

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

NINTH SESSION

Official Records



CONTENTS

Agenda item 20: Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: report of the Disarmament Commission (<i>continued</i>)	} 193	Page
Agenda item 68: Conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction (<i>continued</i>)		

Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia).

AGENDA ITEMS 20 AND 68

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/2685, A/C.1/751, A/C.1/752/Rev.2) (*continued*)

Conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction (A/2742 and Corr.1, A/2742/Add.1, A/C.1/750) (*continued*)

1. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): It seems to me that this discussion has been concentrated on questions mainly connected with the draft resolution [A/C.1/750] submitted by the Soviet Union and that many of the points raised in it are important and require careful attention. It would be unrealistic, however, to try to discuss all the points raised; the only possible course is to select the most important points without an examination of which our debate would be definitely incomplete. I feel I must make this clear and I would ask the representatives whose statements I shall be unable to discuss in detail at the present time to bear this fact in mind and not to ascribe my method to any inattention to their statements.

2. As the debate has shown, there has been a *rapprochement* between the positions of the Soviet Union and of the Western Powers on the question of the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other types of weapons of mass destruction. This *rapprochement* has found expression, for example, in the proposal to use the Franco-British memorandum of 11 June 1954 [DC/53, annex 9] as the basis for the international convention which the Soviet Government has recommended should be concluded on this question. It also explains the important fact that the draft resolution submitted to the First Committee by the Canadian delegation [A/C.1/752] is now sponsored by five delegations: those of Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union [A/C.1/752/Rev.2].

3. It is true that, during the debate, attempts have been made by some representatives to deny the existence of a

rapprochement between the positions of the Soviet Union and the three Western Powers or, in any event, to minimize its significance. Those who have adopted that attitude have stressed their pessimistic view of the future prospects of solving the problem which is before the United Nations. Some have asserted that the position now taken by the Soviet Union is insufficiently clear, and that the debate has shown how difficult it is to determine exactly what that position is. I think that the nature and content of our proposals do not warrant this attitude towards them and that they are sufficiently clear to make it unnecessary to take the line I have just mentioned.

4. The representatives who have been infected by this disease of pessimism, which they represent as a healthy pessimism, as the Australian representative puts it, have been trying to disregard facts which cannot fail to be clear to any person who is capable of understanding facts objectively. They have tried to lay as much stress as possible on the existing differences between the two sides, rather than to emphasize the factors which unite or bring closer the positions of the two sides on this matter. But in the end even they could not withstand the force of facts.

5. The Australian representative showed this in his statement on 22 October [696th meeting], when he said that the objectives of the proposal submitted by the Soviet Union at the 484th plenary meeting on 30 September for a draft international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, and the objectives of the Franco-British proposals of 11 June were—and I quote Sir Percy Spender's exact words—"so similar that I think they may be regarded as practically in agreement". Sir Percy continued: "Indeed, the representative of the Soviet Union acknowledged on 14 October 1954 that, as he saw it, this was the case". Yes, this is the case. And it cannot be otherwise, because the international convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons proposed in the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union is really based on the Franco-British proposals of 11 June 1954. Even those who had doubts on that score at the beginning of the debate can harbour no such doubts now. I consider that to be one of the positive aspects and achievements of the debate which has been held in this Committee.

6. It is true, as I have already said, that some representatives expressed such doubts at the outset of the debate, occasionally in somewhat uncompromising terms. Thus, for example, Mr. Lloyd tried to cast doubt on this fact and to deny the truth of the assertion I have just made, but the comparison between certain provisions of French and United Kingdom memorandum and provisions of the Soviet Union draft resolution seems to me to have proved incontrovertibly, as I have shown at previous meetings, that such attempts are unfounded and to have confirmed that our draft resolution is indeed based on the Franco-British proposals.

7. I should like to remind you that both the Soviet Union proposals of 30 September and the Franco-British proposals of 11 June show that the principal objective laid down in both documents is the reduction of armaments, the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of definite and agreed levels for the reduction of conventional armaments. This is an important principle. Moreover, it is precisely the principle on which the Soviet Union has undeviatingly insisted throughout these past years.

8. In order to finish with this question, it might be well to point out that, whereas in the past we had substantial differences with the Western Powers on such matters as the principle of stages, this difference is now eliminated. The USSR draft resolution of 30 September makes it quite clear that the Soviet Union accepts the principle proposed by the Western Powers that the implementation of measures for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons should be carried out by stages. The Soviet Union is thus meeting the Western Powers on that point.

9. The Franco-British memorandum of 11 June provides for three stages, but our proposal provides for two stages. This might not be important, since the principle of stages is accepted by both sides, but I must point out that the convergence of our positions in this matter goes deeper than mere agreement on the number of stages.

10. If we bear in mind that the first stage in the Franco-British plan provides for a so-called "freezing" and that this stage cannot, strictly speaking, be included in the category of measures for the reduction of armaments, the Franco-British proposals of 11 June may also be regarded as providing for reduction by two stages. Accordingly, even in that respect our positions have converged and, I must say, have converged considerably.

11. How, indeed, should the proposal to limit over-all military man-power to 31 December 1953 levels made in paragraph 5 of the Franco-British proposals be interpreted? It can mean nothing more or less than the retention, in respect of armaments and armed forces, of a situation which may be termed the *status quo*, that is, a situation existing at a given moment without change. In other words, it would mean "freezing" armed forces and armaments at the level which existed at a given moment, in this case, on 31 December 1953. At this first stage, therefore, there is no question of any reduction. Accordingly, when we consider the question of reduction, we find there are two stages in the Franco-British proposals and two stages in the Soviet proposals, a fact, which, in my opinion provides cogent, clear and convincing proof that our positions have converged even in respect of the actual process of reducing armaments and armed forces by stages.

12. I think this is so transparently clear and so patently obvious that it was quite unnecessary for the Australian representative to expatiate on the subject in the part of his statement dealing with what he described as "timing". I take the liberty of pointing out that the question of "timing" is quite a different matter. We are sure that this question can be satisfactorily settled within the framework of the proposals set forth in our draft resolution of 30 September.

13. I should now like to say a few words on the part of our draft resolution directly concerned with the question of stages about which I had already begun to speak.

14. As we all no doubt remember, the first stage proposed in the Soviet Union draft resolution provides for such measures as the reduction in the course of six months (or one year) of armaments, armed forces and budgetary appropriations for military requirements to the extent of 50 per cent of the agreed levels, or from the strength of armaments and armed forces existing on 31 December 1953.

15. Thus, according to our draft resolution, the measures carried out at the first stage will be solely concerned with the reduction of conventional armaments. The reduction from the above-mentioned levels of armaments and armed forces and of budgetary appropriations for military requirements by the remaining 50 per cent of the agreed levels will be effected during the subsequent six months, or one year, as may be decided, but in any case at the second stage.

16. With regard to the complete prohibition of atomic weapons, our draft resolution envisages measures to that effect, as I have just pointed out, only at the second stage, after conventional armaments have been reduced to the extent of the first 50 per cent of the agreed levels and simultaneously with their reduction by the remaining 50 per cent of the agreed levels.

17. Thus, it is clear from our draft resolution that, with regard to the first stage, the Soviet Union does not insist that measures for the reduction of conventional armaments and measures for the prohibition of atomic weapons should be taken simultaneously; that is to say, our position on this matter is that the reduction of conventional armaments, at least to the extent of 50 per cent of the agreed levels, should precede the measures to be taken in respect of the prohibition of atomic weapons.

18. I think that Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Moch were right in drawing attention to this fact, pointing out as they did that the reduction of conventional armaments to the extent of 50 per cent of the agreed levels envisaged in the first stage of our plan precedes the execution of measures for the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other types of weapons of mass destruction, discontinuation of the production of such weapons, elimination of those weapons from the armaments of States, and the use of atomic materials only for peaceful purposes.

19. I therefore think that it was not by chance that Mr. Lloyd made the observation in his statement of 15 October [690th meeting] that this went further than anything contained in previous plans we had proposed in this field. I consider this an extremely significant point, as is the fact that it was noted by the representative of a country which co-sponsored the memorandum of 11 June 1954.

20. It is evident from the draft resolution of 30 September, as well as from the Franco-British proposals of 11 June, that the basic objective in both cases is the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons and that definite and—I must stress this—agreed levels must be laid down for the reduction of armaments.

21. Thus, in contrast to the position taken by the United Kingdom and French delegations in the past, before 11 June 1954, the Western Powers have now accepted the principle of the reduction of armaments, on which the Soviet Union has always insisted. On the other hand, a perusal of the Soviet proposals shows that the Soviet Union has accepted the Franco-British proposal providing for the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces in two stages, such reduction to be effected

to the extent of 50 per cent of the agreed levels at each stage, as was proposed on 11 June by France and the United Kingdom. Thus, a convergence of our positions may be noted in this question also, and this is of no small importance to the consideration, discussion and appraisal of the possibility of reaching agreement on the question as a whole.

22. During the general debate, reference was also made to the important question of the levels from which the reduction of armaments and armed forces should be effected. Both the Soviet Union draft resolution and the Franco-British memorandum provide that the reduction of armaments and armed forces should be effected from the level of armaments and armed forces existing on 31 December 1953. This shows that, here again, the positions of the Soviet Union and of France and the United Kingdom coincide. The same applies to the position of the United States, if it concurs in the Franco-British proposals, which I believe to be the case, although no direct statement has been made here to that effect.

23. Speaking of stages, it should be noted that the Soviet Union, in proposing to carry out measures for the reduction of armaments in stages, which is, in effect, also what is proposed in the Franco-British memorandum of 11 June 1954, was actuated by the desire not to delay the reduction of armaments and armed forces. I repeat: not to delay the reduction.

24. The Soviet Union has therefore proposed that the reduction of armaments to the extent of 50 per cent of the agreed levels should be effected at the first stage, before any measures have been taken to prohibit atomic weapons. Under our proposals, the first stage does not relate to atomic weapons; the first stage of the whole process of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons does not relate to atomic weapons. The very fact that this stage does not relate to atomic weapons and that the only measure to be carried out at this stage is the reduction of conventional armaments, and that only to the extent of one half of the agreed levels, also determines the decision on the type of control at each stage, both the first and the second. This explains the Soviet Union's proposal to set up a temporary control commission at the first stage and a standing international control organ at the second stage. I consider that my Government's proposal is justified both by logic and by the desire, to bring our position into line with those of the Western Powers on which our position is based.

25. The rights and powers of the temporary control commission, as is quite clearly defined in paragraph 1 (b) of the Soviet Union draft resolution, are quite specific. It cannot be said that they are ambiguous; they are not only unambiguous, but, in our opinion, quite adequate for the discharge of the supervisory functions assigned to the commission at the first stage.

26. At that stage, provision is not made for supervision on the spot, because only the reduction of conventional armaments is involved at the first stage and the prohibition of atomic weapons does not yet come into the question.

27. It is obvious that the rights and powers of the temporary control commission should be determined by the functions which are assigned to it and which will be quite different from those assigned to the standing international control organ to be set up at the second stage, when armaments will be reduced by the remaining 50 per cent, and complete prohibition of atomic weapons will be effected simultaneously.

28. Thus, under our proposal the type of control is closely related to the stages by which measures for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons will be carried out, and the powers of the control organ will be enlarged upon transition from the first stage to the second. In other words, under the plan proposed by the Soviet Union, control will come into effect at the first stage and, upon transition to the second stage, when the standing international control organ will be set up in the course of the ensuing six or twelve months, control will operate to its full extent.

29. That is the meaning of our proposals both on stages and on the powers of the control organ at the two stages. I think that these proposals are logically well founded and that there is no ground whatsoever for the assertion that when, let us say, measures are put into operation in respect of the reduction of armaments, or, more pertinently, in respect of the prohibition of atomic weapons, such measures will be initiated before a control organ is in existence. That is not so.

30. Even at the first stage, when the prohibition of atomic weapons is not yet in effect and before a decision to that effect is even taken, the control commission or temporary control organ will already be in operation; its functions, under our proposals, will be expanded; and subsequently, at the second stage, it will be replaced by another, standing organ, with wider functions and powers.

31. I can see no justification for saying that under our plan there will be no control when measures for the reduction of armaments are initiated, and certainly none for saying that there will be no control when prohibition measures are begun. I shall explain later our understanding of simultaneity, which seems to us to be the only possible understanding. At this point, however, I should like to draw attention to the following.

