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Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia).

AGENDA ITEMS 20 AND 68

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/2685, A/C.1/751, A/C.1/752/Rev.1) (*continued*)

Conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction (A/2742 and Corr.1, A/2742/Add.1, A/C.1/750) (*continued*)

1. Mr. JOOSTE (Union of South Africa): The South African delegation has followed the present debate with close attention and great interest. We have heard a number of speakers and there are few facets of the disarmament problem which have not been dealt with. Although we cannot but feel that there is still much confusion on certain fundamental issues, there appears to be little that remains to be said on the more general aspect of the matter, at this stage at all events. However, there are certain comments of a general nature which I would like to make.

2. May I say at the outset that the South African delegation welcomed the decision [*691st meeting*] not to curtail the present debate. We welcomed that decision because we agree that it is wise to afford this further opportunity for free discussion on this problem, a problem which is of such fundamental importance in all our efforts to create the conditions of peace and security. It is true that the problem of disarmament is no new problem. It is true also that past discussions over a period of many years have yielded but little success and that despite all past efforts there exists today more armament in the world than ever before in its history, in times of peace at all events. We are only too conscious of these facts, as we are of the inescapable conclusion that there is but little hope of success while there still exist in international life forces of evil which are generated by man's continued appetite for power and for domination.

3. We realize also that the problem of disarmament is one the solution of which is primarily the respon-

sibility of the great Powers, and that it is only realistic that they should take the lead in all our debates and in all our efforts to evolve an effective system. Moreover, as complete agreement between them is a condition precedent to any solution of the problem, it would be unwise to impede their negotiations by endeavouring at this stage to find complete agreement among all the nations of the world.

4. All this is true, yet there are important reasons why the present debate should take place—why this Organization should again be given the opportunity of taking stock of the position and of expressing itself on the problem as a whole as well as on the concrete proposals which have already been evolved.

5. In the first place, we should never lose sight of the fact that the United Nations was created primarily for the purpose of maintaining peace and rendering the world secure from aggression for the purpose of saving, in the words of the Charter, "succeeding generations from the scourge of war". The Members of this Organization, therefore, have a collective function and a collective responsibility, and any problem which is related to this function and responsibility must therefore engage the point and collective attention of all Member States of this Organization. Consequently, while the problem of disarmament persists, no Member can escape its responsibility for assisting in every way open to it in securing agreement and thus finding a solution.

6. Furthermore, we all know that the incidence of peace is universal—as are the consequences of global war. While it is the great Powers that have to bear the brunt of modern armament as well as of modern global warfare, the consequences of armed conflict, on a world scale, affect us all. In fact, the great Powers have the resources and the economic resilience to recover from the consequences of war, whereas the smaller Powers might suffer injury which could be fatal. The stake of the smaller Powers in peace may therefore be the greater—it is a question of their survival. All this is especially true today when we consider the technological advances of our time.

7. The necessity for finding a solution is recognized universally. It is necessary, however, that all of us should give expression, whenever and wherever we have the opportunity of doing so, to the yearning of all our peoples for a lasting peace in security—a yearning which is shared by all peoples throughout the world.

8. The mere fact that war has not yet been outlawed is proof in itself that there are still individuals—or there may still be individuals—who appear to believe in the fruits of armed conflict, who appear to believe in war as a means of realizing national ambitions. If this is so, then it is our duty to keep on reminding these misguided people how the bulk of humanity views this continued threat of war and how humanity regards those who are responsible for its persistence.

9. However important it may have been in the past to solve the question of disarmament, the urgency of doing so is now such that no State or group of States can with impunity continue to impede the process of solution by adhering to rigid attitudes.

10. We have heard, in the course of the present debate, that scientists have found the means which, if developed, could wipe life off the surface of this planet—and we know that monopoly in the nuclear field has ended. It has therefore become increasingly essential that every effort be made to remove this threat—and any nation which in any way obstructs us in our efforts to do so will undoubtedly have to assume a terrible responsibility.

