

United Nations
**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**
NINTH SESSION
Official Records



**FIRST COMMITTEE, 696th
MEETING**

Friday, 22 October 1954,
at 10.30 a.m.

New York

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Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia).

AGENDA ITEMS 20 AND 68

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/2685, A/C.1/751, A/C.1/752/Rev.1) (*continued*)

Conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction (A/2742 and Corr.1, A/2742/Add.1, A/C.1/750) (*continued*)

1. Sir Percy SPENDER (Australia): I have already intervened twice in this debate, but I hardly think that I should have any compunction about asking to speak once more. This is a debate the importance of which cannot be over-emphasized and I hope that representatives will take my repeated participation in it as a measure of the interest with which it is regarded by my delegation, and by my country.

2. At this time I do not propose to reiterate or to enlarge upon the reasons or substance of my earlier interventions; rather I would wish to make it clear that, whereas before I have been expressing certain opinions as to the conduct of our examination of this subject, opinions which I felt required to be expressed without delay, at the present time I am principally concerned with an examination of the general question of disarmament in its wider context. In the course of my earlier interventions I have necessarily touched upon certain pertinent current issues—I shall ask for your indulgence if, in mentioning these again, I should appear to be repetitious.

3. I wish, first of all, to give expression to the thought which I am sure is uppermost in the minds of all of us; that is a restrained feeling of thankfulness that on this subject of disarmament the Soviet Union has now for the first time, not only indicated that some of our proposals have been heard, but has even signified some readiness to discuss them. This is an advance, at least in the realm of discussion, which has been welcomed and enlarged upon by other speakers before me and one which we cannot but regard as being of importance.

4. During the debate in the First Committee at the eighth session on this subject I made the following observations on the deadlock in which we found ourselves. I should like to repeat what I said at that time [662nd meeting] and I ask the Committee's indulgence:

"Is there any way out of this impasse? Is there any hope that the Disarmament Commission can produce any fruitful result no matter how small? Or are we to confess that it is hopelessly deadlocked because the great Powers find it impossible to move from the positions they have taken up? ...

"Why, then, does the Soviet Union continue to put these proposals forward? I know that, by constant dripping, water can hollow out stone. The trouble, however, with the Soviet Union proposals is that all the holes are in them. I am therefore compelled to say that the proposals are repetitiously put forward by the Soviet Union as a talking point upon which to hang its so-called peace propaganda. May I say that it is conduct such as this—the constant submission of this loaded proposal which the Soviet Union knows the Assembly will reject—which creates no small measure of the suspicion and distrust that we feel about the Soviet Union and that, I should have thought, it would have been that country's objective to dispel. ...

"... But if we can, in this debate, give to the Disarmament Commission some indication of the sense of urgency which pervades us all, this will have achieved something. The members of the Disarmament Commission should also be made aware that they should produce a more adequate indication of progress during the next twelve months than is shown in the sorry record of the last twelve. Naturally, I am not blaming the great majority of the members of the Commission for what has happened in the recent past, but they will appreciate, I know, that members of this Committee, who are not members of the Disarmament Commission, will be gravely dissatisfied and alarmed if real efforts are not made to produce something by the time this matter next comes to the General Assembly." ¹

5. I cannot therefore but be pleased that some step forward has apparently been taken and that the Soviet Union delegation has shown a change of attitude—whatever be the significance of that change. That action may happily do something to dispel the suspicion and distrust to which I referred last year. At the same time I must endorse the warning given by other speakers in this debate that care should be taken not to indulge in excessive optimism. Optimism is of the heart rather than the mind. I am by nature—as are all of my countrymen—an optimist. But in the matter of disarmament I am at pains, particularly in the light of past experience, to ensure that my optimism does not displace reason. Therefore, while I welcome

¹ This quotation is from the verbatim record. The official record appears in summary form only.

this action of the Soviet Union I feel that we should guard against any too easy optimism. It is of course a nice thing to present complimentary addresses. But it helps but little in the solution of the grave issues with which we are faced. After all, the Soviet Union has made no concession of substance. It has hardly done more — if it has done more — than merely consent to discuss proposals, an action which I submit would not in any other circumstances be regarded as remarkable. Indeed, it is only behaving as we would automatically expect any other nation to behave at the outset. It is not the accepted practice to disregard, in any brusque or cavalier fashion, carefully wrought proposals which have been especially and painstakingly submitted for consideration.

6. What is it that basically we are trying to find out? It is the position now occupied by the Soviet Union. As has already been clearly shown in the debate, it will prove extremely difficult to ascertain exactly what this position is. The distinguished representative of the Soviet Union does not care for direct questions — or does not care to give them answers. He says rather that we should examine his proposals and draw our own conclusions. We can but try. We know in general outline well enough what the Anglo-French proposals are and where, in general terms, the Western Powers stand. Up till 30 September 1954 we knew what the Soviet proposals were and where the USSR stood. Between East and West was a deep and apparently unbridged chasm. On 30 September 1954 the Soviet Union took some action. What did this action amount to? Did it entail any movement; if so, movement in what direction and how far? Did the Soviet Union take some bold step towards a promontory on its side of the chasm from which it might be possible to construct a bridge to ours? Did it merely shift a short distance along its side, perhaps coming nearer into sight but still too far away for a bridge to be built? Or did it, as I very much fear to be the case, just pick up the telephone which the West had been constantly ringing and, by announcing its acceptance of the Anglo-French proposals as a basis for discussion, in fact do no more than indicate readiness to talk — and to go on talking. But, whatever action has been taken we in this Committee must do our best to find it out. I think the best way is to examine, from an objective standpoint, and in simple terms, the proposals of each side — the points of agreement and the points of difference which now appear to exist.

7. The new Soviet Union action must be examined in relation to the Anglo-French proposals [DC/53, annex 9] to which it is directly related — it would be impossible to try to discover what its action has been *in vacuo*. I do not propose to go into a detailed technical analysis; that is not my purpose. But I do propose to attempt to paint the picture in three primary colours representing let us say, the agreed, the disagreed and the middle ground. In this way I hope to achieve some simple finished picture which can be comprehended by all and which will be such that the lines and colours are not blotched and unrecognizable in a tangled confusion.

8. First, I wish to make a general comparison. Basically, as I understand them, both sets of proposals provide for the same things: (a) progressive reduction by stages of armaments (including atomic), armed forces and armaments expenditure to an agreed level, starting from the levels of 31 December 1953; (b) prohibition of the possession, use and manufacture of nuclear weapons;

(c) conversion of existing atomic materials to peaceful uses.

9. The Anglo-French proposals, taken together with the other Western proposals submitted to the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission — particularly the United Kingdom memorandum of 21 May 1954 [DC/53, annex 3] on the scope of the disarmament treaty, and the United States paper of 25 May 1954 [DC/53, annex 4] on the rights, powers and functions of the international control organ — constitute a precise and detailed “blueprint for disarmament” which is water-tight and appears workable. Once the treaty incorporating it entered into force, all signatories would be permitted to take a series of automatic steps, under international supervision, which would lead inevitably to the desired objectives.

10. The Soviet Union proposals [A/C.1/750] involve two major stages, and at each of these stages certain measures are to be taken “simultaneously”. The representative of the Soviet Union has, during the course of the debate, explained [686th meeting] that “simultaneously” is meant to refer to the completion of various measures within a certain period of time. In the first stage armaments and armed forces would be reduced by 50 per cent of the agreed levels on the basis of the strength existing as of 31 December 1953 and a temporary international control commission would be set up to supervise this. The second stage, to begin when the first has been completed, is to achieve reduction of the remaining 50 per cent, prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other types of weapons of mass destruction, and the setting up of a permanent control organ.

11. The Soviet Union proposals lack, it seems to me, the basic simplicity and, if I may give it the term, inevitability of the Anglo-French plan. The steps would not be automatic and they would not provide for effective international supervision and control throughout the entire operation.

12. Now, let us turn back to a more detailed examination, setting one side against the other. I shall deal with them under headings, and my first heading is preliminary prohibition.

13. The Anglo-French proposals say that the big Powers should regard themselves as prohibited, in accordance with the terms of the Charter of the United Nations, from using nuclear weapons, except in defence against aggression. The disarmament treaty, they suggest, should contain immediate and explicit acceptance of this prohibition pending total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.

14. The Soviet Union proposals would instruct the Disarmament Commission to study and clarify this question and to submit recommendations accordingly.

15. The Anglo-French proposals are an attempt, I think, to meet the Soviet Union's condition for a total preliminary ban, on which the Soviet Union has insisted so rigidly in the past. It has, in its new proposal, forsaken this stipulation. Here, then, is not disagreement or agreement; it is what I have described as the middle ground.

16. On the subject of non-member States, the Anglo-French proposals say that non-member States signatories to the disarmament treaty should engage themselves to accept obligations to refrain from the threat or use of force, and so on, which Member States have assumed in accordance with the Charter.

17. No mention of non-member States is included in the Soviet Union proposals, but this might well be

covered by the preparation by the Disarmament commission of a treaty based on the Anglo-French proposals. This, again, would appear to be still middle ground.

18. The Anglo-French proposals provide that the treaty should be prepared by the Disarmament Commission and submitted by it to the Security Council, the General Assembly and a world disarmament conference.

19. The Soviet Union proposal provides for the disarmament treaty to be prepared by the Disarmament Commission and submitted by it to the Security Council for confirmation.

20. There appears to be so little difference between these two proposals that I think agreement may be considered to exist.

21. In regard to the objectives of the disarmament treaty, first, the Anglo-French proposals provide for the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons of mass destruction and the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons to peaceful purposes. The Soviet Union proposals provide for "the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other types of weapons of mass destruction, and their elimination from the armaments of States".

22. Secondly, the Anglo-French proposals provide for "major reductions in all armed forces and conventional armaments". The Soviet Union proposals are for "substantial reduction in armaments".

