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**Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia).**

**AGENDA ITEMS 20 AND 68**

**Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/2685, A/C.1/751, A/C.1/752) (*continued*)**

**Conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction (A/2742 and Corr.1, A/2742/Add.1, A/C.1/750) (*continued*)**

1. Mr. MARTIN (Canada): The speakers who have preceded me have already, I think, sufficiently outlined the earlier stages of disarmament negotiations. I do not, therefore, propose to take up the time of this Committee with any general exposition of this problem. Instead, I shall try to suggest, as briefly as I can, what seems to me to be the essential perspective of international relations and world politics in which the disarmament problem should be viewed. Within the particular field of disarmament problems, I propose to address myself to those aspects which, in the view of the Canadian delegation, present the most important unresolved differences between the views enunciated by the Government of the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the governments of some of the Western Powers, on the other. I shall also have a suggestion to make as to the procedure which, in my view, we can most usefully follow if we are to make further progress in this important field.

2. It is, I think, worth while reminding ourselves, as we discuss this item on our agenda, that armaments are a symptom rather than a cause of international tension. They are, as a great student of the art of diplomacy has recently pointed out, primarily the reflection of international differences and only secondarily the cause of them.

3. Any actions, however, which diminish international tensions and contribute to a real understanding in world politics, are direct contributions to the solution of the problem of disarmament. Without such

relaxation it is arguable, of course, that concentration on disarmament negotiations alone is unlikely to be productive. If the Soviet Union wishes to make a real contribution to disarmament, permitting progress on such matters as the conclusion of a peace treaty with Austria would be a major contribution to this end. So would actions to grant a real, rather than a spurious, national autonomy to those many European peoples the control over whose destinies has in the past fifteen years been forcefully assumed by Moscow. Now I have no desire to broaden our debate, and certainly no desire to initiate any controversy. However, I do feel that in a matter of this importance we should be realists as well as idealists. I have no doubt that Mr. Vyshinsky could point his finger at various Western actions which have been, in our view, defensive, but which he might claim have caused concern in Moscow and so contributed to tension. But it is well for all of us to bear in mind that in the world as it is the problem of disarmament must be seen against this real background of international tension. Polite unrealism or artificial abstractions are no service at this time to the cause of disarmament or, in the view of my Government, to the cause of the United Nations.

4. This is not, however, to say that no progress can be made in the disarmament field itself. Success, or even partial success, in negotiating a disarmament agreement would of course, in time, facilitate agreements in other fields.

5. Moreover, there are reasons to believe that progress under present conditions may be less difficult than it has been hitherto. For one thing, I think it quite possible that men in the governments principally concerned, on either side of the Iron Curtain, are beginning to fear the awful power that scientists are putting and have put at our disposal. Certainly I am not ashamed to admit myself that I find the situation most disquieting. For the stakes are incomparably higher now than they were a few years ago. I think that only those associated with governments which have some direct experience of atomic processes and direct access to classified information of technicians working in this field can be aware how serious is the threat which contamination and other effects of nuclear explosions can pose to the very existence of organic life on this planet.

6. None of us should be ashamed or too proud to admit that we are concerned. I am the Minister of National Health and Welfare in my country, and I am sure that it will be appreciated that in that capacity alone I would have added reasons to be vitally concerned about the cataclysmic possibilities of the future and the great draining of resources which heavy levels of armament mean to countries which wish to improve their health and their social services. Humility before the awesome power which our scientists are placing in our hands is, I suggest, a becoming attitude for members of governments now in any part of the world.

7. We have barely begun to realize, still less to work out, the implications of the growing interdependence which technology is forcing on the human race. But in face of this interdependence, we dare not shut the door on any possibility of negotiations to bring nuclear powers under civilized control.
8. It may be that it is awareness of these growing dangers that, at least in part, has prompted the apparent advances in the Soviet position which the able Mr. Vyshinsky has outlined during the last few weeks. On the one hand, we of the democratic world dare not be naïve. It would be foolish and dishonest to pretend that those who are most sceptical may not be right. Certainly, the timing of the Soviet Union's proposals suggests that the men in the Kremlin may have their eye rather on debates elsewhere—in London, in Paris—concerning the unity and the defence programmes of Western Europe than on the desirability of a disarmament programme in itself. But, though one cannot help being to some extent sceptical, my Government dares not, and suggests that none of us dare, write off as exclusively propaganda any advances which promise even the possibility of progress in the important field of armament control.
9. At this early stage in our debate it is not, I think, necessary for this Committee or the General Assembly to come to any final conclusion regarding the substantive proposals of the Soviet Union or of the Western Powers as they stand before us at present. Our principal effort at this stage, as I see it, should be to seek to clarify and to understand, and above all to create the best conditions for further negotiation.
10. In taking stock of our position we can, however, recognize that, as a result principally of the efforts of the London Sub-Committee, where the Anglo-French proposals were worked out and presented [*DC/53, annex 9*], the gap between the two sides, though still formidable, is narrower than when the Assembly last debated this question over a year ago. Without wishing in any way to belittle the Soviet Union proposals of 30 September [*A/2742 and Corr.1*], I hope that one of the direct results of our Committee proceedings this year will be the recognition of the true significance of the Anglo-French proposals of 11 June last. If these proposals are carefully examined against the background of previous Western proposals, it is, to my mind, not surprising that they have now been accepted by the Soviet Union as a basis for negotiation or, as I think Mr. Vyshinsky put it, as a basis for discussion. They represent indeed a very serious and a very generous effort towards compromise and conciliation of previously irreconcilable positions.
11. Methods of diplomacy are not everywhere the same, and it may not be helpful to underscore the differences too heavily. However, I think it is worth noting that the Anglo-French proposals were first presented to the Soviet Union privately and informally, so that they might receive the serious and sympathetic consideration which we felt they deserved. No attempt was made to capitalize publicly on the step forward the Western Powers were then taking. Our object was not publicity but agreement. No extraneous conditions were attached to these proposals, and they dealt simply and solely with the question of disarmament. There has never at any time been the slightest suggestion that, if the foreign policy of the Soviet Union were not changed in one or other major respects, the Anglo-French proposals might be withdrawn. The fact is that any real agreement on a substantial measure of disarmament would so alter the international scene as to affect the course of foreign policy not only in one field but in every field, and not only in one country but in all countries.
12. One cannot help but recall the reception of the Anglo-French proposals by the Soviet Union in London. This reception, I think, was in contrast to the reception the Western Powers have accorded the Soviet counter-proposals which are now before us. On the very day that he received the Anglo-French memorandum in London, Mr. Y. Malik accused the United Kingdom and French Governments of proposing merely to "legalize" the use of atomic weapons. Mr. Vyshinsky's counter-proposals, put forward a few weeks ago, have not only been welcomed by the Western Powers and other nations, but were at once promised the most careful consideration. And I can say to Mr. Vyshinsky that my Government has given and is giving his proposals the most serious and careful study and consideration.
13. However much we might have wished for a quicker response, the important thing now is that there has been a response from the Government of the Soviet Union, and our task is therefore to study it with the care and objectivity which the importance of this subject requires. It is only human to admit, however—and I am sure that Mr. Vyshinsky, great realist that he is, will understand why we feel it necessary to say these things, and I hope we say them in good temper—that, in view of the long and unhappy experience which we have all had in negotiations on this subject, we cannot wholly remove from our minds the memory of past manoeuvres intended to play upon the hopes and fears of all peoples for the narrow national advantage of one country in the battle for the minds of men. In 1954, the ninth year of the atomic age and the third year in which all countries have coexisted in the fear of hydrogen weapons, it is already much too late for any of us to treat the subject of disarmament as an element in the cold war. No disarmament proposal can be treated merely as bait to be pulled out of the water if it does not catch its fish. Nor can any of us afford, let it be added, to dismiss any proposal as mere propaganda, at least until the proposal has been thoroughly sifted, preferably in a small informal group.
14. At this stage, I would not want my colleagues in this Committee to think that, because we submitted a draft resolution [*A/C.1/752*] yesterday, we believed that the time had come for termination of the general debate on this subject. We think it is important that there should be a full and unrestricted debate in this Committee. I am sure that all of us were greatly impressed yesterday [*687th meeting*] by the interrogations and the replies of Mr. Vyshinsky and Mr. Belaúnde, and even the smile of the representative of Thailand. Assembly debate and Committee debate have an essential place, and, in the process of arriving at a collective assessment of the merits of the two sets of proposals before us, every country around this table has an important role to play.
15. My country does not regard itself, just because it has been a member of the Sub-Committee, as among the few countries in the world that have a stake or a responsibility in the solution of this problem. In the final analysis, I think our experience over the years has shown that no country can indefinitely resist the moral judgment of the great majority of the members of the

