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Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia).

AGENDA ITEMS 20 AND 68

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/2685, A/C.1/751, A/C.1/752/Rev.1) (*continued*)

Conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction (A/2742 and Corr.1, A/2742/Add.1, A/C.1/750) (*continued*)

1. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): The Committee will recall that on 13 October [688th meeting] we agreed to a suggestion by the representative of Lebanon that the list of speakers should be closed, not on the following day, but today, 18 October, at 1 p.m. However, in view of the way the debate has developed, I feel that it might be somewhat premature to close the list today at 1 p.m. If the Committee agrees, I would suggest closing the list today at 6 p.m.

2. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): My delegation would be inclined to support your first proposal not to close the list of speakers at 1 p.m. today. We should, however, prefer not to be too hasty in closing the list of speakers at all or, as you have suggested, in closing it at 6 p.m. Needless to say, if that proves to be the wish of the majority we shall defer to it, although I believe that the step would be premature. The item is an important one and observations are constantly being made which are imperfectly understood and require clarification. Because of this, the upshot of our discussion on this item appears so uncertain that any undue haste in closing the list of speakers, in other words in limiting the debate, would be ill-advised. We can always close the list of speakers, and the fewer the speakers remaining on the list, that is to say, the more fully the debate develops, the more natural will it be to do so.

3. I would therefore suggest that the list of speakers should not be closed today, either at 1 p.m. or at 6 p.m. and that we should see how the discussion of the item develops. After all, we are only in the second

week of debate on this item. Can we really believe that what has been said so far and what may be said today will be sufficient to create the best conditions for achieving agreement on a question as important as the one we are now considering? My suggestion is, therefore, that we should not be in a hurry to close the list of speakers. That will be the perfectly natural thing to do when the Committee reaches the stage where further discussion can be dispensed with and the discussion itself transferred to another forum, to be carried on by others at a different level.

4. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from French*): I should like, as the representative of the Soviet Union proposes, to be able to let the discussion take its course and see what develops. However, the fact remains that I have no speakers on my list. I wonder if we could not clarify matters. Perhaps there is some misunderstanding. It should not be forgotten that after the general debate the Committee proceeds to examine the actual proposals. Now it is quite clear, given the most recent statements, that we are no longer engaged in the general debate but in the examination of the actual proposals.

5. In order to meet the wishes of the representative of the Soviet Union we might perhaps proceed as follows: we could refrain from closing the list of speakers this afternoon but close the list for the general debate tomorrow at 1 p.m., it being fully understood that after the general debate we shall begin the discussion of the proposals themselves and that all delegations will, again, have the right to speak. Actually, I think that this second discussion will have to be a very broad one, since it will revolve around the proposals themselves which all the delegations will have had sufficient time to study.

6. Is this suggestion acceptable to the Committee?

7. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): If I have understood the Chairman correctly, what he proposes is that the list of speakers should be closed merely as a matter of form; when the list of speakers is exhausted the general debate will be formally closed, but will be continued in the guise of a debate on specific proposals. If my understanding is correct and if you and the majority of the Committee agree that when we reach the second stage of our discussion on this item we may touch on general issues also, regardless of the fact that they relate to the general debate — in short, if no restrictions are imposed, and if the debate on specific proposals does not preclude reference to general issues as well — then I have no objection to the list of speakers being formally declared closed.

8. In that case, we must agree beforehand that if, after we have begun to discuss specific proposals, a speaker wishes to touch on general issues which should have been disposed of during the general debate, he will be free to do so. I repeat, if during the second stage,

when we discuss concrete proposals, we shall have the opportunity to refer to general questions, I shall not object to the formal closing of the list of speakers in the general debate.

9. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): It is obviously customary for the general debate to be of general nature; and when it is closed and the discussion of the actual proposals has begun it is best not to reopen it. Clearly, however, it is impossible during the consideration of the proposals to avoid referring to remarks made during the general debate. I am not, however, in favour of a second general debate. All members of the Committee who have participated in its work in former years are very familiar with the practice of our Committee in this respect. The general debate takes place first; and then follows a discussion on the specific proposals made. In the present case, the discussion will turn on the draft resolutions submitted by Canada and three other Powers [*A/C.1/752/Rev.1*] and the Philippines, and also, probably, on the Australian proposal [*A/C.1/751*], which however, has not yet been submitted formally.

10. Is it the wish of the Committee that the list of speakers entered for the general debate should be closed, not tomorrow at 1 p.m. but tomorrow evening? At all events we must take some decision, and I propose that the list of speakers for the general debate should be closed tomorrow, 19 October, at 6 p.m. If there are no objections, I shall consider this proposal adopted.

The proposal was adopted.

11. Mr. SHUKAIRI (Syria): The matter under discussion deals with the regulation, limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments. Closely allied with this question is the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction. Whether it be limitation, reduction or prohibition, the small States are faced with a peculiar situation. We have nothing to limit, nothing to reduce, and nothing to prohibit. That is the position of the overwhelming majority of the Members of this Organization. Although for practical intents and purposes the item belongs to the big Powers, the floor belongs to all Members of this Organization.

12. The problem legitimately belongs to mankind, for the destiny of mankind is at stake. Should another war be unleashed—God forbid—devastation and mass destruction would visit every corner of the globe. All rules of international law regulating the conduct of war would be erased. Combatants, civilians and neutrals would be embraced in the lap of annihilation. The weary task of condemning those responsible for the war would be out of the question, as neither historians, witnesses, victims, prosecutors nor judges would survive to tell how the catastrophe began, who was on the offensive and who was on the defensive.

13. May I now be permitted—not in the words of a layman and not in the words of an illiterate as far as the nuclear weapon is concerned—to call on Professor Moon. Professor Moon is one of the inner group of United States scientists who developed the atomic bomb. The following is his statement:

“The atomic age began on 2 December 1942 in the laboratory of the University of Chicago, under the football stadium. Now there are hydrogen and cobalt bombs a thousand times”—I repeat, a thousand times—“more powerful than the atomic bomb.”

Then he says:

“One cobalt bomb could spread an undetectable radioactive dust which destroys life within two weeks . . .”—I repeat, it destroys life within two weeks. “It could bring about the eclipse of Western civilization.”