23. Thirdly, the Anglo-French proposals provide for "the establishment of a control organ with rights, powers and functions adequate to guarantee the effective observance of the agreed prohibitions and reductions". The Soviet Union proposals provide for "the establishment of international control over the implementation of these decisions" — taking, of course, as a basis the Anglo-French proposals. The Soviet Union also includes as an objective the strengthening of peace and international security.

24. All these objectives — as objectives — are so similar that I think they may be regarded as practically in agreement. Indeed, the representative of the Soviet Union acknowledge on 14 October 1954 that, as he saw it, this was the case.

25. I pass now to the provisions to be contained in the treaty. I have already explained that the Anglo-French proposals envisage automatic steps, while the Soviet Union, on the other hand, proposes two broad stages, each to include certain simultaneous actions. Now, at this point we come to the area of difference. Broadly, this area concerns questions of timing and effectiveness of international control.

26. In regard to timing, in the implementation of the Anglo-French plan there would be three stages. The international control organ would itself decide when it was ready to supervise the implementation of the first stage, namely, the "freezing" of man power and expenditure levels, and nothing would be done until it had so decided. On completion of the first stage, the control organ would prepare itself to supervise the second stage, namely, the first half of the agreed reductions in armaments and armed forces and the cessation of manufacture of prohibited weapons, and this stage would not begin until the control organ reported that it was able to supervise its implementation. Similarly, the third stage — the remaining half of the agreed reductions in armaments and armed forces, the total prohibition and elimination of all prohibited weapons, and the conversion of existing stocks of atomic

materials to peaceful uses — would not begin until the control organ reported that it was ready to supervise it. After all three stages were completed, the control organ would remain permanently in existence.

27. Under the Soviet Union plan there would be two stages. Simultaneously with the implementation of the first stage — in the course of six months or one year the first half of the agreed reductions in armaments, armed forces and military expenditure — a temporary international control organ would be established, with the rights, powers and functions which I shall discuss later. It is not envisaged that the control organ would be in a position to supervise these reductions from the start. On completion of the first stage, the second stage, involving the simultaneous implementation of the second half of the agreed reductions and the complete prohibition of atomic weapons, including the prohibition of production and possession, and the conversion of existing stocks of atomic materials to peaceful uses, would begin. Only at the beginning of this stage would a permanent international control organ be established, with the rights, powers and functions which I shall discuss later.

28. I now come to the question of the effectiveness of international supervision. The Anglo-French proposals are presumably based on the suggestions contained in the exhaustive and helpful United States paper of 25 May 1954, which dealt with an organ with sufficiently wide powers of inspection, investigation and enforcement to ensure its effective operation. The very essence of the Anglo-French proposals is contained in their insistence: first, that the control organ should be established and ready to do its job before any of the agreed steps would be taken, and secondly, that the control organ would decide when the next step should be taken.

29. The Soviet proposals show that the Soviet Union has accepted neither of these basic points. This is the field in which the Soviet proposals show the greatest weakness. Under the Soviet plan the implementation of the first stage reductions would be supervised only by a temporary control organ. This temporary control organ would not be in position when the reductions started but would be in process of establishment at the very time when countries were intended to be carrying them out. Furthermore, its powers are by no means clearly outlined in the Soviet proposals which say only that it would have "the right to require States to provide the necessary information on the measures taken by them to reduce armaments and armed forces" — the right to do so — and "would take necessary steps to supervise the fulfilment by States of the obligations assumed by them. . . ."

30. The permanent control organ of which the Soviet proposals speak would not come into being, according to the Soviet plan, until after half the programme had been completed. The contemplated rights and powers would also require clarification. The Soviet proposals say merely that it would have "full powers of supervision, including the power of inspection on a continuing basis to the extent necessary to ensure implementation of the convention by all States".

31. To sum up under the main heading of this section — which deals with provisions of the treaty — one side has put forward proposals which are designed to achieve the end in view by a series of actions based upon the concept of automatism, as Mr. Moch called it in his speech [685th meeting]. The number of stages is three. The other side, also presumably seeking the same end,

has based its proposals for action on the concept of "simultaneity", to be effected in two separate stages. Now I have, throughout this examination, attempted to remain objective. I do not think I can be accused of forsaking this principle if I suggest that the differences between the two plans of action can best be seen by applying to each of them two major criteria by which each must be judged—realism and common sense. I hope the representative of the Soviet Union will forgive me if I do this in the form of questions. These I may assure him are not put for the purpose of seeking satisfactory answers in the debate—my optimism falters at this point—but rather to point up the issues as I see them. What on each side is clear-cut and comprehensible, and what, from a practical point of view, appears capable of execution?

32. To me the Anglo-French plan is in its basic conception both simple and straightforward. The conditions which must be provided for in any disarmament plan are adequately met. One step leads naturally to another. If I found great difficulty in understanding it I would not hesitate to say so. I do not find any such difficulty, and see no point in wasting the Committee's time in explaining the obvious.

33. The Soviet proposals for "simultaneity" do not however create a clear picture in my mind. What is meant by "simultaneity"? The representative of Peru, Mr. Belaúnde, has said that the term was first introduced by the Australian delegation at the sixth session in Paris. I do not know what was meant precisely by the term then, since I was not at that meeting of the Assembly, but I fear that there is nothing in our delegation records capable of explaining adequately what the Soviet Union means by it now. "Who", as Mr. Belaúnde asked on 18 October [691st meeting], "is to do the synchronizing?" How is it practically possible to achieve so many goals "simultaneously"? The application of common sense is called for, and to my mind the verdict is not one flattering to the authors of the Soviet proposals. How can we establish a control organ, even a temporary one, and bring about a 50 per cent reduction in one fell swoop? Even supposing this could be done, how in the next stage would we set up a permanent control organ, complete the remaining 50 per cent reduction and institute the ban on nuclear weapons?

34. There are many more questions arising out of the nature of the Soviet proposals, ranging as they do from major to minor importance, but at the root of all of them is the unsatisfactory vagueness of the proposals themselves.

35. Let me refer again to the temporary control organ. The reason the representative of the Soviet Union has advanced for having a temporary control organ—namely that as the job will be only temporary, only a temporary organ is required—seems to me entirely inadequate. Moreover, the temporary control organ will as I see it, still be subject to the control of the veto. To me, such an organ is entirely nebulous in character.

36. Or take the verification of levels of armaments, armed forces and expenditure as at 31 December 1953. In what manner exactly is this to be achieved?

37. The representative of the Soviet Union has spoken of elaboration and explanation. Let him proceed to this. Until and unless he does so, we can only pass on to those for whose sakes we are seeking clarification and making comparison—namely, the peoples of the world—the conclusion that, because of their nature, we can no more clarify, evaluate and delineate the Soviet proposals than we can describe with confidence the

pattern of an intricate mosaic lying fathoms deep beneath the sea, which is just visible, but nothing more.

38. This concludes my examination. It has, I hope, achieved the simple comparison of the picture which I set out to paint. I should now like, with the indulgence of the Committee, to make one or two comments on some of the issues involved.

39. To achieve success, some agreement must be reached on these major divergences. While it is true that we, the middle and smaller Powers of this world, cannot in the scheme of things do a great deal except by persuasion, our destiny is nevertheless caught up in the tide of events and we cannot remain silent. Nor can we merely be onlookers. We have just as much at stake and must take increasing responsibility. We must have some clear understanding of the basic elements of the problem in their most simple terms. But, because we have the sense to admit our limitations, it does not follow that we are henceforth to be disregarded. We want to know what is going on and we want to be given the opportunity to comment. Indeed, the problem is one which requires so much detailed examination and analysis that not only should small Powers have every right to be heard but the most careful attention must be paid to all who study the problem and express themselves upon it.

40. It is not easy—indeed, it is exceedingly difficult—for any layman, whether statesmen, diplomat or private citizen, to advance ideas, certainly to advance any new ideas on a subject which is so technical as disarmament. This difficulty is magnified many times when we seek to deal with the problem of control and inspection of the atomic and hydrogen bombs, when so much of the necessary technological knowledge is available only to a few. And so it is with more than diffidence that I wish to advance, rather in the sense of thinking aloud, an idea which may contain the germ of a solution to the terrible problem posed to mankind by its discovery of the truly awful destructive power of atomic, hydrogen and possibly other bombs.

41. This concerns the power of veto in the Security Council. Surely, if both sides desired to do so, it would be possible to agree that there should be certain matters on which the veto would not apply, such as the control organ. It seems to me quite competent for one or more of the great Powers, without in any manner derogating from the United Nations Charter, to agree beforehand not to exercise the veto in certain express circumstances or in certain defined cases. After all, the veto which may be exercised at a meeting of the Security Council need not be exercised. Why, then, is it not competent for any nation which has the power of veto to agree in advance not to exercise it in a particular defined case? The veto is a right, not an injunction and, like any right, it may be waived. The representative of the Soviet Union himself has said that a super-autonomous control organ would be a second Security Council. This point was also raised with Mr. Vyshinsky by Mr. Belaúnde of Peru and Mr. Kyrou of Greece in our debate. Mr. Belaúnde asked whether Mr. Vyshinsky might not consider waiving the right of veto in this respect. I should like to ask the representative of the Soviet Union precisely the same question. I feel that Mr. Vyshinsky's reply to Mr. Belaúnde, while an example of brilliant improvisation, might well, after considered reflection, be amended.

42. We must keep alive the sense of urgency. This feeling has not diminished during the course of the last

twelve months. In October of last year, a private member of the Australian House of Representatives secured discussion on a resolution which stated that the present development of atomic armaments could lead to world disaster unless effective international safeguards were speedily imposed; that international safeguards could not be effective without full powers to inspect against possible violation and to enforce the decisions of the international authority; that ineffective safeguards would be worse than useless in that they would tend to operate to the advantage of a potential aggressor, which might build up atomic weapons in violation of its undertakings under an atomic pact and thus strengthen its position against peace-loving nations which would honour their obligations to disarm; that the time available for the peaceful solution of the world's atomic problem was short, and action was therefore urgent; and that it would be appropriate for the United Nations, having regard to the Purposes and Principles set out in Chapter I of its Charter, to devise and implement forthwith a world-wide and water-tight system for the control of atomic armaments.