Assembly. We saw at the seventh session, for instance, how an Indian proposal [*A/C.1/734/Rev.2*], adopted by the General Assembly [*resolution 610 (VII)*] with the support of almost all countries outside the Soviet bloc, subsequently was accepted as the basis for the Korean Armistice Agreement [*S/3079*] that brought the fighting in that part of the world to an end. Though the representative of the Soviet Union in the Sub-Committee in London rejected the Anglo-French proposals as vigorously as his delegation in the Assembly had turned down the Indian proposal on Korea eighteen months before, the Soviet Union has now accepted the Anglo-French proposals as the basis for discussion, after approximately the same interval of time as had elapsed before the Assembly's Korean resolution was virtually accepted by the Communists.

16. As soon as we have covered the ground in a general way in this Committee, I believe that the Disarmament Commission should be requested to reconvene its Sub-Committee to continue its work in an effort to reconcile the proposals made by the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom, the United States and other governments, to seek in private an acceptable solution and to report to the General Assembly and the Security Council as soon as sufficient progress has been made. But I wish to repeat that in no way would we be in favour of any move today or tomorrow that would restrict the general character of this debate.

17. Some lessening of the gap between our respective points of view, I think, is possible, and agreement will, I submit, be easier to reach in private informal meetings of the Powers which the Disarmament Commission considered "principally involved": France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and my country. Whatever views may be held as to the membership of the Sub-Committee, it will be conceded, I think, that the Sub-Committee, where the Anglo-French proposals were born, is competent to find out what are the possibilities of making further progress now. If headway cannot be made among those five countries, I very much doubt whether it can be made in any larger group of nations. But let us underrate neither the possibilities nor the difficulties.

18. The other day, when we were debating the inclusion of the Soviet item in our agenda, Mr. Vyshinsky complained of what he interpreted as a critical attitude adopted by the United Kingdom representative towards the new Soviet proposals, and on 11 October [*686th meeting*] he also referred to Mr. Moch's "inquisition". I suppose this is the danger which all of us run in any attempt to obtain a clearer understanding of what exactly the Soviet Union means by its proposals — although I suppose that danger would exist with regard to any proposal, whether it was offered by the Soviet Union or not. Although one apparently runs the risk of having one's questions interpreted as criticisms, that risk exists both here and in the private sub-committee if we should decide to re-establish one. I shall therefore try, in a constructive spirit, to indicate some of the problems which the new Soviet proposals, as we understand them, present to my Government.

19. Let me acknowledge in advance that in several respects the new Soviet proposals appear to be an improvement on the Soviet Union's former position. I shall not make the mistake which Mr. Y. Malik made, I think, in London, when he rejected the Anglo-French proposals as being "indistinguishable" from the pre-

vious Western position. Other speakers who have preceded me have already analysed certain ambiguities and uncertainties in the Soviet draft resolution. They have asked Mr. Vyshinsky certain questions which also seem to my mind to require an answer if we are to understand one another and to make progress. I can well understand that there may be questions — as indeed there are — which Mr. Vyshinsky will want to take time to answer, although he has thus far, I think, been very generous in his readiness to participate in the debate and to answer questions. This matter is so important that one should not draw hasty conclusions from a refusal at a given moment to furnish a full reply to a particular question.

20. But, after examining the Soviet proposals with care and attention and having heard Mr. Vyshinsky's preliminary reply and further exposition yesterday and the day before, I am, I confess, left in some uncertainty as to how far the Soviet Union has really gone towards the Western position. Indeed, the Soviet Union's basic provisions, as Mr. Vyshinsky calls them, appear in certain respects quite inconsistent with the Anglo-French proposals. Mr. Vyshinsky says that his Government has accepted the Anglo-French proposals as a basis. He has asked the General Assembly to instruct the Disarmament Commission to prepare a treaty on the basis of the Anglo-French proposals. The Soviet Union has made what is really a series of counter-proposals, which fully bear out the comment which Mr. Vyshinsky made here on 11 October that his Government had not accepted our proposals "wholesale". The main outlines of the two sets of proposals, he told us, however, converge. I hope he is right, but, at the first glance which we have been able to give to this problem, some of the Soviet counter-proposals seem to diverge from those of the Anglo-French memorandum.

21. Mr. Vyshinsky complained on 11 October that previous speakers had not made their questions sufficiently precise, had not framed them in such a way that he could answer "yes" or "no". I do admit that some of Mr. Moch's very able and, I think, very important questions [*685th meeting*] did not perhaps encourage that kind of abbreviated reply. One way, however, of posing the problem in such a manner that a straight "yes" or "no" answer can be given is to attempt a brief exposition of the Soviet proposals regarding control, as I understand them, and to ask Mr. Vyshinsky to correct me if I in any way misrepresent his position.

22. The basic provisions specified in the new Soviet proposals regarding control fall into two stages or phases. In the first phase of reductions of armed forces and armaments, there is to be a temporary control organ set up under the Security Council. In the second phase of reductions and prohibition, as in the first phase, there is to be a control organ which would be totally unable to take the smallest enforcement action in case of violations or evasions without specific authority in each case from the Security Council, where the veto would apply. Mr. Vyshinsky said as much on 11 October, and again yesterday, maintaining that only the Security Council was in a position to apply enforcement measures. This is a very important phase of the whole problem. In other words, there is no action which either the temporary or the permanent control organ could take covering either phase of the Soviet reductions and prohibition other than to report a violation to the Security Council.

23. I do not think, by the way, that anyone is proposing to give the control organ arbitrary or unnecessary powers over the economic life of any State. But to say that the control organ could do nothing except report, could take no action to stop a violation on the spot, pending investigation and a reference to a higher authority, seems to me and to my Government to be wholly inadequate.

24. Still more important, the Soviet proposals give the temporary international control commission, which is to control the reductions of the first phase, only "the right to require States to provide the necessary information on the measures taken by them to reduce armaments and armed forces. . . . States shall periodically supply the commission at established intervals with information concerning the implementation of the measures provided for in the convention". I take it that this means that the temporary control commission for this first phase would be empowered merely to receive information submitted to it by Member States in order to substantiate their own statements concerning the fulfilment of the reductions in the conventional field which they had undertaken. So far as I can see, there would be no "on-the-spot" inspection or control of any kind in this phase, unless that is what is intended by the phrase: "The commission shall take the necessary steps to supervise the fulfilment by States of the obligations assumed by them in connexion with the reduction. . . ."