11. It is, of course, not only the awful prospect of atomic warfare which spurs us on to new efforts to solve this problem. There continue to be many other compelling reasons. Among these features prominently the necessity for putting a stop to the incredible waste of effort and resources which is involved in the present armaments race. If these vast sums of money, all this effort and all these resources, could be diverted to peaceful ends, what giant strides could not be made in all our countries in the improvement of standards of living, to what extent could not poverty, ignorance and suffering be alleviated throughout the world!

12. In South Africa, where we face a future of possibly the greatest industrial development in our history, those who are responsible for planning our future are necessarily faced with the grim necessity of seeing that future always with military overtones. Of the national income, which should be devoted solely to the betterment of living conditions, sums which to us are vast have to be set aside for the machines and weapons of war. Alongside the constructive items in our national budget we must list also those items which are solely for the purpose of safeguarding our security in the event of a global war, a contingency which lies completely outside our power either to start or to prevent.

13. My Government has noted, with a cautious sense of relief, the slight progress which has been made towards a better understanding of the problem and perhaps towards a narrowing down of the differences between those who are principally engaged in negotiations. And here I would place on record our appreciation of the efforts of those who, since our last debates on this matter, have striven so untiringly to find common ground for future progress. The Government of South Africa has studied with the utmost care the documents relating to the conferences and discussions in question, and while it found little, if anything, to encourage hopes of early success, it could not but note, with real appreciation, the work of those who refused to despair in their efforts to forge ahead. I say this not in a spirit of recrimination, for I agree that the embers of the past should not be disturbed unnecessarily. It is right, however, that those who refuse to be discouraged by the unyielding attitudes of others should know of our appreciation.

14. Furthermore, I should add that there are few of us here who could have failed to feel some spark of hope and a slight encouragement in the discussions which have already taken place in this debate. But we would, of course, be completely unrealistic if we did not see our present problem within the context of the habits which the past nine years have formed for

us, habits of suspicion and a lack of faith born of the disillusionment and frustration of those years. Yet continued discussion, with progress however slight or slow, keeps alive our hope of ultimate agreement and, we firmly believe, tends to reduce international tension. It is in this spirit that we should continue to do our work—that those who are primarily responsible for negotiations should press forward with their efforts to find a solution.

15. South Africa, as I have said, has studied with the utmost care the results of the past discussions. My Government is following, also, with the closest attention, our present debate. We believe that the basis which is gradually crystallizing for further negotiations holds out some promise of further progress. We do not in any way minimize the great divergencies which still exist between the different points of view—divergencies which may not always be apparent from a superficial evaluation of the present position. Yet there has been an advance and we hope a further advance is possible.

16. As regards the principles enunciated in the Anglo-French memorandum [DC/53, *annex 9*], I would say that in the view of my delegation they appear to constitute a realistic and sound approach to the problem. The ultimate elimination of weapons of mass destruction is naturally our major objective. But the elimination of these devices of destruction cannot solve the entire problem. The reduction, to the greatest extent possible, of conventional armaments, and the ending of the armaments race, must also be achieved if disarmament is to be something real. In the proposals which are gradually emerging from our deliberations these facts are of course accepted.

17. Unfortunately, as so many have already pointed out in this debate, mere agreements providing for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and the reduction of conventional armaments are not enough. No matter how such an agreement is worded, it is its implementation that we must ensure, a guarantee that what nations undertake to do will be carried out in full. And for this, it is essential that a system be established which will provide for satisfactory verification and effective control. Only by such means can we, in the existing international climate, hope to bring about a form of disarmament which will be safe and not deny us even that security we now have. We agree, of course, that it is an unhappy commentary on international relations that they should be so poisoned by suspicion that no international instrument could be accepted merely upon the formal guarantees inscribed therein, but that it has become necessary to insist upon measures which would satisfy each one of us as to the effective implementation by the others. There is no alternative, and if effective disarmament is to be achieved, verification and control must be accepted as essential conditions.

