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**Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia).**

**AGENDA ITEM 19**

**Methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter: report of the Collective Measures Committee (A/2713, A/C.1/L.104) (continued)**

1. Mr. BLANCO (Cuba) observed that for several days there had been an atmosphere of conciliation in the Committee and it had adopted two draft resolutions on disarmament unanimously (702nd meeting). Although those draft resolutions were basically procedural, the Cuban delegation was hopeful that the favourable climate would continue in the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee so that a solution of the problem might be found which would be a contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security. While hoping for such agreements, the United Nations had the duty to continue its work of strengthening the system of collective security against aggression. As the Chairman of the Cuban delegation had stated in the general debate (483rd plenary meeting), such work had been made necessary by the lack of effectiveness of the organ of the United Nations which was responsible for the maintenance of peace.

2. The Cuban delegation considered that a reaffirmation of the principles of collective security would be of service in strengthening the system of collective security. One of the principles set forth in the third report of the Collective Measures Committee (A/2713) was that contributions should be made promptly, that they might be of a military, political, economic or financial character, and that they might be either direct or ancillary. At the same time, it was recognized that each nation should act in accordance with its constitutional procedures, its capacities and resources, its domestic security needs and the burdens which it had already assumed in support of the Charter. The Cuban delegation was well aware of the role of agreements for collective defence and of regional organizations, which were an important element in the preservation of peace and security.

3. The Collective Measures Committee recommended that when the United Nations was contemplating action

against aggression, it should be guided by resolution 377 (V), on "Uniting for peace", and other resolutions of the General Assembly, and by the reports of the Committee. The principles set out in resolution 377 (V) constituted the basis upon which the United Nations could take effective action, through the General Assembly, whenever the Security Council failed to fulfil its primary responsibility; that responsibility, in the final analysis, rested upon all the Members of the United Nations.

4. Accordingly, Cuba would vote in favour of the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/L.104), as it believed that the Committee should be enabled to make further studies even though its main objectives had been achieved by the three reports. The Cuban delegation congratulated the members of the Collective Measures Committee and particularly its Chairman for the manner in which they had fulfilled their tasks.

5. Mr. SARPER (Turkey) said that the Collective Measures Committee had not accomplished anything new in the period covered by the report, but the re-statement of principles would be of value. The need to maintain and strengthen the United Nations system of collective security could not be overstressed. If the machinery for the pacific settlement of disputes was neglected, and some State resorted to aggression, the best way of restoring peace was to take collective action. Article 1 of the Charter referred to that fact.

6. Recent history showed that advance preparations were needed to achieve the best results. Although the time and place of aggression might not be predictable, the essential elements of resistance were known. The three reports of the Collective Measures Committee drew attention to those elements and principles, as did resolutions 377 (V), 503 (VI) and 703 (VII) of the General Assembly. If the United Nations decided to take action, it should be guided by those principles, which had been summarized in paragraph 10 of the Committee's third report.

7. The joint draft resolution asked the General Assembly to take note of the third report and, in particular, of the principles of collective security, and to direct the Committee to continue in being and report as appropriate. One of the best guarantees against aggression would be the widest possible consideration of the principles of collective security. Collective security was an insurance against local or general wars and the premium to be paid might involve lives as well as money. However, mankind would make the supreme sacrifice rather than surrender passively to aggression. The Turkish delegation gave its full support to the draft resolution and hoped that it would be adopted by an overwhelming majority or by a unanimous vote.

8. Mr. MAHONEY (United States of America) said that, in discussing the report of the Collective Measures Committee, the First Committee was pursuing the same goal as in the discussion on disarma-

ment, namely, the achievement of common protection against aggression and ensuring world peace.

9. The United States supported a disarmament programme which would ensure security to all and make successful aggression impossible. At the same time, it was important to achieve an effective collective security system. Only by the ability to repel aggression could international peace and security be maintained. The better the system, the smaller would be the likelihood of the need to make use of the preparations. The Charter was not self-executing but required the determination of the Members of the United Nations to carry out their obligations. Advance preparations were essential if future collective measures were to be applied promptly and effectively. And the burdens involved should be shared equitably by the greatest possible number of States.