32. If each of the various stages is to involve certain well-defined operations with regard to the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, then the control must correspond to the work planned for those stages and the tasks to be carried out by States at each stage. The rights and powers of each control organ must be fully in accordance with the tasks and aims which States will be bound to pursue under the international convention they are to sign.

33. What I have said should make it clear that there is no foundation for the comments of some representatives on the timing of the establishment of the control organs nor, in particular, for the allegation that the control organ will be unable to supervise the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces from the very beginning.

34. The Australian representative, for example, asserted [*696th meeting*] that the temporary control organ would not have been established when the reduction was initiated, but would be "in process of establishment". It may be seen from the USSR draft resolution that the temporary control commission is to be established simultaneously with the carrying out of the measures of reduction, a process which is to take six months or one year, by which time the temporary control commission will have been established and will consequently be in operation. If the Australian representative will excuse my saying so, only an excess of pessimism—from which he suffers, according to his own admission—can account for any other understanding of this perfectly clear provision.

35. Our draft resolution provides that the work of the temporary control commission is to consist in supervising the fulfilment by States of their obligations in connexion with the reduction of armaments and armed forces. The commission will be able to perform this task successfully by exercising its functions in accordance with the powers conferred on it, as I have already said, in paragraph 1 (b) of our draft resolution of 30 September 1954.

36. Equally unfounded, in our view, are the comments which have been made here concerning the establishment of the standing international control organ. The gist of those comments was that the standing international control organ should be established and should begin to operate at the very beginning of the first stage and before any measures for the reduction of armaments were carried out. Those who expressed that view apparently failed to take into account the fact that during the first stage, when only measures connected with the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces are to be carried out, and then only to the extent of 50 per cent of the agreed levels, there is absolutely no need for a permanent control organ, which in addition to supervising the reduction of armaments would also have the task of supervising the implementation of the convention on the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction.

37. Consequently, during the first stage, it is pointless and wholly unjustified to institute a permanent control organ with a wider range of tasks than States are to carry out during that stage. The prohibition of atomic weapons is not supposed to be put into effect during the first stage. Therefore, no matter what control commission is appointed and established at that stage, it cannot be endowed with the function of supervising the implementation of those provisions of the convention which deal with the prohibition of atomic weapons. That being so, whether we call the commission by one name or another is immaterial. As the commission whose duty it will be to supervise the fulfilment of the obligation to prohibit atomic weapons will have nothing to do during the first stage, it will be much simpler not to establish it for the time being; since the permanent commission, from the point of view of both its composition and its methods of work, will naturally be a much more complex instrument of control than the temporary control commission which is to supervise the reduction of conventional armaments only.

38. We deem it inadvisable to set up, at the very first stage, a permanent control organ, with its more complex functions, since the peculiar complexity of its work arising out of the peculiar nature of the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes, will of course necessitate an entirely different staff of inspectors, a different body to supervise this part of the work, and undoubtedly a different staff of experts with qualifications which will be unnecessary and will not be called for during the first stage.

39. What purpose would it serve, then, to set up so unwieldy and responsible an organ, especially as we have been warned that to establish a permanent control organ is a very complex matter? Why this insistence on setting up this permanent control organ at the very beginning, delaying the reduction of armaments until it has been set up; instead of proceeding with the reduction of armaments by establishing what I might call a more mobile, simpler, but equally efficient control organ in the form of a temporary control commission?

40. Our plan, of course, is designed to speed up this entire process. The opposite plan would not achieve that purpose. On the contrary, regardless of our wishes, it would automatically have the ultimate effect of retarding the process of armaments reduction and, to an even greater extent, that of prohibition of atomic weapons. We feel that this would seriously jeopardize all efforts to remove the threat of a new war and to strengthen international trust. It has been said here that international trust is essential, although not in itself sufficient. That, of course, is indisputable, no quarrel with that; while trust alone will not take us very far, neither can we make a step without it, especially in the matter we are now discussing.

41. Those who express the view I have just criticized fail to take into account the fact that during the first stage, when only measures connected with the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces are to be carried out, and only to the extent of 50 per cent of the agreed levels, there is no need—as some perhaps imagine there is—to establish a permanent control organ, an organ whose functions must include supervision of the implementation of the convention on the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other methods of mass destruction, the discontinuance of the production of these weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States, and also the implementation of the convention on the reduction of armaments, armed forces and budgetary appropriations for military requirements. I repeat, this permanent control organ will naturally have wider competence and, accordingly, wider powers, including the power of inspection on a continuing basis.

42. I should also like to take up a question raised here earlier and to explain our attitude towards it. I am again referring to the comment that it would be more appropriate to set up the permanent international control organ at the very beginning of the implementation of measures for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. With regard to this comment, I must say that the Soviet Union is still ready to agree to the establishment of the permanent international control organ at the very beginning of such implementation, provided that, from the very outset, all these measures are carried out simultaneously. In other words, if the prohibition of atomic weapons is put into effect during the first stage, we agree to permanent control also being instituted during that stage.

43. I wish to draw the Committee's attention to the fact that the Soviet Union's proposal providing for the reduction of armaments by the first 50 per cent and for the establishment of a temporary control commission during the first stage or phase of armaments reduction represents a further attempt to bring the views of the Soviet Union and the Western Powers closer together, as I said earlier. Consequently, we are prepared to agree to the establishment of the permanent control organ during the first stage, but on the understanding that measures connected with the prohibition of atomic weapons will be carried out simultaneously with it, during that first stage, and will not be postponed until the second stage, as proposed in the Franco-British memorandum. We postponed the establishment of that organ until the second stage in yet another effort to bring our position on this question closer to the Franco-British memorandum of 11 June. That, I think, is perfectly clear, and so is our policy, our line of conduct in this matter. I am therefore perplexed by the remarks of some representatives that the position of the Soviet Union on this question is not

altogether clear. I have just stated our position on this important question.

44. I should further like to draw attention to the fact that as early as 1948, when we had just begun to discuss the problem of reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons, the Soviet Union stressed the need to establish an international control organ at the very beginning of the implementation of measures for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. We pressed this point from the first, since 1948. Turn to the documents, look at the records, and you will see that we held this position even then on the understanding, of course, that all those measures—that is to say, the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons—would be carried out simultaneously from the very first.

45. It will be remembered, however, that a counter-proposal was submitted and was defended during the next few years, according to which an international control organ had to be established first—not, however, at the very beginning of reduction measures, but before the reduction of conventional armaments was initiated. And only after that—yes, only after that, were we to try to reach agreement on prohibition of atomic weapons. We were not to “prohibit” atomic weapons, but only to “try to reach agreement” on their prohibition. That was tantamount to saying: first let us establish the control organ and let it begin to function, and then we shall start trying to reach agreement on the prohibition of atomic weapons. But suppose we do not reach agreement? Or suppose it takes us three years, or ten years, to do so? After all, for almost nine years we have been attempting to reach agreement on this very question, ever since 1946, and to no avail. Consequently, it was impossible to accept a proposal which would have us first establish the control organ and then try to agree on whether or not to prohibit atomic weapons.

46. I shall later take the liberty of recalling certain facts which will show that there was a very great danger in such a proposal, inasmuch as there are certain circles which have no desire whatever to prohibit atomic weapons, and since such a plan, if adopted, would provide a loophole for the avoidance, in the near future at least, of any agreement to prohibit atomic weapons. It must be agreed that a control organ cannot fulfil its functions of controlling the prohibition of atomic weapons unless there is such a prohibition.

47. Thus in 1948 there were two points of view. We said: Let us do both, that is, prohibit atomic weapons and establish control simultaneously. The others replied: No, let us have control first, and then we shall come to an agreement. Please take note of that suggestion. It can be verified by reference to the documents. There was to be no prohibition as yet; we were merely to try to come to an agreement on the subject. What did that imply? It implied a threat that the question might be postponed, as the Romans said, *ad kalendas Graecas* — meaning “forever,” as the Greeks had no Kalends.

48. That was the position at that time and it should not be forgotten. It is, of course, an easy matter to charge the other side with taking a position which makes agreement impossible. But let us take a look at that position. I ask them if they still hold to that same position now. There have recently been intimations that they do; it is said, “let us first institute the control organ and then establish prohibition”. At any rate, now they no longer say, “and then we shall come to an agreement on prohibition”.

In 1948, they did not even say this; the words they used were even less acceptable. I wanted to point out that in speaking now of simultaneity our position was that of bringing our points of view closer together.

49. I should add that that formulation of the question—to start by instituting the international control organ and only then to begin trying to come to an agreement on the prohibition of atomic weapons—was, essentially, the line taken in the so-called Baruch Plan. We considered that the wrong line to take, and we still do.

50. We consistently objected to the Baruch-Acheson-Lilienthal plan. I venture to remark that this plan must now be regarded as completely discredited. No one who formerly supported this plan, no one who attached any real significance to it as a means of ensuring international control over the prohibition of atomic weapons and of the use of atomic energy for war purposes, does so today. Of that I am sure. Hence, I shall not discuss the substance of the plan, as I think it would be inappropriate to do so. If it becomes necessary we shall be very glad to discuss it and then, perhaps, we shall succeed in clarifying all those points which at present are not altogether clear.

51. At any rate, that in essence was the whole substance of this Baruch-Acheson-Lilienthal plan, a plan which in effect denied any possibility of effective control over the production and use of atomic energy by the plants and forces of sovereign States. For what, then, did the plan call? It called for the establishment of a supranational control organ which would own all atomic resources and would therefore be in a position to impose its decisions on sovereign States to the point of intervening in their domestic affairs, intruding even upon economic questions and dictating precise instructions as to the organization of their economies. That is how far the plan went. I could quote many examples to prove it, but I do not think it is necessary at this point because the Baruch Plan is now dead. Even the *London Times* and other newspapers acknowledged that two or three years ago.

52. Such a plan would undoubtedly entail serious difficulties and would not ensure compliance with the agreement on the prohibition of atomic weapons. In the opinion of authoritative atomic scientists, that plan is designed to satisfy strategic requirements and strategic interests, and not to further the development of power resources in countries in sore need of such development.

53. Some atomic scientists, British and American scientists among them—I could quote names which carry the highest authority—have quite rightly pointed out that such a plan could turn a social welfare programme into an international crime and that any violation, actual or presumptive, might, by a majority decision of the control organ, be used to precipitate a new world war.

54. The question of defining aggression, of defining the possibility of using atomic weapons for defence, also has a bearing on this matter. This is a very important question. I do not wish to deal with it now because it will probably be the subject of discussion in the Sub-Committee; but in connexion with the remark I just referred to from a book by a prominent scientist, a specialist in atomic weapons, to the effect that any violation, actual or presumptive, might, by a majority decision of the control organ, be used to precipitate a world war, I cannot forbear to point out that some time ago the well-known Mr. Bullitt went so far as to declare that the Soviet Government's decision to increase the production

of steel in the Soviet Union to 60 million tons a year was a proof of Soviet aggression.

55. However, such an approach to the problems of defence against aggression obviously affords an excellent opportunity first to prohibit a country from producing the amount of steel it is able to produce and considers necessary, then to regard refusal to recognize any such prohibition as proof of aggression, and then to initiate against the aggressor the measures desired by those Powers which are not anxious to see the peaceful production of other countries develop at that level.

56. I would ask that the significance of Mr. Bullitt's observation be carefully weighed. It well shows in what a hopeless maze we shall find ourselves, altogether at variance with the interests of using atomic energy for peaceful purposes, developing national industry on that basis, and affording countries the opportunity to direct the development of their economies in accordance with their interests, which no one has the right to ignore. There can be no justification for ignoring those interests because if they are national interests they are valid interests. If they are the interests of national economic development, they can only be regarded as valid interests, which correspond to the aspirations and needs of the nation, people or State concerned.

57. The proposed plan is based, if only to a certain extent, on the now defunct Baruch Plan; but, you know, the French proverb "*le mort saisit le vif*"—"The dead clutch the living"—is very often true. Although dead, this plan "clutches the living" by dragging them down into the darkness again to run head-on into interests which have nothing to do with the safeguarding of peace and international security.

