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Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia).

AGENDA ITEMS 20 AND 68

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/2685, A/C.1/752/Rev.2, A/C.1/L.100, A/C.1/L.101, A/C.1/L.102) (*continued*)

Conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction (A/2742 and Corr.1, A/2742/Add.1, A/C.1/750) (*continued*)

1. Mr. MENON (India): I am grateful to the Chairman for giving me the opportunity to intervene at this stage of the debate, when we are about to discuss the draft resolutions before the First Committee. I want to say at the outset that I intend to make only a very brief intervention on a special aspect of this matter.

2. After my delegation had participated at the end of the general debate yesterday [700th meeting], three speeches were made in relation to our statement. I shall deal with the last one first. It came from the representative of the Soviet Union, who said that he had not had facilities for studying the statement I had made, that it required study and that he would offer his comments later. Thus, any main intervention by my delegation now must await those and other comments on the merits of the suggestions and proposals that I made—not in the draft resolution [A/C.1/L.100] but in my main statement.

3. The second statement was made by the representative of Iran, Mr. Entezam—who, referring to the draft resolution, said that he would suggest referring the examination thereof to the Disarmament Commission in accordance with the procedure we adopted last year in the case of other proposals.

4. This statement was followed by a comparatively long series of observations by the representative of France, who, also referring to the draft resolution submitted by India, said [700th meeting]:

“I would request him . . . to agree to have [his draft] referred to the Disarmament Commission.

However, I must stress that such a course would not mean that [it was] being rejected, but on the contrary that [it was] being taken into consideration.”

5. Now, there are two or three considerations that my delegation has to take into account, and I would keep my observations on them as brief as I can. First of all, my delegation cannot but give the most serious consideration to any proposal that comes from the representative of Iran and the representative of France. Their relations with us, and the interest and participation of Mr. Moch in the whole of the disarmament work, have been of such a character that anything that comes from them can be dealt with in no way except with the most serious and earnest consideration.

6. Secondly, the position of my delegation in all debates and in all the controversies that go on here—particularly between what are usually called the East and the West positions—has been that we intervene or offer suggestions only by way of conciliation and that we do not take up rigid positions. Therefore, when there is agreement between main contestants it is not our desire to bring a new factor into the contest by submitting amendments or separate draft resolutions. That is why we did not give our proposal the form of an amendment to the main draft resolution submitted by the Canadian delegation and afterwards sponsored by the other four States [A/C.1/752/Rev.2]. We made suggestions, and we elicited the information we needed from Mr. Lloyd by means of question and answer.

7. Thirdly—and this is perhaps not altogether understood, as I infer from the observations of Mr. Moch—the purpose of our draft resolution was no more than what is intended by and was very kindly proposed by the representative of France. It will represent the taking into consideration of those proposals. That is all that we intended by the resolution: the operative part is only a recommendation for consideration. That was our intention, but it is quite obvious that we have not been able to convey that intention to others as fully as we should like, and that has led to a degree of confusion of thinking. At any rate, since our purpose is merely that the Disarmament Commission should take these proposals into account and study them—we have not committed ourselves on whether they are right or wrong, whether they are feasible or not, but have only asked that they be studied—we would have not the slightest objection if that purpose were attained by another format, another procedure. That is to say, we are concerned only with assisting in a small way in the work of the Disarmament Commission and the attainment of its objectives.

8. I should therefore like to say on behalf of my delegation, reserving my position on the substance of the main resolution and on such clarifications as are required in regard to our own, that we would be only too happy to respond to the invitation that has been initiated by the representative of Iran and put into

more precise form by the representative of France. Therefore, our position becomes very much what it was at the sixth session of the General Assembly, in resolution 504 (VI), in paragraph 1 of the operative part, and, if there is an appropriate suggestion in the proper form, my delegation will be only too happy to accept it. I say this not in the sense of suggesting a compromise arrangement in any respect, but as part of the purpose of forwarding the objectives of the discussion on the item now before the Committee.

9. Mr. MARTIN (Canada): I want to say very briefly that I am sure that the sense of this Committee now is such that there will be general satisfaction at the progress that we have made in this extremely important debate. It will be recalled that, when the Canadian delegation put forward its resolution [A/C.1/752], it invited the adherence and co-sponsorship of France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. I was not in the Committee last Friday [697th meeting] to express my own personal satisfaction, not only at the fact that France, the United Kingdom and the United States had agreed to co-sponsor the resolution, but also at the fact that Mr. Vyshinsky, speaking for the Soviet Union, had been able to inform my delegation that he would be pleased, on behalf of his country, to extend co-sponsorship as well. I think we will all agree that, while every country around this table has a vital interest in this matter and has an important contribution to make, it is important that those nations principally interested should be able to agree at least procedurally to the extent that we have been able to agree in this debate.

10. While our agreement is on a matter of procedure, nevertheless I think that we should neither underestimate nor over-estimate the importance of this agreement among the five nations. It may be only a matter of procedure—but the matter of disarmament itself is not altogether non-procedural in character and in quality.

11. I therefore think that this has been a very useful debate. The general discussion has been very valuable and, while we have not been able to resolve all questions, we would want to say for ourselves—and, I think, to the world—that no one could expect this matter to be resolved in the course of eight or nine days.

12. As Mr. Vyshinsky himself said so well, this is a very difficult problem; we have a hard road ahead of us. Other representatives have said the same thing. I think I, myself, said it when I introduced our draft resolution. But an atmosphere of agreement in this initial stage is not without great importance.

13. Very important general indications of present attitudes have been given. That in itself is very valuable. I am sure that every country will not be fully satisfied with some of the responses given to questions that have been put by one side or another—and I am not referring to the responses of any one delegation in particular. There have, however, been certain indications of present attitudes, as I have said. Of course, they do not necessarily have to be taken as final; my Government, at least, does not propose to take them as final.

14. Now that we have had this general debate and some clarifications, it is desirable, it seems to us, that the mechanism envisaged in the five-Power draft resolution [A/C.1/752/Rev.2] should be put to work as quickly as possible, so that negotiations in which these various positions can be juxtaposed may begin.

15. I thought that the Committee would not object to my making those general observations.

16. I should also like to say—as I should have said last Friday had I been able to be here—how very much my delegation has appreciated the attitude shown by France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States in the negotiations with us. The representatives of those countries have been most courteous and most accommodating, and I want to express our deep sense of appreciation.

17. I have just listened with great interest to the observations made by Mr. Menon. I listened to him this morning with as much interest as I did to his remarks yesterday, giving what I thought was a very excellent statement, from his point of view, of the problem.

18. It will be remembered that it seemed yesterday that we had reached a little impasse in our discussion. Mr. Vyshinsky happily suggested that it might be desirable to cancel the afternoon meeting yesterday, so that we might give some consideration to the problems that had presented themselves.

19. As the Committee knows, the five delegations that were members of what has come to be known as the London Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission have agreed on the terms of reference and procedures of further negotiations on the difficult but important substantive questions that must be resolved in connexion with the disarmament problem. The draft resolution embodying this agreement, which has been submitted to this Committee on behalf of Canada, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States [A/C.1/752/Rev.2] provides, among other things, for the discussion in the Disarmament Commission of other proposals within its terms of reference that have been or may be put forward. I think that in those circumstances the Committee might wish to refer to the Disarmament Commission for appropriate consideration the draft resolution that has been submitted by the delegation of India [A/C.1/L.100]. If that were done, it would seem unnecessary for this Committee or the General Assembly to take a substantive decision at this time on the Indian draft resolution. I noted what Mr. Menon had to say this morning about having an open mind with regard to appropriate suggestions for dealing with this matter from a procedural point of view. He used the phrases “another procedure” and “another format”.

20. I have the honour to state that the five countries sponsoring the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/752/Rev.2 and relating to agenda items 20 and 68 have had a meeting and have agreed to sponsor another draft resolution [A/C.1/L.102], which proposes a method for dealing with the Indian draft resolution. On behalf of the five countries, I should like to read out the new draft resolution:

“The General Assembly

“1. Refers to the Disarmament Commission for appropriate consideration the draft resolution submitted by India in document A/C.1/L.100;

“2. Decides also to transmit to the Disarmament Commission for its information the records of the meetings of the First Committee at which this draft resolution was discussed.”

21. I think that that would be a proper procedure for dealing with the draft resolution submitted by Mr. Menon.

22. My final observation is this: I am sure that all members of this Committee will note with great satisfaction that it has been possible to present another draft resolution in the name of Canada, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States on this further procedural matter. I am equally sure that we all hope that this further agreement among the five countries will usher in a most constructive effort on everyone's part to deal as quickly as possible with this very important problem of disarmament.

23. Mr. SHUKAIRI (Syria): I should like briefly to define our attitude towards the various draft resolutions now before the Committee. I shall refer first to the Australian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.101].

24. There is no doubt that that draft resolution is intelligent and helpful. As I see it, it is designed to present a clear picture of this complicated issue. So much has been said, there has been so much argument, so much has been contested, that we feel that an objective elucidation of the question is required. We are confident that the Secretariat will be able to meet the request. Before finally supporting the Australian draft resolution, however, we should like to have clarification on two points.

