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Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia).

AGENDA ITEM 19

Methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter: report of the Collective Measures Committee (A/2713, A/C.1/L.104) (*continued*)

1. Mr. KIDRON (Israel) said that General Assembly resolution 377 (V), on "Uniting for peace", had provided for the establishment of two bodies. The first, the Peace Observation Commission, had not so far exercised its functions, but might be called upon to do so in the future. The second, the Collective Measures Committee, had produced three reports. The first of those reports (A/1891) had been based on the lessons learned in the League of Nations attempt to impose sanctions during the invasion of Ethiopia, the war effort of the United Nations against the Axis Powers, and the North Korean and Chinese aggression against South Korea. The second report (A/2215) had been a paraphrase of the first, with the addition of a proposal for the establishment of a United Nations Volunteer Reserve, and an arms embargo list.

2. The most important part of the third report (A/2713), now before the First Committee, was entitled "Principles of collective security". It might have been better to have used the title "Principles of collective action"; the principles of collective security were those outlined in Chapter VII of the Charter, while the principles mentioned in the third report of the Collective Measures Committee were rather methods governing the implementation of collective security.

3. The first, second and fourth principles reproduced language which had already been approved by the General Assembly and called for no comment. In the case of the third principle, which referred to self-defence and regional arrangements, it was the Israel delegation's understanding that any action must, as the report stated, be consistent with the Charter; in other words, it was subject to all the restrictions contained in Articles 51 to 54 inclusive.

4. While all hoped that the international situation would be such that the continued existence of the Col-

lective Measures Committee would not be necessary, common prudence demanded that it should continue in being to pursue further studies of the problem, without necessarily reporting to the Security Council and the General Assembly at mandatory intervals.

5. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation had already stated its views on the previous reports of the Collective Measures Committee, and on resolution 377 (V), on "Uniting for peace", which had been adopted on 3 November 1950 in violation of the Charter, under which that committee had been established.

6. The Collective Measures Committee had not embarked on any new or more detailed studies since the seventh session of the General Assembly. That fact alone should be enough to prove that it was useless. Nevertheless, in its third report, it was once more submitting unfounded recommendations, of a nature calculated to damage the cause of peace.

7. The idea which had inspired the establishment of the Collective Measures Committee had not withstood the test of time. Furthermore, it was an illegal and dangerous body. The primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security lay with the Security Council. The Collective Measures Committee had been established with a view to bypassing that essential provision of the Charter. It had helped to speed up the armaments race in some countries; it was contrary to the principles of the Charter, whereby the United Nations was "to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations" in the attainment of common ends and the development of friendly relations among them.

8. There had recently been a growing tendency among certain States to criticize the principle of the unanimity of the five permanent members of the Security Council, a principle which was one of the very foundations of the United Nations. As direct attacks on that principle had failed, recourse was being had to underhand methods to subordinate the United Nations to the interests of a small group of States. Reactionary circles in certain Western countries, with the United States at their head, were advocating a foreign policy based on force. That policy, which was expressed in the armaments race, the constitution of military blocs, war propaganda, and the establishment of a network of military bases directed against the USSR, was directed in fact to the preparation of a new world war and the enslavement of the United Nations.

9. As early as 1947, the General Assembly had illegally set up the Interim Committee, or "Little Assembly". That body had not survived for long. After that setback, the opponents of the principle of the unanimity of the five permanent members of the Security Council had induced the General Assembly to adopt the resolution "Uniting for peace" (resolution 377 (V)), which was designed to confer on the Assembly powers which properly belonged to the Security Council. Un-

der the pretext of collective security, the principles set forth in the third report of the Collective Measures Committee (A/2713) were designed solely to enable States which were pursuing a policy of force to gain control of contingents of the armed forces of other States and to utilize their economic resources.

10. The working paper submitted to the Collective Measures Committee by the United States (A/AC.43/L.3) had explained that the studies made by the Collective Measures Committee might assist in reducing, in a future collective action, the amount of improvisation which had been necessary in organizing the collective effort in Korea. In that connexion, it might be recalled that Mr. Churchill had officially admitted that the war in Korea had been fought almost entirely by the United States. Improvisation must therefore be understood in fact as meaning the efforts of the United States to secure the participation of other States. In order to avoid another venture as disastrous as the Korean war, the United States and some of its satellites were now trying to build up the largest possible armed strength for a future war. The sole purpose of the first three principles set forth in the United States working paper was to encourage military preparations by all States, revive militarism and promote the formation of military units ready for service in the field and equipped with standardized weapons.

