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Chairman: Mr. Francisco URRUTIA (Colombia).

AGENDA ITEMS 20 AND 68

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/2685) (*continued*)

Conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction (A/2742 and Corr.1, A/2742/Add.1, A/C.1/750) (*continued*)

1. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): There is a very serious question before the First Committee and we must discuss it in all earnestness. That is our bounden duty, for the problems with which we are faced are much too serious for any other approach. For my part, I shall endeavour to concentrate my attention wholly on the substance of the question, without either digressing or looking for negative elements in the speeches and positions of other members of the Committee, for I believe that our main task now is to find as many positive elements as possible. Some negative elements can be found even in the best cause.

2. It seems to me that now, at the very outset of our discussion of this important question, it is essential for us to try to understand and evaluate correctly the positions of the States interested in a successful solution of the question of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen, and other weapons of mass destruction. It would hardly serve a useful purpose to summon up the shades of the past or to recall our discussions of this question, in previous years, discussions characterized by sharp differences in the positions taken by the representatives of the chief countries which took an active part in studying, discussing and endeavouring to solve these problems.

3. Today [685th meeting] we heard interesting statements by Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Moch. They succeeded in performing a division of labour, so to speak, and

between them have already formed a single front against your humble servant, to whom they now must listen closely. I would prefer that front to be tripartite rather than bipartite. That might make matters easier for the whole Committee. But apparently the time has not yet come to stop forming these bipartite fronts and to stop assigning roles in advance, so that the task in hand may be better accomplished. I want to emphasize that what I would like is not that each of us should have his own task, but that all of us should have a common task, so that we could approach the discussion of questions in which we are interested without having first aligned the heavy guns.

4. I really think that Mr. Moch could at least have separated the volley he fired today at me, at the Soviet delegation and at the Soviet Union, into several volleys. The resulting blasts would have been easier for me to take. I have before me at least twenty-five questions. I am not very good at arithmetic, so I may be wrong. I would have been happier if my interrogators, when putting their questions, had outlined what my answers might be — in others words, if they had appended draft answers to the twenty-five questions. It would then have been easier for me to reply with a "yes" or "no" as they want me to do; for that is what they really want. They ask: "Tell us, are you for this or for that? Have you abandoned a certain position or not? Do you accept a certain proposal of ours which we made long ago, or do you not? Do you still maintain your stand, or have you now given it up?" But there is never a question like: "What is your attitude towards the matter?"

5. Now, in our turn, we ask: "Have you given up your stand; and, if so, on what points? Or do you not feel that it is equally incumbent upon you to change your position, to propose something new and different from what you proposed before, or, at least, to try to avoid serving up old proposals, claiming that they are new?" I heard quite a few hints and even plain words today which indicate just such a tendency.

6. I appreciate the trouble to which my colleagues, Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Moch, have gone in their effort to ascertain our position on various points in the Soviet Union's proposals [A/C.1/750]. I fully appreciate that effort. I am even grateful to them, because their questions may indeed enable me to state with greater clarity and precision what we actually want, and thereby to reaffirm our position, which we hold to be correct and truly designed to promote the welfare of mankind, to serve the interests of peace and to further the cause of international security.

7. It is legitimate to ask questions, and we can only welcome questions on points which it is important to clarify. But that does not mean that only questions of one type, or only such questions as the interrogator wishes to put, are legitimate; for it should be clearly understood that there can be no unilateral questioning here. It would be a mistake to think that some may

ask questions while others must reply to them, giving only the answers that are expected of them, and no others. I am ready to agree that I should reply to questions put to me; but I naturally assume that my opponents will also feel obliged to answer any questions I may ask them. I do not, however, accept, and would even consider dangerous, a method of questioning which makes it obligatory for answers to be given in the manner on which the questioner insists, and in no other; for that would bring us to a position where demands are put forward in the form of questions, with the risk that, unless the questions are answered precisely as the interrogators desire, there can be no hope of successful negotiations. If questions are made to serve this purpose, there can be no negotiations. Negotiations must be carried out on a basis of reciprocity.