25. First, we should like clarification of the adjective "descriptive" used in the phrase "a descriptive and factual presentation". My question should certainly not be regarded as a reflection on the intentions of the Australian delegation or the conduct of the Secretariat. I simply want to ask what is the exact import of the word "descriptive". To give a factual presentation of the present positions of the five Powers is understandable and justifiable, but to give a description to those positions—a description—is somewhat questionable.

26. I have not searched too far into the meaning of the word "description" or its adjectives, yet, in an attempt to describe a position, we may be led to a situation of controversy, and we have agreed to avoid controversy.

27. My second point relates to the reaction of the great Powers to this notion of description. The problem, as we are all aware, is pregnant with niceties and intricacies of paramount importance. We are eager to see the Powers principally involved continue their efforts. We are eager to see how they react in respect of every small detail, no matter how procedural it may appear to be. We are eager not to disturb the agreement so far achieved. With this caution in mind, we would be prepared to support the Australian draft resolution, but only when all the great Powers accept or, at least, make no unfavourable remarks, will we be prepared to vote for it.

28. I now propose to deal with the Indian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.100]. In principle, we cannot quarrel with the Indian draft resolution. It is a masterpiece of clarity of mind, embracing everything and betraying nothing. The preamble takes care of all the outstanding features necessary for an effective scheme of disarmament. The stress on the urgency of the problem is warmly felt in almost every word of the preamble. The operative clauses are equally clear, comprehensive and consistent.

29. The draft resolution as a whole lends itself readily to acceptance and, indeed, leaves no room for hesitation. Of particular significance is the idea of establishing an armaments truce, pending agreement on a dis-

armament convention. We are glad, however, that the Indian delegation has agreed to place this draft resolution before the cognizance of the Disarmament Commission. We are equally glad to note that the five-Power draft resolution now before the Committee [A/C.1/L.102] takes care of this draft resolution.

30. Finally, we are left with the joint five-Power draft resolution [A/C.1/752/Rev.2]. We should like to express our thanks to the delegation of Canada for its patient labour in producing this draft resolution. Likewise, we voice our appreciation to the delegations of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States for joining in supporting the Canadian draft resolution.

31. In this connexion, we should emphasize that the draft resolution is not a procedural resolution. Many principles form the basis of this draft resolution, and we are delighted to see that the Powers are beginning their task from an agreed common ground. At the outset of the debate, we made our position crystal clear. We declared that we would not take sides and that contested resolutions on this particular question would be of no service to the very cause we are aspiring to achieve. We are delighted to see at last that the collective voice of the small States joined the big Powers under the umbrella of one acceptable resolution.

32. In a sense, the small States are thus building a tradition, establishing a precedent. By our collective votes, we, the small States, can arrest any resolution pertaining to international security, save when it is acceptable to all the big Powers. The unanimity of the big Powers is the sole guarantee of international peace and security. That is what led to the conception of the rule of unanimity. But, when this unanimity is not maintained, it becomes the duty of the small States to invoke the moral sanctions of world public opinion. Our votes can become a decisive veto that can veto the actions of those who command the veto when they fall into disagreement.

33. I should like to end, however, with words of gratification that we shall end, as I hope, the debate on this item by a unanimous vote. Without making any formal suggestion, I should like to request the Chairman to express words of tribute, on behalf of this Committee, to the delegations of Canada, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States for their joint draft resolution. It is my feeling that this request of mine reflects the wishes of all the delegations in this Committee.

34. Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom): I should like first to say a few words about the draft resolution of 22 October [A/C.1/752/Rev.2], which my delegation, together with four others, is sponsoring. It is a matter of great satisfaction to us that this draft resolution is co-sponsored by all the five Powers represented in the London Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission.

35. It is, as I say, a matter of great satisfaction to us that this resolution should be co-sponsored by all the five Powers. But, as each of the delegations concerned has already pointed out, this draft resolution is primarily of a procedural nature, and it by no means guarantees that progress will be rapid when consideration of the problem is resumed in the Disarmament Commission.

36. In the preamble to this draft resolution, reference is made to the fourth report of the Disarmament

Commission [DC/55] and to the Soviet Union draft resolution [A/C.1/750]. We have debated these documents at length, and there is no need for me to go over again the ground we have already traversed. Nevertheless, I think that since these documents are referred to in the draft resolution [A/C.1/752/Rev.2], and since the Disarmament Commission is invited to take them into account in its further deliberations, I should point out again that the Western proposals, which are annexed to the report of the Disarmament Commission, and the proposals in the Soviet draft resolution [A/C.1/750] do diverge widely in a number of important respects. It will be no easy task to reconcile these divergencies.

37. I had hoped, before Mr. Vyshinsky spoke on 25 October [699th meeting], that these divergencies were less serious than they now seem to be. I do not want to labour this point, as we are no longer in general debate, but I feel that in approving the five-Power draft resolution, as I hope it will, the Committee should be aware of the implications in it. I must, therefore, briefly indicate a few of the points of divergency in order to put the nature of this draft resolution in the perspective as I see it.

38. It had been our hope that the Western Powers and the Soviet Union were closer together on the question of the levels to which reductions should be made. I had hoped that the Soviet Union had decided no longer to insist upon percentage cuts, but it is now clear, from what Mr. Vyshinsky said on 25 October, that the Soviet Union in fact still does insist on a one-third cut in the armed forces of the great Powers as a first step in the disarmament programme.

39. Then there is the important question of the powers, rights and functions of the control organ. On this we seem, in the light of Mr. Vyshinsky's statement of 25 October, to be far apart. He rejected the United States working paper on a control organ [DC/53, annex 4]. We, for our part, believe that this paper provides an admirable basis for discussion of an international control organ. If that paper is rejected as a basis for discussion, then reconciliation of our respective points of view clearly will not be easy.

40. A further point. We are very pleased that the Anglo-French proposals [DC/53, annex 9] have been accepted by the Soviet Union as a basis for a disarmament convention. I note, however, from Mr. Vyshinsky's speech on 25 October that certain basic provisions of that plan are not acceptable to the Soviet Union. For instance, Mr. Vyshinsky stated that during the first phase of conventional disarmament provided for in the Soviet Union draft resolution, control should not involve inspection on the spot. I frankly do not understand that position. Before a disarmament programme can begin, you have to know for certain the levels from which the reductions shall be made. That surely requires control on the spot. Even under the Soviet plan for a one-third cut in the armaments and armed forces, how could the parties to any agreement be certain that the one-third cut had been carried out unless the officials of the control organ had been able to carry out inspections on the spot?

41. Mr. Vyshinsky also criticized another basic provision of the Anglo-French proposals, namely, that transition from one stage of the disarmament programme to the next should be made contingent upon the findings of the control organ. Indeed, I infer from what he said that he held it to be unacceptable. In our view,

that was one of the most valuable proposals in the Anglo-French plan and, in fact, an essential part of it.

42. One final point. During the course of his statement on 25 October, Mr. Vyshinsky inquired whether the representatives of the Western Powers agree that the beginning of measures for the reduction of conventional armaments and for the prohibition of the atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction should coincide with the time of the entry into operation of the international control body. I should invite Mr. Vyshinsky's attention to the Anglo-French memorandum accepted as a basis for an international convention. That sets out the United Kingdom Government's view on this important question. The memorandum states that the agreed reductions and prohibitions at each stage of the programme shall enter into effect: "as soon as the control organ reports that it is able effectively to enforce them". [DC/53, annex 9, para. 7]. That, then, is my answer on that point.

43. I do not think that it would be appropriate for me to take up further the time of the Committee in commenting on Mr. Vyshinsky's statement of 25 October in connexion with the draft resolution of 22 October standing in the names of Canada, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States [A/C.1/752/Rev.2]. I ask only that the Committee approve this resolution by a very large majority—I hope unanimously. Thereafter it will be the responsibility of the Disarmament Commission to continue discussion and consideration of this problem and to report to the Security Council and to the General Assembly as soon as such progress has been made.

44. The United Kingdom Government will continue to give to the Disarmament Commission the fullest, the maximum support. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom has already stated that one of the Ministers of the Crown will be the United Kingdom representative on the Sub-Committee. I can make no forecast as to when the Disarmament Commission will be able to report. It has much work to do, and I think that before the Sub-Committee can again enter into detailed discussion a certain amount of time will be needed, at least by the United Kingdom Government, in order to assess the position in the light of the important discussions we have had in this Committee and in order to draw up appropriate instructions for the United Kingdom delegation. I can, however, give an assurance that there will on our part be no avoidable delay and that we shall spare no effort to reach agreement on the various problems before us.