14. This item, therefore, has a unique standing. It is unique in its implications, in its eventual result, and in its gravity, complexity and importance. This unique character makes it imperative that we view the problem with unusual vision. It is true that the item is included in the agenda upon the request of one State or another. But, by its nature, the subject is not the property of its author. This is a collective item, a universal item. It belongs to all of us. It belongs to mankind, for mankind is the subject and mankind is the object. With this concept, I trust, we shall apply our minds to the problem.

15. I shall not attempt to trace the history of the question. The representative of the Philippines placed before the Committee [*687th meeting*] a historical survey from beginning to end. With him we followed the course of the item through the avenues of this Organization in its nine years of journey. The train of events was loaded with resolutions and counter-resolutions, with committees and sub-committees, and with reports and debates. But what is the net result?

16. The question was answered, and most eloquently answered, by the representative of the United States. At the outset of his address [*687th meeting*], and without any suppression or misrepresentation of facts, the representative of the United States declared that all these years of discussion had not brought forth a single agreement to scrap one gun, one tank, one bomb, or to discharge one soldier. This is a true statement. But it is a modest and merciful verdict. In fairness to the destiny of mankind, it is proper to reverse the verdict. The fact is—and it is amply proven—that, during these years of discussion, guns, bombs and tanks have not been scrapped but have been produced, and on what a scale and what a level! While our resolutions and reports were lying at rest under the dust of oblivion, the dust of death was spreading its agony in distant lands and over distant seas—and that, after all, was only a peaceful and innocent experiment!

17. Now, at this session, we meet again to deal with the same question. We have heard statements from both sides. The representative of the United States has enumerated four basic ideas necessary for any scheme of disarmament. First, he said, the United States wants disarmament. Mr. Vyshinsky, for his part, has declared in this Committee [*686th meeting*] that the Soviet Union also wants disarmament. Secondly, the United States representative said that there was more than one path by which the world could progress towards disarmament. Mr. Vyshinsky does not claim that there is one single way to disarmament. In fact, we know that all roads lead to Rome, if Rome is our real destination. Thirdly, the United States representative stated: “We want to be rid of nuclear weapons.” Mr. Vyshinsky, I believe, expressed the same desire. Fourthly, the United States representative said: “We want world peace.” Mr. Vyshinsky said the same thing.

18. The declared policy—I lay emphasis on the words “declared policy”—of both parties seems to be identical, with only one difference. The United States voiced peace in English. The Soviet Union voiced peace in

Russian. I wonder whether that makes any difference. Therefore, if both conflicting parties are in agreement on the basic ideas, we are at a loss. We are quite entitled to ask: what is the ado about? We seem to be simply staging Shakespeare's "Much Ado About Nothing".

19. But I am afraid that there is much ado about everything. The problem is not as simple as it looks. No doubt the tone is comparatively mild and the atmosphere is comparatively moderate. This is certainly a new phenomenon in our discussions at the present session. There is, however, another novelty, a rather interesting one. The debate is characterized by a campaign of questions and counter-questions. Questions are being answered by questions. And the vicious circle leads to another vicious circle. We are reminded, in the system prevailing in an English court of law, of the procedure whereby facts are established by a principal examination, cross-examination, and re-examination. That system aims at disarming the parties to the case of every nucleus of distortion. In our case, that system does not and will not disarm us of nuclear weapons.

20. The other day [690th meeting], Mr. Lloyd, with his usual ability and eloquence, went even further. He put to Mr. Vyshinsky two main questions urging that the answer be "yes" or "no". This reminds us of the question, which is never permissible before an English court of law, by the prosecutor who asks the defendant: "Have you stopped beating your wife? Answer 'yes' or 'no'." Naturally, either answer is incriminating. If the defendant says "yes", it amounts to an admission that he has been beating his wife; if the defendant says "no", it means that he is still beating his wife. In both answers, the poor, miserable creature either has been beaten or is being beaten.

21. No, this manner of interrogation is no contribution to agreement. Agreement can only be the result of a free, full, frank exchange of views, and not of an exchange of questions and counter-questions. Here we are not called upon to condemn this party or the other. Our efforts should be directed towards one goal and one goal only: agreement and nothing but agreement. We have been told, however, that certain questions are necessary to discover the intentions of the parties. I wonder whether the intentions of the parties can be discovered easily and in public audience. If those intentions have not been uncovered *in camera*, off the record, in your closed meetings, we, the small States, cannot see where we stand. We should not, however, seek to dig for intentions, for "no one knoweth the intentions of man except the devil", so the English legal maxim runs, and I hope Mr. Lloyd will allow me to borrow his legal maxim. Fortunately, the devil has never been around this table; and I hope I stand uncontradicted.

22. We approach this problem with a free mind and with an independent judgment. This is not a question pertaining to this or that ideology. It does not pertain to the East or to the West. This is not a question of States and interests of States. It is true the world is in general divided into two camps; I say, in general. It is equally true that certain small States favour this camp, others favour another. But on this question, whether we belong to this or that camp, all of us should dislodge ourselves from our trenches, from our positions. Our minds should only be influenced, not by State interests, but by the interests of world security. For if another world war is waged, neither States nor interests of States will survive.

23. We are, therefore, under a supreme and sacred obligation. The small States, in particular, have a great duty to discharge, and a great contribution to make. Our views may be negligible or insignificant when it comes to limitation, reduction, or prohibition of armaments, armed forces or weapons, but we are not observers, and we should not be. We should not be spectators just because we do not command nuclear knowledge and resources. We minor States of Asia, Africa, Europe, South America and Central America, constitute the majority of this Assembly. We minor States can tackle this major problem with our combined efforts. How can we arrive at this magnificent achievement? I venture to answer the question with a humble and modest suggestion.

24. So far, certain resolutions have been adopted, others have been rejected, but the solution has not been forthcoming. We humbly submit that this unique problem does not lend itself to resolutions. I might go even further. I claim that a resolution not acceptable to one party is no service to the cause of peace. In a sense it is a disservice to the cause of peace. A resolution exclusively adopting the Soviet viewpoint is bound to widen the breach. Likewise, a resolution exclusively adopting the United States viewpoint is bound to add dissension to dissension. Such contested resolutions, whether they be on the substance or on the procedure, are bound to carry with them a sense of victory on the one side and defeat on the other, and hence lead to bitterness. This is not the way to achieve peace. Let us call a halt. This road leads us nowhere. If it leads us somewhere, it certainly leads us to a continuation of dispute and conflict. The big Powers must agree, must compose their differences, and must unite their efforts, and mankind is entitled to this mandatory "must".