8. I felt obliged to make these remarks because I consider it important for us to agree in what form and shape, for what purpose and in what phrasing questions — in particular, important questions designed to ascertain positions may and must be put. I repeat, I naturally do not object to the posing of such questions, and I will be glad if our answers help to clarify our position.

9. Before I go any further, I should like to speak of another matter which I consider important. Everyone is of course aware that this is not the first time the General Assembly and the First Committee have examined the question of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons and, nuclear weapons in general. Everyone is also aware of the difficulties which we encountered in our previous examination.

10. I think it would be a mistake to suggest that the Soviet Government's proposal, which, on its instructions, I submitted to the General Assembly on 30 September [*484th meeting*], represents the Soviet Government's first and only step in the entire history of the United Nations — I would not be surprised if it were said "in the entire history of mankind" — towards the solution of this problem; it would be a mistake to say that this is the first time we have accepted any proposal made in the past by representatives of the Western Powers, even if only by taking it as a basis for our own proposals. I think it would be a mistake to say that hitherto the Soviet Union has occupied a certain position from which it would not deviate in any direction, and that it obstinately fought for the acceptance of its proposals without giving reasons or listening to reason. That is not so. We have always given the reasons for our proposals, explained them and altered them in accordance with the situation in the General Assembly and with the possibilities of reaching agreement on a given question. We have always pursued a definite objective, to which I have already referred: that of serving the cause of international peace and security.

11. Today, Mr. Lloyd recalled a number of past events in the United Nations to illustrate the position which has been taken on these matters over the course of time by the United Kingdom delegation and certain other delegations, notably by two which are allies of the United Kingdom. I should like to follow the example he set and recall that since the very first days of the existence of the United Nations, the Soviet Union has constantly drawn the Organization's attention to the vital importance of solving the problems which are now

before us. It is our profound conviction that, unless these problems are solved, the threat of world war, with all the havoc it brings in its train and all the misery it means for millions upon millions of people, will continue to hang over mankind like the sword of Damocles.

12. If you will cast a glance back over the past few years you will recall, for instance, that during all these years the Soviet Union has persistently urged, and still urges, that the General Assembly adopt decisive measures to remove the threat of a new world war and to avert the danger of another catastrophe. The Soviet Union has always acted from a consciousness of the need to put an end to the arms race, to bring about a substantial reduction of armaments and armed forces, to prohibit atomic weapons and, when the hydrogen bomb appeared, to prohibit that weapon too along with other weapons of mass destruction, so that atomic energy might be used for peaceful purposes and peaceful purposes only.

13. This is no new problem to us, and if we have referred to it once more now, in our communication of 30 September, so many years after our first steps in this direction, it would be strange to suggest that this is the first time we have moved along a road already taken by the three Western Powers. That is not so.

14. In 1946, at the first session of the General Assembly, it was none other than the Soviet Union delegation which submitted a proposal [*A/BUR/42*] for recognition of the necessity of a general reduction of armaments. I consider this an honour to my country and my fatherland. It was stated in the draft resolution that the implementing of the decision concerning the reduction of armaments should include, as its primary object, prohibition of the production and use of atomic energy for military purposes.

15. It must also be remembered that even at that time, at the General Assembly session in 1946, the Soviet Union introduced an additional proposal [*A/C.1/83*] for the establishment, within the framework of the Security Council, of an international control organ — or, as it was stated at the time, international control which should provide for the establishment of special organs of inspection; for which purpose, as many representatives must remember, it was proposed that two special commissions should be formed: one to control the carrying out of the decision regarding the reduction of armaments and armed forces, and the other to control the carrying out of the decision regarding the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes. Here, too, the initiative came from the Soviet Union. No one can deny that. But the very same motives which prompted us then prompt us now; we have the very same aims in view, and the measures we are proposing now are the very ones we were proposing then.