25. If that is so, it means that the Soviet Union is proposing that all States should rely on each other's good faith, unsupported by any "on-the-spot" inspection, up to the commencement of the second stage, at which point the vital declaration would be made prohibiting atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction. I might elaborate on the implications of this situation, but I think they are sufficiently obvious to us all.

26. Passing on to the second phase of the Soviet proposals, we see that a permanent international control organ is to be established for the supervision of the implementation both of the prohibition of atomic weapons and of the reduction of other armaments and armed forces. "This international control organ", we are told in the Soviet proposals, "shall have full powers of supervision, including the power of inspection on a continuing basis to the extent necessary to ensure implementation of the convention by all States." This permanent international control organ could not be in existence, therefore, when the prohibition of nuclear weapons was declared. It could not be ready to discharge its functions for some time, probably many months, after the prohibition had come into force. My Government has asked me to underline this point, although it has already been mentioned at least once in this debate.

27. This concept is far removed from the simultaneity proposed during the Sub-Committee talks in London by Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Moch. That simultaneity is one in which prohibition would not be declared until the officials of the international control organ had been stationed in readiness to enforce the prohibition from the moment of its declaration. The same principle of real simultaneity is applied throughout the phasing of the Anglo-French proposals — a phasing which, of course, differs in a number of other respects from that proposed by the Soviet Union.

28. On 11 October, I think, Mr. Vyshinsky conceded that there could be no simultaneity between the declara-

tion of a total prohibition of nuclear weapons — which might take only five minutes — and the establishment of effective controls to ensure the implementation of that prohibition — which he suggested might take six months or a year. During that period of six months or a year I rather thought Mr. Vyshinsky was saying that we would be moving towards effective controls as the permanent control organization was established and trained, but for most of that time a prohibition would be in force before effective control had been established. This is certainly a very important consideration in this problem, and that is why I am spending some time on it.

29. Apart from our worries over the time-table envisaged in the Soviet proposals, the point on which my Government feels the greatest uncertainty and uneasiness is whether the "necessary powers" which Mr. Vyshinsky says the permanent control organ would be given would include the power not only to verify information submitted by governments but also to determine whether the information submitted was complete. Mr. Vyshinsky said on 11 October that the Soviet position had always been that to control was to verify. That is just the very problem. In the first phase of control, and apparently in the second, the Soviet proposals seem to conceive of control as a process of checking up on the correctness of information submitted by governments rather than of actively investigating, anywhere, at any time and by any means, whether the information submitted to the control authorities is not only correct but complete.

30. For us, control is more than verification. For us, a control organ to be effective must have authority to go wherever it wishes, not in order to pry into the economic activities of any country, but because it must make sure that, to use Mr. Vyshinsky's own example, a button factory is not secretly making lethal weapons which have not been reported to the control organ. As Mr. Vyshinsky said, and I think said well, button factories can make things to kill people, and it is essential that the control authority be empowered to make a check at any time on any plant where weapons could be manufactured. This is not economic espionage, but it does involve a good deal more authority for the international control organ than mere verification of data submitted. I think it is in the interests of reaching agreement that this point should be clearly stated. This is the kind of question to which I think a simple "yes" or "no" answer can be given, and I hope that Mr. Vyshinsky will find it possible to do so.

31. There is another aspect of the control problem which may be raised by the new Soviet proposals. It is proposed to take 31 December 1953 as the date fixing the levels of forces from which the reductions are to be made. This date was also suggested in the Anglo-French proposal. But I think we should be clear that this would not mean the exclusion from the disarmament programme, as understood by either side, of new weapons developed since that time, if there were any.

32. The question of the extent of the permanent control organ's powers is also raised in an acute form by the well-known Soviet reservation, which Mr. Vyshinsky mentioned earlier in his statement of 30 September in the General Assembly [484th meeting], that States must adhere to "the principles of sovereign equality of States [and] non-interference in the affairs of other States". If inspection on a continuing basis means permanent inspection with the right to go any-

where at any time in the territory of all States which have signed the agreement, that is all to the good. We have yet to hear, however, from any Soviet spokesman that this is what they mean by "inspection on a continuing basis", and this is certainly what my Government means. If the Soviet Union Government has not modified its doctrine of so-called national sovereignty and adapted it, at least partially, to meet the exigencies of an interdependent world, agreement on effective safeguards—and, therefore, on a disarmament treaty—is virtually inconceivable, and it is not fair to public opinion to state the situation in any other terms.

33. I have tried to state some of the difficulties still inherent in the control problem, and to state them frankly, because I believe with Mr. Lloyd that this is the crux of our problem. When the Anglo-French and Soviet proposals are considered in greater detail, I think we shall find that if agreement on control can be achieved, the other aspects of the problem will all fall into place. I would, however, agree with Mr. Vyshinsky when he said that there was "no insuperable contradiction" between the two positions. I well remember that in the Korean debate, when we thought we had reached the end, Mr. Vyshinsky in that amiable way which is his alone, said he did not think we should conclude that there was no hope in the matter. I felt yesterday, when he said there was no insuperable contradiction, that it may be that this debate will usher in a real and serious agreement on this important question.

34. The creation of adequate and authoritative machinery for inspection and control of disarmament is not—let it be clear—any more disturbing to Soviet interests than to the interests of any other country, because there are very unusual steps proposed in the kind of control we are talking about in so far as the integrity of national governments is concerned. The governments of the Western Powers have proposed only what they themselves are prepared to accept in their own countries. Mistrust is not the exclusive property of one or the other side of the Iron Curtain. A prerequisite of any disarmament system is certainly that no State should have cause to fear that its security would be endangered by the operation of the control system or by any other feature of the programme, and this is indicated in the draft resolution [A/C.1/752] which stands in the name of my country.

35. If we are to have serious and informal examination of the Anglo-French and Soviet proposals, and all other proposals which may have been or may be submitted, then I think we must all agree that upon the conclusion of the disarmament debate in this Committee, a debate which I think and would urge should be extensive and thorough, there should be an early opportunity for the further examination of the problem by a smaller group. For the reasons I have already given, my delegation believes that the most appropriate group for this purpose would be the Disarmament Commission's Sub-Committee where the Anglo-French proposals, now accepted by the Soviet Union as a basis, were presented.

36. There is an obvious similarity between the procedure which I am suggesting and the suggestions made yesterday [687th meeting] by the representative of the Philippines, and I want the representative of the Philippines to know that I tried to see him earlier this morning when I learned that his draft resolution [A/C.1/751] had likewise been submitted. The essential point in common is that both of us see every ad-

vantage in providing a framework for detailed and confidential discussion between those governments which have been principally involved in this topic, in order to see whether differences cannot be thrashed out in the quieter and more intimate atmosphere of small closed meetings. Small closed meetings have the advantage, in difficult and vital negotiations, that they take place away from the glare of publicity and free, therefore, from the constant temptation to speak at least as much for the benefit of public opinion in various key areas of the world as to clarify and persuade one's associates in negotiation.

37. But I think the differences in the draft resolutions of the Philippines and of Canada are significant. I should like briefly to enumerate them.