25. Failure to agree is a breach of an obligation; for agreement on this question is the first and foremost duty. I am afraid such a breach might call for a sanction. It is perhaps odd to speak of sanctions against the big Powers. We cannot, of course, invoke any of the sanctions stipulated in the Charter; it is futile to fly in the face of realities and possibilities. But one sanction, I hope, we can surely invoke, a sanction no less effective than the sanctions of the Charter.

26. Here is the suggestion, and we hope it will be accepted. Let us not allow any draft resolution to pass unless it is an agreed draft, whether it be on procedure or on substance. Let us not support any one-sided draft, from whichever side it comes. Let us not adopt a Soviet draft unless and until that draft is accepted by the United States. Likewise, let us not adopt a United States draft unless and until it is accepted by the USSR. This, I believe, we can do, and that much we can achieve. We, the minor States of Asia, Africa, Europe, Central America and South America, can impose a sanction of this nature. Such a moral sanction carries with it all the fears and hopes of mankind.

27. The big Powers can disagree, but they cannot conduct a world war without the peoples of the world. We pledge ourselves to help bring about agreement, but if we confront disagreement we shall not participate. We shall not take sides. The least this suggestion — humble as it is — can achieve is to reduce the conflict to a minimum.

28. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) (*translated from Spanish*): I think it may be useful to say a few words about our Committee's field of action.

29. As everyone knows, there is a Disarmament Commission which has the task of drafting a general disarmament treaty for approval by a general conference. In view of this, and under our Charter and rules of procedure, this Committee may not engage in negotiations or technical, legal and military studies outside its terms of reference. But this Committee can do something more important than all this and, if it does it well, will have performed a great service: it can point out the fundamental principles and basic facts and, above all, give expression, on the basis of those facts, to the views of our Governments and peoples, to those views of mankind to which the Syrian representative has just referred so eloquently.

30. Whenever difficult problems arise, there is a natural tendency to resort to the misleading tactics of ambiguity, to postpone the solution or to produce an equivocal situation. We must not do this. Between this extreme, from which the Committee's intellectual honesty will certainly preserve it, and the other extreme of endeavouring to achieve unanimity here on every detail, there is the wise middle course of establishing a scale of values in relation to the various questions. There are basic problems which cannot merely be left to the discretion of the great Powers or to possible agreement among them.

31. We, as the Syrian representative rightly said, have nothing to limit; nevertheless we are always the victims of the situation. We shall neither cause nor contribute to any catastrophe, but we shall certainly suffer its effects. With this in mind I believe we should not merely appeal for agreement, but express our opinions concerning certain principles which we should state firmly and exactly, dispassionately and impartially. I believe that this is a very important service to render, and one that has been made easier for us. There is no more agreeable task than doing justice. We all agree that progress has been made in the solution of this grave problem which we have been discussing for the past eight years.

32. I am going to review the question, not for the purpose of recrimination but with the specific intention of giving praise where praise is due and of trying to find out what psychological factors we may be able to use. The manifest progress to which the Franco-British memorandum of 11 June [DC/53, annex 9] bears witness has been confirmed in the attitude which the USSR proposal [A/C.1/750] represents. The level of the discussion has been very high. The United Kingdom representative's statements have been commendable; in his first statement [685th meeting], he traced the historical background to the memorandum of 11 June; in the second [690th meeting], he took the bull by the horns — to use an expression I have used before — and made the crucial point about priority and control powers. The representative of France, with his customary skill, has put a series of questions [685th meeting] some of which he will undoubtedly repeat, with the Assembly's moral support, when the Sub-Committee meets. Mr. Vyshinsky, more genial and cordial than ever, has stated his views [686th meeting]. There are some questions he has not answered; I do not reproach him for not answering or for having avoided those questions. We must show understanding. The Soviet Union Government has a great responsibility today and it cannot give these replies until it has reflected deeply. But obviously great progress has been made.

33. Let us go into history a little. How did this matter originate? There was a proposal, the Baruch plan, which involved the maximum in supra-national organization — an authority. The word "authority" in itself causes me some apprehension. One would think that the authority could be only the United Nations or the State. But on the contrary, this word "authority" — *auctoritas* in Latin — meant the body which was not only to control atomic energy but to own it and at the same time to be responsible for all management and administration in connexion with atomic energy. As against this extreme proposal, which one day we may perhaps have to accept — though we cannot know this and I make no judgment of the past or the future of such a plan — the contrary argument was put forward. In contrast with a supra-national authority, this argument favoured the boundless, unlimited authority of the State, which could undertake, on its honour, a purely moral obligation and agree unilaterally to a proportional reduction in armaments calculated on the basis of information, given in good faith but which could not be verified or even questioned, because that would reflect on the country's honour. But precisely because of the disparity in the levels of armaments, that reduction would be effected in a progressive proportion, as Mr. Moch shrewdly pointed out in Paris.

34. Thus there appeared to be no way out of the situation. Between the notion of a supra-national authority, performing functions of every kind, and the boundless authority, the unlimited sovereignty of the State, in the oldest and most obsolete sense of the word, a real impasse had been reached.

35. However, the impasse was broken as soon as the United States Secretary of State — and we must pay him tribute — said in Paris that the United States wanted no privileges, but that it would not allow a demobilized West to find itself in a situation in which, confronted with the unquestionable superiority of the East in conventional armaments, it would lose the only superiority it had to offset that superiority in conventional armaments. It understood, however, mankind's demand that the atomic bomb should be abolished in fact and not merely in a declaration, and a scale should therefore be established which would make it possible to advance stage by stage towards the reasonable reduction of armaments and, as the culmination of the process, the elimination of the atomic bomb.

36. Then, in Paris, at the sixth session of the General Assembly, the small Powers introduced a very interesting point — I mention it in all humility, without unwarranted pride or pretension — in keeping with the part the so-called small and medium Powers can play. The delegation of Peru said that the Soviet Union was right to oppose the system of stages and to regard it as unsatisfactory unless it constituted an unbroken process, unless the stages formed a whole; one stage must automatically lead to another, and the legal obligation must not be considered discharged until every stage had been fully accomplished.