16. Nevertheless, since the situation as it now exists presents obstacles which must be removed before we can make any headway, we are ready to try to remove those obstacles in order to make progress. And we expect others, too, to endeavour to remove such obstacles as lie in their paths. Of course it is easy to remove by a simple act of denial, those obstacles caused by the position taken by others. However, there are obstacles which are inherent in one's own position; declarations are powerless to remove them: they, too, must be denied. So, then, you have a negation multiplied by a negation — a minus by a minus — making a plus.

17. If we undertake to remove some condition which has up to now been an obstacle to agreement on important questions — questions which, without exaggeration, affect the destiny of mankind — then we have a right to expect, and we do expect, others participating in this work to remove the obstacles which lie at the bases of their positions and prevent the adoption of a positive decision on the question under discussion. It seems to me that this is only fair.

18. Now I shall continue in chronological order.

19. In 1947, the Soviet Union proposed [*84th plenary meeting*] that the General Assembly should reaffirm the decisions taken in 1946 concerning the reduction of armaments and the elimination from national armaments of atomic and all other weapons adaptable to mass destruction; for it considered that the implementation of those decisions was in the interests of all peace-loving nations, and would be a most powerful blow at propaganda and at those who would incite a new war — this threat also remains with us. It is no accident, therefore, that the Czechoslovak delegation has submitted a proposal to the present session of the General Assembly for the prohibition of propaganda in favour of a new war; for such propaganda is an evil which must be rooted out.

20. In 1948, at the third session of the General Assembly, the Soviet Union again introduced a proposal [*A/658*] for the prohibition of atomic weapons, and at the same time proposed that armaments and armed forces should be reduced by one-third during one year, and again urged the setting up of an international control body within the framework of the Security Council.

21. We reintroduced the proposal for the reduction by one-third of conventional armaments at subsequent sessions. We did not raise the question this time and, as you have seen, our proposal does not mention it directly; but if I am asked whether our proposal provides for proportional reduction of armaments or whether we prefer some other arrangement, then I must point out that, so far, the only alternative arrangement has been the one first proposed on 28 May 1952, which recognizes the necessity of establishing ceilings on armaments. One of the documents submitted at the time [*DC/10*] said, with regard to armed forces, that "there should be fixed numerical ceilings for China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America", and that "such ceilings should be fixed with a view to avoiding a disequilibrium of power". Hence, the arrangement would once again have been based on the so-called "balance-of-power system", which, by the way — I may deal with this question separately later on — has never operated as a system of peace, but has historically been a system of rearmament and preparation for a new war. This system found clear expression in the Treaty of Washington of 1922, which paved the way for the Second World War subsequently unleashed by the fascists of Japan and Germany.

22. As I have said, therefore, this principle of balance of power has never in the history of mankind served the cause of peace, but has always been used for the preparation and waging of war. (If I am permitted and time allows, I could explain it in detail.)

23. As a preliminary step, a maximum ceiling of between 1 and 1.5 million men was suggested for the Soviet Union, for the United States and for China, and between 700,000 and 800,000 men for the United

Kingdom and for France. This is the level of which Mr. Moch spoke today when he asked, in one of the questions he put to me, whether we maintain our position in favour of proportional reduction or whether we accept the system and the theory of "levels" which are based on the principle of balance of power with all its consequences.

24. I cannot promise that I shall answer today all the questions put to me by Mr. Lloyd, who incidentally seems to have selected Mr. Moch as his principal legal adviser in the matter. Mr. Moch confirmed this in his statement when he said that he will confine himself for the most part to putting questions to me, pointing out that he was acting as an inquisitor — perhaps even a grand inquisitor, but in any case an inquisitor. I must disappoint him on this score as I did not feel that I was before an inquisition, so he need not have called himself an inquisitor. He acted rather as a fairly strict teacher interrogating a fairly formidable pupil, but he was still far from being an inquisitor.