38. First, it seems to me useful not to interrupt this general discussion on disarmament, but to preserve the full opportunity which the existence of this item on our Committee's agenda provides for the representatives of all nations not only to express their concern—for none of us could be exempt from the fateful consequences of ultimate failure in this field—but also to put forward any views and proposals which any of us may have to contribute to the solution of the differences which still divide us. Thus it seems to my delegation that it would be regrettable prematurely or artificially to interrupt the progress of this debate or to deprive the Sub-Committee, which I trust will be charged with the more detailed negotiations, of the advantage of any general views from whatever quarters which may be available.

39. The second point of difference is one of machinery. The question is whether this Assembly should seek in the matter of detailed and technical negotiations—which obviously will be necessary if real progress is to be made in the field of disarmament—to by-pass and ignore the machinery of the Disarmament Commission, which is the organ of the United Nations especially charged with detailed responsibilities in this field.

40. This question, that is to say, whether we should use or by-pass the machinery of the Disarmament Commission, is also closely bound up with the question of timing. The Philippine draft resolution, with whose basic objectives, as I have already said, I am in harmony, would provide an arbitrary deadline—specifically the deadline, I believe, is 15 November—for a report back to this Committee, whether or not real progress has by then been made and whether or not the interruption of intimate negotiations which such a deadline would involve would be desirable. Of course, it could be said that the 15 November report could be an interim one and need not necessarily preclude further negotiation among the same countries. But is it not our experience that—and I think this is only to be expected—on a topic as important and as potentially controversial as this one is, a restricted group, if charged with the unavoidable responsibility of issuing a public report within a few weeks of beginning its functions, is likely to spend a great deal of its time during those weeks on the process of drafting and discussing the terms of a report rather than concentrating on what is, after all, the more important business of substantive negotiation? There is also the advantage that the Disarmament Commission is in permanent session.

41. On the highly technical question of disarmament it seems to me fairly unlikely—although we would certainly not wish to rule out this possibility—that sub-

tantial progress can be made within a few weeks. If our draft resolution is adopted—I do not say today, but later on, during the course of our deliberations—we should like to see the Sub-Committee set up a group of working parties which would try to come to grips with the essential problems in a few key aspects of the subject, to see whether agreed papers could not be worked out on the basis of which substantial and definitive progress could be made.

42. The sort of timing we envisage, therefore, is flexible as to its outcome. But what we have in mind is that the general debate in this Committee should be continued to give all countries which desire it an opportunity to express their views; and at the end of this period—in a week or two—the Committee, which after all need not now make final judgment on the various positions, should adopt the Canadian draft resolution to provide the appropriate machinery which we hope would lead to further progress. We would then anticipate that if enough delegations felt the matter to be of sufficient importance, as we do, a meeting of the General Assembly could be at once convened to consider and, I trust, to approve the draft resolution which this First Committee would have adopted.

43. Once this was done, the Disarmament Commission could meet within a day or so to consider the recommendation and, I hope, to reconvene its Sub-Committee. The Sub-Committee should then meet without any unnecessary delay, and detailed discussions should begin among its members. As to the date of the Sub-Committee's report, which would of course be submitted through the proper channel of the Disarmament Commission, this would depend on the progress realized. Certainly my delegation will do everything that it can, if it is on the Sub-Committee, to avoid any unnecessary delay. If there is sufficient progress to warrant it, it will of course be appropriate to have a report back to the General Assembly during this session. If, on the other hand, the detailed negotiations are such that more time is required, then the Disarmament Commission can consider the Sub-Committee's report as soon as it is ready.

44. I think that the Canadian draft resolution, to which we have given a good bit of thought, is sufficiently simple and straightforward so that I need not take the time of the Committee to explain in greater detail what is proposed. We have tried in this draft resolution to avoid asking the Assembly to take up a substantive position on the specific proposals of either side on questions where detailed clarification is still needed and where many difficulties are still to be resolved. We have tried to provide what seems to us the most effective machinery for future progress—that is, the same machinery to which we owe the substantial progress which we have made since the last session of the General Assembly. We should not forget, I think, that it was precisely in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission that there were worked out the significant advances in the Western position embodied in the Anglo-French memorandum, which the Soviet Government has now agreed to take as the basis for a convention.

45. I should point out that we take notice in our draft resolution not only of the Anglo-French proposals and of the report of the Disarmament Commission, but also of the Soviet draft resolution.

46. I hope that the procedure we have been proposing will commend itself to the members of this Committee.

47. In particular, I hope that it will be possible for the four other delegations which are represented on the Disarmament Commission's Sub-Committee to join with my delegation in co-sponsoring this draft resolution. I appeal, in the name of my Government, most earnestly to my colleagues—Mr. Moch, the representative of France, Mr. Lloyd of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, Mr. Wadsworth, the representative of the United States, and to Mr. Vyshinsky, the representative of the Soviet Union—to each of whom I yesterday sent a copy of the text with an expression of this hope—to consider whether they can co-sponsor with us this draft resolution which seeks to provide a workmanlike framework for further progress in this important matter of disarmament.

48. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from French*): The next speaker on the list is the representative of Australia. However, the representatives of India, France, the United States and the United Kingdom have asked to speak, one to ask a question and the other three to make a few very brief comments before the Australian representative takes the floor. Under the rules of procedure, I can interrupt the order of speakers only for a point of order. I do not think, however, that these are exactly points of order. A point of order can be raised only to invoke a rule of procedure, to comment on procedure or to suggest changes in the way in which a debate is being conducted.

49. All I can do is to ask the representative of Australia if he has any objection to my changing the order of speakers and allowing these brief statements to be made before he is called upon to speak. I should like to hear the Australian representative's opinion.

50. Sir Percy SPENDER (Australia): If the statements are as described by the Chairman, I shall have no objection.

51. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from French*): In that case I will call upon the four members of the Committee who have asked to speak, on the understanding that their statements must be very brief. I will give the floor first to the representative of India, who wants to ask a question.

52. Mr. MENON (India): May I take this opportunity of saying that we want to thank the Secretariat for the provisional verbatim records asked for yesterday.

53. The point which my delegation wishes to make is as follows. We should like guidance from the Chairman. There are three draft resolutions before the Committee, two of them apparently suggesting that the matter under discussion be referred to a body outside the Committee. The question which I wanted to address to the Chairman is longer than a brief line. Normally, the procedure of this Committee is that an item on the agenda is subject to what is called a general debate. My submission is that these draft resolutions render the general debate into a specific debate. I have not the slightest desire to question the motives in introducing the draft resolutions, which I am sure are excellent. From what we have been told, they are. But the fact is that the introduction of the draft resolutions tends to focus the entire discussion on the subject matter of those draft resolutions and takes away from the purpose of a general debate, which is the usual procedure. Now, if this procedure is followed, any delegation, even before a debate takes place, can submit a

draft resolution and avoid the purpose of a general debate.

54. In view of what the Chairman has said, it would not be proper for me to go into the merits of the draft resolutions before us. The Philippine draft resolution, I think one should say, has almost the effect of adjourning the debate. So far as the other one is concerned, it calls upon the Assembly to come to conclusions on matters which are now matters of difference between the two sides in the Disarmament Commission. It also takes away the fullest opportunities for a general debate in this Committee.

55. My delegation is of the view that even the last two or three days have yielded very wholesome results by way of debate. It has enabled points of view not only to be clarified but to be brought nearer.