18. We have heard a number of speakers on this question of control. We have heard some who argued in favour of an agency with authority and powers which others have regarded as too extensive. Therefore, while there is general agreement on the necessity for control, the manner in which it is to be effected continues to be a major source of disagreement. The representative of the Soviet Union recently voiced certain doubts as to the wisdom, or even the possibility, of creating an agency with the extensive powers visualized for it by

other speakers. In doing so, he advocated some small measure of mutual confidence. Here, of course, Mr. Vyshinsky has put his finger on our real problem—on what I would say is at the very core of the problem of disarmament — this lack of faith, this suspicion, which today so unhappily characterizes the relations between those who only recently in history were allies in a common struggle.

19. While it is most essential that we press forward with our task to seek a solution for the problem of disarmament, it is unrealistic to expect ready agreement in the embittered atmosphere of the present cold war, for it is this cold war which has destroyed our trust in, and our acceptance of, each other's professions of good faith. Many previous speakers have drawn attention to this fact. Indeed, we all agree that until such time as this cold war is relaxed, there can be no hope of returning to a healthier international climate, a climate in which the problem of disarmament would be rendered far less complex.

20. Yet despite all this—despite our general agreement on this point—we find proposals being made for the inclusion in the agenda of even our present session of items which are designed to inflame the passions, items the discussion of which cannot but lead to further estrangement, to bitterness; in fact, items clearly designed or intended for the further prosecution of the cold war.

21. My delegation agrees with those who maintain that it is futile for delegations to profess a desire for peace and the elimination of factors which endanger that peace, if they persist in their efforts to bring about continued friction and conflict, whether inside or outside this Organization. It is necessary that this dangerous process be stopped and that those responsible for it give us proof, by their performance, of their real desire to co-operate and to establish conditions of peace and security in the world. If this real and genuine desire exists. I can imagine no more useful contribution and practical demonstration of good faith than a more co-operative attitude from those who have so far frustrated all attempts to arrive at equitable solutions to such problems as an Austrian State Treaty, Germany, Korea and even the question of new Members of the United Nations.

22. May I say in this connexion—i.e., in regard to this all-important matter of reviving confidence amongst the nations—that it is here that the smaller nations have an all-important role. It is in this connexion that we who represent the smaller nations in this Organization have great responsibilities, for we should realize that while it may only be the great Powers who are capable of allowing situations to develop in which world peace and security become impossible, the smaller States can also, by their actions, contribute to the deterioration of international relations.

23. It is essential that we all realize this, that we realize to what extent our differences could serve to add to the existing tensions. In conditions such as the present, it is necessary that we exercise the greatest care lest our conflicts—that is, the conflicts of the smaller countries—aggravate and already serious situation. We should know that by pursuing often ill-founded grievances we could well create, inadvertently perhaps, opportunities for others to exploit those grievances for their own purposes. Moreover, as we are aware, international conflict need not necessarily result only from direct action by one State against

another. It was not so long ago that we agreed that conflict could result also from subversive action inspired from without.

24. It is in these circumstances that I say that we, the smaller Powers, should exercise the greatest care in our relations with each other so that we do not afford any other State the opportunity of exploiting our differences and, by so doing, add to international tension—which will render disarmament and ultimate peace and security impossible of achievement.

25. This is all I have to say on this point. Let me now conclude by saying that I have not commented in detail on the principles which have been discussed in the present debate. I have not done so because, despite this lengthy debate, there continue to be a number of points on which we are not completely clear. And in this connexion I would refer to the proposal which was put forward by the representative of Australia [688th and 690th meetings]. We believe that that proposal is a useful one and agree that it might be amended, as was suggested yesterday [694th meeting] by the representative of the United Kingdom, in such a way that the Secretariat would be requested to prepare a document setting out, as fully as possible, the different views which had been expressed on the proposals in question.