43. It will not escape the notice of members of this Committee that the purpose of this resolution was largely to direct the attention of the United Nations to the deep concern felt by the Australian people at the danger which threatened them and the world if no water-tight system of control of atomic energy could be developed. Our concern is as grave today.

44. At the same time, our present action must be dictated by the realities of the current international political situation. Disarmament is not a problem existing on its own. Failure to solve outstanding problems such as the unification of Germany and other major problems can only increase the difficulties under which we are already labouring on this subject. Were these few major outstanding differences to be resolved, surely it would be possible for both East and West to breathe more easily. Everyone who prays for peace is praying that somehow means will be found to enable the communist and democratic systems to exist peacefully together. History has shown how societies or groups hostile to each other have nonetheless learned to live side by side. Along the peripheries where communist and anti-communist forces come into contact with each other, situations are bound to keep arising which will generate tensions. If we can keep these tensions under control without sacrificing any of our principles, we may develop a long and uneasy peace with lessening strain, less reliance on costly arms, and increasing amenability toward international co-operation.

45. But our hopes, unless and until they are realized, must never allow us to lower or to neglect our defences. Indeed, I am obliged in all honesty to repeat what I have said before to the representative of the Soviet Union: that there may be no alternative open to the free world except to build up and maintain our defences at the highest level for many decades to come, if the things in which we believe—freedom and liberty—are to be preserved for us and our children. And since it is against some potential enemy that these defences are being and will continue to be erected—if we cannot in the meantime find some solution, even a partial one, to the problem we are discussing—it follows that our defences are erected against his country and others who have tied themselves to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. And they are so erected for no other reason than the strongest reason, we think, which is

our belief that the armaments of his country were created to be used against us.

46. During this speech I have, on the one hand, discussed the current problems of disarmament, and, on the other hand, the sobering realities of the present international situation. The prophecy I have given in regard to the course of future events is, I hope, not too gloomy. If this is indeed to be the future to which we must look forward because, as the United States representative, Mr. Wadsworth, said in his speech [687th meeting] we have so dismally failed to achieve a mutual trust, is there not some sphere of action, some middle ground, to which we can direct the energies which in happier circumstances would be spent in carrying out a disarmament programme? Can we only look helplessly at two extremes—the distant goal of a disarmed and confident world and the present spectacle of a world which is both quarrelsome and directly threatened? Can no attempt be made to find some outlet for the impulses and aspirations of those who would build now toward the goal which we all realize is a very long way off?

47. I think the present Eisenhower plan for the peaceful utilization of atomic energy is just the kind of scheme to fit into the category I have described. This scheme has my Government's support, and we are waiting with hope and interest to discover the steps which have been taken and which it is proposed to take towards work in this field. Since this, however, is to be the subject of a special debate later in this Committee, I shall make no further reference to it now.

48. We are still engaged in the general debate, and it may not yet be the proper time to discuss draft resolutions. However, although I have said that this is a general review of disarmament, I cannot, in the light of my earlier remarks and my suggestion that a sub-committee of the First Committee should be set up to engage in work of clarification, ignore this side of our discussions. I think that the plea for work of clarification which we entered at the beginning of this debate was of some value. I am glad that we brought the matter up and that it has received the support which it has received. Indeed, the worth of our suggestion has been generally recognized by many speakers during the debate. We are particularly pleased that Mr. Lloyd, the United Kingdom representative, should have taken up our suggestion that the Secretariat should circulate a paper, for use in the Disarmament Commission, analysing the present grounds of agreement and disagreement. While we do not think that enough work of clarification has yet been done to make all the issues before us sufficiently clear, we do not wish to push our idea for a sub-committee of the First Committee any further at the present session of the Assembly.

49. But we do propose to circulate in due course a draft resolution following up the second half of our suggestion, which, as I have just said, was so strongly endorsed by Mr. Lloyd [694th meeting]. I know that this problem has been a special concern of the representative of the Philippines, also. I should be very happy indeed if he himself put the proposal forward or joined with Australia in sponsoring the draft resolution which I propose to submit. The draft resolution will be in the following form:

"The General Assembly,

"Recommends to the Disarmament Commission that it request the Secretariat as soon as practicable to

prepare a working paper for the Commission and for circulation to all the Members of the United Nations for their information, giving a descriptive and factual presentation of the present positions of the great Powers on various aspects of the disarmament problem."²

50. As we see it, the Secretariat's general function would be to approach the task on the lines of the four steps set out in my previous statement [688th meeting].

51. We intend for the present to rest content with this and do not propose to press the other half of our original suggestion. In so doing, however, we have only postponed and not abandoned that other half. Circumstances may oblige us to bring this matter forward again at a future date.

52. I should like to make it quite clear that we reserved our position on the Canadian draft resolution [A/C.1/752/Rev.1] not because we were in disagreement with the proposal to refer the matter ultimately to the Disarmament Commission, but because we thought work of clarification should be done first. We further thought that such work would be of value in the discussions in the Disarmament Commission itself.

53. I was very pleased to observe in Mr. Lloyd's statement that he considered it to be the right and duty of all Powers to communicate their views to the Disarmament Commission. I should like to say here and now that the Australian Government will wish to present views in due course to the Disarmament Commission. We shall, however, need time to formulate those views and therefore suggest that the Commission should not embark upon any new programme of work until after the end of this session of the Assembly. I should like to point out that there is already provision in the Disarmament Commission's rules of procedure for the communication to the Commission of the views of other Powers. Indeed, as I read the rules, any nation has the right to appear before the Commission and to present its views orally, if invited so to do. I refer in particular to rules 28 and 29 of the rules of procedure of the Commission. We feel quite certain that the sponsors of the four-Power draft resolution [A/C.1/752/Rev.1] and the Disarmament Commission will welcome such medium-sized and small Powers as may wish to take advantage of these provisions.

54. One further reason for my pressing at the outset for the clarification of the outstanding differences between the great Powers was that, when we came to consider the draft resolutions before us, we should have been, in our judgment, better able to bring to bear a proper knowledge of the situation and less liable to be satisfied with mere words. At the eighth session during the discussion of the disarmament draft resolution, I felt — rightly or wrongly — that the exercise in which we were then engaged might not unreasonably be regarded as largely one of playing a game of words. This Committee, we all agree, has better things to do than to engage in semantics. To try to find words to express the terms of a real agreement is one thing. But we owe it to ourselves and to the peoples we represent not to fall into the error of papering over with words fundamental and deep differences which still exist.

55. We must not raise false hopes. Progress on paper is one thing, but so many problems remain unsolved that we should take very good care not to be over-optimistic and not to give the impression that significant

progress in substance has been achieved. Optimism is, as I have already said, a condition of the heart — or perhaps of the liver — more than of the mind. We should divorce our hearts from our minds to achieve reality. It would be more encouraging if the Soviet Union, rather than joining in the resolution game, gave some indication that it felt that the problem was one which affected humanity and did not regard it as a propaganda exercise related to the Soviet Union's objectives in Europe, Asia and elsewhere.

56. And so, having at the end of this Assembly made our true position as clear as possible to the people of the world, let us again turn back to continue, through discussion in the Disarmament Commission and with all the resources at our command, our attempts to find some common ground. I should have hoped that we could work out here and now in clear, precise terms exactly what we should ask the Disarmament Commission to do and that then, remembering our directions when we met again to discuss the subject, we should be able clearly to evaluate any progress which it might have been possible to make.

57. A resolution on the lines of our suggestion, asking the Secretariat to prepare a working paper, is, however, going an appreciable distance along the road. It is my hope that such a resolution will be unanimously adopted.

58. This year the Anglo-French proposals have shown a statesmanlike approach, and the world is indebted to them for their leadership in this complicated and vital matter. For our part, we were also most impressed by the contribution of the United States, particularly its working paper on the control organ. This, as others have already said, is really the crux of the whole matter. Let us hope that during this coming year some corresponding approach will be evoked from the Soviet Union. If, on the other hand, nothing has been achieved by next year, we should seriously consider the possibility of making some entirely new approach to the whole subject.

59. Mr. LEME (Brazil) (*translated from French*): The Brazilian delegation is confronted with a problem which it had to consider some months ago in the Disarmament Commission. I am glad to see that since that time considerable advances have been made towards the realization of a general hope, namely, the finding of a formula which may be used as a basis for final agreement on this question. The endeavours of the Subcommittee in London and the Disarmament Commission have not been in vain. We can see this from the debates of the First Committee, in which the subject has recently been studied from all angles, and where the areas of disagreement are being reduced further and further.

60. It is not easy to dispose of all the existing difficulties permanently. But we do not despair of seeing the day in the not-so-distant future, when the conclusion of a disarmament treaty can be celebrated without reservations.

61. I am even more hopeful than when I spoke on 26 July in the Disarmament Commission [40th meeting]. The Franco-British memorandum [DC/53, annex 9] had been rejected in London by Mr. Malik; in our meetings in New York it was not accepted by Mr. Tsarapkin. The French and United Kingdom proposal, as I said then "is a very important document, which should be valued at its true worth. It undoubtedly offers

² This text later appeared as A/C.1/L.101.

a suitable basis for a formal agreement between the nations which bear the major responsibility in this matter in virtue of their advances in atomic research and in the production of atomic weapons and the hydrogen bomb. Such an agreement is a matter of no greater concern to the United States, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and Canada than to other countries which lack the economic and military might of these great Powers”.