10. The United States had always supported an effective system of collective security and had urged the adoption of the "Uniting for peace" resolution (resolution 377 (V)) in 1950. It had given its support to the strengthening of the General Assembly in the field of security and had backed the work of the Collective Measures Committee. The task of that committee had been to explore ways of strengthening the security system of the United Nations and, under the leadership of its present Chairman, and his predecessor, it had done a useful and constructive job. In its third report, the Committee had taken another important step, which was a supplement to its previous work. It was to be hoped that the report would fortify the common determination of the Members of the United Nations to suppress or prevent breaches of the peace. The three reports should be regarded as a composite unit, setting forth the principles of collective security which would help to ensure the maintenance or restoration of peace.

11. The first report (A/1821) was devoted to the types of military, political, economic and financial measures which might be taken by the United Nations. It also included suggestions on the co-ordination of such measures. The need for such planning had been shown by the difficulties of organizing hurriedly the collective resistance against aggression in Korea. After analysing that experience, the Committee had evolved a number of principles which should help to avoid delays on future occasions. One of the most important was that there should be a central executive military authority responsible for military operations.

12. The second report (A/2215) expanded upon the first report and gave particular attention to steps which States might take to set aside forces for possible United Nations service, to make available assistance and facilities and to prepare themselves legislatively. It also suggested the possibility of an *ad hoc* negotiating committee to deal with States on the question of their contributions to collective action. It included comprehensive lists of armaments and strategic material which should be of assistance to the Security Council or the General Assembly in expediting the application of any embargo.

13. In its third report (A/2713), the Committee had presented important principles for reaffirmation in the belief that that would help develop the common determination necessary for effective collective action. Those principles recognized the varying capacities of States and the fact that each should determine for itself the contribution which it could make.

14. The first principle underlined the importance of the effective and prompt participation by the greatest number of States. It was important that all States should consider what further preparatory steps they should take to place themselves in readiness. That principle was derived from the experience of Korea. Although fifteen Members had contributed the equivalent of two divisions to the United Nations action and over forty States had made contributions of a non-military nature and an equal number had joined in the strategic embargo, it was generally recognized that the burden of collective resistance there could have been shared more equitably. That was particularly true in connexion with manpower.

15. The second principle was concerned with that question and stated that those supporting collective measures should seek to secure the maximum contribution of effective military forces not only by contributing their own forces but also by helping to provide logistical support to other States. There were various reasons why certain nations had not been able to contribute more manpower in Korea, some because they had important commitments elsewhere and some because of economic and logistic difficulties. The United States had given consideration to that problem, and its policy was in accord with the second principle enunciated in the report. In future, when any nation was willing to contribute forces but was not able to provide logistical support, the Members of the United Nations should do everything possible to assist it. That principle should encourage more nations to assume their fair share of the burden and stimulate them to greater preparedness.

16. The third principle reaffirmed the mutual relationship between collective self-defence and regional arrangements on the one hand, and the more universal collective security system of the United Nations on the other. Under present world conditions, the United States attached great importance to regional agencies. They had an important function within the framework of the United Nations in organizing resistance to aggression and in reducing international tensions. The Organization of American States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the South-east Asia Collective Defence Treaty were all important contributions to stability and security. The attitude of the United States was reflected in the statement of Mr. Dulles, United States Secretary of State, at the opening session of the Manila Conference, when he said that the participating States were acting under the authority and in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and that what they were doing was directed against no nation and no peoples.

17. The joint draft resolution reflected the view of the Collective Measures Committee that it should remain in a position to pursue further studies. The United States shared that view and recognized that the three reports constituted a comprehensive examination of ways to strengthen the United Nations collective security system. The collective security concept, however, needed continuous reassessment, and the Collective Measures Committee might at some future time find it desirable to undertake further studies. The continued availability of the Committee would help discharge the responsibility of the United Nations in the field of collective security.

18. Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom) observed that the recommendations in the first two reports of

the Collective Measures Committee did not seek to bind Members of the United Nations to any definite course of action in an emergency, but rather to tabulate the types of collective action so as to guide and expedite action by the Security Council or the General Assembly. The most important part of the third report was paragraph 10, wherein the Collective Measures Committee submitted certain principles which might guide the Security Council or the General Assembly in the event of collective measures being undertaken by the United Nations. Those principles were not novel. They were contained in the ideas and recommendations of the earlier reports of the Collective Measures Committee. By reformulating only certain ideas the Committee did not intend to belittle its other recommendations, which had not been restated. It did, however, draw particular attention to certain principles.