25. I must say that we consider the 1952 scheme for fixing limitations of between 1 and 1.5 million men and 700,000 and 800,000 men for various States as hardly satisfactory.

26. Allow me to ask some questions in turn. I should like to know on what the suggested figures of 1 to 1.5 million men for the United States, the USSR and China, and of 700,000 to 800,000 men for the United Kingdom and France, are based. How were they arrived at? Why does it provide for 1 to 1.5 million rather than 2, or 2.5, or 3 million? What are these limitations, and on what criteria or considerations are they based? That is not known.

27. It would be wrong for me to say that nothing was ever said on this subject. I believe it was the sixth session of the General Assembly in Paris that Mr. Acheson, who was then United States Secretary of State, tried to defend the figure of 1 to 1.5 million, and he explained the theory of his criteria at the time [*335th plenary meeting*]. What were the criteria he put forward at the time? I consider that the criteria he suggested as a basis for the solution of the problem had some validity, but that the conclusion he drew from them had none. He referred to the size or area of a State's territory, which is a sound criterion. It goes without saying that the territory occupied by a State — that is, whether it covers 200,000 or 2 million square kilometres — is a factor which must necessarily be taken into account in making proposals regarding the strength of the armed forces required for the defence of that State against external attack.

28. An equally valid criterion is the length of a country's frontier. It is one thing to have to defend a frontier of a thousand kilometres, and another thing to have to protect one of fifty thousand kilometres.

29. A third criterion is the physical character of the frontier. The situation is quite different according to whether a country has a frontier looking out over a level plain, whether it is separated from other countries by a vast ocean like the Atlantic or by a mountain range like the Himalayas, or whether it has no natural barriers to invasion, and so on.

30. I am sure the Committee will not require me to list or explain all the criteria at the present stage. I will merely mention them, in view of the fact that, if we reach the stage of discussing the substance of

the question, we shall of course have an opportunity for an exchange of views — not, I would point out to Mr. Lloyd, with an eye to the past, but with an eye to the future, which is to my mind a far more encouraging and profitable procedure.

31. It is proposed to fix levels for the USSR and China, let me say. For which China, incidentally, is it desired to fix a ceiling? For the China which is entirely located on Formosa, or for the real China? Now I also should like to ask a question: on the national army of which China is it proposed to fix a numerical ceiling of 1.5 million? There is absolutely no basis for this figure. We might very well say that it is an invented figure, just as it has been said today with reference to our proposal that we have cooked up two different types of control organ. It is, I repeat, an invented figure, for which there is no justification. I told Mr. Acheson at the time (I believe it was in 1952) that these criteria were useful and deserved serious consideration. The arrangement proposed, however, bears no relationship to territorial area; since to fix the same ceiling for the USSR, China and the United States is, of course, to disregard the area of those countries, the character and configuration of their frontiers, and all the other relevant factors. It is also necessary to have regard to the character of the armed forces involved: whether they are composed of troops armed with carbines or antiquated rifles, or of troops equipped with hydrogen weapons. That is another factor which has to be taken into account.

32. At present, United States military publications and the United States Press in general are propounding the very significant thesis that what matters to that country is not the number of bayonets, but the possession of armed forces of a certain quality, capable — to follow the expression used in this connexion — of carrying out massive retaliation anywhere and at any point throughout the world. All these things have to be taken into account. If, therefore, it comes to a choice between the principle of proportional reduction and other principles of reduction, such as the one proposed in this 1952 document, then I and my delegation would be disposed to give our preference to the former and not to the latter, which clearly cannot withstand criticism.

33. I do not propose to discuss the fact that, after issuing this document listing the criteria, the United States Secretary of State at that time made a statement to the effect that, regardless of the criteria, a numerical limit must be imposed on the armed forces of every State, however large. If the question is put in this way, then of course the principle of criteria is automatically discarded and goes by the board.

