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Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia).

AGENDA ITEMS 20 AND 68

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/2685, A/C.1/751, A/C.1/752/Rev.1) (*continued*)

Conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction (A/2742 and Corr.1, A/2742/Add.1, A/C.1/750) (*continued*)

The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): The representatives of the following countries are on the list of speakers, which was closed yesterday afternoon: New Zealand, United Kingdom, China, Pakistan, Chile, Israel, Union of South Africa, Ukrainian SR, Mexico, Australia, Brazil, India, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Lebanon, Indonesia, Byelorussian SR, United States of America, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

I call upon the representative of New Zealand.

Mr. MUNRO (New Zealand): The question of disarmament is of supreme importance both to this Assembly and for all peoples of all countries whether they have their representatives here or not.

Our present discussion stems from Article 11 of the Charter. This, then, is a constitutional responsibility as well as a moral one. It rests the more heavily on us because, in the face of the immense and awful achievement of atomic science, we have not as yet had success even after eight years of almost continuous endeavour.

I wish to begin with a note of very restrained optimism. It is indeed refreshing to speak on disarmament in an atmosphere of some expectation, tempered enough this must be by a proper sense of realism.

When I put forward the New Zealand point of view in the Disarmament Commission, 26 July 1954 [*9th meeting*], the situation was, I think, far different. There was no sign then of flexibility on the

part of the Soviet Union. I said at that time that so long as this attitude of stony immobility was maintained, an unbridgeable gap would remain in the way of progress towards disarmament since an acceptable solution would be achieved only with Soviet co-operation.

7. But I added these words:

“In the past, Soviet Union positions on some important matters have changed. Must we despair that some day—perhaps soon—the Soviet Union will conceive effectively-controlled disarmament to be in its own interest, at least as much as in the interest of other Powers? Against that day the work of the Sub-Committee has not been without value. The proposals placed before the Sub-Committee by France, the United Kingdom and the United States furnish bases upon which the negotiations can be resumed.

“An acceptable solution has not, unfortunately, been agreed upon; but the meeting in private of the Powers principally concerned has done something to point out, not only the difficulties ahead, but also the direction in which progress might be made when co-operation is forthcoming from the Soviet Union. My delegation sincerely trusts that that happy time will not be far distant.”

8. There is nothing in these words which needs to be retracted. Fortunately, there is something which can be added. The Soviet Union has, in fact, taken the proposals of France and the United Kingdom [*DC/53, annex 9*] as a basis for further proposals of its own [*A/C.1/750*]. Whatever else may be said of them, these Soviet proposals do differ—to what extent I am bound to say is not yet clear—from the earlier Soviet proposals which proved unacceptable to this Assembly.

9. In addition, the Soviet representative has indicated a willingness to discuss proposals other than his own, and in fact a discussion of various concepts has been going backwards and forwards in this Committee for the past ten days. What is unusual about this debate is that neither side has insisted that the Assembly take a position immediately on one set of proposals or another. This is the most encouraging feature of the present situation.

10. Other features, I must admit, are not so encouraging. In particular, the Committee has not had as much success as might have been hoped for in clarifying either the substance of the Soviet proposals or their exact relationship to the Franco-British proposals, on which they are said by the Soviet representative to be based. On the other hand, the persistence of certain fundamental points of difference has been sharply etched into the records in the course of what I might call the dialogues between various members of the Committee.

11. There are certain elements in the problem of disarmament which, after all, are fundamental. Two of

these which seem most important to my delegation are: first, the functions and powers of the control organ and, secondly, the timing of the prohibition of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and the reductions in conventional armaments. I shall discuss these points more specifically later. At this stage I wish to emphasize that, on these fundamental principles, the scope for compromise is limited. There can be no such thing as a partially effective disarmament treaty. We can only accept an agreement which is as nearly as possible self-executing, and which—and this goes to the very heart of the matter—reflects a genuine desire of all parties, not only to abolish nuclear weapons and reduce other armaments, but to abolish war itself and to live together in peace and understanding.

12. In the Disarmament Commission last July, I agreed with those who felt that the Franco-British proposals of 11 June had been put forward as a compromise in a genuine effort to make progress, that they offered the possibility of a marked narrowing of differences, and that they represented a major advance in the Western position.

13. I expressed appreciation also of the United States working paper on the operation of a control organ [DC/53, annex 4]. Although requiring further amplification, these papers do offer the prospect of a solid basis of agreement.

14. It is gratifying, therefore, that the Soviet Union should now feel able to accept the Franco-British proposals, at least as a basis for the negotiation. We should be clear, however, as to the scope and nature of any differences which remain.

15. It is for that reason that I wish to comment on some of the aspects of the draft resolution submitted by Mr. Vyshinsky in the General Assembly on 30 September [484th meeting] and appears in document A/C.1/750. In his statement of 11 October [685th meeting], Mr. Moch sought clarification of the Soviet Union phrase "agreed norms" of armaments. As I understand it, Mr. Vyshinsky's reply was to the effect that his Government was not posing the question of a one-third reduction in its proposals. On 12 October [687th meeting], however, Mr. Vyshinsky implied that his Government had not given up its proposal for a one-third arms reduction. Again as I understand it, he said that the only other alternative so far proposed had been based on the concept of a balance of power.

16. In the verbatim records of the meeting of this Committee on 15 October [690th meeting], it is reported that Mr. Vyshinsky said the following:

"We will agree to reduce the conventional armaments—which for some reason you fear when they are in our hands—first by 50 per cent and then by another 50 per cent. Fifty per cent in relation to what? Naturally, in relation to the level which we will agree upon, which is why our proposal speaks of 'agreed levels'. This will have to be worked out and agreed upon."

17. So far as any concrete alternative to the old Soviet Union proposals is concerned, Mr. Vyshinsky referred only in most general terms to the criteria put forward by the United States at the sixth session. Obviously, we are some way from agreement.

18. It is the view of my delegation that unless the criteria agreed on are such that the two sets of fifty per cent reductions do not perpetuate existing dispar-

ities in conventional armaments, then we are virtually back where we started. If the only point open to debate and negotiation is whether a reduction in conventional armaments should be by one-third or by some other fraction, there remains an all-important point of disagreement.

19. In addition, I understood Mr. Vyshinsky to say at the 690th meeting that, as the Soviet Union did not now insist, as it had before, that atomic weapons must be prohibited first, the old argument that the Soviet Union disarmament plan would leave unaltered the preponderance of the Soviet Union in conventional armaments no longer applied.

20. It seems to my delegation that there could be a misunderstanding here. Even if the total prohibition of nuclear weapons does not take place until an agreement for the reduction of conventional armaments also comes into force, any insistence on a fractional reduction in conventional armaments would still leave the Soviet Union with a superiority in those weapons. Thus—because at that point nuclear weapons would have been prohibited—any such insistence would actually improve the relative military position of the Soviet Union.

21. May I now comment on the question of control. During our discussions in the 690th meeting, Mr. Vyshinsky also stated that, while safeguards would be needed, nothing could be done without a modicum of trust or confidence. I am sure that no one would disagree with this as a theoretical concept. In practice however, it would appear to mean that we are asked to accept mutual confidence as a substitute for certain safeguards which involve a limitation of national sovereignty. In our view, to do this might well weaken the degree of confidence which now exists, since the absence of full safeguards is bound to engender fear and suspicion. Therefore, I suggest the best way of demonstrating our belief in the existence of mutual confidence, and of strengthening it, is to accept the limitations on sovereignty inherent in an effective disarmament treaty.