11. It was in the light of that policy that the steps taken for the remilitarization of Germany and its admission to the aggressive North Atlantic Treaty Organization bloc must be considered. Moreover, the Collective Measures Committee did not attempt to conceal the connexion between the measures which it recommended and the activities of aggressive military blocs, such as NATO. Thus, in annex 2 of the Committee's report, several Governments drew attention to their participation in NATO as proof of the steps being taken in implementation of the recommendations of the General Assembly. In short, it was obvious that there was an illegal movement afoot to bring the armaments race within the framework of the Charter.

12. The rejection by the States which controlled the Collective Measures Committee of the USSR proposals for the conclusion of a European treaty on collective security clearly revealed the true intentions of the partisans of the policy of force. It merely confirmed the fact that the purposes of the so-called collective measures had nothing in common with collective defence and the maintenance of international peace and security. The Collective Measures Committee should have been abolished long ago. It was useless, and the money which was being spent on it should be devoted to more useful purposes.

13. Mr. LORIDAN (Belgium) was surprised at the opposition of the representatives of Poland and the Soviet Union to the Collective Measures Committee and the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.104). The Committee had been described as illegal and harmful, and at the same time it had been accused of doing nothing in 1954. The Polish representative had criticized the membership of the Panel of Military Experts (704th meeting), though the limitation of the number of States taking part was entirely due to the refusal of certain States to associate themselves with the Committee's work.

14. The Collective Measures Committee was a subsidiary organ in the sense of Article 22 of the Charter. It had been set up to study methods which might

be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter. The reports it had presented set forth methods and principles intended to serve as a guide to collective measures against aggression. There was thus nothing mandatory about those documents. As the Australian representative had remarked (703rd meeting), they were a sort of manual of techniques that could be applied if necessary. The freedom of action of the competent United Nations bodies was unimpaired, but the fulfilment of their task might be facilitated by the Committee's work.

15. The third report of the Collective Measures Committee (A/2713) contained principles in keeping with the conclusions of the first two reports. It strengthened collective security; at the same time, it respected the independence of States, took into account their capacity to pay and emphasized the necessity for the equitable sharing of sacrifices and burdens. It also mentioned the problems that might arise from the simultaneous activity of various systems of collective security consistent with the Charter.

16. The principles set forth took into account not only the action of the mechanism of collective security laid down by the Charter, including the articles relating to regional agreements, but also the sphere of action of individual and collective self-defence.

17. Without minimizing the importance of the question, which was potential rather than immediate, the Belgian delegation hoped that the First Committee would be able to deal speedily with the item by adopting the twelve-Power draft resolution, to which the Belgian delegation had given its support.

18. Mr. MICHELET (France) remarked that a reading of the reports of the Collective Measures Committee revealed the virtues of humility and patience.

19. The French delegation had endorsed the text of the twelve-Power draft resolution, which confirmed four years of discreet and persistent efforts. As long ago as 16 March 1953 (576th meeting), the French representative had been able to state that at no moment had the Collective Measures Committee sought to go outside the limits laid down for it by the "Uniting for peace" resolution (resolution 377 (V)) or by resolution 503 (VI). Nor had the Committee sought to elaborate a doctrine. It had confined itself to a technical study of ways and means, from a disinterested point of view and aiming ultimately at universality. Consequently, as the French representative had pointed out on 10 August in the Collective Measures Committee (19th meeting), there was no reason why the Committee should not remain in existence for the time being, on the understanding that it would continue to be merely a study organ.

20. Mr. Michelet noted the contrast between the breadth of the questions at issue and the imperfection of the partial solutions proposed. The Collective Measures Committee had been set up as a result of a particular case of unquestionable urgency. It had started its work in an atmosphere of improvisation and tension, which had fortunately improved since then. The third report happily reflected that improvement. The examination of a problem as vital as that of collective security obviously called for at least a certain degree of serenity.