58. It is from this standpoint that we approach the so-called "working paper" submitted by the United States on 25 May 1954 [DC/53, annex 4]. That is why we raised objections during the negotiations on the question of our co-sponsoring the Canadian draft resolution [A/C.1/752], which, it is apposite to note, had already become a four-Power draft resolution [A/C.1/752/Rev.1] by the time the negotiations with us were begun, since the United States, the United Kingdom and France had already co-sponsored it before the negotiations with the Soviet Union had achieved any result. I do not object in the least to such a step; on the contrary, I welcome it; but I must point out that we did object to recommending the examination in the Sub-Committee of the proposals in the working paper on the grounds I have just indicated. This working paper follows the line which the Baruch-Acheson-Lilienthal plan failed to establish, and at many points resurrects the principles embodied in that plan. For objectivity's sake, however, we must acknowledge that it renounces many other principles, such as the international control organ's right of ownership over atomic materials and over, not only all undertakings engaged in the production of atomic energy, but all those associated with them: which is to say, in the last analysis, the subjection of the whole economy to the international control organ, which would also dictate economic development plans and order the adoption of this or that measure—and would in fact become a super-State over all other States.

59. We objected to special emphasis being placed on the need to take this plan into account. We consider it ill-adapted to any of the fundamental purposes of our proposal and of the Franco-British proposal. It is, of course, a fairly easy matter to demonstrate that the fundamental principles of the Franco-British proposals are different

from those underlying the working paper of 25 May. Different fundamental principles are involved here, and we can not adopt both sets. That is why we raised our objections.

60. I must point out that the Soviet Union still considers that the achievement of agreement on the unconditional renunciation by States of the use of atomic weapons, as a major step towards the complete prohibition of such weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States, would be of the greatest significance in facilitating and expediting the implementation of all the measures provided for in the convention proposed by the Soviet Union in its resolution of 30 September 1954.

61. But I emphasize once again that, although this is particularly necessary now—the more so since atomic and hydrogen weapons are becoming ever more destructive—we nevertheless do not make the implementation of the programme we have proposed contingent on the achievement of agreement on the question of an unconditional renunciation by States of the use of atomic weapons.

62. The importance of this fact in determining the Soviet Government's policy on the question of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, and on the question of seeking agreement among all the States concerned, must not be underestimated.

63. Reverting to the question of when the standing international control organ should be brought into operation, I should like to ask the representatives of the Western Powers whether they agree that the introduction of the measures for the reduction of conventional armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction should coincide in time with the entry into operation of the standing international control organ. If the Western Powers agree that it should, that will eliminate the obstacles to having the standing international control organ come into operation at the very inception of the plan for reduction and prohibition.

64. I am very diffident about putting questions to my colleagues, but feel that this question is fully justified once there is a suggestion that there is no need for two stages and that it would be better to carry out the whole operation in one. I should be glad if representatives would, in their replies, clarify the question I have just asked.

65. I must point out in this connexion that the Soviet Union is in favour of agreement being reached on the functions and powers of the control organ, as part of a single international convention—I repeat, a single international convention—before the initiation of the programme for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons by the signature of that single international convention.

66. Attempts have been made in the course of the debate to represent the Soviet Union's proposals as providing for the implementation of measures to reduce armaments and prohibit atomic weapons before agreement is reached on the functions and powers of the standing international control organ.

67. Precisely that construction could have been put on the statement by Mr. Lloyd, the United Kingdom representative, on 15 October when in putting his questions to me he asked [690th meeting, para. 62]: Does the Soviet Union Government "accept that there must be agreement as to the nature, function and powers of the control organ before countries begin to carry out the agreed disarmament programme?"

68. A similar observation was made by the United States representative on 19 October when he said [693rd meeting, para. 34]: "The . . . fundamental difference between the Soviet position and that of the other States . . . relates to the timing and phasing of the most important elements of the disarmament programme."

69. On the other hand, the Canadian representative has construed our proposals for control during the first stage as—to use his own words [688th meeting, para. 29]—a process of checking up on the correctness of information submitted by governments rather than of active investigation. That comment obviously stems from doubt as to the possibility of exercising really effective control without carrying out the measures envisaged in plans such as those set out in the so-called working paper of 25 May 1954. I must repeat what I have already said, namely that all such questions should of course be covered by the international convention.

70. When Mr. Lloyd was asking questions, he also inquired [690th meeting, para. 62] whether we agreed "that the officials of the control organ should be in position and ready and able to function in the countries concerned before . . . those countries begin to carry out the disarmament programme". I have already said enough on that subject. I shall now address myself solely to Mr. Lloyd's remark to the effect that he received no answer to this question either before or during the Sub-Committee's discussions in London or during the present debate. That is untrue. Mr. Lloyd did receive an answer. But that did not prevent him from asking the same question again. I myself gave an answer, pointing out that the question naturally depended on the agreements which would be embodied in the international convention. Our position on the substance of the matter is also completely clear, since we have reverted to it on more than one occasion.

71. I greatly regret that I have to make this statement in Mr. Lloyd's absence, but I am sure Sir Pierson Dixon will keep him informed and send him the verbatim record of this meeting, which he can obtain from the Secretariat; if however, there are any difficulties, I can let him have the text of this statement I am making today, so that Mr. Lloyd will be kept fully in the picture. I must, however, go into the matter, because it concerns the position of the United Kingdom delegation, which is present today and is continuing to function despite Mr. Lloyd's departure.

72. Mr. Lloyd said that the control provisions referred to in his questions were fundamental to any satisfactory disarmament plan, that their acceptance represented an important gesture of good will and of a readiness to receive officials of the control authority before the agreed programme came into operation.

73. When an international agreement provides for the need for officials of the control organ to be present in various territories and when we have signed that agreement, the question will, of course, be solved *ipso facto*. But there is no mention at all of this matter in the draft resolution.

74. The provisions in the Soviet Union resolution regarding the timing of the establishment of control organs at each of the stages envisaged in the resolution, in our opinion, fully ensure the exercise of the necessary supervision at each stage. And this in itself should be enough to persuade everyone—that is, everyone capable of listening to answers attentively and objectively—of the good

intentions of the countries signing such an international convention.

75. In considering the Soviet Union's proposals for the organization of international control, it is necessary to take into account the proposals it has submitted on various previous occasions when this question was under discussion. I have already stressed this point, and it was apparently what Mr. Belaúnde had in mind in referring today to the Soviet Union's draft proposals of 1947 regarding the rights and powers of a permanent international authority. Some of those who have criticized our proposals do not, it seems, think it necessary to refresh their memories on this and on certain other documents relating to this question before coming to conclusions which prove to be completely incorrect on reference to these documents. This may be due either to circumstances which are a matter of conjecture, or to a circumstance which is not a matter of conjecture, namely their tendentious attitude towards these documents. The tendentious attitude shown, in particular, by the Lebanese representative, Mr. Charles Malik, I will not dwell on at the present time. I shall refer to it at the end of my speech because it is not a relevant question, being only indirectly related to the business in hand.

76. An examination of the proposals I have just mentioned will show that they contain all the points that have been advocated here and in defence of which various representatives have, so to speak, crossed swords in apparent conflict with ourselves. But there is no ground for conflict here; the powers proposed are very extensive.

77. On the other hand, in commenting on our position regarding the question of the system of control, the functions of the control organ, and so on, with particular reference to atomic energy, some representatives have maintained that the working paper of 25 May 1954 is an exhaustive and useful document, and that the provisions outlined in it represent the substance of the Franco-British proposals. They added, that, with reference to the organization of international control, the most important thing was that it should be established before any "agreed steps", as they called them, were actually taken, and that the control organ should decide when the next step in the process of implementing the international convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons could be taken. But these two questions, while of course important, are, in our opinion, far from constituting the substance of the Franco-British proposals, which can serve as the basis for agreement on an international convention.

78. According to Sir Percy Spender, for example, the chief merit of this working paper of 25 May 1954 lies in what he called the "concept of automatism", borrowing, if I am not mistaken, the phrase used by Mr. Moch. But it seems to me to be incorrect to apply such a term to this document. I think it is wrong to contrast this "concept of automatism" with the concept of simultaneous action which—and this is unquestionably the case—is embodied in the Soviet Union draft resolution. I think it is wrong primarily because careful study of the question as treated in the working paper of 25 May reveals no mention of automatic action, nor does it appear in the joint Franco-British proposals of 11 June, since it is specifically stated in these proposals that the measures envisaged will not be put into effect until the control organ reports that it is able effectively to enforce them. What sort of "automatism" is this? Can there be any question of automatic action when the transition to

the next stage is contingent upon a report by the control organ? Surely this cannot be described as an automatic transition? Only a move which would not hinge on any report or decision could be described as automatic. When the time limit was reached, the second stage would begin and the first be completed. But if there first has to be a decision by the international control organ, can there be any question of "automatism"? There can be no question of any automatic action here. Just the opposite; one of the most serious defects of the document lies precisely in the fact that it makes the measures for reducing armaments and prohibiting atomic weapons directly dependent on the findings of the control organ.

79. A question of course arises in this connexion. I am not asking it in order to obtain an answer; I do not think this question requires an answer. I merely wish to emphasize the relevant point that, if you make the decision governing transition to the next stage, involving the prohibition of atomic weapons, dependent on the decision of the international control organ—in which, as you yourselves have emphasized, the minority will not enjoy the right of veto, and the Soviet Union will, of course, always belong to the minority—what guarantee is there that the transition to the next stage will ever take place if certain circles in some countries decide that the time was not ripe or that no time was ripe for the transition?

80. This is the Baruch Plan all over again. There is a saying in Russian that runs: "It is the same cabbage soup, but thinner". It is the same cabbage soup, which is not sustaining and is even less so when diluted.

81. To revert to the question of the inacceptability of the working paper, I must point out that it contains a number of provisions totally unrelated to control; however, it purports to provide for a system which would be effective, not dependent on any other organ, and which would ensure what has been described today in this Committee as "complete autonomy of the control organ".

82. There should undoubtedly be complete autonomy, but in what respect should this autonomy be complete? It is supervision which should be completely autonomous. But supervision is one thing and the solution of political problems another. The control organ should be autonomous where its operations of supervision and verification are concerned, but not where decisions on questions and problems with political, as well as technical, aspects are concerned. This is an important matter of principle, to which we will of course have to give serious consideration.

83. The working paper ignores this distinction. I would remind you that the working paper seeks to give the control organ punitive functions, although this is disguised by the use of the words "action to remedy violations". But corrective or remedial measures may also be punitive ones; and if you turn to paragraph 41 of the working paper, and in particular to the two points I have already mentioned, you will see that these remedial measures are nothing but straightforward, ordinary sanctions, punishment, enforcement measures. Incidentally, Mr. Lloyd said he agreed that the control organ could take such action. There we disagree on a point of principle. The control organ could not and should not take any enforcement measures, since if it did, it would no longer be a control organ but a political organ, and there is no doubt that any action concerned with verification, the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments in general is directly and incontrovertibly bound up with political issues.

84. Those who view the question in that way put a completely false construction on the relations which should exist between the permanent control organ and the Security Council. In our opinion, the United Nations Charter leaves no room whatsoever for doubt about the right to apply sanctions—and enforcement measures are in fact sanctions, and sanctions are enforcement measures. Would sanctions be sanctions if their execution could not be enforced? And of course the most important problems are those which will arise if there is disagreement with the instructions issued by the control organ and an attempt is made at enforcement, which, under the Charter is the exclusive prerogative of the Security Council. The United Nations Charter leaves no room for doubt on this point. It is clear that the right to apply sanctions is vested exclusively in the Security Council, and that no other organ may be given such rights without a flagrant violation of the Charter.

85. I must point out that to give the control organ the right to take punitive action, even if, as I have already said, it is described as remedial action, would conflict with the provision in that same United States working paper of 25 May, which lays down that the control authority, in the event of its finding any violation of the treaty and of failure by the State concerned to comply with its recommendations, shall report the facts to the Security Council to permit appropriate action in accordance with the convention establishing the control organ. How then can the right to take enforcement measures be reconciled with this provision? The right to take such action—whatever you like to call it, remedial action or what you will—means the right simultaneously to ask a man to "do you the honour of coming with you" and to drag him out of his house by the scruff of his neck. They describe this as an "honour". A fine "honour" when it actually means "getting it in the neck".