22. We have been considering in some detail the vital matters of control and limitation of armaments, both conventional and atomic. It is Mr. Vyshinsky's reference to a minimum of confidence which impels me to make the remarks which I now make. Might I address myself at this moment to those who live on the borders of two great Powers and their satellites. Those to whom I speak may very well be pondering, as the debate draws to a close, the question of the elimination of other forms of aggression—I speak of those of subversion. In the urgency of our present problem, it would be dangerously foolish to overlook the insidious weapons which may overthrow a nation as surely, although more slowly, than the instruments we are now considering. Let us bear this in mind when we speak of security and of a minimum of confidence which I have just mentioned.

23. I now wish to return to the question of the control organ and to comment on the relationship between the control organ and the Security Council. My Government has, on more than one occasion, emphasized the primacy of the Security Council in respect of Chapter VII of the Charter. This does not mean that we ignore the inhibiting effect of the veto power. Neither, in our opinion, does it mean that the Security Council is the appropriate body to deal with each an

every breach of the control agreement. It does mean, however, that we must strive to establish an appropriate relationship between the control organ and the Security Council which recognizes the authority of that Council.

24. So far in this debate, a number of suggestions has been put forward. Mr. Vyshinsky, for example, expressed the view that the control organ could not and must not do anything which must be regarded as punitive. If this means in effect that the control organ can have no powers whatever to back up its decisions, while at the same time the veto is fully applicable in the Security Council—a point on which Mr. Vyshinsky has made his views perfectly clear—the position, from our point of view, to put it moderately, is far from satisfactory.

25. Signatories to any disarmament convention cannot be expected to reduce their defensive power in the faint hope—I refrain from saying in the illusory hope—that the Security Council, as at present constituted, will ensure that all other signatories do likewise.

26. We cannot shut our eyes to the sixty or more Soviet Union vetoes that have already stultified the majority. The control organ must be authorized to do more, surely to do more than merely investigate and report to the Security Council. There is, however, the suggestion that the permanent members of the Security Council might formally waive their veto power on questions relating to disarmament. This is a valuable suggestion which deserves further study.

27. This debate has shown that the enforcement aspects of the problems of control are of central importance, since they raise not only the question of ultimate authority but the question of the ways and means of exercising that authority. I should like, therefore, to expand my thoughts on this point a little further.

28. On the first question—where does the ultimate authority reside—I do not think there is any real disagreement. The Soviet Union, as I understand it, insists that the control organ must operate within the framework of the Security Council. This is not, if I may say so, a precise formulation, but the Soviet Union has made it abundantly clear that anything partaking of the nature of enforcement—and the Soviet Union appears to regard even measures of a precautionary or preventive character, such as the cutting off of nuclear supplies, as of this nature—that any kind of compulsive measure is a prerogative of the Security Council and the Security Council only.

29. The representative of the United Kingdom indicated at the 690th meeting that the ultimate sanction must rest with the Security Council. The United States working paper on control [DC/53, annex 4, para. 4] provides that the control authority “should be empowered to take action as appropriate short of the imposition of sanctions as provided in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter”.

36. It does seem to me, therefore, that there is a broad basis for agreement, namely that, whatever the functions of the control organ, the ultimate authority of the Security Council in regard to sanctions must be maintained. The real division of opinion concerns the functions with which the control authority is to be endowed. Here one may take as a starting point a concrete point of difference which has emerged from his debate.

31. The Soviet representative argues, as I understand him, that to cut off the supply of nuclear materials to an offending State, as proposed in the United States working paper, might be regarded as a sanction within the meaning of Chapter VII. It seems to me that such a measure might be regarded as merely a necessary and indeed elementary precaution. No doubt, however, the offending State might regard the action as punitive.

32. Should such action therefore be subject to a veto? Here we must take account not only of the juridical position established by the Charter, but of practical realities. Since it would be unrealistic to expect a State to concur in what it regards as punitive measures against itself, or even against its allies, one must conclude that the Council voting system is not, for this purpose, a workable system—whatever may have been thought when it was first agreed on at San Francisco.

33. So we face, it seems, an impasse—a conflict between the juridical situation and the practical situation? We cannot afford to be so passive. Moreover, and here I wish without commitment to throw out a suggestion for your consideration, I feel that even within the present Charter framework a solution can be found.

34. I note, for example, that the Security Council has the power under Article 29 of the Charter to set up subsidiary bodies to assist it in the performance of its functions. Might it not be possible for the Council to establish the control organ, as a condition precedent to the entry of the disarmament treaty into effect, as a subsidiary organ, and simultaneously to delegate to it the functions which it is to exercise under the treaty? Of course, this would require the unanimity of the permanent members of the Council, but prior great Power unanimity is, after all, a *sine qua non* of any disarmament scheme.

35. I am not suggesting, however, that there should be no appeal from the decisions of the control organ. On the contrary, the Security Council—whose overriding authority in matters affecting international peace and security my Government has consistently asserted—might be the final arbiter on certain specified issues. But under the procedure I suggest, the Council would be required to act in accordance with the rule of unanimity to reverse the decisions of the control organ, which would have been taken by a suitably qualified majority vote; unless and until the Council so acted, the decision of the control organ would be binding.

36. These suggestions, which I put forward entirely tentatively and with due sense of the difficulties involved in the question as a whole, do no violence, I suggest, either to the Charter or to common sense. I do not feel, however, that it would be desirable to attempt to elaborate upon or to seek agreement at this stage on the question of the relationship of the control organ to the Security Council, or indeed on the functions and powers to be allocated to the control organ—a question on which I do not at this stage propose to offer even a tentative opinion. These are matters, after all, which can best be thrashed out in the technical organ specially created for this purpose—the Disarmament Commission.

37. One point should, however, be made clear here and now. Already it has been eloquently developed by other speakers, notably the distinguished representative of Peru [691st meeting], and I shall not dwell on it. The point is simply this: in effect, we cannot

accept—I say, we cannot accept—a disarmament system which is subject to a veto. Whatever the means—and I am sure we have not yet explored all possibilities—some way must be found to avoid its application. Unless everyone is prepared to co-operate in this search, there is a barrier before us which may well be insurmountable.

38. My delegation considers that this debate has contributed to our understanding of the points of difference, and—we trust—ultimately to their eradication. The problem before the Committee is to decide on the best course of future action. My delegation, of course, appreciates the reasons for the proposal made by the representative of Australia [690th meeting]. It is a proposal which is based on a desire to clarify the fundamental issues—a desire which we all share. My delegation considers, however, that the exchanges which have already taken place in this Committee and the further amplification of points of view that will no doubt occur before our debate is concluded have clarified these points of difference already considerably. We shall have verbatim records of these exchanges and my delegation has considerable doubts whether it is now necessary to appoint a sub-committee of this Committee to tell us what the points of difference are.

39. My delegation can also understand and sympathize with the reasons which prompted the representative of the Philippines to put forward his proposal [A/C.1/751]. It does seem to my delegation, however, that having at last reached a point where progress is possible we would be foolish to risk receiving—what I might call for lack of a better expression—a nil return on 15 November. Such a return of nothing could only prejudice the chances of complete agreement, the next step towards which must be taken calmly, deliberately and without fixed dates, in the forum especially created for this purpose.

40. It is for these reasons my delegation agrees in principle to the course of future action suggested by the delegation of Canada [A/C.1/752/Rev.1]. We consider that this is the logical step to take. My delegation hopes that it will be possible for all five members of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission to join in sponsoring this resolution. We are of the opinion that paragraph 2 of the operative part of this resolution might usefully refer all proposals, including the Soviet, to the Disarmament Commission, and we would hope that this might facilitate agreement.

41. At the end of this address I reiterate my earnest hope that in the coming year we shall advance towards our goal. It is my belief that, with patience and sincerity, the peoples of all nations, and thus my own, can achieve their hearts' desire: peace with security. Hard-headed realists though perforce we are, equally we must not be pessimists. Despair can only result in a relaxation of our efforts, and relaxation is a luxury we cannot afford so long as the sole alternative to an effectively controlled disarmament system remains—as I believe it always must—the ever present threat of thermo-nuclear cataclysm.

42. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom): I feel that I should apologize for intervening for a third time in this debate. I have, however, tried to follow a pattern in this trilogy of speeches. The first [690th meeting] was meant to be an exposition of the various papers put into the Disarmament Commission. The second

[690th meeting] was designed to ascertain and to clarify. In this third speech I hope to indicate the views of the United Kingdom delegation upon the present position and the course of action which, in our judgment, should be adopted by this Committee.

43. We feel that this exchange of views has been useful. Certain issues have been clarified. Above all, we have found it possible to debate with good temper and, indeed, good humour, almost the most important international problem of the day.

44. I have been criticized for asking too many questions. I am afraid that I am quite unrepentant about that. I do not see how else it is possible to clarify the position. Debates should not just be the emission of cloud upon cloud of words. It is impossible to make physical progress in a fog, and a fog of words can be just as difficult to penetrate. Therefore, I do not apologize for my questions, nor do I think Mr. Moch should apologize for his.

45. At the 690th meeting I asked two questions. It will be within the recollection of the Committee what they were. They were not intended to put Mr. Vyshinsky on the spot. There was no catch in them. The first question was:

“Does he accept that there must be agreement as to the nature, function and powers of the control organ before countries begin to carry out the agreed disarmament programme?”

46. That question was implicit in all our debates in London in the Disarmament Commission Sub-Committee because it does go to the root of the problem of simultaneity, the idea of simultaneously declaring a ban, a percentage reduction and the institution of a control organ, and that matter was not clear.

47. Mr. Vyshinsky, in answer to that first question said, in the same meeting:

“Clearly, we first have to conclude an agreement, the international convention I have mentioned. Is that not obvious? All these matters will be provided for there; the two parties will no doubt propose different provisions and there may be differences of opinion between us, though I hope that this will not be the case. But as for giving an answer now, giving some guarantee or assuming some obligation or taking some sort of oath, I say let us wait awhile, let us meet around the table and begin our work on the convention. Whether there is to be a control organ and when it will begin to function will have to be laid down in the convention”.

48. I think, from that passage, that it is quite clear—although it might have been more succinctly expressed—that Mr. Vyshinsky's answer is “yes” to that first question. As I say, that might have been obvious to other people before, but it certainly was not obvious to me, and that answer has clarified the position to that extent.

49. The second question which I asked, as the Committee will remember, was: does the Soviet Union agree that the officials of the control organ should be in position, ready and able to function, in all the countries concerned before any of the agreed programme comes into effect? That question, in fact, is practically identical with the question which I put in the Sub-Committee on 17 May [DC/53, annex 2] in these words “The Disarmament Sub-Committee should con-

sider whether there is agreement on the answers to the following questions:”. The first one I shall not deal with, but the second was:

“Is it agreed that before the elimination and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction and the reductions of armed forces and conventional weapons begin to come into effect, the international control organ must be created and its officials stationed in all countries concerned ready to supervise the prohibitions and the reductions agreed upon?”

50. So I do not think that a complaint can be made that no notice had been given to my question, since that document was put in on 17 May of this year. We did not have an answer to that question during the course of the Sub-Committee’s discussions and we have not had an answer to that question in the course of this debate, except perhaps on the argument which Mr. Wadsworth used yesterday [693rd meeting], when he asked us to imply that the answer was “no”. But we have certainly not had a positive answer, and I understand that Mr. Vyshinsky really takes up the position that this is a matter for negotiation when discussing the nature, functions and powers of the control organ—that the timing of the placing of the officials of the control organ in position is a matter for discussion and negotiation when going into the nature, functions and problems of the control organ. That is a position which he is perfectly entitled to take up and we know where we are upon that matter; that he is not prepared to say “yes” to that question at this stage, but that it is a matter to be negotiated.

51. But there should not be any illusion as to our position in that matter. We still hold the view—and hold it strongly—that that is a condition precedent to any satisfactory scheme of disarmament. It is the essential manifestation of good faith and willingness to accept the officers of the control organ in position before the agreed programme starts to be put into operation. So much for those two questions.

52. The present position, as I see it, is this. In June, in the Franco-British memorandum [DC/53, annex 9], which was supported by the United States and Canada, we tried to meet certain of the Soviet Union’s points. Our plan included specific provision for the total prohibition of nuclear weapons. That is something which, it had been alleged on previous occasions, we had not expressly provided for. I do not think that was a fair criticism of our previous draft resolutions, but nevertheless we made absolutely clear a specific provision for the total prohibition of nuclear weapons.

53. Secondly, our plan provided that conventional armaments and nuclear weapons should be dealt with together. It had been suggested before that we wanted to have conventional disarmament completed before we would even begin to consider nuclear prohibitions. Well, I think that our memorandum makes it quite clear that, in our view, the two operations should proceed at the same time.

54. Thirdly, when the convention comes into effect, those who ratify it would be committed from that moment to a process ending in comprehensive disarmament. There is no question of first having disclosure and verification of conventional armaments before deciding whether or not to prohibit nuclear weapons. That, again, was designed to meet that Soviet Union criticism.

55. Finally, to meet the point which Mr. Vyshinsky—and, indeed, Mr. Malik—had repeatedly made, that disclosure and verification was all we were after, we drew up this memorandum in such form as to make it absolutely clear that complete disarmament, in the sense of the prohibition of nuclear weapons and agreed reduction in conventional armaments, was the manifest object of our memorandum and our programme and of the convention which we proposed.

56. Thus, in those four ways we tried to meet previous criticisms and comments made by the Soviet Union.

57. Now the Soviet Union seems to me to have sought to try to meet our views in certain matters. It no longer insists upon an unconditional ban upon nuclear weapons as the first step in the process. The Soviet Union does not insist upon percentage cuts, although it still says—if I do not misrepresent its position—that it would prefer the cuts to be percentage cuts, but it does not insist upon that. It accepts the idea of disarmament by stages and it has agreed to a first stage of conventional disarmament to the extent of fifty per cent of the agreed reductions. What is more, the Soviet Union has publicly declared that it accepts our proposals as a basis. I do not think that that is a misrepresentation of the present position as between us and the Soviet Union; so I think it is wrong to say that there has been no progress.

58. It is true—and it would be wrong not to say so—that there are many serious problems and differences of opinion still to be cleared up, and the matters to be cleared up, I think, would seem to many outsiders to be of the essence of the problem.

59. First of all, we have got to try to get agreement upon levels to which reduction shall take place. We have got to seek agreement covering all the countries of the world with substantial armaments, with all the complicating diversity of factors affecting their own domestic and other positions. We have got to seek to reach agreement, covering all those countries, relating to reductions in conventional armaments. We have got to try to reach agreement on the nature, functions and powers of the control organ. Anyone who has listened to the debates must see that there are very wide differences of opinion, and we have had very little comment or discussion concerning what, as I ventured to suggest in an earlier speech [685th meeting], was the most difficult thing of all: whether it is practically possible to devise a safe means of controlling nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. We have skated round that. We have not got down to the practical possibility of establishing an effective control organ. Then, we are disagreed about the timing of what we regard as one of the conditions precedent—a matter to which I have previously referred, namely, the positioning of the agents of the control organ. So, really it is quite wrong to say that we have agreed upon the outline of a plan and have only to fill in the details. That would be to arouse a sense of quite false security.

60. On the other hand, we have achieved something together. We have, I believe, put ourselves in a position to discuss these other complicated matters. Therefore, I am not discouraged. I think that the memorandum of 11 June was a decisive initiative. I think it gave a new impulse to this work for disarmament, and I welcome the Soviet reaction of 30 September.