19. The first two principles stated that there could be different types of contributions; military, political, economic or financial; direct or ancillary. However, the contributions should be prompt and effective and should seek to achieve as a primary object the maximum military effort. The report made it clear that the contributing State retained the right to decide through its own constitutional processes the extent of its contribution. It would be hard for any country which had subscribed to Article 1 of the Charter to take exception to those principles.

20. The third principle emphasized the importance of collective measures of self-defence and regional arrangements and agencies constituted under Articles 51 and 52 of the Charter. It stated that the United Nations should seek to make effective any action taken by such agencies which was consistent with the Charter. It was clear that neither the United Nations as a whole nor any Member was expected to give its support blindly. The United Nations would first have to be satisfied that the action was consistent with the Charter. Secondly, any steps which were taken would have to be in conformity with the Charter and its procedures. Conversely, if the United Nations should take collective measures, States would seek to obtain, wherever appropriate, the support of other international organizations to which they were parties.

21. The fourth principle recognized that collective measures might have to include economic and financial aid to the victim of aggression and to contributing States themselves.

22. Finally, the Collective Measures Committee drew attention to the machinery for co-ordinating collective measures and to the lists of armaments and strategic items which it had previously drawn up. In the view of the United Kingdom delegation, paragraph 10 represented a valuable synthesis of the earlier studies. For that reason, the United Kingdom had joined in sponsoring the draft resolution before the First Committee.

23. Sir Pierson Dixon paid tribute to Mr. Pérez Pérez, the representative of Venezuela, whose skillful chairmanship had greatly helped the Collective Measures Committee.

24. With regard to the future of that committee, the United Kingdom was anxious to contribute to the strengthening of both the concept and the practice of collective measures. The Collective Measures Committee was primarily a study group, and its work had been general and even in a sense theoretical. There did not seem at the present to be any immediate

need for it to pursue further studies. However, the United Kingdom Government believed that it should be kept in being so that if the need arose it could resume its work at short notice. The United Kingdom also believed that the existing members should continue to serve, so that their experience might be preserved.

25. It was the hope of the United Kingdom delegation that the joint draft resolution would be adopted by so great a majority as to demonstrate the solidarity of the United Nations on the subject of collective security.

26. Mr. BIRECKI (Poland) noted that previous speakers had emphasized the significance of the unanimity achieved in respect of the draft resolution on disarmament (702nd meeting). For the first time since 1946, the United States, France and the United Kingdom, together with the Soviet Union, had made joint proposals. It was reasonable to expect that the work of the First Committee in connexion with disarmament would show how other problems could be solved. However, the debate on collective measures and the joint draft resolution which had been submitted showed that some delegations had already forgotten the discussions on disarmament.

27. Some had even asserted that the proposals on collective measures and the draft resolution on disarmament were compatible. But the Collective Measures Committee was endeavouring to use the United Nations for the legalization of armaments under the pretext of organizing a system of collective security. Thus the United States representative, for instance, had said that the work of the Collective Measures Committee was to keep the Members of the United Nations in a state of military readiness. The Collective Measures Committee also contradicted the basic principle of the United Nations, which was the co-operation and unanimity of the great Powers. That principle had been confirmed by the draft resolution on disarmament, while the existence of the Collective Measures Committee was in flagrant disregard of that principle. Indeed, General Assembly resolution 377 (V), which had created the Committee, had been recognized at the time as an attempt to revise the Charter illegally.

28. In order to restore respect for the basic principles of the United Nations, it was essential to have a proper approach to the Collective Measures Committee. Speaking in the First Committee at the seventh session (575th meeting), the Polish delegation had demanded that the Collective Measures Committee should be brought to an end as soon as possible, since they reflected a policy of transforming the United Nations into an instrument of the United States. Under resolution 377 (V), the Collective Measures Committee had been given the task of seeking changes in the Charter provisions which served as barriers to arbitrary action by any one State. That the Committee had done its best to carry out its illegitimate task was clearly shown in its three reports.