62. I was also very happy to hear Mr. Vyshinsky using quite a new language in the general debate [*484th plenary meeting*]. Moreover, the presentation of his draft resolution convinces us that the Soviet Union is prepared to help in solving this problem.

63. The changed attitude of the USSR Government is very clear from the explanatory memorandum [*A/2742/Add.1*] and the introduction to its draft resolution [*A/C.1/750*] which reads:

“The General Assembly instructs the United Nations Disarmament Commission to prepare and submit for confirmation by the Security Council a draft international convention (treaty) designed to strengthen peace and increase international security . . . on the basis of the French and United Kingdom proposals of 11 June 1954”.

64. The draft disarmament treaty, according to the Franco-British memorandum, should necessarily provide for the following: (a) the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type; (b) major reductions in all armed forces and conventional armaments; (c) the establishment of a control organ with rights and powers and functions adequate to guarantee the effective observance of the agreed prohibitions and reductions.

65. The USSR draft resolution proposes: (a) the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction; (b) their elimination from the armaments of States; (c) a substantial reduction in armaments; (d) the establishment of international control.

66. It is clear that up to that point there is no difference between the two proposals. They begin to diverge when it comes to the method to be followed in establishing control and the measures adopted in connexion with conventional armaments and nuclear weapons, budgetary appropriations for military requirements and armed forces.

67. It is not my intention to go into these divergences, on which my colleagues have already spoken with eloquence. I shall confine myself to a brief outline of the fundamental points in both proposals to enable us to judge how far we are from complete success.

68. The Franco-British memorandum suggests four stages for disarmament.

69. First stage: following the constitution of the control organ and as soon as that organ reports that it is able effectively to enforce them, the following measures: (a) limitation of over-all military man-power to 31 December 1953 levels; (b) limitation of over-all military expenditure to amounts spent in the year ending 31 December 1953.

70. Second stage: (a) one-half of the agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces shall take effect; (b) cessation of manufacture of all kinds of nuclear weapons and all other prohibited weapons.

71. Third stage: (a) the second half of the agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces shall take effect; (b) the total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes; (c) total prohibition and elimination of all other prohibited weapons.

72. Fourth stage: further reduction of the armaments and armed forces of the powers to the levels strictly necessary for the maintenance of internal security and the fulfilment of the obligations of signatory States under the terms of the United Nations Charter.

73. In the USSR proposal, these four stages are reduced to two. In the first stage, on the basis of the levels existing on 31 December 1953, States are to reduce their armaments, armed forces and budgetary appropriations for military requirements to the extent of 50 per cent of the agreed levels. In the second stage, the remaining 50 per cent of the agreed levels for armaments, armed forces and budgetary appropriations for military requirements will be reduced. There will also be a complete prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction, discontinuance of the production of such weapons and their entire elimination from the armaments of States; all existing atomic materials are to be used only for peaceful purposes.

74. I am no military expert and I am not qualified to make a detailed examination of the methods of bringing about general disarmament outlined in the two proposals. Only the parties concerned, in informal talks, will be able to overcome the obstacles and find the happy formula to which all parties will agree. That is why I am in favour of the proposal put forward by Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States [*A/C.1/752/Rev.1*] under which: (a) the Disarmament Commission would re-convene the Sub-Committee established in accordance with paragraphs 6 and 7 of General Assembly resolution 715 (VIII); and would report to the Security Council and to the General Assembly as soon as sufficient progress has been made.

75. But the basis of the proposed agreement must be its efficacy. Hence the need to establish a control organ, as provided in the Franco-British memorandum and the USSR proposal. The first calls for the establishment of a control organ “with rights and powers and functions adequate to guarantee the effective observance of the agreed prohibitions and reductions”. The control organ is to remain in being “to ensure that the reductions, prohibitions and eliminations are faithfully and permanently observed”. The USSR proposal suggests, in the first stage of its plan, the establishment of a temporary international control commission under the Security Council, with the right “to require States to provide the necessary information on the measures taken by them to reduce armaments and armed forces”.

76. In the second stage there would be instituted

“ . . . a standing international organ for the supervision of the implementation of the convention (treaty) on the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction, the discontinuance of the production of these weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States and the reduction of armaments, armed forces and appropriations for military requirements”.

77. I agree entirely with the comments made by Mr. Moch in his brilliant speech [*685th meeting*]. It is indeed difficult to understand why there should be two

control organs, one temporary and the other standing, if from the outset it is possible to try to establish this essential disarmament machinery on a solid basis.

78. The temporary control commission, under the Security Council, will certainly have to act on the Council's behalf. The executive decisions will be taken by the Council. The permanent members of the Council will have the right of veto. It is not clear whether the standing control organ will also be under the Council. But, in view of Mr. Vyshinsky's replies to the speeches of Mr. Moch and Mr. Belaúnde, that would appear to be the case. The veto would then constitute a permanent threat to the disarmament treaty.

79. It is true that the USSR representative has reduced that danger by stating that the veto would not apply within that framework so far as the application of Article 27, paragraph 3 of the Charter is concerned. I have great esteem for the talent and legal skill of my eminent colleague, formerly rector of the University of Moscow. But Mr. Vyshinsky knows very well that the historic factor is not decisive in the interpretation of treaties and laws.

80. The experts will consider the question whether the control organ, endowed with all the powers required to enable it to carry out its purpose, is to be established under the Security Council or not. I am not against either of those two possibilities. But, if the organ is set up under the Security Council and requires the Council's approval to apply any sanctions which may be recommended, it is essential that the five permanent members of the Council should, in the treaty, renounce their right of veto in respect of the application of the disarmament regulations to be laid down. No country will be able to sign the treaty to be prepared if, in that instrument, there is any possibility of making a distinction between large and small, or strong and weak States, which have or have not a privileged vote in the Council. That renunciation is a safeguard even for the permanent members of the Security Council, since it will prevent any one of them being able to annul by its vote a decision which is in the interests of the other four.

81. But these are all details which are to be examined by the Sub-Committee and the Disarmament Commission. Let us await with confidence the outcome of their labours. The important thing is that the world, which is so anxious for the establishment of true peace, is awaiting the satisfactory outcome of our efforts. We hope that the five Powers of the Sub-Committee will succeed in reconciling all views and in preparing a proposal sponsored by France, the United Kingdom and the USSR, which can also be endorsed by Canada and the United States. The Disarmament Commission must proceed to draft the disarmament treaty, which will be submitted to the Security Council and the General Assembly. As soon as it has been adopted by a world disarmament conference, the treaty will be opened for accession by all States, and can be put into operation immediately.

82. The fate of all mankind is hanging on the goodwill of all the Governments and all the peoples. We are here listen to the voices of the peoples and to await the decisions of Governments. From the four corners of the earth a united appeal for peace can be heard. It is our duty to give the world the safety which it demands. We must be worthy of the responsibility entrusted to us by our Governments and our peoples. Let us pray that

our spirits may be enlightened by divine grace and let us continue our work with confidence.

83. Mrs. SEKANINOVA-ČAKRTOVA (Czechoslovakia): A significant feature of the consideration of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction thus far has been that this very vital question is being discussed in our Committee under circumstances more favourable than at any other time in the past, under circumstances which give justified hopes of fruitful results.

84. Recent international negotiations, especially the conferences at Berlin and Geneva, confirm that it is the road of negotiation which leads to the solution of outstanding international problems. It is such negotiations as an effective means in the solution of international problems that must receive special emphasis in connexion with the issue of disarmament. There is no other international problem to which this truth — that the only effective means towards a satisfactory solution is that of seeking agreement — is more applicable. In the course of the discussion a number of delegations have rightly stressed that the problem of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction cannot be solved by any other means than by negotiation, with goodwill on both sides.

85. The Czechoslovak delegation concurs in the opinion expressed by almost all representatives who have taken part in the discussion that considerable success has already been attained on the path towards agreement on the vital question of disarmament. All these successes are the result of negotiation. There can be no doubt — and a number of delegations have noted this in the discussion — that the results achieved thus far have been made possible first and foremost by the new initiative of the Soviet Union, the initiative expressed in the proposals contained in the Soviet Union draft resolution [A/C.1/750].

86. Without intending to enter into consideration of past discussions on the question of disarmament, we should like to recall that from the very creation of the United Nations the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has been submitting just and concrete proposals for the elimination of the danger of a new war, for the prohibition of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction and for the reduction of armaments. All these proposals of the Soviet Union are marked by an untiring and unceasing endeavour for the maintenance and strengthening of a lasting peace. A common and fundamental trait of the Soviet Union proposals which have at all times been in harmony with the development of the international situation and which have taken account of the concrete circumstances and conditions under which they were submitted, is the consistent endeavour for agreement on these important international problems. The Soviet Union proposals have been and are an expression of the vital interests of peace-loving peoples all over the world.

87. As a result of the development of science and technology, atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction represent an ever-increasing threat of annihilation. The danger which hangs over mankind in the form of these weapons, a danger unknown to past generations, has become a new factor in the strivings of humanity to eliminate the danger of war. A number of representatives have, in the course of the discussion, given expressive descriptions of the horrors that the utilization of these new weapons of destruction would

bring upon humanity. The peoples of the world, who are coming to an ever-increasing awareness of this danger, call with ever greater determination for the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and for the reduction of armaments. Mankind meets this increasing danger by the increasing unity with which it demands agreement on the most important international issue of our times, the question of disarmament. There should be but one camp in the defence of peace and security — the call of the peoples.

88. The endeavour to reach agreement on important international questions is also a fundamental characteristic of the Soviet Union proposals submitted on 30 September 1954 for the consideration of the ninth session of the General Assembly. The Soviet Union proposes the drafting and conclusion of an international convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction, and takes as a basis the proposals made by France and the United Kingdom on 11 June 1954 [DC/53, annex 9].