26. Moreover, many of the proposals themselves have not yet been fully worked out, and in this connexion we have noted with interest the suggestion that countries not represented on the Disarmament Commission might be afforded an opportunity of stating their views to the Commission, should they desire to do so. In any case, it is only after further details have emerged from future negotiations that we shall all be able to determine how the different proposals might affect our individual and collective interests.

27. In the meantime, the Canadian draft resolution—which was originally introduced by the representative of Canada and has since then been co-sponsored by three other Powers [A/C.1/752/Rev.1] — would seem to us to afford a realistic approach to our problem and a logical conclusion to this most useful debate. It embodies the principles which we would consider essential, and we will support it. It is our hope that it will have the unanimous approval of this Committee and of the General Assembly—and let me add here that the wholehearted support of the five members of the Subcommittee would ensure a harmonious start in the difficult task with which that group will again be entrusted.

28. Mr. DE LA COLINA (Mexico) (*translated from Spanish*): Very little can be added to all that has been said and written during this session and in previous sessions about the thorny and complex problem with which we are now concerned. The discussion has seemed at times to border on hair-splitting, particularly to nations which do not possess death-dealing instruments of mass destruction and which are therefore unable to exert any direct influence on the decisions of those which do possess them. Unfortunately, the subject is in itself neither idle nor very subtle. On the contrary, its essentials appear on closer inspection to be quite clear, and it can safely be said that this item far surpasses all the other items on our agenda in importance. All of us—great and small, Easterners and Westerners, rich and poor—would face the same unhappy fate in the event of an atomic war. The dread spectre of total war, the terrible effects of which were barely glimpsed during the last world war, now looms before

us, threatening destruction to civilization, unless we succeed in controlling our desires and our passions in the same way as we have begun to master the hidden forces of nature.

29. The problem of disarmament or, to use the more modest terms of the agenda item, the problem of the balanced reduction of armaments, is indissolubly linked to two diametrically opposed theories: the classic theory of the unlimited sovereignty of States, and the nascent theory of a new international community endowed with functions and powers superior to those of its constituent members.

30. That is why the definition, with any degree of precision, of the structure, functions and jurisdiction of the international control organ—the keystone of the system contemplated in the main proposals before us—depends upon the extent to which the Governments directly concerned are willing voluntarily to limit their own sovereignty. I realize of course how difficult it would be for a State, particularly a great military Power, to renounce even partially the traditional right to manufacture, stockpile and use armaments—the last resort of the strongest—and to allow the entry into their territory, willingly and without reservation, of numerous foreign inspectors whom an uninformed public opinion might suspect of spying into industrial secrets. But what is the alternative? The only alternative that my delegation sees is the frantic armaments race and the final explosion which history has taught us to expect as its inevitable culmination, with this difference, however, that this time the results would exceed anything ever imagined.

31. I am reminded of the words spoken by the President of Mexico in reference to this question:

“There can be no peace or harmony in the world under the menace of total destruction with which the armaments race threatens mankind; on the contrary, there can be peace only in an atmosphere of security and confidence engendered by a nobly conceived and honourably executed disarmament.”

32. For all these reasons, my delegation has noted with particular gratification that discordant notes have been less frequent in the present discussion of this item than on previous occasions. While on the one hand the Western Powers have ceased to insist on some of the fundamental aspects of the earlier Baruch plan, the Soviet Union, on the other hand, has not reasserted its proposition that the previous and unconditional prohibition of weapons of mass destruction is a condition *sine qua non* for any agreement.

33. Moreover, the Soviet draft resolution [A/C.1/750], in spite of its ambiguity and the omissions that have been noted and although some of the ideas contained in it must be clarified, is based on the Franco-British plan [DC/53, annex 9], which has been rightly described as imaginative and boldly conceived. The United States, on its side, has submitted a proposal [DC/53, annex 4] on the organization and functions of the control organ which is both detailed and flexible and makes a positive contribution to the future study of the problem. Also, we must not overlook the Indian proposals [DC/44 and Corr. 1], which contain important ideas born of a generous concern for the fate of mankind. Lastly, President Eisenhower, addressing the General Assembly [470th meeting], has presented to the world a plan for international co-operation in

the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes which, even with the limitations imposed by prudence, offers encouraging prospects.