34. A proposal for a reduction of armaments and armed forces is of course tantamount to a demand for a limitation of armed forces. This objective must, however, be achieved by a reasonable procedure which takes due account of the interests of all the countries concerned, through the attainment of agreement, with respect for mutual interests, and not by the procedure a stronger party sometimes follows in regard to a weaker. It should be noted that quite frequently the "weakness" of the other country is a figment of the stronger party's imagination, and the reality may be quite different.

35. This answers one of Mr. Moch's questions; the rest I will answer as I go along. I would remind you

that at the third session of the General Assembly in 1948, we submitted a proposal for the prohibition of atomic weapons and for a one-third reduction in conventional armaments and armed forces. I will briefly recapitulate the motives which led us to take this action. As the work of the Atomic Energy Commission, which had then been established, was not yielding satisfactory results — I draw attention to the following fact, which I wish to emphasize — the Soviet Union proposed that the General Assembly should recommend that the Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission prepare a draft convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons and a draft convention instituting effective international supervision of the implementation of this convention, the intention being that both these conventions should be signed and come into force simultaneously.

36. It is therefore apparent that we had this idea as early as 1948 and that it assumed a specific form—as was quite natural, since it was the outcome of our unchanging foreign policy—namely, that of stressing the need to draw up conventions regulating this question. As I have reminded you, we made this proposal in 1948.

37. Now the question of conventions has arisen here also. Mr. Moch, it seems, has even asked me what is the difference between a convention and a treaty and which term is used in our proposals. Our document refers to the "conclusion of an international convention (treaty)". On the basis of my knowledge of Russian philology and my rather slighter knowledge of English and French philology, I would have said that the word "convention" in French and in English and "*dogovor*" in Russian have precisely the same meaning. But Mr. Moch sees some distinction there. I would therefore ask him what he has in mind in asking me what the difference is between "convention" and "treaty". He appears to think that some vital distinction is involved, on which a specific explanation is required. But it seems to me that legal subtleties should not present us with any difficulty. We can say "treaty" or "convention", but it seems to me that this will be determined by the decision we take at a later stage. We have no objection to either word, whether in Russian, English or French, so long as the word is a word of peace and not something else, so long as the convention is for defence and not a convention serving as a cloak for warlike aims, so long as it really serves its stated purpose. When the time comes to select its title, we—or at least I, if I have any hand in the matter—will gladly take Mr. Moch's authoritative views on the subject into account. When the times comes, we shall reach agreement as to what it shall be called.

38. With reference to our proposal for the conclusion of a convention, I must repeat that there can be no question of asserting that we have used the words referring to a convention for the first time in our document of 30 September. These words were not used for the first time.

39. In 1949 the Soviet Union submitted proposals which envisaged, as a first step, the preparation of a plan for the reduction of the armaments and armed forces of the five permanent members of the Security Council and the drafting of a convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons. We also proposed the adoption of a draft resolution [S/1216] requiring the permanent members of the Security Council to submit by

a specific date—the date of 31 March 1949 was indicated—full information about their armed forces and all types of armaments, including even atomic weapons.

40. At the fourth session of the General Assembly in 1949, the Soviet Union proposed the adoption of a draft resolution [A/1150 and Corr.1] under which the General Assembly would have proclaimed the use of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction as contrary to the conscience and honour of the nations and incompatible with membership in the United Nations; and would have invited the five permanent members of the Security Council, who unquestionably bear the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace, to conclude a pact for the strengthening of peace. We followed the same policy at the fifth session of the General Assembly in 1950. At the sixth session in 1951 the Soviet Union lent strong support to a similar proposal put forward by the Polish delegation. At the seventh session in 1952 the Soviet delegation supported the Polish draft resolution [A/C.1/L.39] on the same subject, while at the sixth session in 1951 it submitted its own independent proposal [A/C.1/668/Rev.2] for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments and armed forces.