21. To the memory of Simón Bolívar, so deservedly evoked by the representative of Venezuela, should be

joined that of Aristide Briand, who between the two wars had striven persistently for collective security. The first attempt at collective security conceived under the League of Nations had met with a lamentable failure, which had played its part in hastening the developments leading to the outbreak of the Second World War. That failure had doubtless been due to the fact that the system of collective security had not been universal. The founders of the United Nations had borne that experience in mind, as could be seen from Articles 51 and 52 of the Charter. The conclusion of purely defensive regional agreements, to prepare the ways and means of collective security, was provided for and even encouraged to the extent to which all nations participated actively in the work of the Organization. Incidentally, the Italian and Portuguese Governments, in their replies to the questionnaire submitted to them by the Collective Measures Committee, had referred specifically to Article 52.

22. However, it was only when all the regional agreements could be fitted into a universal agreement that collective security would be a reality. It was obvious that when that happened national defence budgets could be greatly reduced.

23. The success of the First Committee's work on the disarmament question and the cultural agreements recently concluded between France and Germany showed that collective security was on the way to being achieved.

24. It was clear that the best collective security lay in the people's common longing for peace. The propaganda technique employed in modern wars should not be disregarded by bodies such as the Collective Measures Committee.

25. Mr. Michelet noted that the First Committee's debates on the question had been moderate in tone, and urged all Member States to associate themselves in the gesture of conciliation made by the twelve Powers which had sponsored the draft resolution.

26. Mr. MUNRO (New Zealand) said that the Collective Measures Committee had been established four years before as part of an effort to plug a hole in the United Nations collective security system created by the failure of the permanent members of the Security Council to agree on ways and means of implementing the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter.

27. Articles 43, 45 and 46 of the Charter dealt with the military measures, the air force contingents and the plans for the application of armed force which were necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security. Those plans, however had still to be drawn up, nine years after they had been written into the Charter. It might be that the progress achieved in the field of disarmament would open the way for a further effort to bring those articles to life. They might also be reconsidered if a Charter review conference were to be convened. In any case, however, the agreement of the great Powers would be necessary for it was their failure to agree which had led to the non-application of those clauses.

28. The purpose of the debate was not to assign responsibility for that failure, but to ensure that the principle of collective security did not become a dead letter. The example of Korea had demonstrated both the vitality of the principle and the need to provide supplementary and alternative procedures which would

make its application possible when an act of aggression was committed. The provisions of the "Uniting for peace" resolution (resolution 377 (V)) were no doubt only a second best. As the representative of Sweden had pointed out (703rd meeting), General Assembly resolutions were purely recommendatory and lacked the mandatory force of decisions taken by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. Nevertheless, only a resolution of the General Assembly possessed the direct moral authority deriving from the right of every Member State to speak and vote upon it. It was all the more important, therefore, that Members should have at their disposal acceptable procedures for putting into effect without delay the Assembly's recommendations as well as the directives of the Security Council. That was the problem which the Collective Measures Committee had been set up to study. Its work had been necessary and useful.

29. The New Zealand delegation was pleased that the Collective Measures Committee had stressed the importance of an equitable sharing of the burden of collective defence. Mr. Munro recalled that, in June 1952, his Government had submitted a memorandum to the Committee on that subject, stating that the burden should not rest on a minority of States but that all Member States should contribute to collective action according to their capacities. He was happy to see that those principles figured in the Committee's report. His Government also supported the Committee's views on the importance of collective self-defence and regional arrangements. New Zealand had entered into one such arrangement in 1951 with Australia and the United States. It had also signed the defence treaty drawn up at Manila in September.

30. The New Zealand delegation had already pointed out, in the course of the general debate (482nd plenary meeting), that Article 51 of the Charter explicitly recognized the right of individual or collective self-defence and that it was important to organize in advance for the prompt and effective exercise of that right. Such organizations supplemented but did not supplant the overriding authority of the United Nations. New Zealand would therefore support the twelve-Power draft resolution, and hoped that the present members of the Collective Measures Committee would agree to serve for a further period.

31. In reply to a remark made at the previous meeting by the representative of Poland, Mr. Munro said that an improvement in the international atmosphere did not justify any relaxation of efforts to set the principles of collective security on a solid foundation.