89. A study of the Soviet Union proposals, as well as the course of our discussion so far, already give today a clear indication of the considerable *rapprochement* of the opinions and views of individual Member States on the question of the principles which are to guide the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, as well as on the methods which are to be used to these ends. This favourable situation has been made possible by the fact that each one of the two sides has taken certain steps which reduce the existing differences of opinion. This fact has found its clearest expression in the question of the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction.

90. The Franco-British proposals contain — and this represents considerable progress against all previous proposals of the Western Powers — provisions for the complete prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction. Undoubtedly, this is the most significant step taken by the Western Powers, a step by which they have accepted the main principle of the Soviet Union proposals. And when, on 20 October 1954 [694th meeting], the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, spoke of the issues on which the Western Powers have met the points of the Soviet Union, he justly referred to this step first.

91. As against the position adopted by the Western Powers in the past, the Franco-British memorandum is based on the need for dealing with the question of conventional armaments and nuclear weapons at the same time. The Western Powers have thereby abandoned the position that consideration should first be given to the solution of the problem of the reduction of conventional armaments and only after such a reduction had been effected should there be discussion on the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

92. The Franco-British proposals likewise abandon the former concepts maintained by the Western Powers, according to which the main objective was disclosure and verification, a concept which relegated the reduction of armaments into the background and deferred the prohibition of nuclear weapons to a nebulous and distant future.

93. In determining the scope of the agreement on disarmament in paragraph 2 of the memorandum of 11 June 1954, the Western Powers accepted the principle advocated by the Soviet Union that the convention

on disarmament should form an integral and comprehensive whole which would solve at the same time the questions of the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, the reduction of armaments and effective international control.

94. There has likewise been considerable *rapprochement* in the position of both sides on the problem of international control over the implementation of the agreement on disarmament, though there still remains a certain number of questions which require further discussion.

95. The Soviet Union proposals provide for effective measures for the establishment of international control over the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments. These proposals envisage, in the first stage, the establishment of a temporary international control commission for the effective control of the reduction of armaments; and, in the second stage, the establishment of a standing international organ for control of the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction and the further reduction of armaments. The Franco-British proposals foresee the establishment of one single control organ for all stages of the implementation of the agreed disarmament programme. Certain delegations, to our mind, have placed undue emphasis on the differences between the Soviet Union proposals and the Franco-British proposals.

96. The proposals of the USSR for the establishment of two control organs are a logical consequence of the fact that these proposals, in the interest of making agreement possible, have accepted the concept of phases in the implementation of the disarmament programme. The head of the Soviet Union delegation, Mr. Vyshinsky, has given convincing proof that it is reasonable and necessary to establish two control organs. In presenting their proposals in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission in London, both Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Moch also stressed the difference in the control functions in the first and second phases. Thus, for instance, Mr. Lloyd explained [17th meeting] that "... in the course of this first phase the control organ would be preparing itself for its fuller tasks thereafter". And at the same meeting Mr. Moch, speaking of the first phase, added, "... it" — the first phase — "calls only for the verification of simple data, in particular by the use of spot-checks, and demands only a relatively lenient and easily-positioned measure of control". If there is then — and the authors of the Franco-British proposals have pointed to this — such a fundamental difference as to the control functions between the first and second phases, it seems only logical that there should also be a different composition of the control organs and different methods of control.

97. As to the important principles, the Franco-British proposals are a step forward as compared to the position maintained by the Western Powers in the past. The Franco-British proposals are thus not contrary to the fundamental principles of the Soviet Union proposals on the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and the reduction of armaments. The new Soviet Union proposals do not make agreement contingent upon the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. In the interest of making agreement possible on the questions of disarmament, the Soviet Union proposals accept the Franco-British proposals of 11 June 1954 as a basis for the drafting of an international convention on the

substantial reduction of armaments and on the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction, a convention that would serve the strengthening of peace and international security.

98. The Soviet Government's proposals are a further proof of its willingness carefully to examine and take account of every proposal which could aid in halting the armaments race, eliminating the danger of war and strengthening world peace and security. It is an apt reply to all fabricated allegations as to an "unbending attitude" on the part of the Soviet Union. Such allegations can have but one aim: to thwart and prevent agreement on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. They are voiced by those international forces which do not desire the relaxation of international tension and the elimination of the danger of a new war.

99. In the course of our discussions in the First Committee we have sometimes heard such opinions expressed. We fully share the one already expressed by certain delegations that the best way we can help to promote agreement is to believe it possible and demand it with conviction. We have noted with satisfaction that the opinions hostile to agreement have remained isolated and that the voice which predominates in our deliberation is that of faith in the possibility of agreement on those questions which are still at issue.

100. To us optimism is not a matter of false hopes and we firmly believe that instead of divorcing them, as was proposed to us here today, crystal clear minds and fervent hearts have to be joined to achieve living reality. In the discussion we have also heard voices complaining of lack of confidence which they claim is a serious obstacle on the path towards agreement. An atmosphere of confidence and trust is undoubtedly a positive factor in international relations. It does not, however, come about of and by itself. Lack of confidence is not the cause but the consequence of the fact that important international problems have remained unsolved. Good will on both sides and a persistent endeavour for a solution of outstanding international problems can, above all, lead to the creation of an atmosphere of confidence, the lessening of international tension and the solution of important issues. It is this endeavour which has brought about the termination of war in Korea and the restoration of peace in Indo-China. These important successes represent steps forward for the cause of peace. Constant efforts and the untiring strivings of all interested parties can achieve a satisfactory solution of the problem of disarmament, a solution which will eliminate the very possibility of war, liberate mankind from the threat of war and offer it the perspective of lasting peace and well-being.

101. The discovery of the possibilities for the practical utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes is undoubtedly a remarkable success of modern science. The fact that already at the present time an atomic power station has been put into operation in the Soviet Union has aroused hopes and the conviction that the immense forces of nature will be used for peaceful purposes, for the well-being of all mankind. The utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes in the Soviet Union has opened a new era in human history.

102. The peoples of all lands demand with increasing urgency, that the world be freed from the armaments race and the heavy burden of military expenditures. Great tasks await the industrially developed countries

in the promotion of the economies of the under-developed countries in large areas of the world. The full utilization of atomic energy for peace will only be possible if agreement is achieved on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction.

103. As a result of the initiative of the Soviet Union, which has been welcomed and appreciated by all the delegations, there is agreement on the main principles of disarmament and a considerable *rapprochement* on a series of further questions related to the implementation of the agreement. There would be no point, of course, in ignoring the fact that the drafting of a convention on disarmament will still require the solution of a number of important questions.

104. There can, however, be no doubt that agreement on the substance, on principles, and *rapprochement* of views, forms a solid basis for further negotiations and offers real perspectives for success, provided that all the other great Powers concerned will manifest the same will for agreement as the Soviet Union has done by its proposals of 30 September 1954.

105. It has been said here repeatedly, and rightly, that the significant task of reaching agreement on disarmament is primarily in the hands of the great Powers. It is no less true and just, we believe, that if this agreement is to be effected successfully all countries must contribute to this end. Czechoslovakia, a highly developed country with a modern industry, possessing important raw materials, a country whose Government, in harmony with the will of the people, unceasingly pursues a policy of peace, is firmly determined to make its contribution to this great cause.

106. Mr. HANIFAH (Indonesia): The deliberations on the report of the Disarmament Commission [DC/55] and on the conclusion of an international convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction are of the greatest import to all nations, large and small. The hopes and fears engendered by these two items weigh equally upon the conscience of all peoples. We recognize, of course, that the great Powers have the primary responsibility for securing and maintaining peace and it is vital for world peace that these Powers reconcile their differences. But it is also true that it is the small or the so-called under-developed countries which most desperately need peace.

107. Indeed, it is questionable in this age of nuclear weapons to speak of a country or group of countries needing peace. It is all too self-evident that today all countries need and desire peace, that no country can any longer afford the risks inherent in all-out warfare. Nevertheless, it is worth stressing that the so-called under-developed countries cannot afford even so-called limited wars or, for that matter, even a "cold war". We are all only too well aware of the tragic fact that so much of the resources and capital now expended for military purposes could be expended on much more profitable and lasting projects. This is, in the opinion of my delegation, a compound tragedy since we are convinced that the surest way to strengthen peace is not by building up military strength, but through the economic and social advancement of all peoples, and especially those of the so-called under-developed areas.

108. Therefore, my delegation has listened with care and attention to the various statements made in the course of our present deliberations. Aside from the

refreshing atmosphere permeating our discussions — of which mention has been made by many other representatives — my delegation has heartened to find that an encouraging field of agreement now exists between the parties most concerned, as a consequence of the acceptance by the Soviet Union of the Franco-British memorandum [DC/53, annex 9] as a basis in their proposal. The clarifications offered by Mr. Vyshinsky, the representative of the Soviet Union, seem to my delegation both reasonable and constructive. They have shown, indeed, that far greater agreement and future possibilities for agreement exist than may have been originally thought by many delegations. All this, of course, serves to enhance the already bright atmosphere and to justify and nourish our hopes for a successful solution of this complex problem. In fact, even the differences still existing between the parties principally concerned are generally being acknowledged in such a friendly fashion as to make it almost inconceivable that their solution will not likewise be forthcoming. For this happy state of affairs I think we should give all due credit to the constructive contributions made by the representatives of the Powers most concerned.

109. Having closely followed and studied the discussion in this Committee, my delegation feels that it has attained a somewhat clearer idea of the points on which it may be said that the parties concerned are already in agreement, those on which the present discussion is going in the direction of agreement and, finally, those matters on which serious and detailed negotiations still have to be conducted. Many distinguished representatives have already listed the points on which there is now general agreement. Yet, it may be well to enumerate them again, even if our excuse is only that it gives us pleasure to do so. In any case, it can do no harm and it may do some good.

110. First, the principal parties agree that it is necessary to make mutual concessions. And there is general agreement among all present here — and I venture to say also among those not present here — that this trend should be encouraged and continued.