29. The first report contained many examples of infringements of the Charter. In chapter II, the Collective Measures Committee recommended extending the competence of the General Assembly to include the right to call upon States to sever diplomatic relations, which was a right reserved to the Security Council by Article 41 of the Charter. In chapter III, it recommended that the Assembly should have the right to apply economic and financial sanctions, which had also

been reserved to the Security Council. It proposed that a panel of military experts should discharge the duties assigned under Articles 46 and 47 of the Charter to the Military Staff Committee of the Security Council. It even sought to give control over armed forces to the General Assembly, although that had been clearly reserved for the Security Council by Article 43 of the Charter.

30. Although the report had not been met with enthusiasm, resolution 503 (VI) had made possible the continuance of the Collective Measures Committee. Attempts to revise the Charter had continued in the second report. In violation of Article 41, the Committee had continued to work on embargo measures and on the creation of a "United Nations legion". Again there had been a lack of enthusiasm, largely because of the conviction that the use of armed forces must be contingent upon the principle of unanimity. Despite a further attempt to revive the plan, paragraph 5 of the third report gave the opinion that no further study of the question of a volunteer reserve was required.

31. The Collective Measures Committee had, however, established an illegal body, the Panel of Military Experts, within the framework of the Secretariat. Annexed to the third report was a list of the members of that panel who represented nine countries confined to the member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the South-East Asia Treaty Organization. Since the panel was to be a substitute for the Military Staff Committee, the ultimate goal of the Collective Measures Committee stood revealed.

32. The life of the Committee had been prolonged for two years at the seventh session (resolution 703 (VII)), despite the protests of many delegations. Doubts as to the legality of the Committee were shared by many States and had even been admitted in an official publication of the United States Congress. The United States Senate Sub-Committee on the United Nations Charter, in its Staff Study No. 1, dated 18 February 1954, had admitted that some delegates had expressed the opinion that the letter of the Charter had been exceeded by resolution 377 (V) because of the manner in which it extended the competence of the General Assembly.

33. There had been so little interest in the work of the Committee that, during the first year, out of all the States requested to answer a communication on readiness to participate in a collective measures system, only thirty-eight had replied, and only eighteen in the affirmative. Nine States had refused to contribute forces to that system. Seven had answered evasively in what amounted to refusals. Four had merely acknowledged receipt of the communication. It should be noted, moreover, that the eighteen States replying affirmatively were linked to the United States by military alliances. In the last two years, there had been only five more replies, with affirmative responses from two members of NATO.

34. It was now common knowledge that the Wehrmacht, under the command of Nazi generals, was to be the backbone of NATO. Yet the members of NATO considered their participation in NATO as participation in a system of collective security. That had been confirmed by the representative of the United States. The consequence of such confusion was that the Wehrmacht would become the core of the United Nations system of security.

35. The third report further illustrated the harmful character of the Collective Measures Committee in its principles concerning future United Nations collective action. The United States representative had said that the principles were derived from the lessons of Korea and had added that the purpose was to emphasize the importance of maximum participation and distribution of the burden among the largest possible number of States. The United States had found great difficulty in securing contributions for its intervention in Korea and had not been satisfied with those contributions. It was also known that the United States was interested in making use of the United Nations again for its bellicose schemes. That was why the United States hoped to keep the Collective Measures Committee in existence.

36. Another reason why the United States wished to make the Committee permanent had been revealed by the Secretary of State at a Senate sub-committee hearing on 18 January 1954. In answer to a question concerning the setting up of United Nations armed forces, the Secretary of State had said that one of the features of the "Uniting for peace" resolution (377 (V)) had been the establishment of the Collective Measures Committee to explore the question of what contributions Members would be prepared to make in order to have forces at the disposal of the United Nations which could be counted upon in the absence of the establishment of forces under Article 43 of the Charter. Mr. Dulles had said further that the Collective Measures Committee had not had as much success as had been hoped for, but that it had large potentialities which could be developed.

37. Those "large potentialities" were potentialities for violating the Charter and using the United Nations flag in accordance with the Korea pattern. Because the Collective Measures Committee was an instrument which the United States wished to use for its own purposes, the Polish delegation called for the termination of its activities.

