the reactions and statements of Mr. Vyshinsky had shown that there was movement and a convergence in points of view. Mr. Malik felt that the differences with respect to the relationship of the agency to the United Nations in general and to the Security Council in particular, with respect to the connexion between the peaceful uses of atomic energy and the possible use of atomic energy for warlike ends, and with respect to the usefulness of atomic energy for the development of the under-developed countries, could be reconciled in the prevailing atmosphere of good will. Were negotiations on those points not already in progress, he would have suggested a formule for reconciliation, as he considered that there were solid grounds for hope. What was not yet clear was the type of facilities

the Soviet Union was prepared bilaterally to offer other countries.

55. Fifthly, the chain reaction set off by President Eisenhower's speech had led to the current debate in the Committee, which was as momentous as any since the San Francisco Conference of 1945.

56. The debate in the Committee had produced in some of the representatives a sense of profound humility, stemming not from inability to comprehend the nature, significance and implications of atomic energy, both for peace and war, but from the fact that they represented countries which, for one reason or another, had not been active participants in the dramatic advances in the development of atomic energy. Mr. Malik recalled the contributions of their nations described by previous speakers in the debate and inquired whether it was an accident that scientific culture had flourished in recent centuries only in Europe, America, Russia and such countries as Japan, which had submitted to European scientific disciplines, but not to the same extent among the great cultures of Asia, the Middle East and Africa and even Latin America. That question was of the greatest importance and determined the very heart of the matter.

57. The reality of international relations was basically determined by power. Power depended not upon the presence of raw materials, but upon industrial development, which was impossible without the deepest participation of the nation in scientific and technical culture. There was thus a direct relationship between science and the love of science, on the one hand, and the weight of a nation in the international political field, on the other.

58. The nuclear research and discovery in the United Kingdom during the previous half-century would not have been possible without antecedent generations and centuries of continuous and cumulative scientific maturation in Western Europe, especially in the United Kingdom. The recent advances in nuclear science followed a century of international co-operation. Beyond that was the dynamic historical interaction between cultures and peoples.

59. In the Near East, the most recent flowering of science and knowledge had occurred about one thousand years before. The Arab-Moslem scientific creativity had formed an integral link between Greek antiquity and modern Europe. The elaboration of laws on the basis of inductive experimentation upon particulars had been an invention of the Arab and Moslem peoples. They had excelled especially in mathematics, physics and medicine. The atomic theory itself was a chief topic of their speculation. The Near East at present was not only far behind Europe and America, but also far behind the greatest scientific achievements of its own history.

60. Mr. Malik drew three conclusions from the foregoing. First, it was not enough for the less developed countries to be atomic beneficiaries; they must also become partners in scientific creation. Secondly, responsible participation in scientific creativity could take place either between different countries of the same general culture or between countries of different cultures, but on the basis of fundamental understandings. In that field there were severe limits to philanthropy; only as people were prepared to pay the price in intellectual discipline would they enjoy the boon of science. Thirdly, the peoples of the Near East might take reasonable comfort, in so far as their present

scientific deficiency was concerned, from the historical law that what was possible once was possible once again.

61. The Near East was one of the main oil-producing regions of the world, and it was of great significance for all the oil-producing countries that, according to Mr. Malik's preliminary researches, the entire oil and gas resources of the earth would be exhausted by the year 2041. It was necessary for them to establish capital goods during the next hundred years, rather than spend all their wealth on consumer goods. With respect to the problem of fuel and power, they must begin planning now. Thus the debate in the Committee was of the greatest importance to the peoples of the Near East.

62. The new technology offered great economic and political possibilities for the crisis-ridden Near East. Mr. Malik felt that the "atoms for peace" proposal was not only a matter of raising living standards, but one that might lead to a wholly new indirect approach to the region's fundamental problems. It might, in the words of the United States representative, be a sort of new prism that might refract rays of hope for a happier peace in the Near East.

63. Lebanon proposed to take full advantage of the material and scientific assistance offered by the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Canada. Lebanon eminently qualified as a site for the establishment of one of the pilot reactors in and for the Near East. The educational and scientific facilities in Beirut were not inferior to those in most places in the world, as was evidenced by the large number of representatives in the United Nations who had graduated from its institutions. Its central location, as well as the concentration of medical services in the city and in the mountains, were additional advantages. Some of the hospitals in the country had already used radio-isotopes received from the United States. Lebanon could also put in good claims for experimental training in agriculture, but since other countries could put in equally good claims, it must be satisfied with concentrating upon the applications of the atom in the fields of power and medicine. Since the earliest days, Lebanon had served as a transmission agency between countries; it might again be called upon to perform the same service.

64. Turning to the joint draft resolution before the Committee, Mr. Malik stated that his delegation would support and vote for it in its final form. He hoped that the negotiations among the Powers principally concerned would result in a compromise text, acceptable to the entire Committee. He reiterated that, were he not sure that the sponsors would devise every possible means for agreement, he would have himself suggested modifications.

65. Lebanon would join the proposed agency and would participate in the proposed conference. Mr. Malik wished, however, to make two observations. In the first place, he hoped that an appropriate State from the Near East—a State that was politically and technologically qualified—would be asked to sit on the advisory committee which would help the Secretary-General to prepare for the conference. Secondly, the seven Power draft resolution failed to provide for any relationship between the agency and the conference

which would both deal with one and the same general field. Whichever was first convened would critically bear upon the other. He therefore hoped that the

sponsors would modify the text so that it would reflect some connexion between the two.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.