86. Fine corrective measures indeed, to close down factories and cut off supplies of raw materials! Those are more than corrective measures. That is not at all what Mr. Lloyd was saying here, when he quoted what Mr. Baruch said. I have already quoted Mr. Baruch's words: one flick of the wrist could divert a plant producing atomic energy for peaceful purposes to the production of atomic weapons. Mr. Lloyd asked whether it would not be possible to say: "Move back that gauge". But that is an entirely different matter—that is in fact a corrective measure. And where will you find such measures indicated? You will find them in our 1947 proposals. In what form? Our proposals provided for rules of technological control which would be binding and which would be prescribed or ordered by the control authorities. I said quite plainly: the control organ will "give orders". To whom? To the factory or plant. It would be the rules of technological control which would forbid the gauge being moved to the left for the production of atomic energy for warlike purposes; which would compels it being moved to the right for the production of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. That is quite a different matter. That is what is meant by corrective measures. But to close down the factory, after all, might mean closing down the whole of industry: one factory, a second factory, then a tenth or a twentieth factory. In those circumstances: how can we willingly embark on such a course? After all is the control organ a holy of holies? Is it to be some sort of supreme moral force which can do what it likes without the possibility of appeal?

87. Surely the working paper of 25 May proposes no provisions of that sort; what it says is that if after invest-

tigation a government is found to have committed a violation, the control organ will make recommendations to that government; and if the latter is unwilling to comply, the control organ will report to the Security Council so that the Security Council may take appropriate action, as the working paper says, to ensure compliance with the provisions of the international agreement; that is, in the case in point, to ensure the implementation and fulfilment of the rules of technological control laid down for the production of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

88. What is more, as I also said, you cannot say one thing in one place and another in another place, and cover up the discrepancy by saying that there is no question in the working paper of enforcement measures, because the words used in paragraph 41 are "short of the imposition of sanctions as provided in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter". But neither, I venture to point out, does Article 39 in Chapter VII speak of "enforcement" measures or "punitive" measures; what it says is that the Security Council will take measures to put an end to any situation liable to constitute a threat to the peace, and so forth.

89. But suppose some State which has signed the international convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons nevertheless secretly produces atomic energy for warlike purposes or secretly produces armaments, will that not endanger international security? Will that not create a threat to the peace? Will that not justify the presumption that preparations are being made for aggressive action; and if a complaint to that effect is brought before it, will the Security Council be able to evade consideration of the question on the pretext that the measures involved are not the same, but something different? Article 39 mentions no corrective measure of any sort; and paragraph 41 of the working paper uses the words: "short of . . . sanctions". But surely the phrase "short of sanctions" must be construed as covering "corrective measures" since in any case Article 39 indicates—and no other interpretation is possible—that it is unthinkable that such measures should be put into effect by some special procedure, or that any member should waive his rights when such measures are being considered in the Security Council.

90. Mr. Belaúnde said today that we should avoid arbitrariness. I welcomed his statement. Of course we must avoid arbitrariness; but on what grounds can Mr. Belaúnde describe the Charter, its Articles, and the provisions of those Articles as arbitrary? They are the law; not arbitrariness, but the law. You say that any arbitrary position on the part of a single country, in defiance of the views of other countries, must be avoided. But, I venture to ask, are we obliged to accept an arbitrary position on the part of the other countries towards that single country? For example, to use his own phraseology, is it not arbitrary action on the part of a number of countries to conclude among themselves some special agreement—and I could name quite a few such agreements—directed against the interests of some other country?

91. I submit that there can be absolutely nothing arbitrary about the principle of unanimity. That principle is the law; it is laid down in the Charter; and consequently, to apply it is to exercise a legal right. I have never yet heard of a lawyer who would regard the exercise of a legal right as arbitrary; that is a completely novel legal concept and one which, I am sure, is foreign to Latin-American legal science; for a legal right is a right which is based on the law. How can it be arbitrary for me to exercise my legal rights? I cannot subscribe to juridical arguments of that sort.

92. Thus, the suggestions that have been made here that members should waive the application of the principle of unanimity in the Security Council, that they should voluntarily renounce that principle in deciding questions connected with the imposition of sanctions on States in certain circumstances, are completely incomprehensible. That simply will not do. Such a demand is absolutely unjustifiable.

93. You are all perfectly familiar with the history of the question of the principle of unanimity; you know that it was the subject of protracted controversy. You will also be aware, I am sure, that the unanimity principle was first sponsored, as far back as 1944, by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, President of the United States at that time, in a letter which is, of course, public knowledge. The Soviet Union signified its agreement. The outcome was that rule of unanimity which Mr. Stettinius, the then Secretary of State, excellently described as one of the rules that ensure the unity of the five great Powers, without whose agreement there can be no peace. That is absolutely true. There might be relationships of various degrees, but certainly not peace.

94. Equally true is the fact, pointed out by a number of representatives, including Mr. Lloyd, that it would be completely out of order for an international agreement to bar the application of the unanimity principle in the Security Council in respect of certain questions. That, as Mr. Lloyd rightly said, would be inconsistent with the Charter.

95. However, I cannot possibly agree to certain proposals which have been made in the discussion, proposals which in essence boil down to the idea that the Security Council—in conformity with Article 29 of the Charter, according to Mr. Munro, the representative of New Zealand—should delegate to such subsidiary organs as it may establish, the power of taking decisions on various matters which properly fall within the jurisdiction of the Security Council.

96. What does this mean? How can such an idea be suggested or supported? Article 29 of the Charter says:

"The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions."

That is to say, it may establish such an organ to carry out, in a subsidiary capacity, functions which belong to the Security Council. That, after all, is what is meant by a subsidiary organ.

97. Thus, if any matter needs investigating, the Security Council may establish an investigating committee; if the need arises for supervision, it may establish a control commission for supervisory purposes; if a document needs to be drafted, it may set up a committee or subsidiary organ to draft the document, taking as much as six months about it if necessary. That, Mr. Munro, is what is meant by a subsidiary organ. But when the Charter says: "such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions", it is referring to functions within the limits of the Council's powers; for obviously the Security Council may not concern itself with functions which are not within its competence. That would be wrong. Clearly, the Security Council cannot take action in fields which are the province of, say, the Economic and Social Council, or the Trusteeship Council, or the General Assembly—although the functions of the last-named body approximate more closely its own. That would be beyond all comprehension.

98. How can the establishment of a subsidiary organ possibly be interpreted in the way the representative of New Zealand interprets it, that is, in the sense that the Security Council has the power to establish an organ that will take decisions which only the Security Council itself has the duty and the power to take? This amounts to suggesting that where a particular proposal fails to pass because unanimity has not been achieved, the matter should be referred to another body, which will adopt whatever decision is desired.

99. That, incidentally, is the policy which was followed (I address my remarks to those who voted for the proposal at the time) in the establishment of the so-called "Little Assembly", the Interim Committee. Then, also, it was intended to give the Interim Committee the power to by-pass the Security Council in order to take decisions on matters which, on account of some obstacle, could not be settled in the Security Council; that was why the "Little Assembly" was set up. But what came of the "Little Assembly"? What happened to the Interim Committee?

100. Clearly, attempts to by-pass the Security Council can take the most varied forms; it might even be possible to find jurists to dispute for some prize in this matter. But that is not a proper subject for the First Committee. In my view, Article 29 of the Charter cannot warrant the establishment of any subsidiary organ empowered to discharge the functions of the Security Council in connexion with the settlement of problems. That would be a flagrant violation of the Charter; it would be a repetition of the attempt which was made in the United Nations some years ago in establishing the Interim Committee. That attempt produced absolutely no results. The Interim Committee has fallen into oblivion; and a good thing too.

101. Thus, to give the control organ the right to apply certain enforcement measures would be to invest it with the power to adopt decisions in fact involving the application of sanctions, whatever word may have been used to describe them. And that would be a perversion of the mutual relation which should exist between the permanent control organ and the Security Council.

102. I mentioned in my last statement—and would hardly think it necessary to mention the matter again were I not dealing with this whole complex of questions at this moment—the fact that Mr. V. M. Molotov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, defined the proper relations between the control organ and the Security Council quite clearly as far back as 1946. It has been said here that decisions in the control organ can be taken only by a majority. That is quite true, and must be regarded as an agreed point. In the control organ all decisions are to be taken by a majority.

103. But in the Security Council? All decisions on matters before the Security Council—assuming that they are not matters relating to the technical operations of the control commission, which are of no political significance—are taken by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the five permanent members of the Security Council. That is the law, and no one should evade or break it, certainly not the First Committee.

104. The working paper to which I refer, that is to say the document of 25 May, is unacceptable because the measures proposed in it do not and cannot guarantee international control. On the contrary, if that document is accepted, it will be a source of very serious friction

and conflict—friction and conflict which may be quite easily avoided if we refuse to authorize the control organ to arrogate to itself more power than it should rightly possess.

105. Without going too far into this point at the moment, I should like to remind the Committee that we demonstrated quite conclusively several years back that such proposals (I have in mind the Baruch Plan, which, as I have said, is the source of these proposals) have in no way been designed to establish a genuine system of international control of atomic energy, and that their real purpose has been to enable the United States (I am referring now to American documents) to secure world control of atomic resources and subject the economies of other countries to its control.

106. That is all down in black and white in the Baruch Plan. And the same policy is expressed in black and white in the United States working paper of 25 May. It makes that document unacceptable; and it would of course be useless to try to force it on us. The paper contains a number of useful provisions, which could be extracted from it; for example, there are the provisions I referred to just now which lay down a definite procedure to be followed by the control commission in the event of the discovery of a violation, up to and including the action of complaint to the Security Council. That might be acceptable. However, paragraph 41, and a number of other paragraphs of the same kind, cannot be accepted. These paragraphs again refer to verification, aerial surveys, and so on. But what can an aerial survey do to check on the direction in which the lever controlling the machinery of atomic energy production has been turned? Nothing, of course. But paragraph 37 specifically includes aerial surveys. That, of course, is quite out of the question; no country can be allowed freely to carry out surveys of any kind over another country's territory without the consent of the government concerned. What would Mr. Wadsworth say if I proposed that our aircraft should be allowed to fly over the entire area of the United States to carry out an "aerial survey"? In the words of the fable: "I can imagine what a shout you would have raised, my friends, if it had been I who had said that."

107. An international control organ organized along the lines suggested in the working paper would of course readily lend itself to such designs. At the same time it would be a serious obstacle to the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes in other countries especially, as I have said, in countries which need to expand their resources.

108. In reply to this plan, the USSR put forward its own proposals. I have already remarked that much water has of course passed under the bridge since 1947 as Mr. Belaúnde said; but our approach to this question, which was outlined in our document of 11 June 1947 [*AEC. 31/Rev.1, annex 3*] still remains unchanged; although it may of course have been modified in a number of respects, and much ground may have been yielded in one direction or another according to the many new circumstances that have arisen.

109. Reference has been made here to the principle of simultaneity. Our draft provides for application of the principle of simultaneity throughout—and this is emphasized—from the execution of the measures assigned to the first stage to the execution of the measures assigned to the second stage.

110. I should like to make one or two explanatory observations to clarify my previous remarks. First of all,

should like—and I must ask you to excuse me for having spoken too long already today—to recall the history of this question in very general terms.

111. Let me remind the Committee that in 1946, at the first meeting of Sub-Committee 1 of the Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. Evatt, at that time Minister of Foreign Affairs of Australia, submitted a document entitled "Tentative proposals by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission".

112. If you refer to this document, you will see that it raises the important question of a recommendation for the establishment of an international atomic energy authority, and suggests a number of principles to be followed with that end in view. Here is the passage in that document which I should like to read out here today, because it may be of particular interest to us. It reads as follows:¹

"Accordingly, in order to explore the possibility of making recommendations covering all the main aspects of the problem as discussed in the Commission, the following general principles should be examined: 1. There should be a single international instrument providing for (a) a comprehensive plan for the international control and development of atomic energy; (b) the establishment of an international atomic energy authority to administer and carry out the plan and to be vested with wide discretionary powers; (c) that, as part of the plan, undertakings by member nations not to use atomic energy for purposes of war; and (d) that the several parts of the plan to come into effective operation under terms and conditions which are just and equitable, having regard to its overriding purposes."

113. This document is of great significance, because it calls for the preparation and execution of a single international instrument covering all these matters. Though the two things are not the same, this very largely anticipates the position of those who have advocated the principle of simultaneous operations. At that time the document was supported by the majority of the Sub-Committee; thus a majority of the members of the Sub-Committee expressed themselves in favour of a single international instrument providing for international control, with a simultaneous undertaking by States not to use atomic energy for purposes of war; that is to say, a prohibition of atomic weapons.