45. I turn now for a moment to the draft resolution introduced by the representative of Australia [A/C.1/L.101]. I recall that in his intervention on 20 October [694th meeting], Mr. Lloyd welcomed a suggestion first put forward by the representative of Australia [688th meeting]—that the Secretariat might be asked to prepare an analysis of the present position, a factual document without recommendations. I am glad to see that Sir Percy Spender has now followed up his earlier initiative and has formally presented his suggestions to the Committee in the form of a draft resolution. If this draft resolution is adopted, the Secretariat will be faced with no easy task. Its task will be to prepare a working paper that will set out clearly and concisely the present position of the great Powers on various aspects of this highly complex problem of disarmament. I trust, therefore, that if this draft resolution is adopted and if and when the Disarmament Commis-

sion in due course comes to act on the recommendations it contains, the Commission will take great care to give to the Secretariat clear and precise terms of reference so as to enable it to prepare a working paper that will be of assistance not only to the Disarmament Commission, but also to the Members of the United Nations in general in their further studies of the problem. I have no doubt that in deciding upon these terms of reference the members of the Commission will take into account the views of the Australian delegation as expressed by Sir Percy Spender.

46. I turn, finally, to the Indian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.100]. The representative of India told us this morning that he does not wish to press for debate here on his draft resolution, and that he would be prepared to see it considered elsewhere if the Committee held that that course were more appropriate. I consider that to be a very helpful suggestion and a very statesmanlike attitude on the part of Mr. Menon.

47. The Committee has also heard a proposal introduced by the representative of Canada on behalf of the five Powers that sponsored the resolution of 22 October, proposing that the Indian draft resolution should be referred to the Disarmament Commission for appropriate consideration. That seems to me to be a practical and constructive suggestion. This short draft procedural resolution, which has now been circulated as document A/C.1/L.102, standing in the name of the five Powers, also provides that the records of the meetings in this Committee at which this draft resolution has been discussed should be transmitted to the Disarmament Commission for its information. The Disarmament Commission will, I feel certain, wish to consider in particular Mr. Menon's moving speech in the general debate yesterday [700th meeting].

48. In conclusion, it is my hope that the Committee will unanimously approve both of the draft resolutions standing in the name of the five Powers and will thus set the Disarmament Commission to work in the best possible circumstances.

49. Mr. MENON (India): Once again I have asked for the Chairman's indulgence, and I thank him for it in giving me this opportunity to make a procedural intervention, reserving, as I said before, my position in regard to offering observations on the draft resolutions before the Committee.

50. Since I made my previous intervention [700th meeting], the representative of Canada, with the support of four other States, has now submitted a draft resolution that is contained in document A/C.1/L.102 and has been circulated. This draft resolution can have any meaning only in relation to the draft resolution submitted by my delegation, which is contained in document A/C.1/L.100.

51. I am happy to state that my delegation will vote for the resolution in document A/C.1/L.102. In view of that decision, I think it is appropriate to submit to the Chairman that the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.102 should be taken before the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.100 because the whole purpose of our desiring to vote for this draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.102 is in order not to force the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.100 to a vote.

52. If I may submit, the procedural position as it appears to me—which is naturally subject to the Chairman's view of it—is that the draft resolution submitted by Canada and four others [A/C.1/752/

Rev.2] has first priority in time. It was the first one submitted. Then there is the draft resolution submitted by India [A/C.1/L.100] and the draft resolution submitted by Australia [A/C.1/L.101], the Philippine draft resolution [A/C.1/751] having been withdrawn. Finally, there is the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.102.

53. I should therefore like to move, as I believe I am in order in doing under rule 132, that the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.102 have second place in the order of voting, first place being given to the five-State draft resolution.

54. Secondly, I should also like to ask the indulgence of the Committee for permission to withdraw from the Indian draft resolution, which is submitted for reference, paragraph 2 of the operative part. Obviously it would be sheer nonsense to refer it to the Disarmament Commission. So I ask the Committee to permit the withdrawal of paragraph 2 of the operative part, while reserving our position to use the content of it, if it be thought fit, in other ways and in other places. This is with reference to the resolution in document A/C.1/L.100. I move these procedural items, if it is in order.

55. The CHAIRMAN: It certainly is in order. Before we come to the vote on all the draft resolutions, Mr. Menon's suggestion will be put before the Committee.

56. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) (*translated from Spanish*): My delegation has already stated that it will be happy to vote for the five-Power joint draft resolution [A/C.1/752/Rev.2], which will we hope be unanimously adopted.

57. I should like to refer briefly to the Australian proposal [A/C.1/L.101], the Indian proposal [A/C.1/L.100] and the proposal just submitted to us in document A/C.1/L.102.

58. In regard to the Australian proposal, my delegation has considerable sympathy with the idea that we should have a document giving a reliable, impartial and objective summary of the positions taken by the great Powers on the question of disarmament up to the present time—and, I would add, the suggestions and ideas put forward in the various debates on this subject.

59. I do not think there can be any objection to the preparation of a document of the kind since the views of the delegations will obviously be better expressed by the delegations themselves than through the interpretation of experts, however able the experts may be. I understand that the Secretariat has prepared extremely useful summaries of this kind in other cases. For instance, the Secretariat has prepared documents or symposia of this kind on the admission of new Members and other items, sometimes without being asked by a Committee to do so. I think that a summary of this type is more necessary in the case of disarmament than in any other connexion; not only for the information of the Disarmament Commission, but also to keep public opinion and the Governments concerned fully and reliably informed.

60. The Syrian representative rightly remarked a moment ago that public opinion is a very important factor in disarmament, as in other questions. The only way of influencing public opinion is through the provision of accurate, complete and absolutely reliable information. Accordingly, my delegation will support

the Australian proposal if Sir Percy Spender is prepared to introduce a slight amendment regarding the opinions to be included.

61. I now come to the Indian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.100]. I have read it and find that it contains extremely important material and very useful suggestions with which I have considerable sympathy, but I think that this Committee is not at present the body best qualified to make a decision on the Indian delegation's well-conceived and high-minded proposal. I think that the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee are in a better position to do so.

62. I accordingly welcome Mr. Menon's truly statesmanlike decision not to press for a vote on his proposal, and also the draft resolution submitted by Canada, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States of America [A/C.1/L.102], proposing—with all the authority of a resolution by this Committee—to refer the Indian resolution to the Disarmament Commission for appropriate consideration. The wording of this new draft, introduced by Canada, gives due importance to the Indian proposal, and my delegation will accordingly support it.

63. I wish to thank the Canadian representative and the other sponsors for the second paragraph, which satisfies the desire expressed here by the Lebanese and Peruvian delegations [698th meeting] that the Disarmament Commission should take into consideration not only the proposals submitted by the members of the Sub-Committee or by the other Governments, as I understand it, but also and principally the ideas, opinions and suggestions put forward in the debate.

64. Although I am in complete agreement with the Indian proposal, I must—without wishing to reopen the general debate—inform Mr. Menon that I strongly disagree with him on the matter of the veto. I will merely say that I hope—since he was not able to be present at San Francisco—that he will study the background of this thorny subject. I am sure that he will, with his insight and impartiality, reach the following conclusions.

65. First, the veto was not a privilege; it was not a right; it was an obligation of unanimity imposed on the great Powers; in other words, they were placed under the obligation of agreeing. Consequently, the veto is neither a right nor an obligation; it is not a power given to particular States. They have treated it as such, but they have done so contrary to the Charter. Secondly, if it were a right, it could be waived; since rights can be waived. Thirdly, there is nothing in the Charter to prevent the waiving of the right. The fourth point I wish to stress is that the veto has not shown that the law is bad because the cases are difficult. The cases have been easy. The results have been bad because the law has been bad.

66. I will say no more, because I am convinced that if Mr. Menon reads the records of the San Francisco Conference he will reach the conclusion we did at that time; I would add that those of us who were opposed to the veto at San Francisco will never lower the flag. That is all I wish to say.

67. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I am very sorry that Sir Pierson Dixon did not speak earlier in the general debate on the points he raised today. I quite agree with his closing statement that the present time, when the general debate has ended and we are

discussing the various draft resolutions, is not an opportune moment for him to present the observations that he made. But, since he did make those observations, let me dwell upon them very briefly, without in any way seeking to engage in new polemics on matters that already lie behind us.

68. Sir Pierson Dixon saw fit to draw attention to the divergent positions of the Soviet Union and the Western Powers on certain questions related to our basic problem, which is to reach a decision on the conclusion of an international convention on the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic weapons. He also drew attention to various other important points. I certainly do not deny that divergencies exist on a number of important points, but through persistent effort, these divergencies can be overcome—though hardly overnight.

69. It is of course difficult to determine how long a period will be needed to resolve any particular difference and to reach agreement. Prophecy is difficult in such matters and I shall not undertake to prophesy whether that time will come late or soon. I am convinced that, if we agree that we have a common basis, we can use that basis as a means of achieving agreement on matters on which agreement would otherwise be impossible.

70. We have stated in our draft resolution [A/C.1/750], which is now before the First Committee, that it is based on the Franco-British proposals of 11 June 1954 [DC/53, annex 9]. Sir Pierson Dixon, as I gathered from his statement, has some doubt on that score and considers that the basis for the future international convention should be the United States working paper of 25 May 1954 [DC/53, annex 4]. In essence his statement appeared to be an effort to explain to us that if we reject the working paper of 25 May as unsuitable for the solution of the problem before us, this would be tantamount to rejecting the very basis of agreement, since, he held, that document was the basis. I cannot agree. With all due respect for Sir Pierson's logic, I cannot agree that there can be any basis other than the Franco-British proposals of 11 June 1954.