61. Certain questions have been asked about the draft resolution of which the United Kingdom is a co-sponsor, the draft resolution originally submitted by

Canada [*A/C.1/752/Rev.2*]. Certain questions were asked by Mr. Krishna Menon [*693rd meeting*], and I want to make it quite clear that, in answering them, I am really answering for myself, because I have not had time to discuss his points with the other co-sponsors. I should like to thank Mr. Menon for his courtesy in sending me a copy of his questions. I shall do my best to answer them, because I quite agree that the process of question and answer is the way to try to clarify views.

62. Mr. Menon's first question relates to a comparison between sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of the Canadian resolution and sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 2 of the Franco-British memorandum [*DC/53, annex 9*]. Both those sets of sub-paragraphs really deal with what the convention should provide for.

63. I think that, in both the Franco-British memorandum and the Canadian resolution, the one which we are now co-sponsoring, the draftsmen were seeking to find words which would represent a common or a general position. Although nothing in this world is perfect, and I do not think that anyone would pretend that he had found a perfect form of words, I still believe that it will be possible to get an agreed formulation of these matters, one which every member of this Committee could accept.

64. The second question was with regard to the words "regulation and limitation" which appear in the draft but were not, I think, in the Franco-British memorandum.

65. I must say that I think the words "regulation and limitation" are an improvement on the words in the Franco-British memorandum. But I also think that we could usefully put in there the word "conventional", to make it quite clear to what we are referring in that sub-paragraph. However, that is only my personal view.

66. In his third question, Mr. Menon asked whether it was our view that a control organ should deal with matters appertaining to prohibition and reductions, and no other matters.

67. I think that, generally speaking, that is our view. But I would remind the Committee of what I said about the Atomic Development Division in the United States paper [*DC/53, annex 4*] and what I said about the relationship of the functions of a control organ to whatever body may result from President Eisenhower's plan relating to civil use of atomic energy presented in 1953 to the General Assembly [*470th meeting*]. I think, as I said then, that there will have to be a relationship. But I agree that the primary purpose—and it may be the exclusive purpose—of this control organ should be to deal with prohibition and limitation of weapons.

68. The fourth point which Mr. Menon put was the suggestion that the drafting of the resolution would make it appear that we are contemplating the regulation and reduction of nuclear weapons as well as of conventional armaments.

69. I think it is right, of course, that in any form of words it should be made absolutely clear that, in relation to nuclear weapons, what we are considering is their prohibition, and that the question of regulation and reduction really applies to conventional armaments.

70. Mr. Menon's fifth point related to the term "all armed forces and armaments", and he asked to what that referred.

71. I think that is a very important point and one which perhaps has not yet been made clear. It is the United Kingdom view that the effect of any disarmament agreement should be a major reduction in the armed forces and armaments of the world as a whole. Naturally, the armaments of the most heavily armed powers would be most affected, but some reduction should be possible in most cases. I recognize, of course, that there may be certain States where present levels are low and where no reductions are practicable. But I would recall at this point that it is specified in the draft resolution that the whole disarmament programme should be such that no State should have cause to fear that its security is endangered.

72. Mr. Menon's final question in this first group of questions related to the factors to be taken into account in deciding the levels of armed forces, and I agree that the factors which he mentioned are factors which would have to be taken into account.

73. Mr. Menon's next question dealt again with the differences between paragraph 1 of the Canadian resolution and paragraph 2 of the Anglo-French memorandum. I think I have already dealt with that and, as I have said, I hope that agreement will be possible and that we can find a form of words which is acceptable to everybody.

74. The next point dealt with the "control organ" and the question of whether that was a technical term, whether it was to be regarded as one of the Organs—with a capital "O"—of the United Nations, of which there are already six.

75. I think that the phrase "control organ" was used in the Franco-British memorandum not in a technical sense. I, personally, do not care whether you call it "authority", whether you call it "organization", whether you call it "machinery". It was not, as I say, a technical term.

76. The next question is a very important one. Perhaps I had better read it [*693rd meeting*]:

"Is it in the minds of the authors of the Anglo-French memorandum that the control organ or organs—indeed, the whole functioning of disarmament—should be under machinery or institutions set up under the proposed world disarmament conference, or is it, as we assume, to be part of the United Nations?"

77. Certainly, the disarmament agreements would derive their authority from the treaties signed by the parties, but the system, we hope, would be within the framework of the United Nations. We have already, of course, in General Assembly resolution [*502, VI*] directed the Disarmament Commission, "when preparing... proposals... to formulate plans for the establishment, within the framework of the Security Council of an international control organ...". We certainly have envisaged its being within the framework of the Security Council and therefore within the framework of the United Nations.

78. Mr. Menon's next question dealt with proposals from other delegations. I think that the feeling of a those who served on the London Sub-Committee and a those who serve in the Disarmament Commission that they certainly want what Mr. Menon called the "constructive co-operation" of other Member State

and I believe that other countries should have the right, and indeed the duty, to communicate their views to the Disarmament Commission.

79. The next question related to an analogy between factory inspectors in the United Kingdom under the British Factories and Workshops Acts and the position of the inspectors or supervisors under an agreed system of disarmament. Those more industrious than I have prepared a long answer on that point, but I shall give a short answer.

80. My own view is that the powers of the servants of the control organ should be greater than those of factory inspectors under the Factories Acts. On that whole question of the powers to be given to the servants of the control organ or organs, I repeat that our view is that the ultimate sanction must rest with the Security Council, that punitive measures should be taken on the authority of the Security Council, where the veto does apply. But in a completely different category, to be considered separately, there must be a plan for enforcement measures, and those enforcement measures must not be subject to the veto.

81. If I were to be asked what an enforcement measure was, I would say this: The inspector must have the right to order the man in Mr. Vyshinsky's factory to turn the gauge back when that man had been seen to switch it so as to make it convert the nuclear energy from peaceful to warlike purposes. As an enforcement measure, the inspector must have the right to give orders. It must be one of the provisions of the international treaty to which the government of the manager of the factory subscribes that the inspector should have the right to give orders. That is what I call an enforcement measure.

82. We then come to the other end of the scale, to matters such as the suspension of the delivery of stocks of nuclear fuel. Would that be an enforcement measure or a punitive measure? In my view, it would lie within the bounds of enforcement. Certainly, however, that is a matter which must be studied very carefully. The line to be drawn between enforcement measures and punitive measures is a subject for careful and, I should think, prolonged negotiation.

83. The next question I was asked was whether we would agree to the convening of a special session of the General Assembly, if circumstances required or permitted, and whether a provision to that effect should not be included in the draft resolution. Again, I cannot speak for the Canadian representative on this point, but my initial reaction to Mr. Menon's question would be that I think his point, which is a perfectly legitimate one, is really adequately covered in the General Assembly's rules of procedure, where provision is made for the calling of a special session at the request of the Security Council, or of the majority of Member States, or of a single Member State with the concurrence of a majority. I think that those three possibilities really adequately cover the question of calling a special session to receive a report from the Disarmament Commission or the Sub-Committee.

84. Mr. Menon's final question was whether all the proposals which we are putting forward would be clearly within the terms of the Charter. The answer to that question is "yes". In our view, the proposals which we put forward would have to be within the terms of the Charter. On the question of the veto and the position of the Charter in relation to the veto, we would say, I think, that it would be quite wrong for a

treaty between States to provide that the veto should not operate in the Security Council on this or that matter; that it would be contrary to the Charter to insert such a provision in a multilateral treaty; but that it would be perfectly consistent with the Charter to say that certain enforcement measures should be decided upon in the control organization by majority vote. A treaty providing for that would not be contrary to or inconsistent with the Charter, but it would be contrary to the Charter to have a provision in a treaty drawn up between Member States to the effect that the veto should not operate in the Security Council upon particular matters. That conclusion could only be arrived at by means of an amendment to the Charter itself.