56. While nothing in the rules of procedure can prevent any delegation from submitting a draft resolution, I should like the guidance of the Chairman as to whether the presence of these draft resolutions does not really alter the character of the general debate and whether the conclusions that ought to be arrived at by the Committee itself, which are now put forward in the Canadian draft resolution, would not have the effect of restricting the general debate. In those circumstances, would the Chairman feel that it is right either to advise the Committee or to seek its opinion so that the usual character of a general debate is maintained?

57. My delegation regrets the introduction of these draft resolutions at this stage and believes that this is not conducive to arriving at the result, namely, finding accommodation between the different points of view. With regard to the Canadian draft resolution, I also want to point out that, in our appreciation of the situation, right or wrong, the effect on world public opinion is to give the feeling that the whole of this matter is now being sent back to a committee and that the next time that we shall hear about it is this time next year.

58. The CHAIRMAN: I think that, according to the rules of procedure, draft resolutions can be introduced at any moment, technically even before any debate; but it is clear that they will be put to a vote only at the end of a general debate. We all agree that we are going to have the general debate and all speakers who wants to speak can ask to do so.

59. Mr. MOCH (France) (*translated from French*): I should like to thank the representative of Australia and apologize to him for intervening at this stage. I should also like to assure the Chairman that I shall not require more than the four minutes just taken by Mr. Menon.

60. The French delegation is happy to accede to the Canadian delegation's request; it is ready to co-sponsor the Canadian draft resolution. It has had time to study the text and finds it to be in keeping with the spirit, if not the letter, of the Anglo-French proposal. In my statement on 11 October [685th meeting], said that the French delegation was prepared to consider any procedure that would facilitate that task, whether in the ordinary course of the full meetings of the Committee—as Mr. Menon wants, or, after a general debate here, in a small committee of the kind that met in Paris in 1951—as the Philippine representative has proposed, or even in a committee of the type that met in London in 1954, as proposed by the Canadian delegation.

61. The procedure laid down by the Canadian delegation for the study of the Western proposals and of the new Soviet proposals seems to us the best. We agree with the Canadian representative that the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee should be convened and that they should set to work as soon as the general discussion in the First Committee is finished, that is to say, during the present session of the General Assembly. As the Canadian representative has suggested, if the Disarmament Committee makes sufficient progress, it might report back to the First Committee, which could either reopen the debate or ask for an additional item to be included on its agenda.

62. The French delegation would not have been opposed to the procedure suggested by the Philippine delegation. But, like Mr. Menon, we would prefer not to interrupt the general debate in the First Committee; on the contrary, that debate should be allowed to proceed so that everyone can state his point of view and then, immediately afterwards, we can go on to the detailed work in the Sub-Committee, which has already proved its worth.

63. In conclusion, may I say that I am an optimist; we must first and foremost gain a quick and clear grasp of the situation, and get our bearings without delay so that we can forge rapidly ahead. The Canadian proposal would serve that purpose, and that is sufficient reason for the French delegation to support it and to express the hope that the other three delegations that met in London will also respond to the Canadian representative's appeal to support it and overlook the minor objections which can always be found to a new text. In that case, the five members of the Sub-Committee could unanimously propose this accelerated procedure to the First Committee.

64. Mr. WADSWORTH (United States of America): The United States is glad to co-sponsor the Canadian draft resolution [A/C.1/752], which in our opinion provides a constructive approach to this problem. While fully appreciating the motives of the representative of the Philippines in putting forward his suggestion, we believe that the Canadian draft resolution covers the points made in his draft resolution in a manner which better assures progress towards agreement on disarmament.

65. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom): I would like to express my thanks to the representative of Australia for his courtesy in giving way, as he has done, and I respond at once to the appeal of the representative of Canada.

66. My Government is prepared to co-sponsor that draft resolution. However, I feel very strongly that we should not seek to limit in any way the fullest possible general debate. I think it would be a very poor compliment to the work of the Sub-Committee if our colleagues did not comment upon it at length and let us have the benefit of their views. I feel that so strongly that I shall not say any more now about the reasons for our co-sponsorship of the Canadian draft resolution except to say that I certainly do not regard it as meaning a moratorium of twelve months in work on disarmament. I certainly would not accept that proposition. But I think we should really go into this procedural matter at a later stage and in the meantime permit the general debate to continue.

67. The CHAIRMAN: May I ask the representative of the Philippines whether he desires to speak now on a point of order?

68. Mr. SERRANO (Philippines): It is more or less a point of order, but I shall put it as a point of propriety.

69. The CHAIRMAN: May we again ask for the permission of the representative of Australia?

70. Sir Percy SPENDER (Australia): So long as it is the last one.

71. Mr. SERRANO (Philippines): Thank you. Before saying anything at this juncture of our debate, I would, of course, seek the permission of the Australian representative. But the point I am raising is one of propriety and perhaps the Chairman would like to interpret it as a point of order.

72. I cannot understand how we can discuss the merits or demerits of particular proposals before they are actually put before us by the Chairman for discussion, especially at a time when the representative of Canada has just delivered his speech. If allusions are made to particular drafts which are now before the Committee, certainly any representative sponsoring the draft will be called upon to rise in defence of it. But the time would not be proper. I suppose that if there are to be any remarks upon the draft resolutions now pending before the Committee, any discussion thereon must necessarily be at the time when such drafts are properly placed before the Committee for discussion by the Chairman. At this juncture, therefore, I would reserve my right to speak on the references made to my draft resolution by the representatives of India and France.

73. May I now reiterate my thanks to the Australian representative for the courtesy extended to the Philippines delegation.

74. The CHAIRMAN: I regret to have to inform the representative of Australia that although he has already given permission to four speakers, the representative of the Soviet Union is now asking for the same privilege.

75. Sir Percy SPENDER (Australia): I would be in great trouble if I refused it.

76. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I am very grateful to the Australian representative for not objecting to my joining the other speakers who have made statements about the Canadian proposals. I shall not take more than two minutes.

77. Yesterday evening I received the letter Mr. Martin very kindly sent me, in which he asked the Soviet Union delegation, on behalf of the Canadian delegation, to co-sponsor the draft resolution which it was introducing. He was kind enough to enclose the draft resolution.

78. I hope Mr. Martin will not be annoyed with me if I say that in view of the late hour at which I received the letter and his draft resolution and the early hour at which our Committee convened, I have not yet had time to give his letter and the draft resolution the careful and thorough consideration which the matter warrants. As a matter of principle, the Soviet delegation never considers otherwise than sympathetically any proposal that it should co-sponsor any draft resolution, but I can give a definite answer only after I have studied this question. I am unable to give such an answer

at this precise moment and I hope that Mr. Martin will accept this statement as my preliminary reply to his kind letter which I received yesterday evening.

79. Sir Percy SPENDER (Australia): I have asked to speak today not because I am ready at this stage to make my full statement in this general debate—dealing as it does with the issues of the gravest importance for the world, and attracting as it does the thoughts and aspirations of millions of people throughout the world whose interest is peace—but because I would like to put into the minds of the Committee at this point one or two thoughts about the way in which the First Committee may most effectively deal with this item. I know that this question of how the Committee should tackle this momentous problem and how smaller nations may make some useful contribution to this debate and to the resolution of the issues with which it is concerned has been in the minds of others who have spoken before me in this general debate.