71. After all, the Franco-British proposals were made by France and the United Kingdom, and we say that these proposals are the basis. There had appeared to be no divergence on that score. However, as I understand it, now that the five-Power draft resolution has been submitted [A/C.1/752/Rev.2]—which some here have called a procedural resolution but which, as the Syrian representative has very properly stated and as we have constantly pointed out, is far from procedural in nature—there is apparently a proposal to make, not the Franco-British proposal of 11 June 1954, but the working paper of 25 May the basis for the future international convention.

72. I believe there is some misunderstanding here, which should of course be dispelled. I believe that the first task of the Disarmament Commission or of the Sub-Committee—if this question is brought before it—will be to determine what should be made the basis of the future convention.

73. My understanding is that we have agreed that the basis of the convention is to be the Franco-British proposals. But we are now told: "No, the basis for agreement on the convention must be the working

paper on control". I fail to understand that at all, and I cannot agree with it. That is my first point.

74. Let me repeat, however, that if the basis is really what we agreed on, then that is one thing. But if instead of what we agreed on, instead of the Franco-British proposals of 11 June 1954, some other concept is to be the basis—the concept, we may infer from Sir Pierson Dixon's statement, that underlies the United States working paper of 25 May—then it will be necessary at once to review that concept, that situation.

75. But I see no reason for such a review. We continue to maintain that the basis of the future international convention must be the Franco-British proposals of 11 June 1954. Secondly, we insist that there should be one basis, not two or more, particularly since any other basis would conflict with the first if it differed from it in any way. That is why I believe it is erroneous to assert that the proposals referred to by Sir Pierson could also be the basis.

76. Of course, it is stated in the draft resolution [A/C.1/752/Rev.2], with our concurrence, that the Commission should examine all "other proposals", including those referred to in the third paragraph of the preamble. The Commission may therefore decide to examine the proposals contained in the working paper of 25 May. That is one thing; but it is another thing altogether to insist that the working paper should be the basis. This is a new notion that may create new difficulties in the work of the Sub-Committee. Let me repeat that I believe this is merely a misunderstanding. The basis should be what we had apparently agreed upon, at least within the limits that we were able to establish, when the five Powers sponsored the draft resolution based on the original Canadian draft.

77. As I have stated, we regard as incorrect the provision in the Franco-British proposal that makes transition from one stage to another depend upon a decision of the control body. I hardly need dwell further on this point. We object to this provision because that is not a function of the control body. Its function is control and verification, to determine whether the convention is being observed or not. The problem of what to do if the convention is not observed, who bears the responsibility for its non-observance, and what must be done to ensure its observance can be dealt with in two ways. Technical rules, production and the like would be within the competence of the control body; but such matters as responsibility and the reporting of instances on non-fulfilment or violation of the international convention, which would establish certain rules for certain stages, would not be within its competence.

78. I will not dwell further on this matter. The critical question is simultaneity, which we must consider very carefully. If the formula of the Western Powers were adopted there would be no simultaneity at all but merely a revival of the old formula: first control, then prohibition. This would hardly be proper. We are making certain concessions, and we expect others to make certain concessions also. This at least, we are happy to note, appears to be the situation at present.

79. However, if it is put in this way: "All our old formulas are correct and are not subject to modification, but the Soviet Union ought to make all the changes that we find necessary"—then all will agree that this is not the way to proceed. I am sure that

Sir Pierson Dixon will concur in this. Negotiations conducted in such a way cannot lead to positive results, at least as far as the position of the Soviet Union is concerned.

80. Reference has also been made to the one-third reduction that we proposed. Yes, I defended that proposal: at the very outset, on 11 October [686th meeting], I said that we regard the principle of proportionality as the most correct one and that no other concept had been proposed instead, because the concept of balanced reduction cannot serve as a basis for measures to secure peace and to eliminate the threat of war. Speaking on that point, I cited numerous historical facts. We cannot abandon our position unless it is challenged by another more acceptable one that takes into account those purposes and interests which I hope we all have in common. These are: to eliminate the threat of war, to ensure the security of the peoples, to create conditions for a real peaceful coexistence, to strengthen friendly relations, and so on.

81. I must say, however, that Sir Pierson Dixon lost sight of certain circumstances that he should have kept in mind in discussing our proposals for a one-third reduction. I should like to draw attention to these circumstances.

82. As I said at the 699th meeting, "One of the main tasks in the work before us is to establish definite and agreed levels for the reduction of armaments," and "as a first step in such reductions" we have proposed that "all the great Powers should reduce their armaments by one-third and that the question of the reduction of the armaments of other States should be examined".

83. At the same time I stated that, once certain reductions had been accomplished, the time would undoubtedly come when it would be necessary to fix levels for the various countries and for various types of armed forces. I said that in my last statement here, and there is no need to dwell further on the matter now, but I should draw attention to that statement expressing my stand in the matter. I stated as follows:

"We also think it necessary to point out that when the agreed reductions of armaments are carried out, a number of questions will inevitably arise, including that of the concrete levels of armaments remaining after the reduction.

"We consider"—as I said then, before Sir Pierson Dixon had made his statement—"that these levels may be different for different countries and different types of troops, depending on various factors which must be taken into account when the agreed reductions of armaments are determined in respect of individual States."

84. It is surely clear from this that we are not simply saying "one-third" and nothing more, but that a one-third reduction should be the first step, followed by other measures that will take into account the different circumstances of each country, and that attempts must be made to agree on specific levels of armaments. Accordingly, we envisage a comprehensive schedule of measures capable of bringing our work to a successful conclusion, which we at least—and, I have no doubt, others—desire. Therefore, the observation that the one-third reduction is wholly unacceptable seems to me premature. We shall have more to say on that score.

85. The same applies to control, which Sir Pierson Dixon also discussed. I may point out merely that from the very beginning I have defended the idea that the forms, the methods of control, are linked with the form and nature of a particular stage. At the first stage, when the problem is merely the reduction of armaments, and the prohibition of atomic weapons does not yet arise, the forms of control will be different from those of the second stage, which will also include the prohibition of atomic weapons.

86. At that time I asked, and I should appreciate an answer from Sir Pierson Dixon—if not today then perhaps at least in the Commission or in the sub-committee—whether the Western Powers agree that measures for the reduction of conventional armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons should begin simultaneously with the entry into operation of the permanent international control body. It is well known that the permanent control body, as we proposed and as our draft resolution makes clear, should be given the power of inspection on a permanent basis with all the consequences that such power entails.

87. If, as I have said, the Western Powers agree to that, there would no longer be anything to prevent the permanent international control body from starting its work as soon as the plan for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons is introduced. This means—and I believe Sir Pierson Dixon will agree with me—that there is ground on which agreement can be reached, and that we have not taken such an unyielding stand that we cannot move a foot—or even an inch.

88. I submit that this explanation of our position provides good ground for a more optimistic view of the future than that engendered by the gloomy reflection that “our proposals are being criticized”. Of course your proposals are being criticized and contested, and you yourselves contest other proposals; but that does not mean that deep despondency and pessimism—even healthy pessimism, so-called—must prevail.

89. So far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we put the question like this: the way has been cleared for the further solution of difficult problems, for the conquest of these difficulties, by joint effort; and we of course trust that our partners will act in the same spirit in order to help to overcome these difficulties. This is our sincere and ardent desire. Therefore, when Sir Pierson Dixon says that the United Kingdom delegation will bend every effort towards a successful outcome, I wholeheartedly welcome his statement; and I affirm that for our part we will make every effort to achieve success in the form of a decision acceptable to all countries concerned in the settlement, the single basic purpose of which will be to secure the peace and the security of all peoples.

90. I should like to touch briefly on the Australian proposal [A/C.1/L.101]. First of all I should like to point out—in particular to the First Committee’s Secretary—that the Russian translation is incorrect. The English text of this document reads: “. . . information, giving a descriptive and factual presentation of the present positions . . .” The word “descriptive” was translated by the Russian word “detailed” (*podrobnoye*); the proper word is *obisatelnoye*.

91. Why do Secretariat translators make such flagrant mistakes? No wonder Mr. Shukairi, the Syrian representative, who raised the question about this word,

was perplexed by it. When I looked at the Russian text I did not find the word for “descriptive”; I found the word for “detailed”. When I turned to the English text after hearing the Syrian representative’s observations (otherwise I might not have noticed it, since I am not in the habit of comparing Russian texts with, for instance, the English, French or Spanish text) I found the words “descriptive and factual presentation . . .”.

92. Secondly, as I said yesterday [700th meeting], what was suggested in the Australian proposal was a dangerous thing to do; and I must point out again today that if such a resolution were adopted the Soviet Union delegation, for precisely the reasons that I set forth yesterday, would not consider itself responsible for a single line of the documents issued in this connexion by the Secretariat, notwithstanding my high regard for the Secretariat’s work.