85. I have tried to answer the questions which have been put. Again I would say that I have been speaking on behalf of the United Kingdom delegation and have perhaps been trespassing on ground which should more properly have been covered by Mr. Paul Martin of Canada.

86. So much for that matter. I now come to the question of our future conduct.

87. I hope that a resolution on the lines of that put forward by the four countries [*A/C.1/752/Rev.1*] will be adopted. I hope that the Disarmament Commission will meet. I hope that the Sub-Committee will be reconstituted, and I am sure that Her Majesty's Government would be very glad to welcome it again in London, although it may be said that we have had our turn.

88. There is one point that I would raise in dealing with future conduct. It concerns the suggestion put forward by the representative of Australia [*688th meeting*], a suggestion which, in my view, was interesting and helpful. Speaking only for the United Kingdom, I should like to present this idea to the Committee: Perhaps Sir Percy Spender's suggestion might be acted upon to the extent that the Secretariat might be asked to prepare for circulation to all delegations and as a preparatory paper for the Disarmament Commission—and so for the Sub-Committee—an analysis of the present position, a factual document without recommendations. I think that that sort of analysis might be helpful to all delegations, and indeed to the members of the Disarmament Commission. I put that forward as an idea for consideration.

89. I now return to what I have already said. I think that we have cause for modest satisfaction at what has transpired. There are many grave and difficult matters still to be resolved, but we have put ourselves into a position in which they can be discussed with better prospects than has been the case for several years past. I think that it is very important indeed to try to maintain the momentum, because one day the whole operation may gather speed. Our goal is a reasonable, practical, safe scheme of disarmament, under which countries will feel safer and not more insecure. For it would indeed be a retrograde step to produce a scheme for disarmament which was so full of uncertainties that countries in fact would feel less secure than they do at present. The scheme that we want to have is one under which a small island like Britain, easily inspected and easily surveyed, can have confidence that in vaster countries nothing untoward is happening.

90. My friends, Mr. Jules Moch and Mr. Krishna Menon, and others have been so kind as to say nice things about me personally. I thank them very sincerely

I am very conscious of the help and the friendship which I have received in the past three years, and from many of those who are present in this Committee today. One would not be human if one could prevent personal relationships affecting oneself and one's conduct. I believe that the individual has a part to play, so, as I go to other duties, I, as an individual, extend to you, my colleagues, as individuals my very best wishes. But I also pray that you in your collective capacity, that this Committee as a committee, that this United Nations as an organization, will so handle these grave international problems that suspicions will be met, that doubts will be resolved, that tensions will be diminished, that fears will be quietened, with the vision before you of a world society, in which true peace will be established, not only between the nations but also regardless of class, creed or colour, in the hearts of men.

91. Mr. WADSWORTH (United States of America): As the representative of the United Kingdom leaves us today to assume his new and heavy responsibilities in London, I would like to take this opportunity of expressing on behalf of my delegation our especial appreciation of the tremendous contribution which he personally has made to this problem and many other problems in the United Nations. Mr. Lloyd carries with him our very best wishes and our sincere regret that he must leave us, together with our warmest congratulations on this latest recognition of his outstanding ability.

92. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) (*translated from Spanish*): It is a most pleasant duty for me to associate myself with the words the representative of the United States has just spoken in tribute to Mr. Lloyd, the representative of the United Kingdom.

93. I am sure that everyone will agree with me that he has rendered outstanding services to the United Nations, not only by his knowledge, but by his tact, his exquisite courtesy and his spirit of co-operation. Since I first had the honour of working with him in this Committee, during the memorable Paris days, I have recognized in him that clear devotion to the United Nations and that human quality, that appreciation of individual co-operation, which is of such value. Accordingly I should like, both personally and on behalf of the Peruvian delegation, to convey to him our gratification that he has been promoted to a more important position and the hope that in that position or in any others that he may occupy in the course of his brilliant career he will continue to be a friend and an effective collaborator of the United Nations.

94. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from French*): The last two speakers have expressed sentiments that are shared by the majority of the members of the Committee. In any case, as Chairman of the Committee and on behalf of its officers, I should like to give Mr. Lloyd my personal assurance that I fully endorse the words of appreciation addressed to him.

95. Mr. SARPEN (Turkey): I should like to say that I associate myself with what has been said by the representatives of the United States and of Peru, and, before the intervention of the Chairman, I was about to move that the Chairman express our views, both personally and collectively on behalf of the Committee and on behalf of members individually, to the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd.

96. Mr. MENON (India): I should like to express the appreciation and gratitude of my delegation to

Mr. Lloyd for answering our questions at length and *seriatim*. Since this is the last time he will address this Committee at this session—and I expressly say “at this session”—and since he has made his concluding speech, I do not propose to probe into this matter. I am happy that he has not avoided any of the questions or tried to give answers which leave me in the air. We were very happy to receive them, and I hope the answers will be of assistance to this Committee as certainly they will be to us.

97. If it will not be considered as being out of order, I should like to take this opportunity of saying that since requests for clarification—they were not questions—were made on the basis of the draft resolution before the Committee [*A/C.1/752/Rev.1*], and since we have had the answers of the representative of the United Kingdom, I should like to request that those concerned, in the further observations they make, would kindly assist us, since Mr. Lloyd quite rightly was careful to explain that he was only presenting the view of the United Kingdom delegation.

98. The question about regulation, did not, in my contemplation, apply to matters of civilian use of atomic energy. It applied to other matters, but, of course, we will take that up in debate.

99. I have already expressed, on behalf of my delegation, our sentiments and feelings about Mr. Lloyd. I do not like to say too much, because he might come back in some other capacity, and I should not like to have to withdraw my words. But there is one thing, perhaps, which I should add from my knowledge of him. The position he is going to hold is of importance, and he is going into a situation where this problem of enforcement, regulation, and limitation is relevant, and his further assistance with regard to the problem of disarmament, particularly in this field, will be, I am sure, at our disposal in the months to come.

100. Mr. MATES (Yugoslavia): We are all here as representatives of governments, and I have had occasion to address this Committee [*689th meeting*] in that capacity and to express our views concerning the Franco-British memorandum submitted in London [*DC/53, annex 9*] and the contribution it has made to the further discussion on disarmament. But I can assure the Committee and Mr. Lloyd that we do understand as he has said, that there is also a human aspect of the question, and the contribution of the individual, although he is representing his government, should not be underestimated and that we do appreciate the work of those who have individually been engaged in making and offering us these proposals in London in June. As we are now, in some respects taking leave of Mr. Lloyd—and I hope it will be temporary leave—I should like to join in the expression of recognition of his personal contribution to this question, as well as to other questions with which we have worked with him.

101. Mr. MARTIN (Canada): In view of the observations of the representative of India, may I take this opportunity to say that the questions which he, understandably, addressed yesterday to one of the co-sponsors of this draft resolution [*A/C.1/752, Rev.1*] are matters that are of interest and of importance. Some of them are matters, of course, that can only be dealt with in negotiation and in the Sub-Committee, if that Sub-Committee should be re-established. However, I do not want to take this particular moment to add what may be our views or our interpretation of a document of which we are a co-sponsor, but

I think that ought to be done in an orderly way, and I would prefer to do it after those who have already inscribed their names on the list have been given an opportunity of doing so, and also to do it in co-operation with those who agreed to co-sponsor this draft resolution.

102. Perhaps, now being out of order in speaking on this point, I could take this opportunity of expressing the gratitude and admiration which we all feel for the constructive role that Mr. Lloyd has played in the disarmament debate here and for the outstanding contribution which he has made to the progressive evolution of the disarmament question during the past three years. I should also like to say to him and to the Committee that we are at the moment engaged in seeing whether what is now a four-Power draft resolution will become, as I hope and trust it will, a five-Power draft resolution.