32. Mrs. SEKANINOVA-ČAKRTOVA (Czechoslovakia) said that her delegation had repeatedly drawn attention to the illegal character of the Collective Measures Committee, which had been created pursuant to a resolution paradoxically designated "Uniting for peace". That resolution 377 (V) attempted to transfer to the General Assembly the competence of the Security Council to take measures for the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security. Its objective was to eliminate the principle of unanimity, which was one of the basic principles of the Charter regarding decisions on important questions of peace and security.

33. Having been established on those faulty premises, the Collective Measures Committee, in its third report (A/2713), followed its previous pattern in pro-

viding for the application by the General Assembly of measures which, under the express provisions of Chapter IV, Article 11, of the Charter, could be imposed solely by the Security Council. It was, moreover, significant that one of the working papers had made a clear distinction between the competence of the Security Council, based on the provisions of the Charter, and the competence illegally attributed to the General Assembly pursuant to the aforementioned resolution. In its final text, however, the Committee's report omitted all reference either to the illegal resolution which had brought the Committee into existence or to the Charter. The authors of the report, being aware of the illegality of the procedure, had preferred to avoid drawing attention to that striking contrast. Moreover, contrary to the New Zealand representative's contention, the existence of the Collective Measures Committee and the proposed measures themselves could not be justified by the excuse that they were but temporary and designed to serve only until the provisions of Article 43 were put into effect. Article 106 specified the procedure to be followed until that time.

34. In its third report, the Collective Measures Committee noted that it had confined itself to a restatement of the principles of collective security. But just as the Committee had attempted to modify the relationship and the balance of functions between the principal organs of the United Nations, so it had also endeavoured to substitute for the principles of the Charter a set of principles of its own fabrication.

35. Earlier attempts to justify the illegal activities of that Committee, by asserting that they were not directed against any State in particular and were only designed to meet some hypothetical aggression, had already been exposed as preposterous at previous sessions. References to the lessons of Korea had exposed those attempts anew. The lesson to be drawn from Korea, however, was that aggression directed against peoples determined to defend their independence was doomed to failure and that it was by negotiation, not by war preparations, that international conflicts would be avoided or solved.

36. From the outset, the activities of the Collective Measures Committee had aroused distrust. During the sixth and seventh sessions, some delegations had opposed approval by the General Assembly of a series of political, military, economic and financial measures proposed in the Committee's first two reports. The General Assembly had taken note of those proposals without approving them. Subsequent developments had themselves proved that an organ which was established and operated on an illegal basis had no right to exist. The only new feature in the third report was the admission that the creation of a so-called United Nations volunteer reserve would be both illegal and impossible. The Committee's conclusion was that no further action or study on its part was required on that question. It could therefore be assumed that the matter was finally shelved.

37. The alleged principles of collective security contained in the report under consideration qualified regional arrangements as an important part of the collective security system within the framework of the United Nations. In that connexion it was interesting to note that the United States representative had stated, when submitting his working paper to the Collective Measures Committee (18th meeting), that regional arrangements had developed to an extent not envisaged

at the San Francisco Conference. The admission confirmed that regional agreements, as conceived and practised by the United States, were not provided for under the Charter; in fact they were not compatible with its provisions. Nothing could be more characteristic of that concept of collective security than the fact that the South-East Asia Treaty Organization was cited as an example of regional arrangements which constituted an important part of the collective security system.

38. The conclusion of a military pact without the participation of the greatest Asian nations did nothing to reduce international tension. Such a treaty, although termed defensive by the Powers playing the principal role in this alliance of unequal partners in which the countries of Asia most directly concerned had refused to take part, was contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Charter.

39. The main link in the chain of closed groupings contrary to the Charter was the North Atlantic Treaty. The Western Powers did not conceal the fact that the treaty was not an open regional arrangement, but a grouping of "like-minded States" with a unity of ideology and institutions. It was no secret that the North Atlantic Treaty was directed primarily against the Soviet Union and the peoples' democracies. The formation of military blocs with a closed membership and directed against other States was contrary to the Charter and could not but lead to increased international tension. The peoples of Europe were deeply aware of that fact, and were for that reason concerned over the revival of the German army under NATO, which revived the terrible threat of another war caused by German chauvinism. It was significant that a report had appeared in that day's *New York Herald Tribune* drawing attention to the rising aggressiveness of groups in Western Germany which dreamed of revenge against Czechoslovakia. The report, written only a few days after the signing of the Paris agreements, stated that such aggressive activities enjoyed the official approval of the Western German Government. The Western Powers' steps towards the rearmament of Western Germany were in direct contradiction to their proposals on disarmament.