37. Along the same lines, with a penetration which I am the first to acknowledge, the Australian representative then spoke the magic word. There might be stages, he said, but if the system was to be fair and to provide a guarantee that no one would be left in an inferior position with regard either to conventional or to atomic armaments — and here he used the magic word, which has become so by repetition — the stages

must be simultaneous. The word "simultaneity" then came into use; it was said that the processes of the elimination and prohibition of the atomic bomb and the progressive reduction of armaments should be simultaneous. It would have been better to use the word "synchronized", for as a rule "simultaneity" refers to coincident moments of time, whereas the word "synchronized" refers to two processes taking place at the same rate in the same period. That idea gained ground in Paris. But I must acknowledge that it was also said in Paris at that time, and evidence was given in proof of it, that moral prohibition was ineffective and, so far from creating confidence, would inspire mistrust. In the words of an old Spanish proverb, "determination balks at nothing". If we want to prohibit the atomic bomb, let us not do so by a mere declaration founded on the honour system for honour is bound up with trust and unfortunately there is no trust. Let us prohibit it by treaty and let prohibition go hand in hand with control. We said at the time that prohibition was bound up with control, with the organization of control and with inspection, as the soul with the body; they were inseparable and indivisible. Prohibition, reduction and control must therefore be agreed upon at one and the same moment. And since that session in Paris, these three items have been welded into an indivisible unity.

38. Yet another thing that was said was that control required verification; that verification required inspection; that inspection should be carried out, not by permanent inspectors but under a permanent arrangement whereby inspectors would be sent out whenever necessary. Yet more was said: it was said — and Mr. Vyshinsky, let us frankly admit, has quite rightly said so here, and Mr. Molotov, apparently, had said the same as long ago as 26 November 1946 — that the control organ would not use the veto in this matter, which means that the unanimity rule that always prevails in the Security Council would not apply to the control organ. That principle was firmly established: the unanimity rule would not apply in the control organ.

39. After such progress was made in Paris — I took part in those discussions with great enthusiasm and perhaps abused the Committee's patience — I believed that we had really come close to the solution. For what remained to be dealt with? There remained the obstacles we are to study now: the control powers and the famous veto.

40. But what happened after Paris? This is something on which I shall pass no judgment. The representative of Syria says that we should not judge intentions. I agree with him; I think it is better that we should not judge intentions. But there was an obvious setback, for in 1952 nothing could be done and, as you well know, there was no real progress in 1953 either. Then the ice was broken by the Franco-British proposal [DC/53, annex 9], which marks a notable milestone in the discussion of this problem. Unfortunately, however, that proposal was not well received by the Soviet Union. Purely for information, I shall read the following statement, which was made during the Sub-Committee's discussions [17th meeting]:

"Acceptance of the United Kingdom and French proposal as the basis for an international agreement would be tantamount to sanctioning, legalizing the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons under the pretext of using them 'in defence against aggression'. Adoption of this proposal would present wide oppor-

tunities for using atomic weapons for purposes of aggression."

These words really meant what we lawyers and diplomats call a rejection *in limine* of the proposal.

41. I pass no judgment on it and, to make up for the bitterness I felt upon reading that statement, I note what is said in the Soviet proposal [A/C.1/750] on the same matter:

"In connexion with the proposal concerning the prohibition of the 'use of nuclear weapons except in defence against aggression', in the Franco-British memorandum of 11 June 1954, the General Assembly instructs the United Nations Disarmament Commission to study and clarify this question and submit its recommendations."

Someone will tell me: "That is merely courtesy." To this I reply that courtesy is the beginning of charity and charity the beginning of understanding. There is no rejection here *in limine*; no hint of bad intentions, no question of a pretext. The Committee will examine this proposal. I shall be told, I know, that Soviet policy includes strategic withdrawals and also strategic advances. Is this a strategic advance? Strategic or real, we are in duty bound to treat it as an advance and to frame our resolutions and cast our votes accordingly.

42. In reality, as I said, the problem has been placed on this new footing by the Franco-British proposal which requires of us a comparative analytical study. I may be accused of anticipating the discussion on the draft resolutions, but I shall explain why. Unless this analytical comparison is made, the psychological movement that I should like to see made use of to further a generally acceptable solution will not come about.

43. For the truth is that the Franco-British plan contains as its first point the statement we have studied. This statement implies that the provisional or conditional abolition of nuclear materials — as Mr. Moch has so well expressed it — will apply only until the final prohibition for which we are all waiting.

44. The second paragraph in the Franco-British proposal contains, summarizes and condenses the gains made in Paris: prohibition, reduction of armaments and control are welded into an indivisible unity. It must be acknowledged, furthermore — this has already been said but we shall do well to repeat it if we are to proceed in good earnest — that the second paragraph in the Franco-British memorandum of 11 June agrees so to speak word for word with the opening paragraph of the USSR draft resolution, which affirms, without numbering them, the same unity between the three basic proposals: prohibition, reduction and the establishment of control.

45. The third paragraph of the Franco-British proposal is very important. It has been said that there are two stages in the Franco-British proposal and the Soviet proposal: during the first stage, there would be a 50 per cent reduction in conventional armaments and the production of nuclear weapons would cease, and during the second stage the second half of the agreed reduction of armaments would take place, and nuclear weapons would be finally outlawed.

46. Thus two stages have been spoken of, but on close analysis this is found not to be the sense of the Franco-British memorandum, and here is the fundamental difference to which I wish to draw the Committee's attention.

47. The Franco-British memorandum provides for a preliminary stage — and in this connexion I fully agree with the lucid explanation given by Mr. Lloyd the other day [685th meeting]. Now, if the interpretation of my remarks fails to conform to his proposals I shall be grateful if the United Kingdom representative will correct me. There is a preliminary stage, that of the establishment of control and the limitation of armaments and expenditure to the levels existing on 31 December 1953.

48. You must allow me to give this Franco-British position my wholehearted support. It may be said that if there is a preliminary stage, then something must have priority. That is true, of course, but what can have priority if there is to be simultaneity and synchronization? It is the establishment of control which has priority. Then there is no simultaneity, I shall be told. If prohibition, the reduction of armaments and the establishment of control are all to take place simultaneously, why say that paragraph 5 of the Franco-British memorandum is right in establishing a priority? I shall tell you why I say this. How can the reduction of conventional armaments and the prohibition of the atomic bomb be synchronized?