103. Mr. BARRINGTON (Burma): My delegation warmly associates itself with the tributes which have been paid to Mr. Lloyd. It does so, however, with mixed feelings. On the one hand, we are happy about his well-earned elevation and offer him our heartiest felicitations. But our happiness is tempered with regret because of his imminent departure from our councils. Regardless of whether we have agreed with him or not, we have never doubted his sincerity and his willingness to co-operate. We have been impressed with these qualities and with his firmness blended with moderation and restraint. In short, he has set us an example of what a highly successful representative to the United Nations should be. We shall miss him sorely. We have little doubt that we shall be seeing him here again in some other capacity, and we shall look forward to that day. Meanwhile, we wish him all the best of luck for the future.

104. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom): I strongly suspect that a good deal of what has been happening in the last quarter of an hour or so has been completely out of order. However, I have been very moved and very touched by the kind things that have been said, and I do express my very sincere gratitude to those who have said them.

105. Mr. Hsioh-Ren WEI (China): On behalf of my delegation, I wish to associate myself with the other representatives in expressing our sincere and deep appreciation to Mr. Lloyd. It has been my great personal privilege and honour to work with him on this problem on a number of occasions. I think that not only the United Nations but the world owes him a vote of thanks for his great wisdom, vision and contributions.

106. Disarmament is one of mankind's oldest dreams, but its history is the most discouraging. The voluminous plans of the League of Nations on disarmament are good only for the archives. The United Nations plan for the international control of atomic energy, although adopted by the overwhelming majority of the General Assembly is collecting dust. Disarmament negotiations during the past several years have been frustrating. In the meantime, the arsenals of the world have advanced from the atomic age to the hydrogen age and from the age of transcontinental bombers to the age of guided missiles.

107. Against this dreary background came the 30 September announcement [484th meeting] of the Soviet Union representative that his Government accepted the Franco-British proposal of 11 June 1954 [DC/53,

annex 9] as the basis of discussion on disarmament. This Soviet Union announcement is significant because it is the first time in the nine years of United Nations debate and negotiation on disarmament that the Soviet Union has ever accepted as the basis of discussion any specific proposal made by any delegation outside the Iron Curtain. I therefore consider the 30 September announcement of the Soviet Union representative to be one of the few bright moments in the long and dark history of negotiations on disarmament.

108. However, I note that many of the representatives in this Committee and a considerable portion of public opinion in general received the new Soviet Union announcement with guarded optimism, or even with skepticism. This is first of all because of past disappointments. More important than past disappointments, there is an additional reason for skepticism, namely, the ambiguities and inadequacies of the Soviet Union draft resolution [A/C.1/750] and the Soviet Union statements in this Committee. It may be that it is best for us all to forget the past, but we cannot and should not ignore or even gloss over the ambiguities and inadequacies found in the Soviet Union proposal and statements. Has the Soviet Union really accepted the basic principles of the Franco-British proposal of 11 June 1954? It is the duty of this Committee to find a clear and definite answer to this question.

109. The Franco-British memorandum of 11 June is one of two basic papers produced in the course of the proceedings of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission in London. The other basic document is the United States working paper on methods of implementing and enforcing the disarmament programme [DC/53, annex 4]. These two basic papers are closely related. I understand that both France and the United Kingdom agree that these two papers are closely related. I also understand that both France and the United Kingdom support at least the basic ideas in the working paper of the United States.

110. My delegation supports the principle of both these papers. The details, of course, are subject to careful study and modification. I believe that a programme of disarmament based on the principles in these two papers will give reasonable assurance and protection to all States.

111. The Soviet Union draft resolution and the Soviet Union representative's statements before this Committee are not encouraging. There is good ground for disillusionment.

112. As I see it, this Committee, in the present stage of the debate, should concentrate on these two questions: (1) Has the Soviet Union really accepted the basic principles of the Franco-British proposal of 11 June 1954? (2) In what way and to what extent does the Soviet Union accept or reject the ideas embodied in the United States working paper?

113. The Soviet Union draft resolution, which is now before this Committee, is silent on the United States working paper. But in his statement before this Committee at the 686th meeting, the Soviet Union representative categorically rejected the United States working paper. After severely criticizing the corrective measures in paragraph 41 of the United States paper [DC/53, annex 4], Mr. Vyshinsky said, "this document cannot be accepted and we do not propose to accept it. We cannot accept it. We propose different measures".

114. Let us then examine first the present Soviet Union position on control. Effective control is the key

to any plan of disarmament and, according to my understanding, is an integral part of the Franco-British proposal. Lack of agreement on control is one of the causes, one can almost say the main cause, for the long deadlock in our disarmament negotiations.

115. In opening the present debate, Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Moch asked the Soviet Union representative a number of pertinent questions relating to international control of disarmament. Other representatives have asked questions in the same field. The answers of the Soviet Union representative are usually long and involved and are often mixed with political propaganda. Some of his answers have been found to be quite puzzling. Some very important questions have not yet been answered. I think the Committee, by this time, may be already convinced that, under our present circumstances, a question-answer method of procedure is not likely to prove fruitful. Instead of asking more questions about control, I wish to single out two points of great importance on which to focus the attention of our debate.

116. The first point that I want to emphasize is the question of the veto in regard to international control. The Soviet Union has made it clear to us that the corrective or punitive measures of the international control organ must be subject to review by the Security Council, where such corrective or punitive measures must be subject to the veto. This is a point of the greatest importance in any scheme of international control. If the corrective or punitive measures of the control organ are subject to the veto, the entire control system is endangered.

117. Even if all parties to the disarmament convention should agree that no permanent member of the Security Council should use the veto on its own behalf, such an agreement still would not be satisfactory. A permanent member may not violate the convention itself, but it may cause one of its allied or satellite or friendly countries to violate the convention. A veto to protect another country would torpedo any disarmament convention almost as much as the use of the veto by a permanent member to protect itself.

118. I realize that the Charter of the United Nations does endow the permanent members of the Security Council with the right of the veto, and I have no illusions in regard to the revision of the Charter in that respect. If the veto in the Security Council is to be intact, evidently the only possible solution is to make the international control organ independent of the Security Council. If it should be considered necessary to provide a court of appeal or of review over and above the international control organ, my delegation would consider any proposal along this line. But we must not give any member of such a court the right of the veto.

119. In a word, while willing to consider some form of appeal or review in the system of control, my delegation is deeply convinced that the use of the veto in connexion with the enforcement of international control would be fatal to the whole scheme of disarmament and would even be catastrophic in the case of atomic violations.

120. The second point that I wish to emphasize is the scope and mode of inspection. This is also critical in the whole scheme of disarmament. If the individual Government should have the right to designate the establishments or regions to be inspected or to prescribe

the time and mode of inspection, the entire system of inspection would be ineffective. On this point, the successive statements of the Soviet representative, put together, leave much ground for scepticism. To be sure, the Soviet representative has used such words as "strict control" and "continuing inspection". We do not know what he means by these words "strict" and "continuing".

121. The control organ must have the rights of freedom of movement and general inspection, by aerial survey if necessary. Take a very simple case. Suppose a State reports to the control organ military installations A, B and C, but engages in clandestine activities in installation X. In order to inspect X, the control organ must first secure the consent of the State concerned. If that State objects, the control organ, besides making recommendations to the Security Council, would be helpless. If the State consents, a certain length of time may have elapsed so that the nature of installation X is completely changed. The control organ may then find that installation X is making buttons instead of munitions. I submit that this is a matter of common sense.

122. Of the many points connected with international control, I have singled out the veto and inspection for discussion because they are the foundation stones for any system of control. Without general inspection and enforcement powers, there cannot be guaranteed reductions, prohibitions or eliminations.