114. That, therefore, was the position taken by the Australian delegation in 1946. It is regrettable that at this session the Australian representative has completely evaded the question. It is a question of great importance. The idea put forward in the document I have referred to was that the establishment of the control organ should take place simultaneously with the prohibition of atomic weapons; otherwise there would have been no point in using the expression "a single international instrument", as Mr. Evatt did at the time—and Mr. Evatt was not alone, for he had the support of the whole Sub-Committee since the proposal received unanimous approval.

115. As you know, the USSR at that time advocated the view that two conventions should be signed. When I used the word "unanimous", of course, I did not mean to include the USSR in the majority which supported Mr. Evatt's plan in the Sub-Committee. At that time we advocated the policy of signing two conventions—one for

the prohibition of atomic weapons, and the other for the establishment of control.

116. In 1948, at the third session of the General Assembly, the Soviet Union, in order to secure agreement on the highly important problem of the prohibition of atomic weapons, submitted a draft resolution [A/658] that the convention for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the convention for the establishment of effective international control over atomic energy should be signed and brought into force simultaneously. That was an entirely useful and proper proposal, since the simultaneous signature and entry into force of the two conventions would have guaranteed both the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of the international control organ in the manner and on the dates specified in the conventions.

117. Thus, our position was that the two conventions must come into effect simultaneously, because if the prohibition of atomic weapons was to be effective, the international control organ must be established and in operation. Here again, the principle of simultaneity was fully justified, and did not operate to produce what has been described here as "unilateral disarmament"; for it was asserted that it would be unilateral disarmament to prohibit atomic weapons—that this would disarm the side which is powerful in atomic weapons and thereby strengthen the side which is powerful even without atomic weapons.

118. This theory—in which Mr. Belaúnde and a number of others have had a hand, I believe—will not hold water. There is absolutely no monopoly of atomic weapons at the present time; there is no monopoly of hydrogen weapons. Atomic weapons are equally powerful whoever possesses them; and if a country can be destroyed by these weapons, it can also destroy another country with them. In this respect there exists, as it were, full equality of rights. Consequently, the prohibition of atomic or hydrogen bombs will give no country any advantage over another; for in any event there still remain many other means of warfare which have not lost their effectiveness.

119. Moreover, we all know that there is another task to be carried out: the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces to the minimum level necessary for security against external attack, the level necessary for defence. If this question is approached objectively, calmly and sincerely, I see no possibility of dispute. In my opinion, there are no grounds for dispute. It is of course possible to invent a quarrel. Artificial pessimism, whether sound or unsound, can always find something to which to attach itself. All pessimism is in our opinion a disease; it always amounts to expecting the worst. Such was our proposal. Unfortunately, it was not accepted.

120. The next attempt to achieve agreement on the question was also a Soviet Union proposal, the proposal dated 12 January 1952 [A/C.1/698] concerning the simultaneous prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control.

121. What was the purpose of our proposal? We proposed that the General Assembly should instruct the Disarmament Commission to prepare and submit to the Security Council, for its consideration, a draft convention providing measures to ensure the implementation of the General Assembly decision on the prohibition of atomic weapons, the cessation of their production, the use of already-manufactured atomic bombs exclusively for peaceful purposes and the establishment of strict international control over the observance of the above-mentioned convention.

¹ *Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Special Supplement, Report to the Security Council, 1946, pp. 91-92.*

122. This proposal comes very close to the position we have just reached. But we reached our present position, as I have already shown, by an effort at *rapprochement* on both sides on a whole series of matters. And that, of course, is a matter for satisfaction. The proposal which we submitted in 1952 undoubtedly opened the way to agreement on the very important question which we are discussing today.

123. Hence, as I have already pointed out, the question of simultaneity is not so unexpected; it is not a new question, nor is it absolutely insoluble. In my opinion it is fruitless, particularly at this juncture when so many other important questions are still pending, to start quarrelling about the meaning of "simultaneity" or to try to think up alternative terms, such as "synchronization" and others, in view of the fact that the international convention will have to include provisions concerning all the technical questions and details to be covered by it.

124. It must, of course, be borne in mind that in the case of these or other actions of a legal nature or significance, simultaneity may not always mean exact concurrence in time. Chronologically speaking, that is, from the standpoint of units for the measurement of time, events may be simultaneous without necessarily taking place in the same second, hour, day, or even month. We cover that point by saying that during a certain period, six months or a year or whatever the unit of measurement adopted, such and such measures will be taken. We therefore feel that our proposal, whereby simultaneity would be understood in the sense of occurrence within the limits of agreed periods of time, is justified; if, on the contrary, one measure is contingent upon another, this would establish a principle of "interdependence" whereby one question may be settled, while action on another is postponed indefinitely. This is how some put the question.

125. If the question is put in the way some others propose, the first step would be to set up the control organ. In other words, we would be returning to the old formula: control first and everything else later. That would mean reaching a compromise by the efforts of one side only. We made this effort. We said: first prohibition and then control, whereas you said: first control and then prohibition. The compromise formula—control and prohibition simultaneously—has not hitherto given rise to lengthy discussion or attracted particular attention, because we were very far from being able to see beyond the wood or feel any sense of optimism. Now the question of simultaneity has been taken up but, in my opinion, it is primarily a technical question rather than one of principle, since we shall have to reach agreement on the organic relationship between one measure and another within the framework of the technical arrangements essential to the execution of both measures. That is quite different from taking first this line and the rest later. It is quite different from the principle of the Baruch Plan, which is unacceptable. Obviously nothing can be achieved by continuing our work on that basis, because it would create a situation of inequality and would not eliminate the danger; while agreement might be reached on control, no agreement would be reached on the question of the prohibition of atomic weapons. Although the agreement might be carried out at the start, all sorts of legal disputes would later be raised, which could be prolonged for years. The fact that legal disputes can be dragged out is well known, particularly to lawyers, who are undoubtedly very skilful in that respect.

126. At this point, I should like to modify this comment from political rather than legal considerations. In my

opinion, the only lawyers worthy of the name are those who attach primary importance to the task of reaching political agreement. If they keep that aim in view, they will not split as many hairs as they often do, thereby completely justifying the rather unflattering descriptions often attached to them.

127. In this case, too, the academic approach is not always the best. A great German poet said:

*"Siebenundsiebzig Professoren:
Vaterland, du bist verloren."*

*("Seventy-seven professors:
The Fatherland is doomed.")*

In other words, if we are to begin by considering all sorts of theoretical matters instead of attempting to find a sound solution to practical political problems, the outcome will be disorder and chaos; complete confusion will result and the Fatherland will be doomed.

128. Today Mr. Charles Malik began by saying that he wanted to deal with certain theoretical questions, and I immediately thought of the lines I have just quoted. Our work will be doomed if we take that course; I shall try to prove that point at the end of my statement.

129. In this connexion, one cannot but agree with what Mr. Lloyd said in his statement on 15 October [690th meeting] about the prohibition of atomic weapons and the setting up of an international control organ, namely that "the Soviet Union attitude is now more in accordance with that of the Western Powers". That is a very important admission. If we have been able to draw closer together on this question despite all the unfavourable circumstances existing today, need we indulge in pessimism, however healthy?

130. We should not go to extremes of pessimism or of optimism. We must take a realistic, objective and practical view of the situation and of the task before us and conscientiously exert every effort to see that the position does not deteriorate but on the contrary becomes more favourable to the solution of certain problems, although principles, of course, cannot be sacrificed. Today, I at least have tried to show that we are in agreement on many principles and that our positions have become reconciled.

131. The question of control is very closely linked to the problem of organizing an effective system of international control. Obviously, certain essential conditions will have to be laid down, but we should not think that when those essential conditions for effective control have been laid down, we can do without mutual trust. In our opinion without trust, albeit of the most elementary kind, a trust which corresponds to the aims, desires, strivings and wishes of all peace-loving peoples, normal international relations cannot be established and *a fortiori* they cannot develop normally.

132. During the discussion here reference has been made to methods of reduction and particularly to the so-called "proportional" system of reduction advocated by the Soviet Union. With your permission I should like to add a few remarks to what has already been said on that subject.

133. I must remind the Committee that as early as 1948, the Soviet Union delegation pressed for the adoption of its plan for a substantial reduction of armaments and armed forces by the five permanent members of the Security Council; that plan provided for the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces by one-third

within a year. We persistently reintroduced that proposal at a number of other sessions, but to no avail.

134. The main significance of our proposal for a one-third reduction of armaments and armed forces by the five great Powers lies in its recognition of the need for a substantial reduction. The USSR delegation felt that agreement should be reached on this question at the outset. We believed that this question of a substantial reduction must be decided at the very beginning. In our view, such a substantial reduction can be achieved by a one-third reduction. But in any event we must try to reach agreement on this question in order not to mislead public opinion by empty words about disarmament and the reduction of armaments which would not be backed up by appropriate action.

135. In his last statement, Mr. Lloyd expressed the opinion that we could profitably discuss this question together at the present stage and that there was no reason why we should not now reach agreement on the scope of the disarmament convention and start negotiations on the extent of the reductions to be carried out in each category.

136. I do not want to imply that he shared our view of the matter. I merely point out that he said the time has come when we can discuss this matter in the hope of being able to reach agreement. He also recognized that a lot of work would have to be done on technical questions, and he expressed the conviction that progress could be made in that sphere also.

137. We agree with this and believe that there is no real reason why we should not reach an agreement on the matter, although naturally a great deal of serious and difficult work lies ahead of us. We feel, however, that the most important thing at the moment is to reach agreement on the main and basic issue, namely recognition of the need to bring about a substantial reduction of conventional armaments and of armed forces.

138. It is important that we should accept this principle and reach agreement upon it, for then on that basis we may be able to discuss my delegation's proposal—which will, we hope, succeed in arousing your interest—as well, of course, as other proposals, which no one, surely, will refuse to discuss. Indeed, our draft resolution says that the Sub-Committee should discuss other proposals too.

139. We agree that a great deal of work will have to be done, but it would be wrong, in our view, to fill our working time with debates about all kinds of small details and secondary matters instead of considering the fundamental question: that decisions must be taken to ensure a significant reduction of armaments. Our proposal for a reduction of armaments by one-third has this object in view. We believe that agreement should be reached in the first place on this important question which is of tremendous significance and a matter of vital principle to us all.

140. One of the main tasks in the work before us is to establish definite and agreed levels for the reduction of armaments. The Soviet Union, for its part, suggests as a first step in such reductions that all the great Powers should reduce their armaments by one-third and that the question of the reduction of the armaments of other States should be examined.

141. We are not in the slightest offended if we are told: "Yes, we know, this is your old proposal", for old proposals, as has rightly been said, may have fresh significance in new conditions, in a different set of circumstances. That, at any rate, is our view. This question

ought, we think, to be approached in another way, especially as no alternative to our proposal for a reduction of armaments by one-third has yet been put forward.

142. If any one thinks that this can be a proposal for establishing limits and levels of armaments or for the so-called balanced reduction of armaments, we must say at once that that would be a great mistake. Proposals for what have been called the regulation, substantial limitation and balanced reduction of armaments—truth to tell, the word "balanced" has dropped out since we raised objections to it, but I am still not convinced that it will not be brought up again—are unlikely, in our opinion, to offer a solution to the problem of bringing about a real reduction, let alone a substantial reduction of armaments.

143. These proposals cannot serve that purpose, for their premises are wrong, being founded on a certain political principle. Indeed, no such proposals can fail to be based on political principles, for we are concerned here primarily with political problems since this is, after all, the Political Committee. The principle I have in mind is the balance of power. Mention of that principle has been made here by those supporting the proposal for a balanced reduction of armaments, for the establishment of limits and levels for the number of armed forces maintained by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the USSR and China, and as in the discussions of the Sub-Committee, the figures proposed were 1 million; 1,500,000; 800,000, and so on. But this is no solution of the problem; it is no way of averting the threat of a new war, a danger which has loomed up precisely because no solution has yet been reached of the more important questions underlying it.

144. History can produce numerous examples to refute the argument that the principle of a balance of power and a system for the reduction of armaments based on that principle can ensure peace. On the contrary, many irrefutable historical facts go to show that this is a road leading straight to war. Not to go into too great detail, this is amply evident from two historical events: the so-called Peace Treaty of Versailles in 1919, and the Washington Conference and the resultant Treaty in 1922. Both these agreements were based on the principle of a balance of power and represented an endeavour to bring about such a balance. But they failed to remove the threat of war and opened the way to the Second World War, thus upsetting all the calculations and hopes of certain pacific-minded peoples who had put their faith in the principle known as the balance of power.