111. Second, there is common agreement that, on the basis of the Franco-British memorandum, efforts should be made to attain agreement on the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction and their elimination from the armaments of States, a substantial or major reduction in all armed forces and conventional armaments, and the establishment of an effective international control over the implementation of these decisions.

112. Third, there is now common agreement that disarmament should be effected in stages.

113. Fourth, it has been generally accepted that the immediate prohibition of nuclear weapons need not precede agreement on and implementation of reductions in the field of conventional armaments. This alone is a significant contribution towards progress.

114. Fifth, there is common agreement that major reductions of all armed forces and conventional armaments shall be made from the strength existing on 31 December 1953, and that it should be effected in two stages to the extent of 50 per cent of the agreed levels.

115. Sixth, there is agreement on the necessity of an effective and powerful control machinery.

116. Seventh, there is agreement that when the decisions of the disarmament convention are put into

effect, there must also be effective control to ensure compliance thereof.

117. Lastly, all the principal parties agree on the desirability of pursuing further negotiations.

118. My delegation feels that these are certainly no mean accomplishments. Perhaps some may find it difficult to reconcile themselves to the rate of progress. Certainly all of us would like to see it accelerated considerably. But after all, what we are after is not only speed but, in the first place, results acceptable to the parties most concerned. My delegation feels that in the present friendly atmosphere there is at least a good chance of attaining this end, particularly if, when considering the still seemingly insoluble aspects of the disarmament problem, we keep in mind the accomplishments already achieved through negotiations and mutual compromise. Indeed, if the problem is in the right spirit, we may well find that there is far less divergency of views on many points than may appear to us now.

119. In this respect, I may cite the question of what norm to follow in effecting major reductions of all armed forces and conventional armaments. It appears to us important to bear in mind that, while favouring one method or another, none of the parties insists that there is one way and only one way of accomplishing major reductions. Moreover, all parties concur that a disarmament programme — including, of course, major reductions of all armed forces and conventional armaments — must be carried out in such a manner that no State will have cause to fear that its security is endangered. If we are correct in this assumption, then we wonder whether it is at all necessary or even wise to persist in using the word “balanced” in connexion with reduction. At least to my delegation, the word “balanced” is just another way of expressing the all-around acceptable criteria of ensuring that all States will feel secure. In fact, it is clear that in the absence of a feeling of security among all the parties concerned, there can be no agreement on a disarmament convention. Why, therefore, use the controversial word “balanced”?

120. Furthermore, there is agreement on the fact that the great Powers should take the lead in reducing armed forces and conventional armaments. This is only natural. But in doing so, it seems important to my delegation that the great Powers think in terms not only of relative strength or, as the representative of India, Mr. Menon, put it [693rd meeting], “equitable” adjustments *vis-à-vis* each other, but in a much wider context. In seeking security for all States, consideration must be given, at least under present world conditions, to the existence of two world camps. That is, a feeling of security must realistically be sought in terms of these two groupings, rather than simply along the lines of the individual great Powers.

121. In short then, there is at this time agreement on the need for major reductions of all armed forces and conventional armaments, on the level from which these reductions are to be made, on the stages of the reductions and, finally, on the necessity of proceeding in such an equitable manner as to ensure the security of all States. It should, therefore, surely not be beyond our collective wit to find some mutually acceptable formula for attaining a goal to which all parties subscribe. Indeed, we all want to go to the same place. We have only to find, through further negotiations, the way of going there together.

122. Another question which has provoked a great deal of discussion is the one relating to the future functions of the control machinery. Here again we wish respectfully to submit that there may actually not be so much divergence of thought as may appear on the surface. Statements made by Mr. Moch and Mr. Vyshinsky have led my delegation to believe that there is, at least, general agreement in principle that many violations of the future disarmament convention, not reasonably constituting a threat to the peace, would be directly handled by the control machinery without reference to the Security Council. Thus, we see again common agreement on what is wanted, but not yet on how it may be obtained. But this aspect of the question, we are sure, should lend itself to solution through negotiations.

123. Of even greater import is the fact that both sides seem to hold strongly that whatever functions may be given to the control machinery, they must not conflict with or in any way supersede the primary functions of the Security Council under the Charter. This seems to be the stand of both Mr. Vyshinsky and Mr. Moch. If I may, let me just quote a relevant portion of Mr. Moch's statement of 18 October 1954 [692nd meeting]:

"We do not in any way confuse sanctions, within the meaning of Articles 39, 41 *et seq.* of the Charter, with the actual functions of the control organ. We have never thought of vesting the control organ with the power of sanction envisaged in Article 39, because it would be unthinkable for two bodies to have that power simultaneously and thus be able to take contradictory decisions. It must therefore be clearly understood that as soon as there is a threat to the peace, within the meaning of Article 39, that is to say when it is determined that there exists a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression, the powers of the Security Council remain exactly as the Charter provides. This must be very clearly understood by us all, as the problem is sufficiently difficult to solve without any such further complications as might be created by proposing a revision of the Charter in the course of negotiations on disarmament."

124. My delegation fully endorses the sentiment expressed by Mr. Moch; namely, that we must not further complicate an already difficult problem. This means also that we must avoid taking an as yet unbridged gap for an impassable abyss. Let me repeat that, although now we may with difficulty only glimpse points on which, in principle, both parties are in step, further exhaustive discussions may well reveal that agreement is not so far away on even the methods to assure practical results.

125. In the course of our present debate, the fear has been repeatedly voiced that corrective measures against a wilful violator of a future disarmament convention may be impeded by the use of the veto. But, as earlier suggested — and I think rightly so — by the representative of Yugoslavia in his statement of 14 October 1954 [689th meeting], any attempt to impose enforcement measures against a serious violator would inevitably result in the total collapse of the disarmament convention. In fact, if a serious violation went unchecked, what would that actually mean? Obviously, it could only mean a resumption of the arms race, particularly in the field of nuclear weapons. Now, it seems to my delegation that, if there is validity in the often heard assertion that the threat of the use of atomic weapons constitutes today a powerful deterrent to any would be aggressor,

then we should also hold as valid the suggestion that the collapse of the disarmament convention, with its inevitable consequence of a nuclear weapons race and even a world war on that basis, would be as powerful a deterrent to any would-be wilful violator of a disarmament convention. Such a deterrent would be, of course, only additional to the strong moral pressure exerted against any would-be violator which, as the representative of Yugoslavia pointed out, should not be underestimated.

126. Indeed, discussions on measures of enforcement unquestionably reflect a lack of confidence. Yet, it should be remembered that it is generally acknowledged that a relaxation of tension and disarmament are inter-related. Disarmament would surely be carried out hand-in-hand with an increase of exchange in the cultural, economic and scientific fields. Can we now assess the confidence and understanding that may be generated in such an open world where nations and peoples, freed from thinking in military terms, will be thinking exclusively in terms of peace?

127. Of course, it should be clearly understood that I am not speaking of irresponsibility or of confidence foolishly placed. There will be supervision — powerful and effective control — of compliance with the decisions of a disarmament convention. We cannot have confidence in promises alone. And, indeed, it might be foolish to have that much confidence. But certainly, at least in the opinion of my delegation, we cannot agree on a disarmament programme, we cannot even talk about one, if there is not a minimum amount of confidence. That is, we may all wish to assure ourselves that the faith we place in all parties strictly to observe the terms of a disarmament programme is justified. But we cannot proceed unless we initially have that faith in the good intentions of all the parties concerned. Otherwise, one must ask, what is the use of even talking about a future disarmament convention? What is the use of asking for clarifications, if one is already of the mind that one of the parties will probably violate the convention?

128. On this matter of clarifications, I may also note that my delegation feels that it may not always be good to ask questions which required "yes" or "no" answers. In the first place, questions that may seem simple to one party, requiring only a "yes" or "no" answer, may truly not be that simple for the other party. It must be taken into consideration that the party questioned may well find it rather difficult to give a "yes" or "no" reply, before many other related aspects of the entire problem have been clarified and exhaustively negotiated. Secondly, our purpose in seeking clarifications should obviously not be merely to ascertain whether or not disagreement exists, but to find out wherein the disagreement lies in order to try to reach agreement.

129. In this respect, I wish to say that my delegation sees considerable merit in the suggestion made by the Chairman of the Australian delegation, Sir Percy Spender, to set up a sub-committee of the First Committee for the purpose of obtaining clarification. The functions of such a sub-committee, as outlined by Sir Percy Spender [688th meeting], were: "to report upon the precise nature of the issues between the parties; to report upon the extent to which there has been any agreement in principle or detail on any of those issues; to report upon the principles and details of differences; and to report upon the nature of such proposals as have been advanced in an effort to bridge these differences".

130. My delegation feels that these are reasonable and possibly very profitable functions. However, we would like to offer the suggestion that, rather than reporting upon the principles and details of differences, the proposed sub-committee should be requested to report on those principles and details on which further negotiations are required. In other words, the functions of the proposed sub-committee would then be: (a) to report upon the precise nature of the issues between the parties, (b) to report upon the extent to which there has been any agreement in principle or detail on any of those issues, and (c) to report upon the principles and details which require further negotiations — I repeat, which require further negotiations.

131. Such a sub-committee of the First Committee should be small in number and should include the five Powers most concerned. Indeed, it might well have the same composition as the sub-committee of the Disarmament Commission.

132. The setting up of such a sub-committee would, in our opinion, serve a twofold purpose. First, it would greatly clarify the situation on disarmament as it now exists. It would provide this Committee with a much better basis from which to continue our discussions. And it might even result in the adoption of proposals by this Committee which would measurably facilitate the task of reconciling the views of the Powers principally concerned, when private negotiations are resumed. My delegation certainly hopes so and will for its part, strive to promote or make easier a meeting of minds. Secondly, the proposed sub-committee would perform a function which, in any case, would have to be done before the Disarmament Commission or Sub-Committee thereof could get down to serious negotiations. There would be no duplication of work or procrastination. On the contrary, the functions performed by the proposed sub-committee would clear the way for the countries most concerned to settle down immediately to serious and detailed negotiations, as soon as they are resumed.