38. Attempts had been made to represent the joint draft resolution as harmless. However, it went far beyond those accepted at previous sessions. It would make the Collective Measures Committee permanent rather than merely extend its existence by one or two years. It suggested that the report be approved rather than merely noted as in the past. It enumerated the previous illegal decisions in an attempt to regenerate them. And it was particularly inappropriate now, when for the first time in many years unanimity had been achieved among the great Powers on the subject of disarmament. Only the co-operation of the great Powers could ensure lasting peace. That co-operation should find expression in the Security Council. The system of collective security of the United Nations should be based upon that unanimity rather than on organizations such as NATO and SEATO. The world hoped for a contribution to the relaxation of tensions from the ninth session of the General Assembly. The draft resolution on disarmament would play its part in that field. The Assembly should consolidate that achievement. Those were matters which should be borne in mind in discussing the report of the Collective Measures Committee. The joint draft resolution should be rejected and the activities of the Committee should be ended as soon as possible.

39. Mr. KYROU (Greece) said that his country considered the principle of collective security to be one

of the cornerstones of the Charter. The Greek people were devoted to it and had proved their devotion by deeds whenever necessary. They had also followed the proceedings of the Collective Measures Committee and were prepared to abide by its recommendations. The final aim of the Committee should be to help create among Member States, and also among non-member nations, a collective spirit which would bring about a firm decision collectively to oppose aggression and thus to prevent it. That preventive character constituted the best answer to the objections raised by the representative of Poland.

40. While appreciating the importance of the argument introduced by certain representatives concerning continuity, Mr. Kyrrou asked if the idea of continuity could not be linked with the introduction of new members, and suggested that the membership of the Committee might perhaps be changed by one half.

41. Mr. Kyrrou stated that his delegation would vote in favour of the twelve-Power draft resolution.

42. Mr. KOS (Yugoslavia) said it was his delegation's profound conviction that there was reason to expect that the constructive spirit which had manifested itself in the First Committee at the current session would prevail during the consideration of the item on collective measures and would permit the Committee to adopt realistic decisions concerning it.

43. The past few years had been marked by the efforts of a majority of the Members of the United Nations to build a collective defence system, with a view to safeguarding world peace and security. Those efforts had been constructive and fruitful, and the collective security system had gathered strength and played an important role in the maintenance of peace. Those efforts had influenced the positive evolution of international relations, and that represented a serious warning to a potential aggressor.

44. The Yugoslav Government had not only sympathized with the idea of collective defence, but had also pursued a consistent policy of peace, contributing to the organization of a system of collective security. It regarded peace as constituting an indivisible whole. During the study of collective measures and the organization of collective defence, the Yugoslav delegation had never failed to point out that a unilateral approach to the problem was not appropriate. Such unilateral approach had found expression in the increased channelling of efforts towards the military and repressive side of the problem. For that reason the Yugoslav delegation had always, without underestimating the study of military measures, emphasized the principle of the peaceful solution of conflicts and the necessity of studying measures and methods directed towards that end. It had placed particular stress on the problem of economic and financial aid to a State which was a victim of economic pressures—a form of aggression. It had maintained that economic and financial aid to such States should be directed towards building up their self-defence, thereby strengthening the system of collective security as a whole. It had also emphasized the necessity of undertaking efficient measures to check and liquidate sources of conflicts and aggression, thus preventing aggression before it occurred.

45. In re-examining the question of collective measures, the Committee should take into account certain developments in international relations. Mr. Kos noted that at present there were no military fronts; that the

world was on the best path to a further lessening of tensions and a diminution of the immediate danger of aggression; that the positive practice of negotiating had been adopted and continued; and that important results had already been obtained since the recent wars, leading to a healthier climate in international relations. In those circumstances, Mr. Kos asked if it were not more appropriate for the First Committee to continue to show moderation and a sense of realism in considering problems relating to collective measures.

46. Yugoslavia was represented on the Collective Measures Committee and had endeavoured to contribute as much as possible to the success of its work. Since its establishment, the Committee had studied and elaborated problems and measures of collective defence. It had obtained fair results and had reported to the Assembly on three occasions. Mr. Kos believed, however, that certain tendencies towards continuing and intensifying the work of the Committee might be interpreted as unsuitable under present conditions.

47. Moreover, it seemed to the Yugoslav delegation that the Collective Measures Committee had, in the main, completed its task. In fact, it was much less necessary than it had been and could even cease to function. However, if a majority of the First Committee believed that the Collective Measures Committee should remain in existence on a stand-by basis, the Yugoslav delegation was prepared to accept such a solution in the interest of the greatest possible agreement. The joint draft resolution, therefore, was acceptable, and the Yugoslav delegation could vote in favour of it.