145. I cannot help reminding the Committee that the Washington Conference of 1921-22, which was convened on the initiative of the United States and without the participation of the Soviet Union, was formally called to deal with the question of the limitation of armaments and more specifically with the limitation of United States armaments, for that was the earnest aim of Japan at that time, since there were some conflicts between those two Powers. This Conference was convened also to settle certain questions concerning the Pacific and the Far East, and especially to deal with conflicts regarding armaments; indeed that was its main object. The situation in the Far East at that time was very strained.

146. The Washington Conference ended with the signing of a nine-Power Treaty which became the chief basis for the so-called "peace régime" in the Far East, just as the Treaty of Versailles and a whole series of other

treaties became the basis for a "peace régime" in Europe. The Washington Conference, however, did not remove the conflicts but merely tempered them for a while. They were intensified later and led to the Second World War.

147. Such are the historical facts. This treaty, far from diminishing the conflicts between the Anglo-American alliance on the one hand and Japan on the other, served to intensify them while it gave Japan certain important strategic guarantees in the event of a new war.

148. That was obviously a very serious mistake, for it might well be said that the nine Powers themselves put weapons into the hands of Japan, which, some two decades later, joined with Hitlerite Germany and Mussolini's Italy in tearing up all the treaties by which those countries were bound and starting a new world war.

149. The sponsors and organizers of that Conference were Mr. Hughes, Mr. Lodge (the grandfather of the Mr. Lodge we have with us today), and Mr. Underwood for the United States; Lord Balfour for England; and Mr. Briand and Mr. Viviani for France. All these distinguished diplomats and eminent political leaders assured their countries of the momentous importance of the nine-Power Treaty concluded at the end of the 1922 Washington Conference, which, it was stated, established the balance of power, that is, of armed power in the Far East and would serve to promote world peace. But it turned out otherwise. War broke out and, as Stalin rightly pointed out, that war disrupted the whole post-war system, the so-called "peace régime".

150. The 1925 Treaty of Locarno played a similar part in the subsequent course of events leading up to the Second World War. Long before it took place, the same kinds of limits and levels were laid down for armaments and armed forces; and battleships, cruisers and other craft were classified by category, number and class. Everything, it seemed, had been done to consolidate the balance of power. Yet nothing came of it, because the conflicts that led to war were stronger than all the artificial schemes designed to prevent it.

151. This, of course, does not mean that there is no way of preventing war. Certainly not; what it does mean is that the methods which have been used and which are based on the principle of the balance of power are incapable of preventing war, even as they had been incapable of preventing it in the past. Hence, we must look for other methods.

152. I should add that we find the same system—which bears no relation to the prevention of a new world war and the strengthening of peaceful co-operation among nations—incorporated in the proposal for the so-called "balanced" reduction submitted to us now. In fact, the proposed system does not even provide for reduction.

153. This is true not only of the agreements I mentioned earlier, but also of the recent nine-Power agreements of London and Paris. It is relevant to point out in this connexion that the measures drawn up in London and Paris with reference to Western Germany run directly counter to the proposals which the French and United Kingdom Governments submitted to the United Nations on 11 June 1954 and which the United States Government supports, that is to say, the proposals which are now on our agenda. It does not seem to me possible to propose a general reduction of armaments and at the same time to carry out the remilitarization of Western

Germany. These two actions I consider to be mutually exclusive and contradictory.

154. As is well known, it has recently proved possible to achieve some relaxation of international tension. In pursuing this objective, the Soviet Government has based itself on the premise that all peace-loving nations desire a further easing of international tension. Can it be said, however, that the London and Paris decisions for the remilitarization of Western Germany and the re-establishment of the German Wehrmacht, which already at this stage is to have 500,000 men and is to be under the command of Nazi generals bent on revenge, are compatible with the work which we are proposing to carry further and to which we have already devoted so much time? We believe that the London and Paris agreements are not only incompatible with this work, but that they add to, rather than relieve, international tension.

155. These are important facts. It is with them that we should concern ourselves rather than with various theoretical or ideological differences which could easily be set aside in our work. This should be clear to anyone who wants our work to bear some fruit. Appeals to renounce communism, such as those which Mr. Al-Jamali addressed to us at a recent meeting or the criticism of Marxism and Leninism with which Mr. Charles Malik amused, or rather entertained us, will bring us no further. If they consider this matter so important, we must, of course, discuss it. But is it really important? The proposals of 1949 cannot be reproduced and served up again in 1954 without regard to historical developments, in fact, to all the water which, as Mr. Belaúnde so aptly remarked here, has flowed under the bridge and which has borne many things away, far beyond recall. We cannot raise these matters at this late date.

156. What we should discuss are matters such as the Paris and London agreements to rearm Germany—which throughout its entire history has been a breeding ground of militarism and war, and which is now under the sway of militarist elements dreaming at this very moment of revenge of which Western Germany's immediate neighbours would be the victims. These, I say, are the matters we should discuss. We must take as our starting point the fact that such decisions are incompatible with the tasks with which, as we see it, the Committee is faced; they are not compatible with the position taken, as we understand it, by the authors of the Franco-British memorandum of 11 June 1954 and by the Soviet Union in its draft resolution of 30 September 1954. The possibility of reaching agreement is also reflected in the draft resolution submitted by the Canadian delegation, which also invites us—the great Powers, the Powers which are the permanent members of the Security Council—to associate ourselves with it. (Incidentally, I would prefer the commonly used word "Powers" to "great Powers". There are neither great nor small Powers here. We are all equal.) This is a significant fact. Now some newspapers and even some delegations consider it necessary to stress that this is just a procedural resolution and nothing more. This is a big mistake. As I said before, there is no procedural question which is not connected with politics. What we need is a procedure which would unite us in examining some questions and striving to find a solution. It is such problems as the prohibition of atomic weapons, international control and the reduction of armaments that we must seek to solve. All five of us were agreed on this. In spite of all the speeches by the opponents of this view, and of the articles that

they may publish in their official newspapers, the fact remains that this has been an important political act. And we are satisfied to take note of this act.

157. Speaking about the levels, which I take the liberty of criticizing—as I criticize the whole system—we believe that the proposals concerning levels as submitted in the course of our work can be interpreted to mean that, instead of being reduced, armaments—just think of it!—may actually be increased.

158. That is certainly the meaning of the so-called regulation and balanced reduction. This time in advocating the principles of levels the Western Powers did not explain what their specific proposals were. It is therefore legitimate to ask whether they still maintain their earlier position that levels should be established for the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and the USSR. It is likewise legitimate to ask how the reduction of armaments and armed forces can be reconciled with a so-called balancing which allows an increase of armaments and armed forces. What would be the practical consequences of such a measure?

159. It is also legitimate to ask how the proposal of the Western Powers concerning levels can be reconciled with the French and United Kingdom proposal of 11 June 1954—which, incidentally, refers not to levels, but to agreed reductions—the main point of which, with regard to conventional armaments, is to reach agreement on a “major” reduction in armaments. This question must be clarified.

160. We also think it necessary to point out that when the agreed reductions of armaments are carried out, a number of questions will inevitably arise, including the question of the concrete levels of armaments remaining after the reduction. We consider that these levels may be different for different countries and different types of troops, depending on various factors which must be taken into account when the agreed levels of armaments reduction are determined in respect of individual States.

161. I should therefore like it to be clear that we are opposed to any stereotyped approach to this matter. We are open to any proposals and decisions of greater flexibility which would take into account the need to protect the interests of all other States, so as not to squeeze those States into one Procrustean bed, where the feet of some and the heads of others would be chopped off. There can be no question of such a procedure.

162. We therefore affirm that when we come to carry out the reduction of armaments to the extent of the agreed levels we shall be faced with the question of the concrete levels of armaments remaining after such reduction, acknowledging that these levels may differ with respect to particular countries and various types of troops, depending on a variety of factors which must be taken into account in determining the agreed levels of armaments reduction and applying them in individual cases.

163. I spoke earlier of the advantages of our proposal for a one-third reduction of the armaments and armed forces of the five Powers. It is impossible to agree with those who question the expediency and correctness of our proposal for the reduction of conventional armaments by one-third in one year as a first step. In the light of our fundamental thesis that it is essential to achieve a substantial reduction, this is only a first step in that direction and thus predetermines the need for further

reductions which will correspond with the real needs of defence against external dangers.

164. As I have already pointed out, we cannot agree with the argument that the reduction we propose will not really change the ratio of the armaments and armed forces of various countries since it is claimed, if the reduction is proportional, that the ratio will remain the same after the reduction. According to that argument, the original figure would be such and such, then everyone would have 30 per cent less, then another 30 per cent less and so forth, but the ratio of the armed forces of individual States would remain the same.

165. We cannot accept that argument. Every chemist—I am not speaking of alchemists, of course—knows the principle of transition from quantity to quality; it is well known that it is one thing to have a large army and quite another thing to have a small army. A small army cannot threaten anyone. A large army may be maintained for the specific purpose of threatening someone.

166. It is obvious, then, that it is one thing if all States are to have gigantic armies and be sharpening their knives against one another, and quite another if their armaments are to be reduced to a minimum which is really related to the needs of defence and cannot represent a threat to their neighbours, if only because that army would not be like those armies Napoleon built to conquer the whole world, with forced drafts of Italians, Dutchmen, Poles, Corsicans, Spaniards, Portuguese and others.

167. A large army is one thing and a small army is something quite different. In the matter of maintaining security and eliminating the threat of aggression, it is very important whether the army of a given State is large or small. We therefore insist on the principle that a substantial reduction should be the first step. That path should be followed further and further, until we reach the agreed level which is essential for *bona fide* defence and which will preclude any possibility of carrying out aggressive designs and plans, even if such exist, because there will be no means of doing so.

168. This is very important consideration which must, to my mind, be taken into account by those who say that a proportional reduction would cause no change because the ratio would remain the same. No! The ratio would remain the same, perhaps, but the individual effects of the reduction would be to change the interrelationship of States in the sense that none of them would have an army capable of carrying out aggressive plans. That should be quite clear.

169. I shall not deal with this question in detail at this point since it will obviously be discussed further in the Sub-Committee and we shall have an opportunity to revert to it later on. I should merely like to say that it is absolutely incorrect, in this matter of the ratio of armaments and armed forces among the various States, with specific reference to the Soviet Union, to try to make out that the Soviet Union's superiority in armed forces and conventional armaments is so great that it cannot possibly be ignored. We consider that such attempts are absolutely unfounded.

170. Moreover, such figures as four, five or six million which were mentioned in previous discussions have no decisive significance. Such attempts are unfounded because the Soviet Union has no such superiority; it has no such supremacy. To say that it has is contrary to the

facts. Furthermore, it is essential to bear in mind that the question of military supremacy is not decided merely by the strength of land forces, for example, or by the number of aircraft or of atomic bombs. When we speak, for instance, of the fleet, of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or of the armed forces, let us say, of the United States or the United Kingdom, there is another factor which must be taken into account: military bases, the largest of which are owned by those two countries, especially by the United States. We cannot ignore the facts concerning the largest navies and air forces in the world. I do not think we need focus attention on this question; I mention it only to the extent needed to clear the path towards mutual understanding, and facts which relate to the Soviet Union in particular should not be exaggerated.

171. These are the principal remarks I thought it apposite to make today, with a view to clarifying further the basic provisions of our proposals which have prompted various comments, replies and criticisms. I do not, of course, for one moment delude myself that I have exhausted all these problems. I have merely tried to point out the most important and fundamental issues; and if I have succeeded in this, I can be well satisfied.

172. In conclusion, I consider it appropriate to draw attention once again to the questions on which the area of agreement between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers has widened. I must point out that the Soviet Union, in endeavouring to increase the possibility of agreement on the question we are now discussing, as on a number of other questions, expects the Western Powers to do the same. I repeat: since we are taking steps towards widening the area of agreement, we expect that similar steps will also be taken by the Western Powers.

173. I should like to take the liberty of making a very brief reply to Mr. Charles Malik's statement. In his statement [698th meeting] Mr. Malik sought to prove that the problem of international relations among sovereign States was identical with that of internal relations in any one State. In support of this incorrect thesis, he quoted a number of passages from the works of Lenin and Stalin, which he interpreted as confirming that the foreign policy of the Soviet State recognizes the admissibility, and even the necessity, of intervention in the domestic affairs of other States. That is an entirely distorted concept of the aims, objectives and principles of Soviet foreign policy.