49. The only purpose of this synchronization is to place West and East on an equal footing: the West with its superiority in nuclear weapons and the East with its superiority in conventional weapons. Synchronization can be effected in two ways: either spontaneously by States, to be assisted later on by a control organ to be set up in the course of the synchronization process; or by the constitution of the machinery or agency to supervise the synchronization process as soon as the treaty has been adopted.

50. How can synchronization be achieved in the absence of a synchronizing authority? How can the processes be made simultaneous unless there is an authority to make them so? How can an orchestra play simply by pre-established harmony and a special kind of genius among the musicians, without a conductor? Or, to borrow Mr. Wadsworth's metaphor [687th meeting], how can we move into a house which is still unfinished? The notion of priority in the implementation of the convention, which establishes three unified and synchronized principles, clearly does not conflict with simultaneity; on the contrary, it guarantees it. This, then, is the essential part of the Franco-British plan, and it is this that constitutes the basic difference between that plan and the Soviet proposal. There are other differences too, but they are small, and I shall point them out.

51. In the first stage of the Soviet plan, which is the second, or first final, stage in the Franco-British proposal, we have the reduction of conventional armaments to the extent of 50 per cent of the agreed levels. There is also, in the same stage of the Franco-British plan — and here is another difference — the cessation of manufacture of nuclear weapons, which in the Soviet proposal marks the beginning of the second stage.

52. In the second final stage of the Soviet plan, which in practice would be the third stage in the Franco-British plan, we have the reduction by the remaining 50 per cent of conventional armaments, and the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. With regard to the halting of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the Soviet proposal provides as follows:

"The carrying out of these measures must be completed not later than the carrying out of the measures taken for the reduction of armaments and armed forces referred to in paragraph 2 (a), and the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons shall cease immediately, as soon as a start is made with the reduction of armaments, armed forces and appropriations for military requirements in respect of the remaining 50 per cent of the agreed standards."

I understand from this — and if I am mistaken I should be grateful if Mr. Vyshinsky would kindly correct me — that the cessation, the freezing of production, marks the beginning of the second stage in the Soviet proposal. On the other hand it is, let us say, the main purpose of the first stage of the Franco-British proposal, or the second stage looking at it in the way I have indicated. But, leaving aside the question of control powers, I would draw attention to the seriousness of the situation.

53. I do not say that this difference cannot be resolved; I do not want to interpret that difference as an indication that the Soviet proposal is really a piece of strategy. No, I consider it a sincere advance; because it really must be admitted that to accept the reduction of armaments without any action being taken with regard to nuclear energy obviously represents a great advance on the part of the Soviet Union. It would serve no purpose, however, if, in an endeavour to make the discussion less acrimonious and a unanimous solution more possible, we now tried to conceal a real difficulty.

54. I think that with regard to that difficulty we must all honestly express our views. It is not a purely technical question that is involved, it is a question of common sense, because if the reduction of armaments in two stages and the prohibition of the atomic bomb, beginning with the cessation of production and ending with its total abolition, is, according to the Soviet proposal, to coincide with the establishment, in the first instance, of a provisional control organ, and, in the second instance, of a permanent body, there will actually be a period during which these two fundamental functions will be left to the unilateral initiative of States without any organ to co-ordinate and direct their efforts.

55. I am aware, and the jurists listening to me here are equally aware, that when there are collective treaties their execution may be entrusted to the good faith of the States themselves; in recent times, however, international organs of co-ordination or collaboration have generally been set up and these organs naturally begin to function before the treaty is put into effect, though this does not mean that this priority conflicts with the simultaneity and the unity of the unilateral obligations which are the basis of law. There must be unity and balance, and equality in respect both of obligations and of their fulfilment.

56. I sincerely believe that we have reached such a situation. We have to synchronize two operations which are the guarantee of equality of rights between West and East, and the guarantee of the effectiveness of peace. Which is the better procedure — to postpone the establishment of control, or to make the operations themselves simultaneous with the establishment of control? It is obviously illogical to suppose that an operation can be carried out well if it is complicated by another operation. There is a previous question: from the logical point of view, control, prohibition and reduction are clearly indissoluble and simultaneous. But in this

case we are looking at things from the chronological point of view. We are not, if I may so put it, moving over a flat surface, a plane of pure perspective, we are moving in a fourth dimension, the dimension of time.

57. In order to make these two operations simultaneous, we need something to co-ordinate and synchronize the measures we adopt. As I say, this is not a technical point of view; in this case we have not the excuse, or the plea, that this is a technical or military question and that we have no competence to deal with it. In this matter we must listen to the voice of common sense, the voice that always speaks more loudly than any other.

58. Priority is essential. This point seems to me so important, and the difficulty so serious, that I believe that, without changing our purpose and still pursuing the aim of unanimity to which we have referred and which the Canadian proposal [A/C.I./752/Rev.1] has in view, we must in some form get the opinion of the Committee on this point. And it is my hope that we shall obtain that opinion once the Soviet Union has given the matter due consideration. On what is my hope based? On the survey I have just made. I have seen how discussions which clarify and enlighten public opinion end by having their effect on the Soviet Union. The leaders of the Soviet Union have a sense of reality, and, as I said on another occasion, not only can they appreciate the tangible and mathematical realities of forces and numbers, but they must also appreciate, especially with regard to this problem — and I make a sincere appeal to them — the imponderable factor, what Bismarck, a true genius, called “the imponderable”, the imponderable factor of public opinion.

59. Why has the idea of statutory prohibition combined with control and the reduction of armaments triumphed over the idea of mere unilateral prohibition? Because the force of public opinion was mobilized behind the idea of prohibition backed by guarantees. Because a strong movement of public opinion has developed in support of statutory and guaranteed prohibition simultaneous with the reduction of armaments, so much so that a mere verbal statement regarding the prohibition of atomic weapons, a statement made for the gallery, could no longer convince anybody or produce any impression.

60. This point, I find, is similar to the earlier one. The idea of postponing the establishment of control until armaments have been reduced and nuclear weapons wholly outlawed, thus leaving a period during which these two operations will be left to the discretion of the States concerned and, to complicate matters still more, to subject this process to an inextricably confused system of dual control to be organized at that precise moment — such an idea can appeal to no one and in my humble opinion cannot win the support of impartial persons. On this matter we can certainly come to a decision. What that decision is to be the wisdom of the Committee will dictate and the course of the debate will indicate.