133. As regards the draft resolution originally submitted by Canada [*A/C.1/752/Rev.1*], I do not intend at this juncture to discuss it in detail. It suffices to say that, at the proper time, my delegation certainly is in favour of having the Disarmament Commission reconvene the Sub-Committee established in accordance with paragraphs 6 and 7 of General Assembly resolution 715 (VIII), as suggested in operative paragraph 3 of the Canadian draft resolution. And we sincerely hope that the Soviet Union will be able to join France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America in co-sponsoring the Canadian draft resolution.

134. Before concluding I would like to say a few words as regards the subject matter contained in annexes 1 and 2 of the fourth report of the Disarmament Commission, [*DC/55*] which, I regret to say, has not yet received the fullest consideration by the Disarmament Commission. The considered opinion of my Government on the question of the cessation of all further experiments in the field of thermo-nuclear and atomic weapons, as well as fully publicizing the extent of destructive power and known effects of these weapons, was clearly stated in the Colombo Conference *communiqué* issued by the Foreign Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Pakistan and Indonesia. In that *communiqué*, the five Prime Ministers of South and South-East Asia declared that they were of the opinion that,

"no further explosions of hydrogen bombs should take place, and that the United Nations and the powers principally concerned should take steps to publish authoritative information regarding the destructive capabilities and the known and probable disastrous effects of these weapons". They went on to express the belief, "that such publication, by arousing the conscience of the world, would help in the search for an agreed solution of the grave problem that threatens humanity".

135. My delegation hopes that the Disarmament Commission will soon give its attention to this urgent matter. We hope that the Powers concerned will come to some sort of standstill agreement on thermonuclear and atomic experimental explosions. I think that it is important to call attention here to the growing feeling of uneasiness among the peoples of Asia. Indonesia and the other countries of Asia are not producers or stock-pilers of these weapons of mass destruction; yet, it is the peoples of Asia who have been the first victims of both atomic and thermonuclear explosions. There is, therefore, an added urgency in our call for an end to thermonuclear and atomic explosions; and we feel that this is not too much to ask of the Powers principally concerned. As the representative of Burma pointed out in his statement in the General Assembly [*485th plenary meeting*], any violation of such a standstill agreement could be readily detected and would earn for the violator the condemnation of the entire world.

136. Mr. KISELYOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): The speakers who preceded me have recognized the necessity for the conclusion of an international convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction. They have also pointed out that the increasingly destructive force of atomic weapons and the appearance of the many times more powerful hydrogen weapon makes such a prohibition a matter of particular urgency. The history of the last two world wars testifies to the fact that war inflicts enormous destruction, devastation and suffering on mankind.

137. We must never forget the lessons of history. We must always remember that it is written in the Charter of the United Nations that the peoples of the United Nations are determined "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind".

138. From the four corners of the globe telegrams and letters are pouring into the United Nations from social organizations and ordinary people everywhere, demanding the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and all other weapons of mass destruction. They demand that their Governments and, above all, the great Powers, reach an agreement to prohibit the use of weapons of mass destruction.

139. Consistently pursuing its policy of peace, the Soviet Government has repeatedly condemned the utilization of the great achievements of science for the purpose of exterminating human beings and wreaking destruction and has submitted proposals to the United Nations designed to bring about the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments. The Soviet Union has made these proposals because it believes that they meet the ever-growing demands by the peoples of the world that the conventional and atomic armaments race should be brought to an end and that measures should be taken to save mankind from the

threat of destructive wars. The Soviet Union has repeatedly made significant changes in and additions to its proposals in order to make agreement possible on these difficult but very important questions. At the current session of the General Assembly the Soviet delegation has submitted new proposals [*A/C.1/750*], on the "conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction".

140. Proceeding on the basis of the Franco-British proposals of 11 June 1954 [*DC/53, annex 9*], with a number of changes, the Soviet Government has sought to meet the Western Powers half-way on the question of disarmament. These proposals do not run counter to the principles advocated by the Soviet Union in connexion with the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons and because of this offer the possibility of achieving the necessary agreement on these important issues.

141. The Byelorussian delegation is glad to note that the great majority of the representatives who have spoken here have welcomed the proposals which were made by Mr. Vyshinsky, Chairman of the Soviet delegation, at the 484th plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 30 September 1954 and have expressed the hope that there would be continued efforts to bring closer together the points of view of the great Powers, for the sake of man's future happiness.

142. In this regard, I should like to mention the statement made by Mr. Guérin de Beaumont, Chairman of the French delegation, at the General Assembly on 4 October 1954 [*487th meeting*]. Mr. Guérin de Beaumont said: "In this connexion I am happy to be able to express from this rostrum the satisfaction we experienced in listening to the proposals and statements put forward by Mr. Vyshinsky in his speech on 30 September. They are worthy of all our attention".

143. I should also like to refer to the statement made in this Committee on 12 October 1954 [*687th meeting*] by Mr. Serrano, representative of the Philippines, who said that the Soviet Union proposals represented a remarkable advance.

144. In his statement in this Committee on 13 October 1954, Sir Percy Spender, the representative of Australia, said [*688th meeting*]: "... the views of the Soviet Union and the Western Powers... this year appear to have come somewhat closer together than ever before in the long consideration which the United Nations has devoted to the disarmament problem."

145. Unfortunately, the statements by the United States representative have struck a somewhat dissonant chord in this Committee. The line taken by Mr. Wadsworth in his statement of 19 October 1954 [*693rd meeting*] was, in our opinion, designed not to bring closer together the different points of view on the problems under discussion but to emphasize what he called the differences. At the very beginning of his statement he said, "The general debate on disarmament... has shown that the differences between the Soviet Union and the free world are almost... as great as ever". We do not agree with this assertion by Mr. Wadsworth.

146. In basing its proposals on the Franco-British memorandum of 11 June 1954, the Soviet Union has gone a long way towards meeting the Western Powers. It is wrong to assert that the Soviet Union has not

really based its draft resolution on the Franco-British proposals of 11 June 1954. A comparison of the Soviet and the Franco-British proposals will show that their fundamental ideas and provisions are identical, witnessing to the fact that considerable progress has been made towards agreement on a whole series of questions connected with disarmament. We are glad to note that there is an identity of views between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union as to the provisions the disarmament treaty is to contain.

147. It is essential to note that as early as 21 May 1954, at a meeting of the Sub-Committee in London [*7th meeting*], Mr. Lloyd recognized that agreement had been reached between the Soviet Union and the three Western Powers "on the main principle, that we want a prohibition of atomic weapons, a reduction of conventional armaments and the establishment of an international control organ". Both the Soviet Union and the Franco-British proposals call for a reduction in conventional armaments and armed forces, from the strength existing on 31 December 1953, in two stages, first by 50 per cent of the agreed levels, and then by the remaining 50 per cent of those levels.

148. The Soviet Union, which previously opposed the carrying out of the disarmament programme by stages, has now agreed to its being carried out in two stages. The Soviet Union does not now insist that the prohibition of atomic weapons should precede the reduction of armaments and armed forces. The Franco-British memorandum provides that on completion of the first half of the agreed reductions of armaments and armed forces, the manufacture of all kinds of nuclear weapons and other prohibited weapons is to cease, and that after the second half of the agreed reductions of armaments and armed forces has taken effect, the total prohibition of nuclear weapons is to be carried out. These most important proposals also form the basis of the Soviet draft resolution. All this indicates an identity of views on important questions of principle in connexion with the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

149. The present debate has already made it possible to clarify and harmonize views on a number of other questions. Mr. Moch, for example, has agreed with what Mr. Vyshinsky said here, namely, that the international control organ must be subordinate to the Security Council, that the Security Council is its higher authority, and that the veto may not be used in the control organ. Obviously, however, none of this suits the United States representative. His statement of 19 October was directed not only against the Soviet proposals but also against the Franco-British proposals, against both sets of proposals which are basically identical. That is the only possible construction to be put on his statement to the effect that "important as they are, neither the Franco-British memorandum nor the Soviet proposal, nor in fact the two combined, can be said to constitute a complete disarmament programme". We cannot agree with such a negative appraisal. These proposals do represent the fundamental principles of a disarmament programme.

150. It goes without saying that every step taken towards agreement among the great Powers to eliminate the danger of the use of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction and to bring about the cessation of the armaments race must enlist the support of all members of this Committee.

151. The representative of Syria and others are quite right to assert that the medium-sized and small countries, which are anxious for a real solution of these questions, can help to advance the cause of putting into effect the prohibition of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction and the reduction of armaments and armed forces.

152. The representative of the United States concentrated his fire on the powers and functions of the international control organ, alleging that "...the Soviet Union objects to thorough and effective international control". He poured out an endless stream of questions with the object of obscuring the Soviet Union's clear proposals on this subject. Mr. Vyshinsky, Chairman of the Soviet Union delegation, has already made many statements giving exhaustive replies to all the questions which have been asked concerning the powers and functions both of the temporary international control commission and of the standing international organ proposed by the Soviet Union. I shall, therefore, be brief.

153. The Soviet draft resolution proposes a programme for the carrying out of measures for the reduction of armaments, the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction and the institution of control over the implementation of those measures, which appreciably shortens and simplifies the practical application of the basic disarmament provisions.

154. Mr. Lloyd, in his statement, said that the question of timing and putting the control organ into operation was an important issue. In my delegation's view, the establishment of the temporary international control commission proposed in the Soviet draft resolution, to be followed by the institution of the standing international control organ, within the framework of the Security Council, simultaneously with the carrying out of disarmament measures at each stage, represents precisely that timing to which Mr. Lloyd referred. We do not see any contradiction here.