174. I do not intend to engage in a discussion with Mr. Malik about what he said and, more particularly, about the passages he quoted here. But I shall discuss some examples which will show the Committee quite clearly the extent of Mr. Malik's scrupulousness in using quotations in order to prove the unprovable.

175. In this connexion I cannot forbear to point out that this is not the first time Mr. Malik has made a statement of this kind. I think it is plain to all that such statements do not help to create an atmosphere favourable to successful discussion of the questions before us; for to go into the questions Mr. Malik dealt with, to go so far as to say we should renounce our ideology, shows an approach to the problem wholly impractical and unreasonable. The United Nations, after all, is not an anti-Communist agency, nor is it a committee, of a type which exists in the United States, for investigating un-American activities. The United Nations is in no sense an organization of politically like-minded people banded together to fight

against people of other political views and ideologies. Mr. Malik seems to have forgotten where he is.

176. He has delivered more than one speech like this before. For instance, speaking in the First Committee in 1949, five years ago, he made a similar attack on the proposition that peaceful coexistence is possible between States of different social structure, and misrepresented the teachings of Marx and Lenin in an attempt to show that they incited to the subversion of other States. Today he said this again, and to all intents and purposes reiterated the overworked and long since discredited argument about the "export of revolution" which is systematically exploited by those who have no wish to see good-neighbourly relations established between the Soviet State and other States—in other words, by those who basically oppose the principle of coexistence.

177. Mr. Malik would gain by acquaintance with Stalin's replies to Mr. Howard's questions. He said, in effect:

"If you think the Soviet people want to change, let alone change by force, the face of the surrounding States, you are woefully mistaken. The Soviet people naturally wish that the face of the surrounding States would change; but that is a matter for the surrounding States themselves. I do not see what danger the surrounding States, if really seated firmly in the saddle, can discern in the actions of the Soviet people."

178. I think this is a completely clear and comprehensive reply to everything Mr. Malik has said here. Furthermore, when Mr. Howard asked Generalissimo Stalin whether that statement meant that the Soviet Union had abandoned its plans and intentions for bringing about a world revolution, Generalissimo Stalin replied that he had never had any such plans or intentions. He explained then and there that Marxism—in other words the teaching of Marx and Lenin, or the Marxism-Leninism of which Mr. Malik spoke today—holds that revolutions in other countries will only occur when the revolutionaries of those countries find them possible or necessary. He added: "The export of revolution—that is nonsense".

179. That being so, what on earth are all those extracts which Mr. Malik quoted today? He was probably speaking of the remark Lenin made in the twenties when the Soviet nation, the young Soviet Republic, had just put an end to the foreign intervention in which the Western Powers had taken part: in the north I would recall Murmansk and Archangel; in the south I would recall the participation of the Western Powers in such opportunist war exploits against the Soviet Republic as that of Wrangel in the Crimea and others; in the east I would recall the occupation of Vladivostok at that time by foreign armies; in the west I would recall the intervention of Yudenich and company against the Soviet Republic with the aid and co-operation of certain Western Powers. If we remember that at that time certain Western Powers took up arms against the Soviet people and not only formed a bloc, but armed and supported with all their forces the mutineers and trouble-makers who opposed the lawful Soviet authority established at the second congress of Soviet worker, peasant and soldier deputies, then how can we assert that the Soviet Union, as Mr. Malik said, will fight against the international bourgeoisie, to use Mr. Malik's language—that same international bourgeoisie which appeared in the territory of the Soviet Union in an attempt to end the life of the young Soviet Republic?

180. Everyone knows that during the succeeding years the Western Powers, or—I shall use Mr. Malik's lan-

guage—the international bourgeoisie, systematically took part in the organization of conspiracies and other measures directed against the Soviet Union. He forgot about that. He referred to Generalissimo Stalin's statement about the impossibility of the complete and final victory of socialism without the victory of the revolution in at least a number of countries; but he completely misinterpreted the sense of that statement of Stalin's. Its real sense is the absolute opposite of what Mr. Malik wanted to prove here. Indeed, in saying that the victory of socialism was possible in a single separate country—one of the most important tenets of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism—Stalin demonstrated that the possibility of victory for socialism in one country did not depend on revolutions in other countries. Hence revolution and support from the proletariat of other countries are not at all necessary for the occurrence of a proletarian revolution, or even for the establishment of socialism, in a given country.

181. Why, then, did Mr. Malik refer to this passage in Stalin's works? If against this passage the argument is advanced that the victory of socialism cannot be achieved in a single country, which means that a socialist society cannot be established in the Soviet Union until a proletarian revolution takes place in other countries—why, then, have Stalin and Lenin both said: "No; socialism can be established in the USSR even if there is no revolution in other countries"?

182. Of course, anyone can understand that the achievement of proletarian revolution in other countries would naturally make the task easier. But how can this be called subversion? Only a completely disordered imagination can present the matter in such a light.

183. Thus by introducing the quotation Mr. Malik revealed his own complete lack of understanding—I do not wish to use stronger words—of what it really contains. He criticized the whole theory of just and unjust wars. This is really enough to astonish anyone. In other words, according to Mr. Malik there are no just, only unjust wars. Does this mean that the war we waged against Hitler's hordes, in company with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Norway and the resistance movements of several northern countries, was an unjust war? This is simply astounding! When Yugoslavia took part in that war, when the Soviet Union took part in that war, when the Romanians and the Bulgarians joined us, when the popular movements in the countries occupied by Hitler's forces allied themselves with us and the peoples waged that underground struggle and supported the military comradeship which existed in those years between the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union—or rather between the three countries, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, because France was in the grievous position of being occupied by the Germans at that time—then does Mr. Malik, Professor Malik, dare to say that that war was unjust? Surely Mr. Malik will not dare to maintain the contrary, namely that Hitler's war was just? The war which Hitler unleashed, which caused millions upon millions of innocent people to be killed, maimed, butchered, or cremated in the furnaces of Auschwitz and other camps, the war which destroyed whole countries—was this a just war? I cannot conceive that anyone present here would venture to make such an assertion.

184. Are wars of national liberation also unjust wars? For instance, the war which the United States waged against British rule when it was still a colony: was that

an unjust war? Of course it would be a sad thing if we kept that conflict in mind to this day and used it to antagonize one another and to inflame all our chauvinistic instincts. I should not wish to go so far as to accuse Mr. Malik on all those counts; but statements like his can be construed in that way. It would be a sad thing if Sir Pierson Dixon and Mr. Wadsworth looked upon each other as enemies because the United States freed itself from British rule a hundred-odd years ago. Let us take another example: when the Northern United States fought against the Southern slave-owners to free the slaves, was that not a just civil war?

185. I do not know what Mr. Malik meant when he regretted that we taught something or other in our schools; but what is taught in the schools where Mr. Malik's theories hold sway and where Mr. Malik himself takes the professorial chair? It is appalling. We hold that in reality there are just as well as unjust wars. There is great significance in the teachings of Lenin and Stalin, which equip us with a correct understanding of this question and a correct attitude to war by distinguishing which wars are just and which unjust.

186. Yes; we differ from the pacifists, of whatever persuasion, who think that no war can ever be just. Even they have to contradict themselves when their supreme national welfare is at stake, and they are right to do so. But what Mr. Malik said here is of course quite incompatible with anything.

187. Now as to the quotations. I have promised not to get involved in this matter, and I will not. By way of illustration, however, I cannot refrain from mentioning one very interesting fact. Mr. Malik quoted Lenin here and referred to the following words, which he interpreted to mean that according to Lenin's teaching, war against the bourgeoisie is legitimate and just.

188. This is what is said in the famous article, "The War Programme of the Proletarian Revolution", in volume 23 of the Russian edition of Lenin's works, to which Mr. Malik referred. Certain speakers have already mentioned this and other articles here. I received the impression that apart from this article they had read very little. Someone has assiduously foisted on them this article of Lenin's, "The War Programme of the Proletarian Revolution", which was written in September 1916, nearly forty years ago. I need not point out that if reference is to be made to such documents, an historical perspective is needed. If we begin discussing this or that matter without an historical perspective, then heaven knows where we shall arrive. We must exercise elementary scruples in choosing our quotations. What does this article say? Let me read you the whole of what it says. This is what Lenin wrote:

"The development of capitalism proceeds very unevenly in various countries: It cannot be otherwise under the commodity production system. From this it inevitably follows that socialism cannot be victorious simultaneously in *all* countries. It will be victorious first in one, or several countries, while the others will for some time remain bourgeois or pre-bourgeois." Please note this—"This must not only create friction, but a direct striving on the part of the bourgeoisie of other countries to crush the victorious proletariat of the socialist country."

What does this mean? It means that the bourgeoisie will strive "to crush the victorious proletariat of the socialist country".

189. But how does the matter look from the point of view of that proletariat of the socialist State? Lenin writes:

“If we waged a war under such circumstances, it would be a legitimate and just war.”

In other words, if the bourgeoisie falls upon the Soviet State with its armed forces—if it makes war on the Soviet State—then, as Lenin wrote as early as 1916, before the Soviet State had even come into existence, that State's war against such bourgeois attempts to destroy the socialist State would be just and lawful.

190. Is that what Mr. Malik said here? He has taken this whole article—I can see what he has done—and extracted a passage from it. In other words, he has arranged this article to his own taste and given out the result as the teaching of Leninism. The teaching of Leninism says—and, to draw a parallel between the questions involved in considering the problems of the reduction of armaments, it says just this—that defence against any aggression by, for instance, those fanatical swarms of reactionary forces in the Western world will be just; if the socialist State repulses such onslaughts, the war will be lawful and just.

191. Indeed, our patriotic second war showed this to be true. In 1941, we faced a deadly danger—invasion by Hitler's hordes. We stopped them. Our war, by Lenin's doctrine, was just, and it was therefore victorious. In that war, moreover, we had the support of comradeship in arms with other countries. Thus this quotation from Lenin proves that Mr. Malik quoted unscrupulously, for he has singled out the passages he needed, and withheld from his hearers those which throw light on the real meaning of his quotations.

192. I consider it inappropriate to discuss this subject here at all. I have been obliged to make just those few observations. I regard such discussion as inappropriate because our Committee is in no way called upon to supervise the ideology of the Soviet Union. It is not for the United Nations to indulge in criticism, much less require the Soviet Union to renounce points of its ideology, and so forth. Our Committee has completely different tasks to perform. To introduce such a discordant note as Mr. Malik did, at a time when we may claim that matters are moving in the direction of agreement between us, seems to me to have no political or practical justification, particularly when he gives loose interpretations which can lead us nowhere.

193. For instance, with regard to article 124 of the Constitution of the Soviet Union, Mr. Malik said that freedom of religious worship is allowed, but not freedom of religious propaganda or teaching. If there is freedom of worship, that means that there is also freedom of propaganda—in other words, propaganda for a particular religion can be carried on. But what does propaganda for a religion mean? It means preaching in defence of religious views. Where can this be done? In the churches. Are not the churches open in our country? Are not our cathedrals open? When our ministers of religion wish to conduct religious services, are they not allowed to preach to their congregations every day? Have we no religious seminaries? Have we no religious academies? Have we not religious schools in which the religious ideas of the Moslem, Jewish, Orthodox and every other faith are preached with complete freedom? That is what our Constitution means. Do we impose any restrictions in this respect?

194. Why did Mr. Malik find it necessary to tell us in all manner of fanciful philosophical phrases: “Do you see, they have freedom of religion but not freedom of religious propaganda?” But how can religion be freely professed, how can religious creeds be learned, without preaching religion, without propagating it? How could there not be schools, seminaries and other religious establishments? We have an ecclesiastical synod. We have a patriarch. We have an archimandrite, archbishops, bishops, priests, deacons, and so on and so forth. We have, so to speak, a whole army of people who are able to devote themselves to the service of their religious convictions. And then it is said that our Constitution allows freedom of religion and of anti-religious propaganda, but does not permit freedom of religious propaganda. But the question is really very simple. It would be ludicrous to say: there is freedom of religion and freedom of Communist belief. It would be ludicrous to say this in the Soviet State; but saying that anti-religious propaganda is permitted amounts to saying that our relations with religion are of a certain nature, but that this is no restriction on the faithful: there is freedom of faith, freedom of religion. What is wrong with that? All this merely shows that Mr. Malik does not consider it necessary to be objective.