34. It has been stated here repeatedly, and many arguments have been adduced to that effect, that in the final analysis the problem of disarmament can be reduced to a question of mutual trust. But surely the best way of dissipating mistrust would be to go back to patient and honest negotiation, striving unceasingly to find points of agreement and eliminating the points of divergence as far as possible, in the staunch conviction that war would not leave victors and vanquished but only a wake of blood and suffering throughout the entire world.

35. My delegation, anxious to contribute within its modest means to the relaxation of the existing tension, would suggest that after the general debate, the Committee should immediately proceed to vote on the draft resolutions, deliberately avoiding all recrimination and invective which would only embitter minds and interfere with the calm study of this difficult and very complex subject.

36. Generally speaking, my delegation is in favour of the Canadian proposal [A/C.1/752/Rev.1], because it considers that the Disarmament Commission, and especially the five-Power Sub-Committee of that Commission, are the bodies best qualified to pursue the study of this problem. Naturally my delegation reserves its right to comment and to take part in subsequent discussions on the other proposals.

37. Diplomatic, patient, persistent and discreet negotiations should now be preferred to public debate which exacerbates passions and leads the participants into extreme positions from which they have difficulty in retreating later. The time consumed by the negotiations should not concern us so much as their success. Premature failure could close the door forever to a truly constructive solution.

38. My delegation would also like to suggest that, in resuming the study of this problem, the Disarmament Commission should endeavour to draw a very precise distinction between the use of nuclear weapons—and their use is, of course, only permissible in cases of self-defence—on the one hand, for tactical purposes or for the elimination of clearly identifiable military objectives and, on the other hand, for the indiscriminate annihilation of millions of defenceless human beings. The latter, indiscriminate, use must be absolutely prohibited in all circumstances.

39. My delegation also considers that the diversion of the world's human and economic resources armaments tends to impoverish still further the under-developed countries whose weak economy should, on the contrary, be of the utmost concern to the highly industrialized nations.

40. Outside this forum thousands of voices are urging—in different ways and in many languages, but all with an undeniable note of sincerity—that men and women throughout the world and governments of nations possessing neither huge armies nor devastating weapons, should unite to exhort the great military Powers to search tirelessly for some honourable, appropriate and wise compromise; to silence the cries of those who preach hatred; to strive to compose their differences amicably by means of mutual concessions; not to abandon the way of conciliation; and finally to use this forum not for propaganda purposes but, in the words

of the Charter, as "a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations", in fulfilment of the high purposes of our Organization. I believe that this desire is neither vain nor sterile, but that it interprets faithfully the deep and hitherto silent feeling of untold multitudes.

41. My delegation fervently hopes that the Members States which bear the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security will heed this growing clamour and that they may be able in the near future to draw up plans that will ensure an equitable regulation of armaments—a goal which may otherwise become merely a Utopian dream.

42. The peoples of the world, terrified by the threat of another war, in which hydrogen bombs would play the principal role, refuse to consider as a mere mirage the solemn promises of conciliation and peace contained in the United Nations Charter.

43. Mr. PALAMARCHUCK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): We all seem to have a sufficiently clear understanding of the vast importance of the problem of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons. This problem affects the destiny of nations, we all realize the difficulties still outstanding before a generally acceptable agreement can be reached.

44. Since the time when the great scientific discovery of atomic energy was first put to use for purposes of destruction, other countries, including the Soviet Union, have mastered the secret of the atomic and hydrogen weapons. These countries have regarded this tremendous power they have acquired in different ways. Some States have clearly tended to use atomic weapons as a means of intimidation, as an instrument of policy and as a basis for strategic planning. The Soviet Union although it has long possessed atomic weapons, has never attempted to use them as a means of intimidating or threatening anybody.