93. As you can see, even Sir Pierson Dixon, if he will pardon me for saying so, described our position in a way that differed somewhat from my presentation, and we are expected to leave this matter, not to the discretion of Sir Pierson Dixon and Mr. Vyshinsky, for us to solve by joint effort, agreement and understanding, but to the discretion of Secretariat specialists who, as the records show, have a very imperfect command of Russian. And yet these specialists—who with few exceptions, I am sorry to say, have an imperfect command of Russian—are to translate from Russian. What could be the value of the compendium that they would produce? What good would it be? But Sir Pierson Dixon supports the idea and I can understand his loyalty: Mr. Lloyd said it was so, and how can his statement now be repudiated? But a repudiation is called for here. It was wrong, Sir Pierson Dixon’s predecessor made a hasty, erroneous observation, and for our work’s sake we should not be bound by considerations of convention and diplomatic prestige. I think that this understanding is entirely unnecessary and can have no bearing on our work. Even if a flawless document were prepared it would nevertheless suffer from the defect that, as soon as we started to work, we should be defending our positions, seeking agreed solutions, and applying new formulas, with the result that our positions might change. How could that be reflected in the documents that we should have before us? It could not, because we could not seat the authors of this compendium beside us, when they have compiled it, to follow every possible change and immediately alter their descriptions of the positions occupied by the various parties. Is this an undertaking worthy of our political objectives? I believe that it would be entirely futile.

94. I seem to recall—I may be mistaken—that a similar attempt was made at some stage of the work of the Disarmament Commission. I think a résumé was prepared, but led to no useful result. We did not object to such a résumé at that time, possibly because we thought that something might be gained by it; but nothing useful was nor can be accomplished by it. Our work is not static or completed. Let me put it this way: if our work were first completed and then the results described, I should agree to that; but there is no point in preparing a résumé of positions as a kind of aid to our work, which, if the Disarmament Commission is really to seek agreement, will inevitably be a process of constant change. And we must seek agreement: you make one proposal and we make another; if nothing comes of it we try another and still another—a third, a tenth, a hundredth. As we know, six

hundred and six scientific experiments had to be carried out to find a remedy for syphilis. In the present instance, if our positions were registered we should then hear the complaint that our positions were not the same as they had been three days or three weeks ago. Why is this necessary?

95. We are opposed to this draft resolution on these grounds, and I would very humbly request that at least some consideration may be given to the points that I have set forth here today.

96. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq): My delegation thinks that the draft resolution of Australia [A/C.1/L.101] is a very useful one. Not only will it enlighten us and give us a true picture of the present situation, but in the future it will also show us the amount of progress that the Disarmament Commission will be making. In other words, we can see where we are starting from and where we are getting to. From that point of view I find that the Australian draft resolution is a very useful one.

97. I certainly believe in the honesty and objectivity of the Secretariat in trying to put down as exactly as they can the present points of view. On the other hand, I would like to address a question to my colleague from the Soviet Union. If the draft that is going to be prepared were to be submitted to them for approval and for them to say that it really presents their true point of view—and if the same were to be done with the other Powers, Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, to see whether it really presents their points of view before it is published—would then the Soviet delegation have any objection? It seems to me that in any case the document will be a very useful and valuable one and I do not see how it can do any harm at all.

98. Mr. MOCH (France) (*translated from French*): First of all, I should like to thank Mr. Menon for the position he has adopted and for the special kindness he has shown. I also wish to avoid reopening the general debate, though I am sorry to say that this has already happened this morning. We can merely repeat what we have already said. It is now for the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee to study the points on which we differ and to seek to bring about the necessary agreements. I will therefore confine myself to the text submitted by the Australian representative [A/C.1/L.101].

99. Yesterday I made certain reservations with regard to this text. After due study and reflection, I can state today that the French delegation will not vote for this text, which, in its opinion, entails a number of disadvantages.

100. First, there is the disadvantage that appeared today, namely that one of the principal parties questions the usefulness of the proposal; this will make the work of the Secretariat still more difficult.

101. There are further objections that I would add to this one. Unlike the representative of Iraq, I do not think that it is advisable to crystallize differences of opinion at the very moment when we are about to make an effort to resolve them. The important thing is the final result of the work of the Disarmament Commission and of its Sub-Committee and not their starting point. We have already learned much about this starting point from the discussions that have taken place here, and I do not wish to reiterate the questions on which the positions of the various delegations do

not entirely coincide. But to ask the Secretariat to specify the initial differences of opinion is to ask it to undertake a historian's work, which may be done if we finally fail—a possibility I refuse to consider—but which may hamper the efforts to bring about understanding, conciliation and synthesis that we must make in the Disarmament Commission.

102. There are one or two other brief remarks that I wish to add. I share the view of the Soviet Union representative with regard to the position of the French delegation: I believe that the French delegation alone is able to make clear its position in a precise and satisfactory manner. The work of the Secretariat would thus inevitably be limited to requesting each delegation to state its position, which has already been done many times. Whatever the qualifications of the Secretariat—and no one questions them—I do not consider that it is capable of rendering my own ideas, which even I have difficulty in expressing, it is true, but which I nevertheless manage to express. That, in my opinion, is the essential point of the controversy, and that is why I wish to emphasize it.

103. There are yet further considerations. Suppose the Secretariat undertakes the work proposed by the Australian representative. There will be disputes. The statement Mr. Vyshinsky made just now proves that the text relating to the position of the Soviet Union will be scrutinized word by word and almost comma by comma. Are we going to replace the substantive discussion in the five-Power Sub-committee, which we ought to hold as soon as possible in view of its urgency, with a critical interpretation of the texts to be submitted to us by the Secretariat—texts that will probably draw objections from each of us, since we are sure to make numerous amendments to them? I am afraid that by that method we would waste much time and encounter very great difficulties just to achieve ephemeral results of very doubtful value. What we are trying to do is to emerge from the present stage of differences of opinion in order to come as close as possible to general agreement. Those are the reasons why the French delegation, to its great regret, cannot support the Australian proposal.

104. And I should like to make two suggestions, because I earnestly hope that we can bring this discussion as a whole to an end on a unanimous vote. First, I would make the suggestion—though I know that Sir Percy Spender has already rejected it—that the text of the Australian proposal should be referred to the Disarmament Commission, as Mr. Menon has so generously agreed should be done with his own draft resolution [A/C.1/L.100]. If we did this, I should be quite prepared to support the proposal.

105. If, on the other hand, the Australian representative will not consent to having his draft resolution referred to the Disarmament Commission, I would suggest that he might at least agree to replace the first word of the operative portion of the resolution, which, I feel, is too imperative, by a less vigorous term. I know that in pure French—as distinct from international French—a recommendation is not necessarily acted upon, and, speaking in French, I would say that the Disarmament Commission, when presented with a text beginning with the word "*recommande*", would be free not to act on it. But in the French that we speak here, under the influence of other languages, the word "*recommande*" is tantamount to an order given to the Commission. If the Australian representa-

tive agreed to replace this with the word "suggests", I would be able to vote for his text. But in all fairness I must frankly warn him that I shall raise the same objections with the Disarmament Commission that I have raised here.

106. In order that we may really reach a unanimous decision, therefore, I hope that the Australian representative, if he will not consent to have his draft resolution referred to the Disarmament Commission, will at least accept the substitution I have proposed. And if, unfortunately, he feels bound by the instructions from his Government to turn down both the compromise suggestions that I have made, I shall then be obliged to refrain from participating in the vote and to hope for the rejection of his draft resolution.

107. Mr. Hsioh-Ren WEI (China): Two things are clear from the general debate on disarmament that we have had in this Committee. One is that the agreed basis for a disarmament treaty is extremely limited in scope; the other is that the differences regarding disarmament between the Soviet Union and the free world are still basic and serious. This is clearly borne out even by the discussion that has taken place in the present meeting. I am, therefore, convinced that the best procedure is for the Committee to adopt the five-Power draft resolution [A/C.1/752/Rev.2] and to give the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee a free hand with our blessing. My delegation will, therefore, vote in favour of the five-Power draft resolution and will urge that it be unanimously adopted by this Committee.

108. With regard to the Australian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.101], I am sorry that I cannot agree with the position of the representative of France. I believe that this draft resolution is useful. An independent analysis, by the Secretariat, of the present positions of the various delegations on the different aspects of the disarmament problem would give a bird's-eye view of the present status of the issues before the General Assembly. We all sit here as representatives of Governments. The official positions of our Governments are clearly recorded in black and white in the verbatim records of our meetings. It should not be difficult for the Secretariat to make factual presentation of these positions, as suggested by the representative of Australia. The world is entitled to know at, this stage, what basic principles of the Franco-British proposals [DC/53, annex 9] have been accepted by the Soviet Union. In addition, such an analysis would be a guide to our future efforts.

109. As to the Indian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.100], I feel that the proposal of an armaments truce is unrealistic and, at best, represents mere wishful thinking. It is a matter of common-sense that, without agreement on control, there is no way to enforce any armaments truce, and an unsupervised truce is of no practical value.

110. The doors are open for any delegation to submit any proposal that it wishes to put forward to the Disarmament Commission itself. It is not necessary for the General Assembly to refer any proposal specifically to the Disarmament Commission unless special endorsement is desired. In the case of the Indian draft resolution, there is serious danger of misunderstanding if such a procedure is followed.