80. Unfortunately I was unable to be here on 11 October [*685th meeting*] when Mr. Moch made his long, lucid and most carefully worked out opening statement which, however, I have read with great attention. I have noticed with particular interest that towards the end of his statement Mr. Moch said:

“It would also be desirable, after this information [some further information on the Soviet stand] is provided, for the Members of the United Nations as a whole . . . to have an opportunity to express their views on the point.”

This precisely points up the purpose of my intervention at this stage.

81. Yesterday morning [*687th meeting*] various representatives, including the representatives of Greece and India, suggested that the opening statements made by the representatives of the Powers mainly concerned with the work of the Disarmament Commission over the last year might be made available to the Committee in verbatim form. This was a clear indication of the supreme importance which members of this Committee quite properly attach to the subject we are now debating.

82. Yesterday morning also there was a suggestion from the representative of the Philippines on the possible method which this Committee might use to deal with the difficult task before it, the task, as I understood him, of clarifying the views of the Soviet Union and the Western Powers which this year appear to have come somewhat closer together than ever before in the long consideration which the United Nations has devoted to the disarmament problem.

83. I want to make it quite clear that I am not suggesting—certainly not at this stage—that this Committee as a whole, or any new sub-committee, might undertake the task of reconciling what appears to be the irreconcilable but which of course we must never regard as such. My purpose is a lesser but yet an extremely important one, namely, to clarify the issues which divide the great Powers, to secure, in other words, a greater clarification than is presently available of the nature of the task which lies before us. It is not sufficient, in my judgment, to be referred to the records of the proceedings of the Disarmament Commission's Sub-Committee, not only because the position has changed by virtue of present Soviet proposals, but also because any attempt at individual analysis of the issues is not likely to prove acceptable to others. Nor is it sufficient to follow in detail the course of this

debate in the various statements made, which themselves tend at times to lead, not to clarification, but to increased confusion.

84. It is because I believe that the positions of the great Powers may possibly be closer than they have been before and because I think that the public in many countries, including Australia—where public interest in the work of the United Nations on disarmament is very keen indeed—will expect from us this year a really thorough-going effort to get, here and now, to the very roots of these outstanding differences, that I take the time of the Committee to make this intervention.

85. This question that we are discussing is not to my mind a matter which should be regarded—as I fear we tend more and more to regard it—as exclusively the province of experts. It is a matter in which the public has a direct and vital interest in a way that perhaps does not apply to any other item that has ever come before the United Nations General Assembly. I admit that the technical details of reductions of forces, the establishment of international controls, and the other matters which would have to be dealt with in a disarmament treaty, are complex indeed. But are they so complex, so difficult, that ordinary men and women cannot understand them at least in broad outline? I believe it is our duty so to deal with this matter before us that the issues are made abundantly clear for the public of the whole world to see and understand. This will not be easy, but I do not think it a task from which we should shrink, no matter how difficult it may prove to be.

86. Last year [*662nd meeting*] I went into some detail in my statement on this disarmament item to inform the Committee of the deep interest of my country in disarmament and the control of nuclear weapons as it had been revealed in the Australian Parliament shortly before I spoke, and from which had emerged a unanimous resolution—which is not a very frequent occurrence in the political life of my country—calling upon our delegation here to do everything possible to assist the work of the Disarmament Commission to arrive at a successful conclusion. I mention this merely as one instance of wide and growing public interest and concern in my own country and elsewhere, and I have no doubt that many representatives here could give the Committee similar examples from their own countries.

87. As I have said, I do not intend today to discuss in detail the substance of the proposals which were put forward by the small group of Powers which made up the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission that met in London in May and June 1954. My observations are directed to the question of how this Committee can best and most effectively discharge its responsibility—one which, despite the great responsibilities and obligations which naturally are borne by the big Powers, rests nevertheless with equal weight on the shoulders of each representative here.

88. The Disarmament Commission was established nearly three years ago by a resolution of the sixth session of the General Assembly, held in Paris [*resolution 502 (VI)*]. The debate in the First Committee at that session was a long and memorable one, in which the then Secretary of State of the United States took the leading part. All the representatives of the great Powers spoke at length to explain as fully as possible their own positions and to explore those of others.

And the representatives of other Powers—the middle Powers and the small Powers—also spoke and expressed their opinions fully on this problem. I think I am not mistaken in saying that it was at the instance of the middle and small Powers that a sub-committee of the First Committee was established to examine, during the sixth session itself, the differences between the great Powers and to attempt to arrive at some agreement. This attempt at reconciliation failed, and the matter was referred to the Disarmament Commission. After two and a half years, it reached the impasse with which we were confronted, until the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Vyshinsky, made his proposal in the General Assembly on 30 September [*484th meeting*]*—if that in truth carries or is intended to carry the matter any further.*

89. In all my remarks the Committee will understand that I am in no way reflecting in the slightest degree on the hard and arduous task which has been carried out by the Disarmament Commission Sub-Committee. Each nation here owes that Sub-Committee a deep debt of gratitude. It is rather out of an earnest desire to assist others, in so far as we can, in the resolution of these great issues by such observations as we may usefully make, that I wish to find means of clarifying the issues.

90. The main problem before the Disarmament Commission, and the work it has tried to do, have thus not changed since it was created in Paris. On the one side are the Western Powers, with their comprehensive proposals for a system of disarmament with international control, and on the other side the Soviet Union with its established position in which there may perhaps have been some real movement in these last few weeks. I say this with caution, not desiring to reflect in any way upon the nature of the Soviet proposals, but because it is not in the least clear that there has been any such real movement. In essence, then, the Disarmament Commission had had one matter constantly before it: how to obtain from the representatives of the Soviet Union acceptable declarations—acceptable to them as well as to the Western Powers—in unequivocal terms regarding the control measures which the Soviet Government is really prepared to accept. This is the main problem before us and in essence it is, of course, what might be called primarily a great-Power problem.

91. But although the achievement of such agreement is primarily a matter for the great Powers—because only after the great Powers have agreed on fundamental safeguards satisfactory to all of them can a universal system of disarmament be in any way considered for the whole world—this does not mean that the middle and smaller Powers do not have, at an appropriate stage, a useful, and indeed a very important, role to play in discussions aimed at reaching such agreement between the great Powers. I am not saying that that stage has yet been reached, though I would hope that, if it has not, it is not far distant. I am, however, prepared to say that it is my belief that the stage has been reached at this session when the middle and smaller Powers must reassert their interest in this matter by playing a greater part in the discussions, a part aimed not so much, perhaps, at reconciling outstanding differences between the great Powers—which for practical reasons may well be beyond our competence—but at least at clarifying them. Only in that way do I think I can properly discharge my duty as the representative of Australia in this matter.

92. I believe that it was right for the Assembly last year to recommend [*resolution 715 (VIII)*] the establishment of a Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission so that the great Powers might talk things over in complete privacy. That had to be done and it was done very patiently and skilfully. But what were the actual results, in terms of agreements achieved, which emerged from these private great-Power consultations? In terms of agreement, the London meetings in May and June got nowhere. What, then, do we have to thank for the fact that now, at the opening of this present Assembly session, Mr. Vyshinsky has come forward with proposals which make his position appear to be nearer to that of the Western Powers than at any previous time? Is it because the Soviet Government has had second thoughts about the proposals which were discussed so exhaustively in the private talks in London? I would hope this to be so, but I would think it open to some doubt. I would think it not unlikely that the reason, or one reason, for the apparently more accommodating Soviet attitude is that, confronted in the General Assembly by the weight of public opinion of most, if not all, of the middle and smaller Powers, the Soviet Union did not feel it was politically desirable for its position to be presented to world opinion with all the rigidity and lack of compromise which appeared to characterize its meetings with the great-Power group in London. Thus I submit that, if there has been a more accommodating approach by the Soviet Union here in the United Nations, the importance to the Soviet Union of the opinions on this matter of the middle and smaller Powers has been in no small measure responsible for it.