195. In conclusion, I should like to say that if the Committee were to approve the approach to the question which Mr. Malik, following in Mr. Al-Jamali's footsteps, has formulated here—a possibility which we naturally exclude—that would be tantamount to a refusal to seek compromise solutions to important international problems. It would be tantamount to a refusal to acknowledge that the peaceful coexistence of capitalism and communism and co-operation between States are possible if there is a mutual desire to co-operate, if there is readiness to fulfil obligations once undertaken, and if there is observance of the principle of equal rights and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States.

196. This same subject was dealt with at the twelfth Congress by the President of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Malenkov, to whom Mr. Malik referred here today when he asked the strange question whether Mr. Malenkov's speech superseded and annulled everything else. There is nothing, absolutely nothing, for us to annul because what you want annulled does not exist; it is your own invention, it is a distortion. There is nothing for us to annul, and consequently we naturally brush that question aside as nonsense.

197. Once again I ask your forgiveness for taking up too much time with my remarks today.

198. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): The next speaker on the list which I announced this morning has prepared a fairly long speech. In view of the time, I do not think that we shall be able to hear him today. The representative of India will therefore be the first speaker at tomorrow morning's meeting. After he has spoken, the general debate will be closed and we shall begin consideration of the various proposals before us.

199. I want to make it clear that representatives who wish to exercise the right of reply under rule 116 of the rules of procedure may do so before we start considering the various draft resolutions.

200. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): Of course, I should like to be given a few minutes to make some observations on Mr. Vyshinsky's remarks about me. However, I shall ask to be given that time later, since I would

wish to read his remarks very carefully before making my brief reply. But at this point I should like to have one minute—or two, at most—to make a passing observation about one thing that Mr. Vyshinsky said concerning the good faith or the bad faith of the quotation I had given earlier. Mr. Vyshinsky went on to reread the quotation from Lenin which I had given this morning. I am very sure that if I point out correctly where a certain misunderstanding has occurred, Mr. Vyshinsky is magnanimous enough to tell us that he was mistaken. The text that Mr. Vyshinsky read was exactly what I read this morning. Exactly the same. I omitted nothing. What Mr. Vyshinsky read was what I read this morning, to the very last word. If Mr. Vyshinsky should check that tomorrow morning, when the record is issued, and should find that that is true—if he should compare what he read this afternoon with what I read this morning and finds that the two are exactly the same—I am certain that he will be the first to say that he made a mistake.

201. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq): Since my name was mentioned by Mr. Vyshinsky, I should like to have just a few minutes to reply.

202. First of all, I should like to quote our prophet Mohammed, who said:

“He who keeps silent and refrains from telling the truth is a dumb devil.”

203. In my brief remarks the other day, I tried to be very objective and to stick to the truth. I wish to say again that we are discussing a very serious subject—disarmament. When I spoke the other day, I also stated that the fact that the Soviet Union has come here in such a spirit of agreement is a welcome fact. I emphasized that. But I said that we are here dealing with symptoms and that treating symptoms alone is not enough. If there are ulcers on the body and we want to treat them, we must go inside the body and see what is wrong with it.

204. It is not enough to say that we should not deal with the factors and forces that are behind armament, that we should separate armament from the things that lie behind it. If one has a tree that yields bitter fruit, one can keep cutting off the bitter fruit, but the tree will continue to grow. Even if we should disarm today, we shall, unless we have cleansed our souls, arm again; we shall have to discuss disarmament again, and so on.

205. In other words, I see a very clear relationship between the question of disarmament and the question that is behind disarmament; namely, the ideology that leads to armament. We have to see to what extent we can remedy the inner soul. We have to see that our spirit and intentions are really conducive to disarmament.

206. What are the causes of armament? They are fear, lack of confidence—the fear that one may go to sleep at night and, on waking, discover that one's country has undergone a *coup d'état*; the fear that while one is sleeping at night the police may come and knock at one's door. All those things lead men to arm to protect themselves.

207. I did not say—and I shall not say—that communism should be renounced. I said that communism was a materialistic religion which has its martyrs, its missionaries and its crusaders. I said that the days of crusades were over and that I hoped that, by the attitude he was taking in this Committee, Mr. Vyshinsky would prove that that was true. I said that it was time that we should disarm ideologically. If communism stops infiltrating other countries, stops doing missionary work, stops carrying on

subversive activities—and I did not say that the Soviet Union was doing those things; I said that communism was doing them—then it will be possible to achieve security; then armament will not be necessary, and disarmament will be much easier to achieve. If we arm morally and disarm ideologically, we shall be able to get on with our task. I did not say, “Give up communism”. The Moslems and the Christians fought during the Crusades. They stopped fighting and now can live together. The Moslems did not give up their religion, and neither did the Christians. There can be coexistence, provided we disarm ideologically and rearm morally.

208. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I shall, of course, check Mr. Malik's quotation, because I did not have the verbatim record of his speech before me today and could only be guided by my own notes. But if he quoted everything I read, how could he arrive at the conclusion at which he did arrive? How could he conclude, for example, that we are urging war against the bourgeoisie when there is a clear statement here, and later on, in addition to what I have already said, it is stated even more clearly? He would have understood this if his approach to this question had been really scrupulous and objective.

209. It is said here: “Engels was completely right when, in his letter to Kautsky of 12 September 1882, he directly acknowledged that defensive wars might be waged by victorious socialism.” What he had in mind was the defence of the victorious proletariat against the bourgeoisie of other countries—the defence, I say. In an earlier passage, it is stated that this should result in the direct striving of the bourgeoisie of other countries to crush the victorious proletariat of the socialist country.

210. If Mr. Malik really read all this, and then said all he said today—I have no notes on this point and must verify tomorrow what he actually said—then the question arises how he could reach such an absurd conclusion as he did. His conclusion amounts to saying that the proletarian State is in such a position to be obliged to intervene in the affairs of other States, capitalist States, and to provoke revolution there, and so forth. On the contrary, only defence is mentioned here. Does not Mr. Malik understand this? Has he not read this? As for his explanation today, what am I to think of that? Incidentally, he says nothing about any other point; he is still only correcting this one. What else did he have to say? Does he still maintain this? If so, it has no significance at all, for this also is one of his distortions. That would be all right if there proved to be no other distortions here, although, of course, there are others. What does he think of all these distortions? He is silent. Perhaps he will speak about this tomorrow. I shall wait.

211. As for Mr. Al-Jamali, he of course is playing on words. He says: “I do not ask you to renounce communism at all, but I ask you to disarm ideologically”. What does “disarm ideologically” mean? Does it mean throwing ideological weapons on the scrap-heap? And what are “ideological weapons”? The teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. You propose that we should disarm, in other words abandon the guidance which our ideology gives us. You say that this is not disarmament; but then what is it? Disarmament is not renunciation but “merely” disarmament. But it is also renunciation. Please, Mr. Al-Jamali, disarm your own ideology which prompts you to ask us to disarm. I do not ask you to renounce your ideology. I ask you to disarm your ideology. I shall wait.

212. Mr. WADSWORTH (United States of America): I should like to speak briefly on a point of order.

213. During his very interesting discourse this afternoon, Mr. Vyshinsky spent considerable time in talking about the United States working paper of 25 May [DC/53, annex 4]. Like Mr. Malik—but perhaps for a different reason—I should like to reserve the right to study Mr. Vyshinsky's statement more fully before making any lengthy reply. There is, however, one particular distortion that I think should be set straight this afternoon.

214. In making fun of one of the suggestions on enforcement and control contained in the United States working paper—namely, the suggestion concerning air reconnaissance—Mr. Vyshinsky very easily passed over the well-recognized value of air reconnaissance for various purposes, particularly for discovering hidden plants, hidden installations or hidden stockpiles. Then, however, he went on to say that, as he understood it, we were suggesting that United States airplanes should fly over Soviet Union territory for that reconnaissance, and he asked me the following direct question: Would I be willing to have Soviet Union airplanes fly over the United States for purposes of reconnaissance?

215. As Mr. Vyshinsky and, I think, all the rest of us know very well, there is nothing in the United States working paper which would even suggest such a thing. What we propose is that airplanes under the control of the international control organ should carry out that reconnaissance. For its part, the United States has proposed to allow such planes to fly over its territory in accordance with the treaty which we hope will be signed and ratified by the United States Senate.

216. I think that that point should be set straight on the record, and I again ask Mr. Vyshinsky, as I did the other day, to accept on behalf of his country the same controls as we are prepared to accept.

217. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): I give the floor to the representative of Greece, on a point of order.

218. Mr. KYROU (Greece): If I am not mistaken, this afternoon's meeting is the fifteenth which this Committee has held on the question of disarmament. Of course, it is, internationally speaking, the most important item with which we have to deal, and we are prepared to have the discussion continue as long as necessary—but only on the subject of disarmament.

219. We have listened today to very interesting statements—really extremely interesting statements—on Communist doctrines. We have also listened to the replies to those statements. And now we are threatened with other replies and other answers to the replies—something which may go on for two or three days.

220. I should therefore like to suggest, very respectfully, that those replies and the answers to the replies should be submitted in writing.

221. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): With regard to Mr. Wadsworth's remarks, I said only what I said. I said that according to the working paper of 25 May the control organ would have the following functions: to organize and conduct field inspections and aerial surveys. That is what I said. I said nothing which was not in accordance with the facts.

222. Furthermore, I was speaking, not about what is said in the working paper, but about my own appraisal

of those demands. Aerial surveys to verify whether a switch had been turned to the right or to the left would be rather a curious thing. Of course they cannot serve such purposes.

223. If Mr. Wadsworth will obtain the literature pertaining to the Baruch Plan and to this question, he will see what purposes aerial surveys can serve. If he will obtain the statement made by Mr. Thomas, Vice-President of the Monsanto Chemical Company, before a United States Senate Committee, probably in 1951 if I am not mistaken, he will learn the real purposes of this whole Baruch Plan. I did not think it was necessary to speak about this, but if Mr. Wadsworth raises any objection I am prepared to adopt Mr. Kyrou's recommendation and, when I receive a query from him in writing, to reply to him in the same way. Mr. Wadsworth can learn many interesting things about surveys and the purposes of the Baruch Plan from Mr. Thomas' statement. But this is Senate Committee material; I do not wish to speak about it now.

224. A fear that Mr. Kyrou's proposal, though highly original, is hardly acceptable, because I, for one, have no intention of engaging in any written correspondence on the questions which have been raised here. Only people who have nothing to do and no obligations can spend their time in such correspondence. I, unfortunately, do not enjoy such freedom; I have far too much work to engage in correspondence on any questions some rambling professor chooses to raise.

225. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): With the exception of the last two or three words, I agree completely with everything Mr. Vyshinsky has said in commenting upon the observations made by the representative of Greece. We have every right to answer, briefly and courteously, whatever we may think is worthy of answer. For my part, what I shall have to say in my observations on what Mr. Vyshinsky said this afternoon will take up very little time, and I shall reply only with a view to straightening out matters of debate, such as the allegations about what I said or did not say, about what I quoted or did not quote. My reply will not be a reopening of the debate, as Mr. Kyrou seems to fear.

226. I should also like to say that I do not agree with the position that the matters upon which I touched today are altogether irrelevant to this debate. That is not true, as I tried to point out in my own development of the question. Therefore, to pass judgment upon these highly important matters by simply saying that they are irrelevant or beside the point, or that they touch upon matters that are not upon our agenda, or that they introduce discordant notes, is not to face the real truth.

227. I assure the Committee that whatever I might have to say in reply to Mr. Vyshinsky's remarks, after I have studied them carefully so as to be as fair as possible, will be brief, courteous, and positive.

228. Mr. WADSWORTH (United States of America): I should like to add just one more remark on the subject of what may or may not be irrelevant. I think it was fairly clearly understood—and I know it was argued and urged many times by the representative of the Soviet Union—that we should talk about disarmament as it is placed before us. We are not talking about what some vice-president of some chemical company may have said at some Senate hearing. When talking about air reconnaissance, we are talking about the United States working paper of last May.

229. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): I agree that, even if we wanted to do so, we could not accept the Greek representative's suggestion. He is quite right, however, in saying that we should establish some order for the close of this debate. Accordingly, I think we might do this: tomorrow morning, as I have already announced, the representative of India, who is the last speaker on the list, will take the floor. Any representa-

tives who wish to exercise the right of reply should say so tomorrow morning, so that they may speak directly after the representative of India. Once the general debate is concluded, it will not be permissible for representatives to use that right in respect of speeches made during the debate.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.