45. The apprehension felt on account of the atomic explosions in the Soviet Union was entirely groundless, as the Soviet Government, despite its possession of atomic weapons, has always firmly and consistently advocated the prohibition of both the use and the manufacture of these weapons.

46. Moreover, the Soviet Union was the first to give the world a great example in the peaceful use of atomic energy for the benefit of mankind. On 27 June 1954, the Soviet Union inaugurated the first electric power station supplying electricity for industry and agriculture by means of atomic energy obtained through the fission of the uranium atom. History will note the date on which the first atomic power station and atomic light appeared, in a country which has consistently striven to ensure that atomic energy should never again serve as a means of destruction and extermination but should be used for the good of humanity at large.

47. Having entered on the atomic age, however, mankind observes with apprehension the ever-increasing stockpiling of atomic and hydrogen weapons which constitute a threat to the very existence of modern civilization, built up by countless generations. If atomic and hydrogen weapons are not strictly prohibited, the consequences of nuclear explosions in the event of war would jeopardize, as the Canadian representative, Mr. Martin, has so rightly pointed out [*688th meeting*], the very existence of organic life on this planet. The peoples of the world urge the United Nations to take

vigorous action to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons.

48. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR feels in duty bound to point out that since 1945, that is to say, ever since the end of the Second World War which resulted in the overthrow of those who were then aspiring to world domination, it has been the constant aim of the Soviet Union that the United Nations should adopt an agreed international instrument which would effectively resolve the question of the reduction of armaments, the prohibition of the atomic and hydrogen weapons, and the establishment of strict international control. The recently published documents concerning the negotiations on the problem of atomic energy between the Soviet Union and the United States again prove to the entire world that the Soviet Union is resolutely endeavouring, despite all existing differences and difficulties, to obtain a decision on that problem which would eliminate the threat of atomic war and would place atomic energy at the service of peace and progress. In its constant efforts to achieve these noble ends, the Soviet Union has continuously sought to reconcile the viewpoints of States in order to arrive at agreed decisions. It has done so primarily in the interests of peace and international security.

49. I should like to remind the Committee of certain relevant facts, which were evidently overlooked by the United States representative, when, on 12 October [*687th meeting*], he claimed that the USSR position had been one of "stony immobility" throughout the examination by the United Nations of the question of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. Here are the facts.

50. In the first place, at the very beginning of the examination by the United Nations of the question of the prohibition of atomic weapons, the Soviet Union proposed that international control should be established for the enforcement of that prohibition by means of periodic inspection. Subsequently, in 1952, the Soviet Union proposed [*A/C.1/698*] that, "with a view to the establishment of an appropriate system of guarantees for the observance of the General Assembly's decisions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments, the international control organ shall have the right to conduct inspection on a continuing basis . . .".

51. Secondly, the Soviet Union took an important step towards reconciling the points of view on the question of the entry into effect of the prohibition of atomic weapons on the one hand, and of control over that prohibition on the other. The Soviet Union deemed it possible not to insist that the entry into force of the prohibition of atomic weapons should precede the setting up of international control, and agreed that the prohibition and the control should come into effect simultaneously. The draft plan of work submitted to the Disarmament Commission by the USSR representative on 19 March 1952 [*DC/4/Rev.1*] in fact states that the "prohibition of atomic weapons and international control shall be put into effect simultaneously".

52. Thirdly, in response to the wish of the Western Powers, the Soviet Union agreed that instead of two separate conventions, one dealing with the prohibition of atomic weapons and the other with control over that prohibition, a single convention might be concluded covering not only these two problems but also the question of the actual establishment of international control.

53. Fourthly, the new Soviet Union proposals of 30 September [A/C.1/750] do not make the execution of the programme of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction contingent on a previous agreement regarding the unconditional renunciation by States of the use of atomic weapons, on which the Soviet Government had previously insisted and which it still feels would be of the utmost importance in facilitating and expediting all the measures envisaged in the proposed convention.