111. The Indian draft resolution asks the Disarmament Commission to study ways and means of estab-

lishing an armaments truce pending agreement on a disarmament convention. It might be intimated that the Assembly had already approved the principle of an armaments truce. Therefore, the five-Power draft resolution to refer the Indian draft resolution to the Disarmament Commission [A/C.1/L.102] is not acceptable to my delegation. Moreover, it is evident that operative paragraph 2 of the Indian draft resolution does not belong with the Disarmament Commission. If all goes well with the Sub-Committee of the Commission in composing the basic differences, it will require long and laborious negotiations in the Disarmament Commission to work out even the essential principles of a disarmament treaty. I do not see any reason for keeping the present session of the General Assembly in recess beyond the closing date of the session. If the occasion should arise later to make advisable the convening of a session, all delegations, I am sure, would be only too glad to come to a special session.

112. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): My delegation will vote in favour of the two draft resolutions submitted by the five Powers [A/C.1/752/Rev.2 and A/C.1/L.102]. We think that they represent an excellent augury for the future with respect to the development of this problem.

113. With regard to the Australian draft resolution that is before us [A/C.1/L.101], I could not agree more fully with what has been said by the representative of the Soviet Union and the representative of France. I think that certainly Sir Percy Spender has the highest motives here, and I think also that the Secretariat would be able to do the secretarial job required of it, and do it very honestly. But I feel that the reasons are so obvious why such a function of the Secretariat would be very limited so far as its usefulness was concerned.

¹ 14. If I may so put it, this is exactly the problem of the third man in logic. In logic, if one needs a mediator between two ideas or two principles, or between two parties in actual life, then at once the problem arises of having to supply also two additional mediators between the first mediator and the two parties. Then one needs four more, eight more, and so on *ad infinitum*. The problem of the third man, so-called, is one that should be avoided whenever possible.

115. In the present case it is obvious that, as the representatives of the Soviet Union and of France have said, representatives themselves are their own best advocates and spokesmen with regard to their changed views—and it is true, as Mr. Vyshinsky said, that these views may change from week to week. Therefore, since we are not writing history here, since history can never really be written in the making but only from the perspective of some attained, stable point of view, and since these parties are asked to meet and confer with each other, let there not be a mediator between them. Let them argue with each other, and if they need secretarial assistance they can certainly ask it from whomsoever they will.

116. For reasons that I think are fairly obvious, I feel quite strongly that in this matter it would complicate rather than facilitate the task of the parties concerned if any other person, even with the best of intentions, were asked to interpret their points of view one to the other or to crystallize and freeze their positions—perhaps even beyond the point at which they would desire them to be frozen at the moment.

117. For all these reasons it seems to me that possibly the wisest course would be to do with the Australian draft resolution what it has been proposed to do with the Indian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.100], and to refer it to the Disarmament Commission for disposition as the Commission pleases, or to follow the suggestion made by Mr. Moch with regard to changing the word to which he referred.

118. For reasons that were eloquently expressed by Mr. Vyshinsky and Mr. Moch, it does not seem to me to be helpful in the present circumstances, when we are dealing with an extremely delicate matter such as this, to interpose any third man between the parties concerned.

119. Mr. KYROU (Greece): I must confess to Sir Percy Spender that I share to a very great extent the misgivings and reservations expressed so eloquently on the subject of his proposal by the representative of France, and in the light of what has been said I also agree fully with Mr. Malik on that point.

120. In view of what has been said by Mr. Moch and, before him, by Mr. Vyshinsky, I wonder if it would not be helpful for delegations to take a stand on this draft resolution [A/C.1/L.101], if the representative of the Secretary-General could tell us whether he feels that the Secretariat would be in a position to prepare the working paper. Personally, I very much doubt that.

121. I should like to take this opportunity to say a few words on the second joint proposal of the five Powers [A/C.1/L.102] transmitting the Indian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.100] to the Disarmament Commission. My delegation appreciates very highly the noble spirit, the high motives and the extremely valuable suggestions embodied in the Indian draft resolution, and we are quite sure that the Disarmament Commission would render justice to them. But with special reference to paragraph 2 of the second five-Power proposal, I would point out that my delegation will vote in favour of the transmission to the Disarmament Commission of the records of the meetings of the First Committee at which the Indian draft resolution was discussed on the understanding that the decision to do so will not prevent the Secretariat from transmitting to the Commission the verbatim records of all the meetings of this Committee on this extremely important question of disarmament.

122. Mr. DE LA COLINA (Mexico) (*translated from Spanish*): I said earlier that I shall be very happy to vote in favour of the proposal originally submitted by Canada [A/C.1/752/Rev.2]. I hope that it will be adopted by acclamation.

123. I should also like to say that I agree with the Syrian representative that the five-Power joint draft resolution includes some important substantive points in the light of which it is reasonable to hope that new and fruitful agreements will be achieved.

124. I note with pleasure that the Indian representative has wisely agreed that his commendable proposal [A/C.1/L.100] should be considered by the Disarmament Commission in accordance with the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.102.

125. With regard to the Australian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.101] I feel that, in the light of the persuasive arguments put forward a few moments ago, it will not be really useful and acceptable unless it is approved without objection by the five sponsors of the joint

draft; any objection on their part would, I am afraid, make it valueless. In the circumstances, although we recognize that the proposal as it stands contains a number of constructive points, my delegation will abstain when a vote is taken.

126. Lastly, I should like to extend to the Canadian representative my delegation's warm congratulations on the success of the constructive draft resolution he submitted. From the start, his proposal had the enthusiastic support of my delegation. I also congratulate the representatives of France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States on this first step—timid and cautious though it be—towards conciliation. My delegation sincerely hopes that the talks that are to be held will make rapid headway.

127. Sir Percy SPENDER (Australia): I owe it to the members of this Committee to give the reasons why we think that the resolution standing in our name [A/C.1/L.101] should go to the vote. I have listened with great care and attention to what has been said by the representative of the Soviet Union and in particular to the words spoken by the representative of France. But may I say that there seems to be little attention given to one aspect of the matter, as I have constantly placed it before this Committee.

128. My resolution has two purposes. One is to provide a basic document for the consideration of the Disarmament Commission, and the other, which I have been at pains more than once to point out, is to indicate to other nations around this table what the situation is that has presently been reached.

129. I have urged more than once that nations other than the five nations represented on the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission have just as direct an interest and responsibility in relation to this problem as those five nations have. And I venture to say, with great respect, that there are few representatives around this table who can themselves be satisfied that they know what the position today is. We owe it to our respective Governments and to the peoples of our countries that the people should understand the position. Even though the members of the Disarmament Commission themselves may have the information in their own bosoms, the people in the various countries should understand precisely what are the issues presently between the parties, in so far as we are able to elucidate them.

130. I have listened to the objections that have been raised by the representative of France. It seems to me that when they are boiled down—and I shall examine them one by one—the real objection is that our proposal will not assist the deliberations of the Disarmament Commission. Even if that were correct, of course, it would not meet the substance of a further ground upon which we place this resolution, namely, that every one of us should know, in so far as it can be put to us, what the present position between the parties is.

131. When I spoke on this matter in my first intervention [690th meeting], I said that I had in mind that there should be a sub-committee of this First Committee for the purpose of reporting upon the precise nature of the issues between the parties, the extent to which there has been any agreement in principle or in detail on any of those issues, the differences of principle and detail that still exist, and the nature of such proposals as have been advanced that are designed to bridge those differences.

132. I cannot, for the life of me, see what possible objection there can be to having such a report, if it can be prepared, brought before this Committee, so that we may at least understand what the issues are, what the differences of principle and detail are, and what the nature is of such proposals as have been advanced to bridge those differences. If, in point of fact, the exercise proves abortive so far as the members of the Disarmament Commission are concerned, it may at least be of great assistance—and I believe it would be—to other members of this Committee.

133. Now, what were the objections raised by the representative of France?

134. In the first place, he said, one nation—the Soviet Union—objects to this proposal. Well, that seems to me to be not the strongest of arguments. Actually, if the representative of the Soviet Union will forgive me, I do not think that the reasons he advanced for his objection are very well based. But, even if they were—and I am sure that he thinks they are—it is a strange concept that, because one nation enters an objection, we must seek the lowest possible common denominator. It would mark the introduction of a new kind of veto if we were to say that because the Soviet Union does not want this resolution we should abandon it. The resolution either stands or falls upon its own merits; its own merits of reason, its own objectives, and the purposes that—in the view, I hope, of the majority of the members of this Committee—it will fulfil. And, if that is the view of the majority of this Committee, then it is not to the point to say that one nation objects to the resolution.

135. It has also been said that it is not good to crystallize the thinking upon this matter. I have never suggested, nor would I suggest, nor do I think anyone in this room would suggest, that there should be a crystallization of viewpoint upon this matter so that it becomes static for all time. Every one of us knows perfectly well, whatever the present positions of the respective powers may be, that those positions are not static; they will be moved from, if any agreement at all is ultimately to be reached. Therefore, this objection is not properly addressed to my resolution. My resolution is designed to find out what the present position is. That does not crystallize the matter; it indicates what presently is the position taken up by each of the Powers in respect of the substantive issues with which we have dealt in the course of this debate.