61. So far, my outlook has been hopeful. I am hopeful because we have seen that there has been a real *rapprochement*, even on matters which appeared at first to be rejected by the Soviet Union. I have hopes that it will prove possible to gain acceptance for priority and for the establishment of an authority in which the Soviet Union will be represented and which will itself be the

guarantee of the effectiveness of the simultaneous operations in which the Soviet Union is interested.

62. I approach, as happens in life, a tragic issue. Let us suppose that this difficulty has been removed, that common sense has opened the way: there still remain other difficulties. There remains the tremendous difficulty of defining the control organ's powers. On this subject it is better not to speak in the abstract, but — as Mr. Vyshinsky has rightly and heartily recommended — on solid ground. The United States has prepared a working paper [DC/53, annex 4] of the greatest importance on the specific powers of the control organ. This working paper has been the subject of some criticisms — to my mind a little unjustified — by the representative of the Soviet Union. The United States paper admittedly contains a number of things which I myself do not like. I am jealous of my independence, and consequently, with all respect but with all moderation, I shall give my opinion. I do not like the word “authority”, for instance, because it recalls what I have said before. I would have preferred the word “organ”.

63. The United States working paper establishes a division which seems to me quite natural. There is a disarmament division with a director-general, and an atomic development division, with a board of governors.

64. The powers of the disarmament division are of course powers of inspection; the power to draw attention to violations, the power to take action so that violations may be made good and the power to notify the Security Council. These powers are in keeping with the nature of disarmament violations so far as conventional armaments are concerned, because violations in respect of conventional armaments — and this has been observed very pertinently by Mr. Lloyd — may often be due to a mistake, a *bona fide* misinterpretation. They do not necessarily imply deceit or guilt. They constitute violations which may, as it were, be settled by administrative measures of a non-punitive nature, measures which — to refer once more to what has already been discussed here — fall under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. Generally speaking, it is to be supposed that the violation of a disarmament convention in respect of conventional armaments does not endanger peace and may be settled by peaceful means. I say generally speaking, because I am aware that there are weapons of mass destruction which were previous to the atomic weapon and which, precisely because they are considered as conventional armaments, were included in an amendment submitted by Peru at the sixth session, in Paris [A/C.I./682], as weapons which ought to be prohibited, just as bacterial weapons, too, were included in an amendment submitted by Lebanon and Egypt.

65. In the case of nuclear energy, however, violations are of a different character. Though they have drawn different conclusions, it seems to me that on this point Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Vyshinsky are agreed. The powers of the control organ in this case would be as follows:

“(a) Calling upon the offending State to remedy within a reasonable time the violations or other infraction;

“(b) Bringing about the suspension of the supply of nuclear materials to the offending State;

“(c) Closing of plants utilizing nuclear materials in the offending State;

"(d) Reporting to the Security Council, to the General Assembly and to all other States the violation or other infraction..." [DC/53, annex 4, paragraph 41].

In my opinion these powers are necessary, because violation of the disarmament agreement in respect of nuclear energy would be very dangerous. Mr. Lloyd referred [690th meeting] very aptly to this fact when he said that, in the opinion of Mr. Baruch—whose words were also quoted by Mr. Vyshinsky—it would be enough at any moment to turn a switch in order to convert to military uses atomic energy which was being used for peaceful purposes. Consequently action must not be delayed: these are violations which require immediate and enforceable remedies.

66. Would an immediate and enforceable remedy be a punitive one? On this point I venture to disagree with Mr. Vyshinsky and to agree with the representative of Belgium. I do not think, for example, that to withhold nuclear materials from a country, as a purely administrative measure, can really be regarded as a sanction. This point is open to discussion, but I am inclined to think that such a measure would not be so much a sanction as an act of co-ordination. The international organ has to take a decision in face of a violation that is being committed. How can the supply of nuclear materials be allowed to a country which is producing atomic energy clandestinely or taking every step to arrange for its clandestine production? That is a very serious question. Mr. Vyshinsky links this question with Article 41 which deals with punitive measures of a non-military nature, authorizing an appeal to all countries to sever economic, air and postal relations with the State which has committed a violation. It is a general measure, applied in accordance with the decisions of an authority. In the case envisaged in the United States memorandum, it is a matter of administrative action, and, as the representative of Belgium pertinently remarked [689th meeting], there is no reason why States should not agree to empower a control organ to take such administrative action immediately. That, of course, is of very great importance.

67. Mr. Vyshinsky says that if we give the control organ these powers, which in my opinion are fundamental, in connexion with the prohibition of atomic weapons, we shall convert the control organ into a Security Council and upset the legal order of the world. The Security Council cannot abdicate the powers conferred upon it by Article 41 and the other articles of Chapter VII. On the other hand, if we do not give the control organ these powers, what will happen? We are going to study this matter at greater length, but in any case we are confronted with an extremely serious difficulty. The point is, can the Assembly reach any decision now with regard to this difficulty? In all sincerity, I do not think it can. At least, I must say in all modesty that in spite of all the attention and study I have devoted to these subjects, I find myself unable to form a final judgment.

68. I think, on the other hand, that this is a subject whose legal aspects—since it might imply a violation of the Charter—could be considered and studied by the Disarmament Commission, as well as its practical and military aspects. It is not that we are evading the difficulty, or "passing the buck", as the representative of Greece so aptly expressed it [690th meeting]. Not at

all; but the problem really has such implications that it would be better to leave it altogether to the Disarmament Commission, as suggested by the Canadian draft resolution. We cannot force an opinion on a subject which is not just a matter of common sense but involves the most complicated technical questions of a legal, constitutional and military nature.

69. There is, however, another point connected with the foregoing. I mean the question of the veto, to which I have already referred in some casual remarks I made earlier [687th meeting].

70. The control organ does not possess the power of the veto. If, as Mr. Lloyd has well said [690th meeting]—and on this point I am in complete agreement with him—Chapter VI of the Charter is applied in the case of violations which do not endanger peace, it is obvious—and here I again support Mr. Lloyd and differ from Mr. Vyshinsky—that, under Article 27, the State concerned could not vote. At the close of those casual remarks, however, I pointed out that serious violations, even with regard to conventional armaments, might well occur, not in the territory of a State permanently or temporarily represented on the Security Council, but in that of an allied State, or of a country subjected to the influence of a particular bloc. Consequently, even where Chapter VI was invoked, the veto would, as I remarked, be applicable.