41. At the eighth session of the General Assembly in 1953, that is to say, last year, we raised this question again, our aim being, *inter alia*, the calling of an international conference at an early date with a view to securing a reduction in the armaments of all States [A/2485/Rev.1 and A/2485/Add.1]. Mr. Moch also referred to this particular question today, observing that I proposed that the text of the draft convention should be submitted to the Security Council, to which he, as the representative of France, had no objection. He then went on to ask me what the position was in regard to an international conference, and pointed out that we have made no reference to it. It is a fact that it is not mentioned in our document, but if the idea of a conference is acceptable to the other members, we raise no objection. We do not regard it as a question of principle, because, as I have already said, we submitted a proposal last year for the convening of an international conference to work out practical measures for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments and armed forces.

42. Quite recently at the Berlin Conference, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Molotov, again submitted a proposal for the convening of a world conference on reduction of armaments, as follows:

“The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France and the USSR, guided by a wish to reinforce peace and to decrease tension in international relations,

“Believing it necessary to take measures for easing the heavy burden of military expenditure borne by the peoples in connection with the armaments race,

“Agree that the Soviet Union, the United States of America, Great Britain and France shall, within the framework of the United Nations, take measures for convening in 1954 a world conference on the universal reduction of armaments, with the participation in that conference of non-member, as well as of Member States of the United Nations.

“Complete agreement has also been reached that the measures proposed for the universal reduction

of armaments must be closely linked with a simultaneous solution of the problem of atomic weapons.”

It should be clear, then, that the Soviet Union is knocking on door after door in the hope of finding some response to its proposal on this important matter.

43. At the Berlin Conference, which was attended by the Foreign Ministers of four great Powers, the Soviet Union, ever concerned with this question, again submitted a proposal, but, as is known, it bore no fruit.

44. I therefore feel that Mr. Moch's question cannot really be intended to make our position clearer, because our position is clear. Year after year we have been talking about a conference, urging that it should be held, and endeavouring to have a decision to that effect adopted; but so far we have met with nothing but protestations of sympathy. Perhaps the situation has now changed, and our colleagues may agree that such a conference is needed. In that case it is worth referring to a few documents with which we should all be familiar, so as to gain a clear picture of the Soviet Union's position in this matter.

45. Hence, there is no need to rack one's brains, perhaps to spend sleepless nights, in formulating more than a score of questions, since I am sure we could boldly dispense with quite a number of them. It is a waste of effort.

46. I must emphasize that these are facts. It may be said: “This is propaganda”. Our statements in defence of our proposals are immediately characterized as propaganda in various American tabloids and by certain inveterate speakers in the General Assembly. But this is not propaganda; it is fact.

47. Eight years have passed, and we are now at the ninth session. From the day when the doors of the General Assembly opened in London, which was the first place to offer hospitality to our Organization, we began raising these questions, and ever since then we have gone on raising them and seeking a favourable solution.

48. It may be said: “But now you are putting the question differently”. That is true; we are now putting the question differently because we must find a useful solution for the sake of millions and hundreds of millions of people, in order to rid ourselves once and for all of the spectre of a new world war. If we are unable to reach a solution to this problem on the basis of our proposals, we will accept your basis. But to do so does not mean that we accept all your conditions, for we are not bowing to the will of a conqueror. Our position and our desire for peace must not be regarded in that light. It should be realized that we are seeking agreement. I shall have more to say on that score, but the question here is one of facts the meaning of which should be clear to all, facts which show the unceasing efforts that the Soviet Union has made systematically and consistently throughout the years, and is still making, to bring about a substantial relaxation in international tension, to avert the threat of a new world war and to ensure international security.