54. All this goes to show that there are no grounds for saying that the Soviet Union position has been one of immobility; it shows, too, that some representatives prefer to forget or disregard these well-known facts.

55. On 12 October [687th meeting, Mr. Wadsworth uttered all kinds of unfounded doubts and far-fetched reproaches on the subject of the new Soviet proposal, in an endeavour to belittle the significance of the Soviet efforts, which are designed to save mankind from the threat of atomic war and to strengthen peace. He spoke of the basic ideas which, he said, had animated the United States in its consideration of the problem of disarmament in the United Nations. He asserted that the United States wanted disarmament, that it wanted to rid the world from nuclear weapons, and that it wanted peace. I shall follow the good advice of the head of the USSR delegation, Mr. Vyshinsky, in not evoking the shades of the past, and I shall neither recall today what has gone before nor compare Mr. Wadsworth's statements with some of the present actions of the country he represents. It is impossible, however, not to say that if a given State, while professing a peace-loving policy, not only fails to reduce its armaments but actually increases them by developing its aggressive potential in the form of atomic and hydrogen weapons, and takes other measures incompatible with the maintenance of peace both in Europe and in Asia, the peoples of the world are justified in doubting the sincerity of its declarations.

56. Let us turn now to the substance of the Soviet proposals of 30 September. The Soviet Union proposes the preparation and conclusion of an international convention of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction, based on the Franco-British proposals, as set forth in the memorandum of 11 June 1954. [DC/53, annex 9]. It is quite clear, from the study and discussion of the Soviet proposals in the First Committee, that considerable new progress has been made in bridging the gap between the views of States on the principles governing a programme for the reduction of armaments, armed forces and military expenditures, and on the execution of that programme. It is quite clear, too, that specific steps have been taken by both sides to reduce differences of opinion. An important step in this direction—and this should be particularly emphasized—was the Soviet Union's acceptance of the provisions of the Franco-British memorandum of 11 June 1954 as a basis for the future convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction.

57. The existence of a common basis and common principles is bound to lead to further fruitful work. We could perhaps refer to Mr. Moch's remarks in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission on the significance and consequences of any acceptance of the Franco-British memorandum as a basis for discussion

and settlement of the problem. He stated that "if our conciliatory effort meets with a response, the study of this plan should enable us—at the price perhaps of a few changes requiring consideration—to reach a solid agreement." This has now happened. The Western Powers have met with a response, and consequently it is now definitely possible to "reach a solid agreement."

58. A comparison of the Soviet proposals with the text of the Franco-British memorandum and with the explanations contained in the speeches of the Chairman of the Soviet delegation, Mr. Vyshinsky, and of the French and United Kingdom representatives, will show that the views of the parties on a whole series of questions have now drawn much closer together or have even been completely reconciled.

59. There is, in the first place, full agreement on what the future international convention should contain. The Franco-British memorandum and the Soviet proposals alike set forth three basic objectives in almost identical terms: the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other types of weapons of mass destruction and their elimination from the armaments of States; a major reduction of all armed forces and conventional armaments; and the establishment of a control organ with the rights, powers and functioning which would ensure the observance of the agreed prohibition and reductions.

60. Furthermore, in view of the Soviet Union's favourable attitude, we can now assume that differences of opinion no longer exists as regards the principle of reductions and prohibition by stages. On this question, the Soviet Union has gone a long way towards meeting the Western Powers in order not to postpone the reduction of armaments. The fact that in the Franco-British proposals there are three successive stages while the Soviet Union divides the whole process into two stages does not constitute a very substantial difference. We feel that what is important is the general acceptance of the principle that the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons should constitute a concurrent and simultaneous process. Both sides agree that the first stage of this successive process should begin by a reduction of conventional armaments by 50 per cent of the agreed levels. The Franco-British memorandum and the Soviet proposals alike recognize the necessity of reducing conventional armaments by two stages, at each of which a reduction of 50 per cent of the agreed levels would be made. There is also agreement that the complete prohibition of atomic weapons should be carried out only after the first reduction of 50 per cent of the agreed levels has been made in conventional armaments; in other words, the Soviet Union no longer insists that measures relating to conventional armaments and atomic weapons should be carried out simultaneously during the first stage.