123. Before there is basic agreement on control, any discussion on the question of stages is not realistic. But since both the Franco-British proposal [DC/53, annex 9] and the Soviet Union proposal [A/C.1/750] deal principally with the question of stages, I have examined them carefully for what they are worth.

124. There are two features of the Franco-British proposal that I wish to endorse especially. One is that reductions, prohibitions and eliminations are to be made only when the appropriate controls for each are in full operation. The second is that, with the development of the disarmament programme, there is increasing balance of military strength in the world and, therefore, increasing security for all States. In the first stage, the present military imbalance is frozen but is prevented from getting worse. By the end of the third stage, not only is there to be balance in armed forces and conventional armaments but all prohibited weapons have been eliminated. This, of course, includes atomic and hydrogen weapons. Further disarmament is also envisaged. The Franco-British proposal, therefore, as I understand it, is to build a truly open, co-operative and disarmed world.

125. "Simultaneity" and "continuing inspection" we all remember are the two major concessions Mr. Vyshinsky made on behalf of the Soviet Union a number of years ago. So far, the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee have not been able to determine their true significance. Now they are both used in the Soviet Union proposal, and simultaneity now covers both stages of the Soviet Union disarmament programme. The explanations of simultaneity by the Soviet Union representative have not cleared up the confusion. It is necessary to know definitely whether the Soviet Union will accept as a basis the thesis of the Franco-British proposal that the control organ shall be established and ready to supervise the implementation of a given stage before measures for reduction and elimination prescribed for that stage are enforced.

126. Special attention should be given to the second paragraph under (2b) of the Soviet Union draft resolution [A/C.1/750]. It deals with the timing of the prohibition and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and of the stoppage of production of atomic and hydrogen weapons. There is no simultaneity here. The Soviet Union draft resolution provides that the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons shall cease immediately as soon as a start is made with the second 50 per cent reduction. Prohibitions and eliminations must be completed not later than the carrying out of the second 50 per cent reduction. The draft resolution does not say that prohibitions and eliminations must be completed not later than the completion of the carrying out of the second 50 per cent reductions. This later version, I believe, represents more closely what the Soviet Union representative has been trying to tell this Committee.

127. If the reductions in the first stage are percentage-wise, as the Soviet Union representative seems to prefer, at the beginning of the second stage the relative military imbalance in the world in the field of armed forces and conventional armaments will be the same as that of today or 1953, as stated in the draft resolution. Then, I believe, pending further clarification by the Soviet Union delegation, that the second stage in the Soviet Union draft resolution would make the entire proposal practically the same in substance, though somewhat different superficially in timing, as the former Soviet Union proposals on disarmament, repeatedly rejected by this Assembly. Thus, in my opinion, the true significance of the Soviet Union acceptance of the principle of stages is also in question.

128. The Franco-British proposal [DC/53, annex 9] is not only comprehensive but also revolutionary, as far as the traditional concept of national sovereignty is concerned. The entire disarmament programme is entrusted to one international control organ. Once the treaty is ratified by the prescribed number of States and comes into force, the control organ will be established and then the process of world disarmament will begin. The process of transition from one stage to another will be automatic, depending only on the condition that the control organ is satisfied with the appropriate controls for the later stage. Even if the Soviet Union should accept the Franco-British proposal in principle, negotiations on the details would be long and laborious. The participating States must be prepared not only to make major sacrifices in their traditional sovereignty but also to trust much of their national security to the international control organ. Human destiny, however, demands our sacrifice and our co-operation.

129. I have not dealt with the question of procedure, because the choice of procedure depends on the mood and productivity of the general debate. I can say now that there is no special advantage in referring the problem to a small group. None of the six-Power consultations of the Atomic Energy Commission, the four-Power Sub-Committee (Sub-Committee 18) of this Committee at Paris, and the five-Power Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, produced any new area of agreement.

130. I wish to reserve my right to speak later on the draft resolutions relating to procedure that are before this Committee.

131. Mr. CHOWDHURY (Pakistan): The problem of disarmament not only concerns the great Powers

but vitally concerns the middle and smaller Powers of the world. After all, when war breaks out, the middle and smaller Powers are hit the hardest and sometimes become the scene of war. Therefore, I feel that this question of disarmament must be watched closely by the middle and smaller Powers in their own interest.

132. The proposal of disarmament is an offspring of the desire of the world to prevent armed conflict and maintain peace. Nations decided to resolve their disputes through peaceful means without resorting to war. Therefore the United Nations came into being, and the first Article of the United Nations Charter explains the objectives of this Organization. This Charter indicates that the United Nations stands for the prevention of war and the maintenance of peace between nations.

133. The most important problem confronting the United Nations today is the problem of disarmament. Efforts have been made during the last half century to explore ways and means to prevent war and maintain peace. Repeated failures to prevent war have been due to the inability of nations to come to an agreement to disarm themselves to the extent of the need of internal security. Therefore, the peace and security of the world depend on the question of disarmament to a great extent.

134. In these days of nuclear weapons, with their inconceivable destructive capacity, this question has been brought more to the fore. Public opinion in the world has raised its powerful voice against resorting to armed conflict and in favour of solving international disputes through peaceful means. In the United Nations, representatives of the millions of the world gather today to solve the problem of disarmament in the interest of peace and security of the world. Nations arm themselves much beyond the need of their internal security only to make aggression on weaker States, and thus war breaks out for territorial and economic gains which the aggressor hopes for as the fruit of aggression. Therefore, aggression means war, destruction, disruption of the economy and havoc to the order of civilized life.

135. It is a very happy sign that the great Powers, through declarations made at different times, agreed that there should be reduction of armaments and banning of nuclear weapons. There have been talks of such nice agreements between great nations in the past also, but the difference is that the latest disarmament moves seem to be making serious efforts in working out an agreement for effective disarmament. The report of the Disarmament Commission [A/2685] and the latest declarations of Soviet Russia indicate that the great Powers agree on setting up an organization for the reduction of armaments and banning of nuclear weapons, but they disagree on the details of the enforcement and control part of the disarmament programme. The crux of the whole disarmament problem is not the agreement among great Powers as to the need of disarmament, but the type of measures on which the great Powers agree to enforce disarmament agreement and to prevent evasion and violation.

136. There had been disarmament agreements in the past, and the world has seen that they were paper agreements to suit the interest of aggressors, as there was no machinery powerful enough to inspect violations and enforce obligations of the disarmament treaty. Let there be no repetition of those blunders which killed the noble objectives of the League of Nations and buried that noble institution unceremoniously.

137. My delegation supports the organization of the control organ as suggested by the working paper of the United States [*DC/53, annex 4*] and as embodied in the Franco-British memorandum of 11 June 1954 [*DC/53, annex 9*]. It is a matter of gratification that the great Powers who were primarily concerned in the reduction of armaments have come so close to agreement on a basis for discussion. We are happy to note that the Soviet Union delegation now finds that the Franco-British proposals of 1954 provide it with the foundation on which a solid structure of agreement can be made. We earnestly hope that it will also, in the same spirit of good will, find it possible to agree to invest the control organ proposed by the United States delegation with the necessary powers to make it effective. We do not think that any real beginning in disarmament can be made unless a control organ is set up which has full opportunities and effective powers not only to inspect and report any violations of the agreement but also, as far as possible, to suspend the continuation of such violations. It is ridiculous to think that there will be real disarmament if the control organ has only the power of a newspaper reporter.

138. We have noted with interest the discussion that has taken place in the Committee as to the propriety of investing the powers to enforce sanctions in this control organ. We have heard arguments for and against considering the Security Council as the sole body to take action in case of violation of the agreement. The control organ, after all, will be an international body and will not be the agent of any particular country. The inspections it would carry out would be on behalf of the comity of nations. Therefore, if the control organ takes any action to suspend or stop the continuation of a violation it has noticed through its inspection, it would not be the action of one State against another but would be action on behalf of the parties to the agreement by which it is set up.