71. If the violation concerned atomic weapons, the matter would again, of course, come under Chapter VI, if the powers of the control organ were considered to be purely administrative. There is a curious thing here, though: Mr. Vyshinsky and Mr. Lloyd appear to agree that the applicable chapter of the Charter would be Chapter VII, because there would be a danger to peace. And that is true. If there was a violation of the disarmament convention or treaty by the clandestine manufacture of atomic energy, peace would obviously be endangered and in that case Chapter VII would be applicable. But Article 27 does not apply to Chapter VII. The veto would apply even if the violating State was a permanent member of the Security Council. And at that point the shadow of the veto appears.

72. The veto is everywhere. The veto can be used, under Chapter VI, when the violation takes place, not in the territory of a Member State, but in that of an allied State. And the veto applies, implacably and definitively, in the case of a serious violation under Chapter VII. There can be no talk of control, or of the effectiveness of control, so long as the veto exists. I shall be told that the Charter cannot be changed. I shall be told that the dilemma is very grave, and that unless we adhere to the unanimity rule, the most serious matters will be decided by a simple majority. It would indeed be serious if matters of this kind were decided by a simple majority which might not, perhaps, include the great Powers. But are we to blame? It was we who proposed that in the Security Council there should be a qualified majority rule instead of the veto.

73. Recollecting the noble figure of Mr. Spaak, we declare, in all modesty, that what we proposed was that a great Power should abstain rather than cast a veto. In a matter in which its intervention was improper, a great Power would abstain and allow the regional organs or the other machinery of the Charter to function. But they did not want that. The great Powers were deaf to such arguments as abstention by a great Power, or the application of a qualified majority rule. No, they said, let us have either unanimity or a simple majority. Such dilemmas are natural in jurisprudence. But let

us not slander the law. The law is a very subtle and noble instrument which must take all economic and political realities into account and always be guided by a moral sense. When law ignores political reality, when it ignores the nuances of economic reality and, above all, ignores, or betrays, the moral inspiration which derives from all the great religions of the world, then it is that decadence sets in. That is what we were told, and that is why we have this imperfect Charter, this monstrous Charter, which has to function in the dilemma of, on the one hand, a unanimity rule which paralyzes all action, and, on the other hand, a majority which would be adequate for procedural measures but not for important questions.

74. Regretfully, therefore, I see how vain was the appeal I made [687th meeting] to the Soviet Union — and in so doing I was probably expressing the feeling of all the small and medium Powers — voluntarily to renounce the veto as the other Powers were prepared to renounce it. But we had to make that appeal, because this matter, to an even greater extent than the question of priority, requires from the Assembly a clear and authoritative expression of opinion. I shall be told that the Soviet bloc will not concur with this opinion and that perhaps it is inadvisable for such an opinion to be embodied in a resolution. We shall discuss this, we shall study it when we consider Sir Percy Spender's very interesting ideas on the need for appointing a sub-committee and producing a new draft resolution to amplify or supplement the one submitted by Canada. On this matter I keep an open mind, but I do believe that we shall fail in our duty if after this discussion there is no sincere appeal to the great Powers explicitly to renounce the veto for the purposes of the application of the disarmament convention.

75. The Committee will note that this second part of my statement, which is already too long, strikes a sombre note, for I realize that the fight against the veto is extremely difficult. Yet at the risk of seeming to be pessimistic, which I am not, I wish to discuss this question more fully. Supposing we came up against the veto under Chapter VI of the Charter, that is, in a case involving the sphere of influence of a large bloc, or under Chapter VII, in a case involving threats to peace and security. Wishing to contribute to the best of my modest powers to a solution of the problem, I thought of the juridical solution as a means of avoiding the veto. It is impossible to amend the Charter; a control organ endowed with many powers would be indistinguishable from the Security Council; therefore, either we should have to amend the Charter in order to abolish the veto, or we should have to establish a body which would replace the Security Council, and that, too, would be an infringement of the Charter. I then thought of the following way out of this *impasse*.

76. I do not need to dwell on the fact that the interpretations of any treaty are in fact juridical questions. Why should they not be solved juridically? I know that the International Court of Justice is very far away. Well, then, let us set up special courts. There are any number of agreements and treaties establishing courts of arbitration and conciliation which deal with questions summarily and immediately. We could take such a decision immediately.

77. Sovereignty would therefore be safeguarded. I myself have a new concept of sovereignty, which I stated in Paris. I believe that sovereignty is the freedom of a State within the international moral and juridical order. There is an international juridical order, even without sanctions or the use of force. Sovereignty is a right

that cannot run counter to another right, namely, international juridical order. But States might have some scruples about immediately accepting an order from a control organ, which is equivalent to an order from an administrative body. Yet, supposing that order were to be repeated juridically, defining a right or establishing rules for a court: States accept juridical decisions on controversial questions as a matter of course and see no infringement of their sovereignty. Moreover, there would be no veto. I realized from the very start, however, that the decision would have to be put into effect and that, in the last analysis, that is a matter for the Security Council. My enthusiasm for the juridical solution was short-lived. I sought to subject my own ideas to criticism and, reflecting on the problem, I arrived at a depressing conclusion.

78. I now come to the most painful and I might almost say tragic part of my statement. I said that law was not an abstract thing and that it could be studied and acquired in the same way as mathematics. A mathematical system of law would be false, since law is not a logical convention. It has logic, and in that it is like mathematics, but it also has life and, above all, it has spirituality. Let us, then, regard law from the point of view of life and of the realities of life. We are confronted with a completely new fact. An infringement of a right or a violation of an international agreement can be remedied by negotiation, conciliation or arbitration, by the juridical method or by the intervention of the Security Council. That was the normal, the old-time way, and that era, in which we began our lives, has disappeared. Many people do not realize this.

79. We are in a new era, more different from the one in which we lived before than the modern age is from the Middle Ages and the Middle Ages from the ancient world. We are living in the atomic age. If a principle or an international agreement, particularly a disarmament convention, is violated, what kind of risk arises? All risks are human risks, they are as limited as we. They become larger or smaller according to man's power, but his power is measurable and may be checked or repressed. But what is an atomic risk?