155. The representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France maintain the stand that there must first be control and then the carrying out of disarmament measures. In support of this they allege that the establishment of the control organ before the implementation of the disarmament programme would provide better safeguards for the observance of the disarmament treaty than are provided for in the Soviet proposals. This is an attempt to create the impression that the Soviet proposals on control provide no safeguards for the observance of the treaty. In our view such an assertion is incorrect.

156. The Soviet Union's proposals for the establishment of a standing international control organ are in full accord with the principles governing the general regulation and reduction of armaments set forth in the General Assembly resolution 41 (I) of 14 December 1946, which was adopted unanimously and for which the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom voted.

157. The Soviet draft resolution provides that at the second stage, simultaneously with the application of the second series of disarmament measures, the contracting States will institute a standing international organ for the supervision of the implementation of the convention on the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction, the discontinuance

of the production of these weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States and the reduction of armaments, armed forces and appropriations for military requirements. This international organ is to have full powers of supervision, including the power of inspection on a continuing basis to the extent necessary to ensure implementation of the convention by all States.

158. The system of international control proposed by the Soviet Union includes the notion that the full powers of the control organ are to become more extensive *pari passu* with the transition from the first to the second stage of disarmament and provides for far-reaching measures to ensure strict international control.

159. It is clear from the previous Soviet proposals on the atomic question that the Soviet Union contemplates not control in general but technological control over atomic undertakings; not merely supervision of the fulfilment by States of their obligations, but also the working out of rules of technological control and the right of the international control organ to prescribe such rules for undertakings engaged in the processing of atomic raw materials and all other undertakings using atomic substances.

160. The United States representative, Mr. Wadsworth, the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Lloyd, and the Netherlands representative, Mr. de Kadt, have praised to the skies the "working paper on methods of implementing and enforcing disarmament programmes" [DC/53, annex 4] submitted by the United States to the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission at London on 25 May 1954.

161. It should be admitted that this document is based on the earlier Baruch plan³, which provided that a control organ should be established first, to be followed by the progressive and continuous disclosure and verification by that organ of information concerning conventional armaments and armed forces, and then by the balanced reduction of armaments and armed forces.

162. In essence, the question of the prohibition of atomic weapons and the control of such prohibition has been left out of this working paper. This question does not fall within the jurisdiction either of the "Disarmament Division" or of the "Atomic Development Division". In the definition given of the functions of the control organ itself the word "control" scarcely occurs. Instead, vague, indefinite terms such as "safeguards to ensure enforcement", "enforcement of the programme", "problems of the development of atomic energy", and the like are used. In place of the clear, unequivocal and definite concept "atomic and hydrogen weapons", indefinite concepts such as "items critical primarily to atomic development" are introduced.

163. This document provides neither for the prohibition of atomic weapons, nor for the reduction of armed forces and armaments, nor for the establishment of an effective system of international control over prohibition and reduction.

164. All these important questions are replaced in this document by a single proposal for the disclosure and verification of information on conventional armaments and armed forces. At the same time, this working paper is nothing more nor less than a refurbished version of the old Baruch Plan with all mention of its real author omitted. Under paragraph 41

³ See *Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, First Year*, No. 1.

of the United States working paper, the control organ is empowered to bring about the suspension of the supply of nuclear materials to States and to close plants utilizing nuclear materials. The effect of this paragraph is that the control organ is empowered to suspend completely the supply of nuclear materials to States which are suspected of violating the treaty, or even to close plants in those States. Measures such as the suspension of the supply of nuclear materials and the closure of atomic undertakings affect the vital interests of a State's entire economy and therefore cannot be left to the control organ's discretion.

165. It is clear from all I have said that such a control plan will not ensure the solution of the main problem of prohibiting atomic weapons and establishing control over such prohibition. Such a plan will not ensure the cessation of the armaments race. One gets the impression that the United States concept of control is based on the continued production of atomic weapons rather than on the cessation of such production. Hence the basis of this control is not the prohibition but the legalization and sanctioning of such weapons. We cannot agree to this plan. We realize that the successful solution of this difficult problem is primarily dependent on agreement being reached among the great Powers.

166. Consequently, the First Committee is faced with the problem of whether to follow the course laid down in the so-called United States working paper and proceed to discuss control of the kind described there or to start immediately working in a way which will really advance the cause of peace, that is, by considering the questions of prohibiting atomic and hydrogen weapons and reducing armaments and armed forces as set forth in the Soviet draft resolution. I venture to express my conviction that the First Committee will choose the second course, that laid down in the Soviet proposals.

167. In this connexion I should like to dwell on a number of important points in the Soviet Union draft resolution.

168. In the draft resolution it is proposed that during the first stage armaments, armed forces and budgetary appropriations for military requirements should be reduced to the extent of 50 per cent of the agreed levels, and during the second stage by the remaining 50 per cent of the agreed levels from the strength of armaments and armed forces existing on 31 December 1953, military appropriations being reduced from the amount of actual expenditure on military requirements during the year ending 31 December 1953.

169. The Soviet Union is in favour of a proportional reduction of armaments and armed forces. Mr. Moch, the French representative, agreed to that in 1952, for he stated at the 7th meeting of the Disarmament Commission on 26 March 1952 that the word "balanced" included the notion that it could be proportional. The Soviet Union delegation, as a first step towards agreement on the question of agreed levels, has proposed a one-third reduction of conventional armaments, armed forces and military appropriations. That proposal meets the requirement that there should be a substantial reduction of armaments, armed forces and military appropriations. It corresponds to the provision in the Franco-British proposals for "major reductions in all armed forces and conventional armaments". All States would benefit from such a reduction, since it would put an end to the race to increase

armaments and armed forces and considerably lighten the financial burden which nations now bear. A one-third reduction of armaments, armed forces and military appropriations, as a first step, would be to the advantage of all governments and peoples and would help to strengthen peace and increase international security.

170. As regards atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, the Soviet Union draft resolution provides that a complete prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction will be carried into effect, that the production of such weapons will be discontinued and that they will be entirely eliminated from the armaments of States while. All existing atomic materials will be used only for peaceful purposes. Those measures are to be completed not later than the carrying out of the measures taken for the reduction of armaments and armed forces.

171. According to the Franco-British memorandum of 11 June 1954, "States...regard themselves as prohibited...from the use of nuclear weapons except in defence against aggression". My delegation thinks that this wording is too general and too vague. It should be noted that if this proposal were made more precise it could help to prevent the use of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction under the pretext of defence against aggression. That is why the Soviet Union draft resolution contains the proposal that the General Assembly should instruct "the United Nations Disarmament Commission to study and clarify this question and submit its recommendations". This also shows that the Soviet Union is anxious to find mutually acceptable answers to all controversial questions and to solve those questions by negotiation. We have not so far succeeded in reaching a satisfactory agreement on the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, but this, far from detracting from the importance of the efforts being made in this direction, makes those efforts even more necessary, having regard to the increasing threat to the peoples of the world from the continuation of the atomic and hydrogen armaments race.

172. The First Committee's task is to try to reconcile the positions of the great Powers. Our goal is to achieve agreed solutions to the important problem of prohibiting the use of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction.

173. Now that the Soviet Union has taken a long step towards agreement with the Western Powers, the United States, the United Kingdom and France must take similar steps. I venture to express the firm belief that the Western Powers will follow the same course and, like the Soviet Union, will try to reach an agreed solution of this important problem.

174. The Soviet Union proposals now under discussion have been made in a spirit of international co-operation and are designed to bring about a further relaxation of international tension and to promote peace and security throughout the world. Acceptance of these proposals by the other great Powers would put an end to the armaments race which is causing such a dangerous state of international tension.

175. The peaceful policy of the Soviet Union is clear to the whole world. In spite of the propaganda being spread by responsible political leaders in the United States about the alleged aggressive plans of the Soviet Union, their attempts are doomed to complete failure since they are utterly at variance with well-known facts.

176. In order to increase the prestige of the United Nations and enable it to play a greater part in strengthening peace throughout the world, the great Powers must show a strong desire to reconcile their views on the question of putting an end to the race to produce atomic and all other types of weapons. It goes without saying that every step towards agreement among the great Powers to remove the danger of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction being used and to put an end to the armaments race will be unanimously supported by all the members of this Committee. The adoption of such a decision at the ninth session of the General Assembly would be welcomed with profound satisfaction by every nation. It would help to strengthen peace and establish mutual understanding and co-operation among all States.

177. The USSR proposals are in the interest of all who want to strengthen peace and ensure lasting international security. The solution of these problems would considerably lighten the heavy burden which nations have to bear because of the armaments race; it would help to relax international tension and would open up new prospects of the wide use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes for the benefit all mankind.

178. The delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic warmly supports the USSR draft resolution and will vote in favour of its adoption.

179. Mr. MOCH (France) (*translated from French*): I apologize for asking for the floor at this hour, in order to make a brief statement. I do not wish to engage in polemics with the Byelorussian representative or to revive past controversies. Our colleague has, however, quoted five words that I spoke, from which he has deduced that I was in favour of a "proportional" reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. I have not before me the five words he quoted but I owe it to the truth to say that I have always opposed proportional reduction and upheld the need for a progressive — and not proportional — reduction, one, that is, that would strike hardest at the most powerful armies. In other words, the type of reduction I advocate is one in which the proportion would vary according to the forces under consideration, striking hardest at those with the greatest total strength. The proportion could even be as much as a hundred per cent in the case of armed forces with a strength of more than a certain number of millions of them.

180. My position, then, is exactly the opposite of the one ascribed to me and as I reserve the right to defend that position before the Disarmament Commission or before this Committee when it finally undertakes the examination of the detailed proposals, none of you, and least of all the Byelorussian representative, will be surprised that I wished to make this brief rectification.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.