93. Now how do these considerations affect the way in which this First Committee goes about its work on this vital question? I have mentioned a number of factors—active public opinion in many countries and the significance attached by the Soviet Union to securing the approval of the middle and smaller Powers in this matter being two of the most important. I would like to suggest that this Committee should not be at all hasty in referring this question of resolving outstanding differences between the major Powers back to the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. I believe that before this is done it is incumbent upon this Committee to provide machinery to obtain clarification of these outstanding differences.

94. What is necessary, it seems to me, is to set up a sub-committee of the First Committee whose exclusive functions would be as follows: to report upon the precise nature of the issues between the parties; to report upon the extent to which there has been any agreement in principle or detail on any of those issues; to report upon the principles and details of differences; and to report upon the nature of such proposals as have been advanced in an effort to bridge those differences. That would be something solid on which the Committee as a whole could usefully base its discussions.

95. There is, I think, some clear need for some objective analysis, and in this the Secretariat itself may perhaps be called in aid to assist the Committee in its deliberations. That, after all, is one of its functions which we have often, in relation to other matters, seen it perform so well.

96. I have not sought to put my ideas in formal language or indeed to make a formal proposal—I am at the moment merely desirous of placing an idea

before the Committee for its consideration and examination. I am not for one moment saying that what I am suggesting would necessarily bring a solution, but I think it might help to soften the edges of differences between the great Powers in a way which might not be applicable in the small Disarmament Commission's Sub-Committee and at least aid us in the discharge of our important and grave duties.

97. If movement towards agreement cannot be achieved during this present session, I believe most strongly that the points on which agreement could not be reached and the reasons for continuing disagreement must be made perfectly clear to the people of the world. While I certainly do not anticipate such a failure—indeed I earnestly hope, as we all do, that we may move forward—I believe that if it did occur then it would be best for that failure and the reasons for it to be apparent to ordinary men and women throughout the world.

98. For the reasons which I have given, the Australian delegation would find it impossible to support the draft resolution which has been put forward by the representative of the Philippines [*A/C.1/751*]. For the same reasons, we reserve consideration of our attitude on the proposal put forward by the representative of Canada [*A/C.1/752*].

99. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): If no other speakers put their names down this afternoon, I shall suggest to the Committee that tomorrow we should consider the possibility of closing the list of speakers in the general debate, since, when that is over, we shall have the debate on the proposals themselves, in which representatives will be able to speak again. In addition, they always have the right of reply in accordance with rule 116.

100. Mr. MENON (India): Irrespective of speakers inscribing themselves, I hope it will be borne in mind that some of us have to get instructions on these proposals, and if the Chairman should close the list too early, and then the debate on the draft resolutions themselves is also short, we shall not be able to address the Committee with the necessary advice from our governments. That is the point I made before, namely, that whatever may be the purpose of the draft resolutions, they would in effect cut down the general debate and turn it into specific debates, which is very hard on us. I suppose we also have some contribution to make to these matters, and I hope the Chairman will bear that in mind.

101. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): I would remind the Indian representative that after the general debate there will be a further debate on the proposals themselves. I want us to complete the first stage at least. After that representatives will be able to speak again on the proposals themselves. Moreover, I am not proposing that the list of speakers should be closed now. I only wanted to suggest it in case no more speakers put their names on the list, because in that case we should have no other alternative.

102. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): I fully understand the preoccupations which move the Chairman to urge us to inscribe our names on the list of speakers, and certainly the First Committee, being loaded with its supremely important task, should move along, but, as everybody has pointed out so far, this is one of the most important questions that has ever come before the United Nations.

103. I do not think, with all respect to the functions of the Chair and to the exigencies of the Secretariat and to the general work of the United Nations, that we can properly hurry this debate. I think, therefore, that it would be neither reasonable nor fair even to contemplate the possibility of closing the list of speakers tomorrow.

104. I would suggest that the very earliest date on which that particular rule of procedure should be invoked would not be before Monday, 18 October, because, as the representative of India has said—and as some other representatives said yesterday—it takes time to get the texts, to study them carefully, and to confer with our governments and with one another. Some delegations are not as well equipped with advisers and research workers as others, so that it is difficult for them to see their way to fruitful and constructive participation in this all-important debate for some time. Therefore, with all respect to the urgency under which the Chairman works, but also having regard to what has been said by almost every speaker about the necessity of leaving this debate as open and as free as possible, I would beg him not to force us to face a closure of the list of speakers tomorrow. I think that by Monday, 18 October, all representatives ought to have made up their minds about it. Also, in a sense, every representative on a Committee has potentially inscribed his name on the list of speakers and is only waiting until he receives instructions from his government before making his statement. If a date is set on which we must hand in our names, it will be found that there are sixty names on the list.

105. Having said all that, I would beg the Chairman and the Committee to be patient and to allow us the maximum latitude possible, because this is a topic which fully merits such latitude. I was glad to hear the representative of Canada say that the debate might still continue for one or two weeks longer. I think that the other items on the agenda of the Committee are very important, but perhaps this one is at least as important as any other, and we cannot give it too much time.

106. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): I should like to reply to the observations of the representative of Lebanon. I agree that there can be no question of hurrying the debate, but rather of organizing our work. I also agree that we can save a great deal of time if we let representatives study the matters under discussion. But what we need is a definite programme, because it is useless to meet to hear only one or two speakers, and have matters go on in that way indefinitely.

107. It seems to me that the Lebanese suggestion is most opportune, and the list of speakers will be closed at 1 p.m. on Monday, 18 October.

108. Mr. SERRANO (Philippines): According to our understanding of the procedure outlined by the Chairman, the purpose for which each draft resolution is presented may be defeated. I do not wish to imply that it is the desire of the Philippine delegation to deprive any representative of the right to participate in the debate; we are firm believers in the right of free discussion, and the draft resolution which we have presented is not designed to remove that right. But there are certain fundamental purposes which, according to that draft resolution, should be observed.

109. Therefore it is suggested by the delegation of the Philippines that perhaps the proper procedure would be to cope with the situation as it develops; that is to

say, if a draft resolution has been presented after a certain speaker has made his statement, such draft resolution should be taken up according to the order in which it was presented, without prejudice, of course, to the continuation of the general debate after action has been taken on the said draft resolution. The draft resolution may be intended precisely to suspend the debate temporarily in the interests of greater objectives to be achieved. That is what the Philippine delegation has in mind; there is absolutely no desire to remove the right to discuss freely the issues before the Committee, but questions of propriety, in the interests of the accomplishment of our ultimate objectives, must be reconciled with the right of debate. Our procedure must be designed to serve a greater end, a greater purpose: disarmament and the peace of the world. That is why it is suggested by the Philippine delegation that if any particular draft resolution is presented, obviously with a certain purpose in view, the situation must be tackled by the Committee in the order in which it has arisen, and then it will devolve upon the Committee to determine the wisdom of such draft resolution. If the Committee decides against it, the decision of the Committee, of course, prevails.