61. The fact that views on the reduction of armaments have also been brought closer together deserves particular notice. The Franco-British proposals now recognize that the fundamental objective is a major reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. They recognize, too, that specific agreed levels for a major reduction of armaments must be established. As we know, that principle has consistently been advocated by the Soviet Union. It is now accepted in the Franco-British memorandum.

62. With regard to the functions and the part to be played by the control machinery, there is agreement that the control must be adequate to ensure that the

convention is fully implemented by all States. The Western Powers want to establish uniform control machinery for all stages of the process. The Soviet proposal provides for the establishment of a temporary control commission during the first stage, and a permanent control organ in the second. The functions of these bodies would naturally not be identical in scope or method, especially in view of the later entry into force of the prohibition of atomic weapons and of the need for controlling that prohibition. Of course, the final determination of all provisions relating to control must be made later when the Disarmament Commission, as proposed in the Canadian draft resolution [A/C.1/752/Rev.1], undertakes a detailed examination of the proposals and draws up the draft convention.

63. There is thus a real possibility that agreement on the basic principles and provisions to be incorporated in the international convention will be achieved through subsequent negotiations. The Soviet proposals, which have been approved and supported by many Member States, constitute, as some representatives have rightly pointed out, considerable progress towards the achievement of the desired goal.

64. Unfortunately some representatives in their statements could not refrain from making their usual references to the alleged vagueness of the Soviet proposals. But it is impossible to agree with them. Others went even further. Thus, the Iraqi representative, Mr. Al-Jamali, became involved in a discussion of such strange concepts—to say the least—as ideological disarmament. Apparently Mr. Al-Jamali is not fully aware of the origin and significance of ideology in terms of the historical development of society. It has apparently never occurred to him that ideas exist regardless of the wishes of those to whom they are unwelcome, that they exist, develop and triumph regardless of the imprecations of those who oppose their growth and attempt to hamper the advance of society.

65. If the United Nations is to smooth the way to the conclusion of an agreement on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, it must act on the basis of the facts of historical reality, on the assumption of the possibility of peaceful coexistence and peaceful co-operation between different social sys-

tems and ideologies; it must not be motivated by the desire, neither must it attempt, to eradicate any of those ideologies. In the final analysis, the United Nations is not, and we hope that it will never be, a club composed of members sharing the same anti-communist ideology.

66. It would, of course, be unwise to close one's eyes to the difficulties and obstacles in the way of solving the question of reducing armaments and prohibiting atomic weapons. But these difficulties can be overcome if all States and especially the great Powers, whose persistence and energy is particularly needed if agreement is to be achieved strive equally, not in words but in deeds, to reach this goal. It is undeniable that as a result of certain international developments during the past year, conditions are now most favourable to the overcoming of these difficulties. Full advantage should be taken of these conditions.

67. Agreement on the fundamental principles of an international convention designed, in the words of the Soviet Union draft resolution, "to strengthen peace and increase international security and providing for the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction and their elimination from the armaments of States, a substantial reduction in armaments and the establishment of international control", would have far-reaching consequences for the strengthening of international co-operation and the peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems. Great economic resources, instead of being used for the purpose of the armaments race and the stockpiling of atomic and hydrogen weapons, would be used for the real interest of mankind, which would be relieved of the heavy burden of taxation for military purposes. The Soviet Union has taken an important new step towards agreement on the conclusion of an international convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction. The Soviet proposal, with its acceptance of the Franco-British proposals as a basis for the conclusion of the international convention, paves the way for a settlement which can deliver mankind from the threat of an atomic war.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.