48. Mr. Kos observed that the type of work performed by the Collective Measures Committee, in the main, had the character of studies and did not need approval. For that reason, and because the first two reports were only taken note of, his delegation had certain reservations about the words "with approval" in paragraph 1. He suggested that perhaps the actual circumstances of the international situation did not require the First Committee to approve the report.

49. Mr. Kos concluded by quoting from a statement made by the President of Yugoslavia before Parliament on 25 October, indicating that Yugoslavia did not attach primary importance to military measures today, but to diplomatic negotiations, which had produced positive results, and that the path of negotiation should be followed, avoiding everything which might introduce elements of distrust and tension into the world.

50. Mr. DE LA COLINA (Mexico) expressed appreciation to the delegations of the United States and the Philippines for having facilitated the work of the Collective Measures Committee by the submission of their joint working paper (A/AC.43/L.5/Rev.1), and to the Chairman who had presided so well over its discussion.

51. The third report of the Collective Measures Committee represented an endeavour to cull from the studies that had been made previously those principles which seemed to be most important and which would guide those organs which would have to recommend the adoption of collective measures. During the discussion of those principles, it had not been difficult to include amendments and reservations which, in the view of a number of delegations, were indispensable not only in order to obtain the agreement of the

greatest possible number of countries, but also to safeguard sacred interests that must not be endangered without the full agreement of the peoples concerned.

52. When the Collective Measures Committee had been studying some of the aspects of the links that existed between regional organizations and the United Nations, Mexico had restated its position, which was that regional obligations must have priority in matters of collective security, and that the contribution of regional organizations should not be automatic. For that reason, the Mexican delegation was pleased to note that the report of the Committee provided that: "States should seek to obtain, whenever appropriate, in and through the international bodies and arrangements to which they belong or are parties, and within the constitutional limitations and the other provisions of those bodies and arrangements, all possible support for collective measures undertaken by the United Nations".

53. The strengthening of democratic ideals based on respect for human dignity, solidarity among nations sharing those ideals, and economic co-operation designed to raise the standard of living of peoples, were of supreme importance in achieving the aims envisaged in the report. The Mexican delegation also believed that at the proper time a thorough examination of the appropriate methods and procedures for strengthening the peace-making functions of the United Nations should be made.

54. In conclusion, Mr. de la Colina associated his delegation with the other sponsors of the joint draft resolution.

55. Mr. Hsioh-Ren WEI (China) said his delegation believed that the Collective Measures Committee should be made a permanent body of the United Nations and that its terms of reference should be extended to include the following functions: first, to prepare specific proposals for the progressive development of a system of collective security within the United Nations, including proposals on the procedure to be followed by the United Nations in concluding agreements with States with regard to their possible contributions in armed forces, assistance and facilities; secondly, to negotiate with Member States on the basis of their

responses to the "Uniting for peace" resolution (377 (V)) and resolutions 503 (VI) and 703 (VII), on the basis of the principles of equitable sharing and universal preparedness, for their possible contributions of armed forces, assistance and facilities in accordance with their obligations under the Charter; thirdly, to make recommendations, upon the request of the Security Council or General Assembly, on specific collective measures to be employed to meet any given case of aggression or breach of the peace, and fourthly to keep the Security Council and General Assembly informed as to the effectiveness of any collective measures taken by the United Nations.

56. The general principles of collective security contained in the report were clear and concise. If the United Nations were to examine its experience in collective action against Communist aggression in Korea in the light of those principles, there were at least two lessons to be learned. First, there had been no equitable sharing of sacrifices and burdens. Secondly, the aggressor, on the verge of bankruptcy, had been encouraged to undertake a new adventure in Indo-China through ineffective application of military and economic measures.

57. The report provided a good foundation for the development of a system of collective security. However, there was an important phase of collective security to which immediate attention should be given, namely, the preparedness of States to support United Nations collective action. Mr. Wei then quoted from successive resolutions of the General Assembly to show that that phase of the problem had been emphasized. Resolution 703 (VII) directed the Collective Measures Committee "to suggest to the Security Council and to the General Assembly such specific ways and means as it may deem appropriate to encourage further preparatory action by States". That task had not been accomplished, and the Committee should consider that directive as a matter of great urgency.

58. With that understanding, the Chinese delegation would vote in favour of the twelve-Power draft resolution.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.