110. As draft resolutions have been presented by the Philippine and Canadian delegations, and a proposal put forward by the representative of Australia concerning the functions of the Sub-Committee, we suggest that the situation must be faced as it arises, without prejudice, as I have stated, to the continuation of the debate after action upon the draft resolutions has been taken by the Committee.

111. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): I must explain the position. Under the rules of procedure, if a proposal is made, it can be put to the vote only at the conclusion of the general debate. We cannot, therefore, put the Philippine proposal to the vote, as the representative of the Philippines has suggested, unless there is an explicit request in the draft resolution, in accordance with rule 117 of the rules of procedure, that the debate should be postponed or suspended. However, I have read the draft resolution carefully and it does not propose either the suspension or postponement of the discussion. It is a draft resolution submitted in accordance with rule 104 on the establishment of sub-committees. The same is true of the proposal submitted by Canada, so that unless some delegation requests a suspension of the discussion, we must keep to the ordinary procedure and conclude the general debate. When that is over, there will be a debate on the proposals themselves and we shall then put them to the vote.

112. Mr. SERRANO (Philippines): The Philippine delegation is not unaware of the rules invoked by the Chairman, but when a vote is taken on a draft resolution, that constitutes the decision of the Committee on the draft resolution itself. What the Philippine delegation has in mind is discussion of the draft resolution as it appears in the order of business of the Committee. The vote may be taken after the general debate has been closed. Indeed, it may be said that, according to the Philippine draft resolution, discussion may be shifted for the time being to the working group. That in itself is a debate, according to our interpretation of the rules. Discussion by a certain group instead of in a general group is in itself a continuation of the debate as contemplated by the rules. As to whether this particular rule should or should not be followed, it

is for the Committee to decide, but, with respect to the vote taken, the latter must necessarily be after representatives have made their general statements. However, discussion of the draft resolution should take place in the order in which the draft resolution has been presented to the Committee. That is the interpretation which the Philippine delegation places on the rule in connexion with the Committee's procedure.

113. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): I am sorry to insist, but I think the point is very clear. During the general debate, delegations are entirely at liberty to speak on the substance of the item or on any of the proposals. As regards the discussion of the proposals themselves, the rules of procedure and the practice of the Committee have always been that the general debate should first be concluded, and then the proposals discussed. Of course the Committee is perfectly free to change this procedure, but I cannot do it unless a suggestion to that effect is made by some delegation and the majority of the Committee so decides. Thus, in the present circumstances, we must first finish the general debate, then have a debate on the proposals, and then vote. However, as I said, under the rules of procedure any delegation can propose a change, since the rules of procedure authorize it.

114. Mr. SERRANO (Philippines): In view of the explanation given by the Chairman, I think that the Philippine delegation would be compelled to submit to the Committee's decision in this connexion, given the fact that the purpose of its draft resolution will be best served by the order of business indicated by the Philippine delegation. It is therefore moved that the procedure should be somewhat departed from in the sense that the draft resolution should be discussed in the order in which it has come to the Chairman.

115. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): To cut short this procedural matter, I formally move that the general debate on this item be continued, and that the texts which we have before us now, or which we may have before us in the future, be taken up at the end of the general debate.

116. Mr. MUNOZ (Argentina) (*translated from Spanish*): I believe that the representative of the Philippines has not, as the Chairman sees it, raised a question of procedure. All Mr. Serrano wants is an opportunity to discuss the proposals during the general debate. I believe that there can be no difficulty in this regard. As I understand it, all delegations can, if they wish, refer to motions which have been made and even to those which have not been made yet. The general debate is sufficiently wide to cover all these.

117. It seems to me that the Philippine representative has raised a question which should be dealt with when a vote is taken, namely, the order in which the proposals are to be voted on. As I see it, this is not a question to be decided now, but when the Committee decides to vote. It will then decide whether the Philippine proposal or the Canadian proposal is to be taken first, or some other proposal which may have been made regarding the procedure to be followed. At this point there is no problem. We are in the middle of the general debate, that debate is continuing, and the representative of the Philippines does not want it to be suspended and the discussion on specific proposals to start. I think that if we assure him that his delegation can refer to any proposals both during the general debate and afterwards, we shall have dealt with this point.

118. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): I fully agree with the representative of Argentina. Naturally, specific proposals can be discussed in the general debate. In addition, when the general debate is finished, there will be the customary debate on specific proposals. But both then and now, in the general debate, all representatives can refer to any of the proposals.

119. The representative of Lebanon has made a formal proposal. However, before putting it to the vote I should like to know whether the representative of the Philippines, in view of the clarification given by the representative of Argentina, with which I am in complete agreement, wishes to maintain his point, or whether we can agree that the general debate should continue as was envisaged.

120. Mr. SERRANO (Philippines): The Philippine delegation would like to remind the Chairman that it presented a formal motion preceding that submitted by the representative of Lebanon.

121. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): I had not realized that the Philippine representative had made a formal proposal. I should like to know what the proposal is.

122. Mr. SERRANO (Philippines): The Philippine delegation moves that, for the observance of the order of business of the Committee, the general debate may yield temporarily to any draft resolution or motion that has been presented at any time during the general debate, with a view to the discussion of such draft resolution or motion.

123. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): There seems to be some misunderstanding, because that point has already been covered, as the Argentine representative explained. There is no need to alter our procedure, because the possibility is provided for. Representatives may refer to the various proposals at any point in the general debate.

124. Mr. SERRANO (Philippines): There is one difficulty in that connexion, and it is an important one. I believe that no delegation which has been accorded the right to speak will be given the opportunity to intervene again until all other representatives have made their statements.

125. The CHAIRMAN: Until the list of speakers is exhausted, all delegations are free to ask for permission to speak, and I shall accord that permission to any delegation as many times as it wishes.

126. Mr. SERRANO (Philippines): On that clarification, the motion of the Philippine delegation is withdrawn.

127. Mr. KYROU (Greece): What has been extremely helpful and hopeful is that this disarmament debate has been conducted with disarming tactics on the part of all representatives, and more particularly on the part of the representatives of the Powers principally involved.

128. In this same disarming spirit, I should like to say a few words on the proposal of the Philippine delegation. In all fairness to this proposal, there is an idea of dividing the general debate into two parts, and, if we agreed to take a vote on this proposal only at the end of the debate, then, assuming that the debate went on for two weeks, there would not be much time left for this proposal, if it is voted on favourably, to be effectuated, since this proposal sets up a time limit of 15 November for the submission

of the report of the working group. That, of course, concerns the formalities of the situation. As to the substance, however, I am quite sure that the representative of the Philippines would agree that the same purpose could be achieved if, during this general debate, the members of the Sub-Committee could meet informally and discuss the subject that the representative of the Philippines has in mind.

129. Mr. Charles MALIK (Lebanon): In view of the fact that the representative of the Philippines is no longer asking for a departure from our normal procedure, and since my proposal was intended only to confirm our normal procedure, there is certainly no longer any need for it. I take it, therefore, that the general debate is going to continue according to the

procedure that we have always followed during the past nine years of the history of the United Nations; that in the general debate any representative may speak on any aspect of the question that may be before him, including whatever draft resolutions are submitted; that, upon the closure of the general debate, as the Chairman has said, there may be another debate specifically on the texts before us; and that we will then proceed to take decisions on these texts and thus to bring the consideration of this item to a close. I take it that that is the normal procedure and that therefore there is no need for the Chairman to put my formal proposal to the vote.

*The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.*