40. Peace and security could be assured only by the common strivings of all countries, irrespective of their social structure. A collective security system, in harmony with the Charter, must take into account political, social and ideological differences in the systems existing in various countries. In such a system, no member would hold a dominating position and the sovereignty of each would be guaranteed. The creation of such a collective security system would strengthen mutual confidence among nations and the cause of peace all over the world. Such were the principles underlying the proposal put forward by the Soviet Union for the conclusion of a general treaty of collective security in Europe. The Western Powers had opposed the Soviet Union proposal with the assertion that it would tend to destroy the United Nations. In fact the strengthening of peace in certain regions on the basis of an agreement fully in harmony with the Charter could not weaken the United Nations authority; what weakened that authority was the policy of manipulating countries into closed military blocs. The Collective Measures Committee was intended to be one of the tools of such a policy.

41. The Czechoslovak delegation was opposed to the report of the Collective Measures Committee and to any further extension of that committee's existence.

42. Mr. DEMCHENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) considered that the question of collective measures had been raised merely as an attempt by a certain group of States led by the United States to convert the United Nations into a docile instrument of their own policy. It was with that end in mind that they had induced the General Assembly to adopt resolution 377 (V), the main provisions of which were designed to undermine the principle of the unanimity of the five permanent members of the Security Council, a fundamental principle of the Charter where measures for strengthening international peace and security were concerned, and to transfer to the General Assembly the functions vested by the Charter in the Security Council. Thus, despite Article 11, paragraph 2, the sponsors of the "Uniting for peace" resolution hoped to obtain final decisions on so-called collective measures against aggression by a simple majority vote in the General Assembly. If they achieved their aim, any State which was unjustly considered an aggressor might become the victim of a military campaign led by the countries of the Atlantic bloc or by any other group of States under cover of the United Nations flag. What had happened in Korea proved the reality of such a danger.

43. Resolution 377 (V), which was a flagrant violation of the Charter, had led to the setting up of a number of bodies. One of them was the Collective Measures Committee, which had been set up to gather military information and survey the various resources of States with a view to taking the necessary measures to repel possible aggression.

44. The Committee's reports showed that it was not the innocuous research body it was alleged to be. Under the proposals contained in the first two reports, the General Assembly would, for instance, be given the right to recommend the breaking off of diplomatic or financial relations or to impose a partial or total embargo on the country or countries concerned. The Committee also recommended that Member States should maintain armed forces which could be used as United

Nations reserves at the decision of the General Assembly. Such recommendations were contrary to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Charter. The recommendations regarding the establishment of a special military body to co-ordinate the activities of various States, which would have at its disposal armed forces whose operations it might direct, were also illegal. Under the Charter, the Military Staff Committee, acting under the auspices of the Security Council, was responsible for directing any military operations to repel aggression.

45. The sponsors of the proposals in question were in reality trying to make the greatest possible number of States take part in political, economic or military measures which they intended to take in violation of the Security Council's powers, for the achievement of their own purposes. An attempt was being made through that so-called committee to compel certain States to keep large armed forces ready, to assemble costly armaments, and to grant to other countries military bases which would in time be used for the aggressive plans at present concealed by so-called collective security measures.

46. The Committee's activities were intended to speed up the armaments race in certain countries of the Atlantic bloc. Far from strengthening international security, such activities were in fact dangerous and harmful to the cause of peace. They were especially dangerous at the present time when there was a certain *rapprochement* among the great Powers on the question of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. The maintenance of the Committee, which had been set up in violation of the Charter, was bound to be an obstacle to the solution of the major problem of disarmament.

47. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR would therefore vote against the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.104) and against any other proposal aimed at extending the life of the Committee.

The meeting rose at 5.10 p.m.