136. What is the objection to that? Is it going to be said that the representatives on the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee are the only people who are to deal with this matter, the only people who are to seek to resolve what these issues are? If so, I cannot see any very useful function for this Committee. And, speaking in behalf of my country, I do not accept the proposition that the smaller nations in the world have not just as grave a responsibility to mankind in general, as well as to themselves, as any other nation in the world.

137. When it is raised as an argument, then, against my resolution that it is not good to crystallize the thinking on this matter, the reply is that no one intends to crystallize it. All that is intended is to seek to find out today—when the resolution is passed—what the various positions are, along the lines that are indicated in my speech.

138. The suggestion has been made that the Secretariat could not do the job. I would find it very strange

indeed if it were to be said that, because each nation may find difficulty in expressing itself—sometimes failing to express itself—it is not within the competence of the Secretariat, with all its training, to prepare a document that, while it may not be of one-hundred-per-cent value, certainly will be of great value, at least to the members of this Committee.

139. The fourth point raised by the representative of France was that it is the final work of the Committee that counts. In one sense, of course, that is true. If the final work, however, produces nothing—and, if the representative of France will forgive me for saying so, the work of the Committee to date has produced nothing—because agreement cannot be reached between the major powers, then I should think that it is no answer to say that there is no purpose in having this document presented, to say that its presentation is of little consequence because it is the final work of the Committee that counts. If the final work of the Committee proves that these discussions are abortive, then it seems to me—and I made reference to this in my previous intervention [*696th meeting*]*—*that it is important that the world should know, as best the world can be informed, why there has been no agreement. Are we to contemplate the possibility—because it would be foolish for us to exclude it—that, when we meet again in twelve months' time, there will be a report that no agreement has been reached, and will we then have to fathom out whose responsibility it is and what the issues are?

140. Frankly, I feel that it is about time for all of us who come from the smaller and middle-sized nations to assert our right to be told—and that is, in effect, what this resolution seeks to achieve.

141. It is said that passage of this resolution would make more difficult the work ahead of us. This is an argument that I find it very difficult to understand. I understand it perfectly well when the representative of the Soviet Union says that the Secretariat cannot speak for him and cannot speak for his country. We all know that: the Secretariat cannot speak for any country around this table. But, after all, if Mr. Vyshinsky can express himself clearly in respect of the matters with which this report would deal, it would indicate that at least he knows his present position upon particular matters that are the subject of this problem—and, if he does not, then I think we ought to know also.

142. I cannot imagine how it would make the work difficult. After all, the Secretariat is a body quite competent to prepare a factual presentation, an objective analysis of what the issues are. I do not doubt, and I say so to the representative of Greece, that the Secretariat is quite prepared so to do if it is directed by this Committee so to do. Such is how I understood the arguments—and I crave the indulgence of the representative of France if I have not understood his arguments—against this presentation.

143. The representative of the Soviet Union said that the proposal was incautious and risky. He said that the Soviet Union Government could not allow anyone else to state its position on its behalf. Nobody asked it to. He said that such a study would serve no useful purpose. I have sought to deal with that. I think it would serve a very useful purpose indeed, but I regret that the representatives of both the Soviet Union and France find it necessary to bring into the discussion the question of whether or not they could support the

paper that I hope will eventually be produced by the Secretariat. I feel that that is not the point at all.

144. What we are asking the Secretariat to do in this draft resolution is to prepare an objective paper setting out the positions occupied by the great Powers. The purpose of the paper is clarification. It seems to me and to my Government that this is a most useful purpose. Who is better qualified than the Secretariat to prepare such a document? It does not follow that, because they have not been asked before, there is any lack of readiness on their part to do so.

145. The representative of the Soviet Union said yesterday that he did not question the capability of the Secretariat to produce a paper. Of course, I assume he questioned whether it would produce a useful paper. I doubt whether anybody else in this room is prepared to go as far as to say that whatever paper is produced by the Secretariat will be of no use at all. If, when the paper has been completed, the Soviet Union should find that it does not state the Soviet position to the satisfaction of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union delegation is perfectly free to enter whatever reservations and objections it wishes. As I have said, the object is clarification. If the Secretariat achieves only a limited clarification in the Soviet view, then we would all welcome the Soviet Union's supplying the rest of the clarification.

146. The representative of the Soviet Union has frequently stated the position of the Soviet Union in his own words and at great length. He has offered to provide still more clarification and elaboration. Many words of the representative of the Soviet Union presumably describe proposals that are clear to him and embody certain qualities that the Soviet Union Government regards as admirable and on which they place reliance. Surely, the representative of the Soviet Union does not object to the Secretariat's making the effort since we—and I speak on behalf of my country and I hope on behalf of many other countries—are still in the dark about certain aspects of the Soviet proposals. Surely, the Soviet Union representative does not object to the Secretariat's restating those proposals and describing the position of the Soviet Union Government in fewer words and in a way as to make it possible for us to comprehend them.

47. It would be my wish, if I felt that my duty permitted me to do so, to accommodate myself to the views expressed by everyone around this table. We did not introduce this draft resolution merely because it was an exercise. I think there has been far too much exercise in words in our discussions in this Committee on disarmament. We proposed this draft resolution because we had a purpose in mind, a purpose that we have sought to make clear.

48. It has been suggested to me by the representative of France that if I amend the draft resolution somewhat it will prove acceptable. He must forgive me for saying that the suggestion he is asking me to accept asks me to destroy the resolution. The change he suggests would destroy this resolution. He says: refer the text to the Disarmament Commission to deal with it itself. What would become of this document if it were sent to the Disarmament Commission without any recommendation from this Committee? Mr. Moch himself does not think there is any use in it; therefore, if it is tabled there, it will stay there.

49. Then Mr. Moch said that if I did not accept that, he suggested that I simply change one word,

the word "recommends", which has a peremptory note about it. He suggests the word "requests" instead of "recommends". Of course the word "requests" under the circumstances would have exactly the same end result: nothing would take place in respect of it. Thus, if I accepted such an amendment, it would simply kill our proposal; if I accepted those suggestions our resolution would be destroyed. If you will forgive me for saying so, I have no intention of doing that.

150. I should like to make reference to certain observations made by the representative of Syria. I understand the criticism that he directs at the word "descriptive". In order to make my position clear I had intended by the word "descriptive" to indicate the various headings to be set up. I feel that the Secretariat should not be hampered when it prepares the paper; I wanted to indicate the numbers of headings, which the members of the Committee may remember I dealt with in my major speech in this debate [696th meeting].

151. However, I can see that there can be difficulties in interpretation of this, and our objective would be accomplished sufficiently and the strength of the resolution would remain the same and the substance unimpaired if the words "descriptive and" were left out. I cannot understand why there should be any objection to a recommendation to the Disarmament Commission. If we "recommend" to it, it may decide to do nothing about the matter, but it is at least our recommendation—that there be a working paper prepared for the Commission for circulation to all the Members of the United Nations for their information, giving factual presentation of the present position of the great Powers on various aspects of the disarmament problem. As I said, I think that would meet—and I hope it would meet—by the omission of these words the objection of the representative of Syria and any other members who may have similar objections.

152. I should like to make one observation about the word "present". The paper would have in mind a factual presentation of the present position—the one at the time when the resolution is passed by the Assembly—because that is the time from which it acquires its validity. It would therefore be one that would take into consideration all that has taken place on behalf of the spokesmen of the great Powers right up to date—at least to the conclusion of the debate. I hope that that would meet the point that was raised by the representative of Iran [700th meeting].

153. I thank the representative of Peru for the support he has given to our draft resolution. If I may say so, it expresses very eloquently what I had been seeking and struggling to express on more than one occasion in the course of this debate.

154. Having stated my reasons, having sought to meet the objections that have been raised against the proposal, having indicated the importance that the Australian Government placed upon the need for clarification for its own guidance and for the guidance of other nations, I would require overwhelming arguments in order to abandon the proposal which I have put forward. Should I abandon it because there is an objection from the Soviet Union? I have given my answer to that; it must be "no". Should I abandon it because of the supplementary objections that have been raised? For the reasons that I have given, the answer to that must be "no". Should I abandon it

merely to obtain unanimity? I cannot imagine that that would be a realistic exercise, nor can I imagine that it is an exercise that would discharge the heavy responsibilities that rest upon the shoulders of all.

155. I would therefore hope that the Soviet Union may reconsider its position. But whether it does or does not, I would hope that I receive the support of the majority of the members of this Committee for the resolution as presented with the amendment I have indicated, which would be subject of course to the agreement of the representative of the Philippines, as co-sponsor of the draft resolution, to the omission of those words.

156. Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) (*translated from Spanish*): While my delegation did not intervene in the debate on items 20 and 68 of the agenda, which are under consideration, it wishes to make a brief statement at this stage of the Committee's work, when we are dealing with the specific draft resolutions that have been submitted.

157. Until yesterday, only three draft resolutions were before the First Committee: the joint draft resolution submitted by Canada and four other States [A/C.1/752/Rev.2] in which the Disarmament Commission is requested to seek a solution of the problem, taking into account the various proposals already submitted and any other proposals that might be submitted to it. Secondly, there is the Indian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.100], with its recommendation to the Disarmament Commission that, in seeking an acceptable solution of the problem, it take into consideration the four points set out in that resolution. Thirdly, we have the Australian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.101], in which the Disarmament Commission is recommended to request the Secretariat to prepare a working paper giving a descriptive and factual presentation of the present positions of the great Powers on various aspects of the disarmament problem.