80. When thinking on these matters, reading the most recent books and remembering the Syrian representative's quotations about the five megatons, which are already not five but fifteen and which tomorrow will be forty-five and then ninety and nine hundred, I see that we are faced by a risk which is immediate, which cannot be restrained, against which there can be no reprisal, an infinite risk. I ask, what solution is there when we are confronted with such a risk? A meeting of the Security Council, although the veto is maintained? Is that a solution? The juridical solution? Will control measures give any solution? We have reached an extreme position. By a quirk of fortune, man has in his hands an infinite and maleficent power, but he has not lost his limitations or his finite nature. He has infinite power to destroy not only culture but life and existence itself, the very life of our planet.

81. Against this infinite capacity for evil we can of course raise an infinite capital of good. That would be the only solution, an infinite capital of good to oppose it. And where is this infinite capital of good? Why is there this terrible cleavage in human history, with, shining bright on the one side, the struggle for truth, the conquest of nature by science and the creation of beauty, and, on the other side, power with its tremendous consequences, its tremendous temptations and its infinite

desire to assert itself? I do not wish to turn this Committee into a lecture hall; the high cultural level of its members prevents my doing that. I shall merely stir these ideas which are already in the hearts and minds of all the members of the Committee.

82. I realize that a philosopher could amuse himself by compiling what we may call the antonyms of atomic power: disarmament, which calls for trust, and trust, which calls for a beginning of disarmament; reduction, which calls for an exact standard, this exact standard being either an unjust proportion or levels which are equally arbitrary. Nevertheless, I say with all sincerity, of two arbitrary standards I prefer the arbitrary standard of levels, which is an approximation to justice, to the arbitrary standard of a proportion which perpetuates an inequality and an injustice. There is also the antonym of the Security Council and the control organ.

83. In fact, we are left with what all philosophers have thought and are thinking today—the need for a restoration of all the moral forces of the world. Meanwhile we have to live. In order to live, and in order to prevent a catastrophe, there must be at least the fear of mutual reprisals; thanks to the restraint induced by that fear, the moral factors which we have lost sight of in our modern culture may slowly come into play.

84. Let us bear in mind that our age has subscribed to the nominalist theory. We have believed in the reality of matter, which is today destroying us. For more than seven centuries we—or at least our leaders—have spurned the reality of those spiritual values which we need today. Are we going to resort to them too late? Is it still possible to order such a restoration? It is a mystery. Yet we must live together, and to live together we must at least live in balance. This is a practical necessity. It is clear that nuclear energy upsets every balance. Yet in this hypothesis of mutual restraint, balance, I repeat, is essential; and in that respect I consider myself radically opposed to Mr. Vyshinsky in spite of the great respect and admiration which I have for him.

85. I believe that Mr. Vyshinsky does not justly appreciate this balance. He is confusing balance with the mad armaments race. Balance was a means of putting a stop to and preventing this race. Balance has been necessary. Moreover, I submit this mathematical formula; I do not need to go into it because it is present in the minds of all: wars have occurred when there has been a disturbance of balance. I do not need to cite cases; the sociologist can say many things which the diplomat cannot. The cases are present in all our minds. I do not wish to offend anyone, or to pronounce judgment. I repeat, however, that the last war broke out not because there was an armaments race but because a balance which should not have been disturbed was upset.

86. Balance is necessary. Man courts disaster if he does not always strive to maintain that balance. Balance postulates a certain resistance; does that mean that it also postulates animosity and aggression? No, it postulates understanding. Resistance as such never means hate or hostility; resistance is a form of defence. The balance which makes for harmony can be achieved only by the action of resistant forces, as Stendhal said, repeating an idea of Kant. We can only maintain inter-

national order when possible aggression and possible overestimation of power are opposed by parallel forces which are necessary, even imperative, but not hostile, radical or antagonistic: the forces of resistance. Such balance requires no less than a continuation of all the elements which unite us if we wish to resist and to maintain our balance in the face of that which we know can not only disunite us but tragically destroy and annihilate us and plunge us into primitive chaos. That is the power which belongs to man: he cannot create one single cell but he has the ability to plunge the whole human race into primitive chaos. That is our paradox.

87. If we can live, seeking and cultivating the things which unite us, let us see how atomic energy can be used for peaceful purposes. Let us not place obstacles in the way of the immediate establishment of this organ. It is said that the function creates the organ and the organ intensifies the function. Nietzsche, an author for whom I have the greatest admiration but no liking, said that he who reaches a goal goes beyond it. Let us modestly achieve this goal; let these atomic plants be built and let the distant and forgotten peoples of Asia, Africa, Oceania and South America receive the blessing of atomic energy. Let this tremendous power be used for peace and for the well-being of humanity. Gradually there will emerge on all sides a feeling of compunction, repugnance and condemnation, by all mankind of any use of atomic energy except for peaceful purposes.

88. Let us preserve the liturgy of peace. It may be objected that peace requires not only a liturgy but also a sentiment. Yes, but my old philosophers, like Pascal and William James, tell me that very often our acts do not follow our feelings but that our feelings result from our acts. That is probably a reversible action. Let us emphasize the liturgy of peace in this manner. The attitude of this Committee on this subject gives hope for the future. The liturgy of peace! Even more courteous, more human, more understanding, we draw ever closer to the need to understand, help and love one another.

89. I know that military and atomic experts are obliged as part of their duties to calculate probabilities and to investigate the possibilities of an adventure, to calculate the risks. But the risks cannot be calculated. The risk of the atomic bomb has made the phrase "calculated risk" obsolete. The risk is incalculable.

90. So I would simply make a request. Let us not heed the advice, or trust the illusory principles, of those experts. Let us view them objectively, as indications of reality, but let the attention of governments be turned to the souls of their peoples. In his very fine book, Mr. Gazenak, a professor at Thuringen, has just shown that, thanks to the influence of the five great religions of the world, the souls of the peoples are as one. Let us, then, be attentive to moral values. Let us listen to the mothers who think of the future, of the vicissitudes which await their children. Let us think of the youth, who work and who still have their illusions; of the workman, who produces all those things which make our existence possible and pleasant; of the man in the street. Let us understand this feeling, let us listen to the soul of the multitude. And if then, instead of making political and technical plans, we give all our attention to the voice of humanity, humanity may yet be saved.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.