139. We do not think that this action encroaches on the powers and functions of the Security Council, which is a political body and to which the complaint of one State against another could be taken up in case of a threat to peace.

140. My delegation wishes to express its satisfaction at the statement delivered by Mr. Lloyd that the Committee might consider two aspects of the veto question in the Security Council. There will be enforcement measures and there will be punitive measures. The great Powers will have to consider whether the veto should apply to punitive measures or to enforcement measures, or to both. My delegation supports the view that the Powers should find ways and means to avoid the question of the veto in the consideration of enforcement measures and action in violation of treaty obligations.

141. We have been told that there is something called sovereignty which will be infringed upon if the control organ has the power to make on-the-spot investigations for possible evasions and violations of the treaty obligations. My delegation feels that the sovereignty of a country, in the context of the present world situation, in talking of disarmament, must be compatible with the problems of world peace. Sovereignty does not mean that any country has the freedom to prepare for aggression against weaker States, to declare war and to throw the entire world into the abyss of destruction. I feel that sovereignty must be in the context

of the present world situation and it must be compatible with the problem of peace.

142. The middle and smaller Powers suffer the most if peace is broken or if there is even a prospect of aggression.

143. The under-developed countries, in view of the aggressive preparations elsewhere in the world, are compelled to maintain defence measures, which become a great burden on their economy. Little is left for welfare projects, as the bulk of the national income has to be used for defence purposes.

144. Therefore, this disarmament question is a matter of life and death for the economy of the under-developed countries, and it is also probably a matter of life for all humanity. Let us express the hope that the right-thinking nations of the world will group together to kill the aggressive nature of the man-killing weapons by co-operating in the conclusion of a disarmament treaty, with effective safeguards against violations and evasions. Let the world accept the might of right and not the right of might to resolve international disputes through peaceful means. Thus, humanity and civilization will be saved from utter annihilation, and the man in the street will heave a sigh of relief that he will not be further used as cannon fodder to humour the wishes of greedy rulers. The long-sought-for international peace and harmony will accelerate measures for the happiness and prosperity of mankind.

145. My delegation reserves the right to express its views on the draft resolutions which have already been submitted or which may be submitted in the future.

146. Mr. COMAY (Israel): In spite of the fact that one of my ancestors made the first disarmament proposal on record when he bade the nations to beat their swords into ploughshares, my delegation intervenes in this debate with much diffidence. The small country I represent has not atomic or hydrogen weapons, and our levels of armed forces and conventional armaments need not cause the slightest anxiety to anyone. Crucial decisions must at this stage be taken by the Powers which are principally involved in the sense that they possess the major means of destruction.

147. The same conclusion flows from the inherent nature of the problems themselves. Take the question of control, about which so much has been said. It is not being asked of us whether a control organ should in principle be set up or not. We all recognize that mutual suspicion can only be met by mutual supervision. This is not a purely technical matter, however complicated it is as such. It is larded with subjective factors. We must believe that there is a line of compromise on which the main parties could ultimately meet each other; but with the best will in the world that line could be drawn only by an arduous, and probably protracted, process of negotiation across the table. For these reasons, my delegation thinks it wise that the Disarmament Sub-Committee should be reinstated, as proposed by the representative of Canada [*A/C.1/752/Rev.1*].

148. This does not mean that we have refrained from forming tentative opinions on certain of the disputed points. For instance, it makes sense to us that the control organ should be able to start supervising when countries start disarming—although, perhaps, it would not be fully fashioned at the outset and would grow with its task. Precisely because we face states of mind

which are anything but trustful or credulous, the whole process of disarmament would get off to a false start if it were not properly supervised. The organ would have to act not merely as a technical body, but also as a kind of psychological middleman.

149. Similarly, for psychological as well as for technical reasons, we would feel that the organ should have great freedom of access and inspection, and not merely have to check what may be told to it. In the world in which we live today, it would be as well for each party to feel that a watchful eye was being kept on the others. No question arises here of encroachment on national sovereignty, since the rights and duties of the control organ would flow from a convention voluntarily signed by each of the States concerned. After all, membership of the United Nations is in itself an agreed encroachment on national sovereignty.

150. On the ticklish problem of weaving together conventional and nuclear disarmament so that neither side should feel that the scales have been tipped against it at any given moment, it appears to us that the log jam has been broken and a striking advance made. It is now agreed that a 50 per cent instalment of reductions should precede the first steps in the nuclear field—and it should be possible to produce a sensible formula for tying the balance of the reductions into the various stages of eliminating nuclear weapons.

151. I have ventured some preliminary reflections on points we have heard discussed, but my delegation would wish to see the Disarmament Sub-Committee take up the problem again without getting any but the broadest terms of reference, acceptable, if possible, to all of its five members.

152. In the circumstances, we have asked ourselves, as I am sure many other delegations have done, what role the rest of us, the middle and smaller Powers, are at present called upon to play. Our Australian colleague has aptly put on record our groping desire to help. We may not be "principally concerned", but we have the painful interest of the potential victim. Even if the discussions in this Committee have not settled controversial points, they have served a vital purpose. For one thing, as the representative of Pakistan has just said, they have emphasized that this is not a private affair of great Powers. Hydrogen bombs recognize no national boundaries and are unlikely to distinguish between great and small, belligerent and neutral.

153. It has become sharply true today what John Donne said in the seventeenth century, that:

"No man is an island entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main; . . . any man's death diminisheth me, because I am involved in mankind; and therefore, never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee."

154. We are only dimly beginning to sense what horrors await us all in the event of another conflict. It is fitting that at this juncture there should be a public stocktaking of this kind, that the issues should be

clarified, the areas of agreement and disagreement defined. And it is fitting that the Sub-Committee should get back to work, if not with any concrete instructions, with a powerful moral directive from this Assembly. What is that directive? It is, put very simply, a collective injunction to find agreement. On each point in dispute, one proposed solution may appear to us more logical than another—but in the last resort any solution which is accepted is better than any solution which is not accepted. It is a situation in which the best may be the enemy of the good.

155. It does not follow that a great Power agreement would solve every individual problem in this field. For instance, a formula for agreed reductions may not quite meet the legitimate needs of countries which are undeveloped, or which have special security problems. Some method of adjustment would have to be written into an international convention; I admit it may be premature to worry about that now, but I was pleased to note the awareness of this question reflected in the remarks of the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Lloyd, this morning, when he referred to a "diversity of factors" which might need to be considered.

156. Incidentally, my delegation would wish to be fully associated with the tributes and good wishes which have gone out to Mr. Lloyd.

157. In the corridors of this building, one can hear much scepticism about the prospect of such an agreement, or about the bona fides of those who purport to seek it. Such talk is distressing. The best way we can help to promote agreement is to believe it possible and demand it with conviction. To be defeatist or cynical about it is a luxury we cannot afford, for the stakes are too high. If that may be wishful thinking, it is a risk my delegation and my Government are prepared to take.

158. One realizes what a heavy burden of responsibility rests on the Disarmament Sub-Committee. The moral pressure upon its members is in a sense much greater than it was a month ago. For years, disarmament has been discussed in a mood of shoulder-shrugging resignation within the Council chamber and public apathy without. While we are sitting here, the climate of opinion has been transformed. This present discussion has been carried on in a spirit markedly different from that of previous sessions, because the possibility of relief from fear is dangling before the peoples we represent. A failure now would produce a world-wide reaction of bitterness and resentment, and there would be a harsh accounting. The rest of us gathered here perhaps feel that we have done little and can do little to influence the course of great Power negotiations, but such a feeling may underrate the force of world opinion, which is being focused on the problem far more intensely than at any time before. Sitting with the five members of the Sub-Committee will be a silent sixth: human-kind asking for a chance to live.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.