158. At today's meeting, a new five-Power draft resolution has been circulated [A/C.1/L.102], under which the Indian draft resolution would be referred to the Disarmament Commission for consideration and the records of the meetings of the First Committee at which this draft resolution was discussed would be transmitted to that Commission for its information.

159. I should like first to refer to the main joint draft resolution submitted by Canada, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States [A/C.1/752/Rev.2.]. It is indeed encouraging for the world to note that Powers responsible for peace and security have finally succeeded—thanks to the efforts of a number of delegations and, in particular, to the laudable initiative taken by the Canadian delegation—in moulding this draft resolution into a document paving the way to, or rather holding out hope of, a solution of this problem, to which public opinion in every part of the world attaches so much importance. The situation in this Committee is also encouraging in that it is almost certain—judging from the various statements made—that the draft resolution will be adopted unanimously by the Committee and later by the General Assembly. All I need say, therefore, is that we shall vote in favour of the draft resolution and are confident that all members of the Committee will do likewise. I would not presume to offer any suggestions with respect to a draft resolution that is expected to win general approval.

160. The Australian draft resolution [A/C.1/L.101] certainly contains much that is of value. It may be helpful, not so much to the members of the Disarmament Commission as to those Members of the United Nations who are not represented on that Commission, and to whom, under the provisions of the Australian draft resolution, the proposed working paper would be circulated.

161. However, in view of the objections raised, reasonable as they are and emanating as they do from two great Powers represented on the Disarmament Commission, the document can hardly serve a useful purpose in the Commission itself. It has also been pointed out that it is doubtful that the Secretariat, despite its excellent technical services, could summarize the ideas or positions of the great Powers to the satisfaction of all. We venture to raise a further objection to the Australian draft resolution, which is that it has the defect of referring only to the positions of the great Powers. While we all realize that the contribution of the great Powers to the debates in the First Committee has been of the highest importance, a no less important, enlightening and constructive contribution has been made by many delegations representing large, medium and small States. Those States put forward valuable ideas that might usefully be taken into account by the Disarmament Commission.

162. Nevertheless, the descriptive and factual presentation referred to in the Australian draft resolution is intended to cover the present positions of the great Powers only. I believe, for that reason, that the draft resolution is defective, that it is incomplete and that it should be completed, as rightly suggested by Mr. Belaúnde, by the inclusion of a reference to the debates held in the First Committee. However, this objection would be met if, according to the suggestion made by the representative of France and accepted by several delegations, the same action is taken with respect to the Australian draft resolution as the five Powers have proposed—in the second joint draft resolution distributed this morning [A/C.1/L.102]—should be taken with regard to the Indian proposal that is, to refer it to the Disarmament Commission

163. The Disarmament Commission would thus have before it the Australian delegation's important suggestion that a working paper should be prepared. I would weigh the pros and cons of such a document consider the feasibility of drafting it and its possible value and decide for itself whether or not to request the Secretariat to prepare it.

164. This suggestion is very similar to the alternative proposal that the French representative made to the Australian representative, which the latter has just explicitly stated he is not prepared to accept. This latter proposal was that we should merely make a suggestion instead of a recommendation. As the representative of France has said, the word "recommendation" in French, Spanish or any other language, has no connotation of compulsion. However, as Mr. Moc also pointed out, under the established practice of the United Nations, a recommendation from an organ or subsidiary body created by it—and the Disarmament Commission is a subsidiary body established by the General Assembly—does have binding force. Thus, if a recommendation were made, it would be difficult for the Disarmament Commission to evade compliance with it. If, therefore, it is thought necessary to adopt

a special resolution to give effect to the Australian delegation's ideas, such a resolution might take the form of a suggestion to the Disarmament Commission.

165. I should now like to refer to the interesting draft resolution submitted by India [A/C.1/L.100]; as has been stated repeatedly, it includes significant and valuable material that should receive the careful consideration of the Disarmament Commission. Four great Powers and Canada have proposed [A/C.1/L.102] that the Indian draft resolution should be referred to the Disarmament Commission. As I have just said, the same action might be taken in regard to the Australian draft resolution.

166. However, the draft resolution submitted this morning by four great Powers and Canada has a second paragraph, in which the General Assembly

“Decides also to transmit to the Disarmament Commission for its information the records of the meetings of the First Committee at which this draft resolution was discussed.”

In other words, the Powers consider that the Disarmament Commission should be informed of the debate held yesterday and today on the Indian draft resolution. However, there was in reality very little debate on that draft resolution. Only Mr. Menon and the representative of France spoke yesterday before it was decided to refer the proposal to the Disarmament Commission. No other delegations dealt with the substance of the draft resolution, because, as Mr. Vyshinsky pointed out, it was distributed only the day before; nor did they have any advance knowledge of the explanation Mr. Menon gave yesterday. They were not therefore in a position to embark on a discussion of the substance of the resolution. Today, Mr. Menon has had the commendable generosity to accept the suggestion that his draft resolution should be referred to the Disarmament Commission. Hence, no further debate on his draft resolution has taken place. In the circumstances, the suggestion of the Powers to transmit the records of the meetings of the First Committee at which this draft resolution was discussed to the Disarmament Commission has little meaning, because there was in fact hardly any debate on Mr. Menon's proposal.

167. On the other hand, the debate that has been held here for the past three weeks on the crucial problem of disarmament has been extensive, very interesting, most useful and fruitful. In none of the draft resolutions is there the slightest suggestion that the records of this debate, which contain most important statements of opinion and extremely useful information of value to the Disarmament Commission, should be transmitted to that Commission.

168. In the main five-Power draft resolution [A/C.1/752/Rev.2], originally sponsored by Canada, the Commission's terms of reference are confined to those set forth in paragraph 2 of the operative part, which reads:

“Requests the Disarmament Commission to seek an acceptable solution of the disarmament problem, taking into account the various proposals referred to in the preamble of the present resolution and any other proposals within the Commission's terms of reference.”

169. These, I repeat, are the Commission's terms of reference. Nothing is said about taking into account

the views expressed in the general debate. I should like to point out that this is somewhat inconsistent with the desire of the five Powers to refer Mr. Menon's proposal, on which, strictly speaking, no debate has taken place, to the Disarmament Commission.

170. I think it would be desirable to modify the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.102, which was distributed this morning. In the first place, paragraph 1 might be expanded by inserting, after the words “document A/C.1/L.100,” the following: “and the Australian draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.101”. Secondly, I would like to suggest a change in paragraph 2 to the Powers co-sponsoring the joint draft resolution. While the paragraph should be retained, it might be amplified to show the same respect to the delegations who devoted so much effort, energy and goodwill to the search for a solution to the basic problem as has been shown to those who took part in the discussion of the Indian proposal. Accordingly, *mutatis mutandis*, I should like to revise paragraph 2 thus:

“Decides to transmit to the Disarmament Commission for its information the records of the meetings of the First Committee at which items 20 and 68 of the agenda were considered.”¹

171. We would not thus be taking any action in regard to the main five-Power proposal but would merely be amending a secondary proposal, the only purpose of which is to provide the Disarmament Commission with additional terms of reference and further information. A secondary document would thus be involved. Our action would also be more comprehensive and would meet the wishes of all parties, for what the Australian delegation wants is to inform the Disarmament Commission of the positions of the great Powers and the positions of those Powers are recorded in the debates of the First Committee. Those debates do not, however, record only the positions of the great Powers, but also those of the medium and small Powers, which have co-operated in the consideration of the problem. The information available to the Commission would thus be more extensive and more complete. The various schools of thought in the Assembly would find this more satisfactory and better results might well be achieved.

172. Moreover, if it is sought, as proposed by the Australian delegation, to prepare a document summarizing or setting out the ideas or points of view of the main delegations, in other words the great Powers, we are confronted with the objection we have already noted that it would be difficult for a single person, however well equipped, to summarize faithfully the ideas or points of view expressed by delegations to the satisfaction of everyone concerned.

173. On the other hand, if what is transmitted is not a summary but the complete records, which reproduce these ideas *in extenso*, and which are open to correction by the delegations concerned—since the technical services of the United Nations allow all of us, within a time limit, to make changes if we feel that our ideas have not been faithfully reported in a document—then the Disarmament Commission, on the one hand, and the States not represented in it, on the other, will be informed in a single set of documents of the ideas expressed on the problem.

¹ This amendment appeared later as A/C.1/L.103.

174. Hence, while I am not making any formal proposal at this stage but only a suggestion, I trust that the views I have expressed will be taken into consideration and that it will be possible for the joint draft resolution [A/C.1/L.102] to be amended along the lines I have indicated, i.e., by including a reference to the Australian draft resolution in paragraph 1 and by amending paragraph 2 to provide for the transmittal

to the Disarmament Commission not only of the records of the meetings of the First Committee at which the draft was discussed—actually there was no full discussion—but the records of the whole debate from the first day we began our work on these items until the conclusion of the debate.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.