49. It should not be forgotten that the Soviet Government presented its proposals for the prohibition of atomic weapons and, subsequently, hydrogen weapons to the General Assembly despite the fact that the Soviet Union at that time already possessed atomic weapons. It will be recalled that on 6 November 1947 the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Molotov, stated that the secret of the atomic bomb had been known for a long time in the USSR, which meant that the Soviet Union

was already supplied with atomic bombs. Scientific circles in the United States then thought that that statement was bluff. They asserted that the Russians would not have the atomic bomb before 1952, and some of the much vaunted so-called experts on the Soviet Union who compiled the reports of the United States Embassy in Moscow on Soviet industry and economy for the War Department in Washington, kept predicting for several years that the Soviet Union could not make atomic weapons before 1954. Those experts, bursting with pride at the success of the United States in manufacturing atomic weapons flatly stated (and I am quoting from a report by one of them) that "as far as production potential was concerned, key sectors of Russian industry essential in the development of atomic weapons were on an average twenty-two years behind the corresponding sectors of industry in the United States."

50. The authors of an article entitled "When Will Russia Have the Atomic Bomb?", published in *Look* magazine in 1948 asserted that 1954 was the earliest date by which Russia could possibly carry out a project such as the Hanford plant in the United States and produce enough plutonium to manufacture atomic weapons. The authors of this article, one of whom was a member of the United States Embassy in Moscow, and the other, one of the leading atomic engineers of the Oak Ridge and Hanford atomic plants, according to the cover page of the magazine, apparently did not realize that the Soviet Union possessed atomic weapons in 1947 and even earlier, which gave the lie to the fanciful calculations of the so-called experts on the Soviet Union.

51. Such predictions were quite ludicrous when it is remembered that President Truman announced on 23 September 1949 that, according to information available to the United States Government, an atomic explosion had occurred in the Soviet Union in the latter part of that month, and that similar statements were made at the time by the United Kingdom and Canadian Governments.

52. Moreover, it should be recalled in that connexion that certain circles in the West raised a cry of alarm about that occurrence, concerning which a Tass *communiqué* was published in September 1949 to the effect that the Soviet Union Government, even though it possessed atomic weapons, maintained and would continue to maintain its previous position in favour of the unconditional prohibition of the use of atomic weapons. With regard to control of atomic weapons, the same *communiqué* stated that control would unquestionably be necessary in future to ensure compliance with the decision prohibiting the manufacture of atomic weapons. That *communiqué* was, it seems to me, an important statement of principle for the whole trend of Soviet foreign policy, especially with regard to atomic weapons and the entire question of the utilization of atomic energy.

53. We now have before us new Soviet proposals that seek the same noble objective of delivering mankind from the threat of atomic weapons and the danger of a new world war. In submitting these proposals the Soviet Union has acted consistently and in full conformity with its peace-loving foreign policy, which is based on the important principle which I already mentioned in my statement in the General Assembly [484th meeting] and which I must mention again here. It is the only principle which, if observed, can secure the

establishment and development of normal relations and which, if adopted, would obviate the need for an armaments race or the utilization of atomic energy for war.

54. This is the principle of the peaceful coexistence of States. Its importance is further borne out by the fact that a number of responsible representatives of the ruling circles of the West have acknowledged in recent statements that peaceful coexistence is, as Sir Winston Churchill put it in the House of Commons on 12 July, a fundamental and far-reaching conception. But such an admission implies certain obligations; it imposes the application of a corresponding policy, and that can be only the policy of peace. It is incompatible, however, with the so-called policy of positions of strength or a policy of "peace through strength". Such a policy can lead only to an armaments race and to the stockpiling of nuclear weapons, of atomic and hydrogen bombs. It can lead only to war, not to peace. The policy of "peace through strength", as expressed recently in Sir Winston's speech at the Conservative Party conference at Blackpool, breeds false and dangerous illusions.

55. An example of that can be seen in the same speech, in which Sir Winston, speaking of the alleged superiority of the United States in nuclear weapons, asserted that so long as that superiority was maintained, it would be a decisive deterrent against—as he put it—a Communist aggression.

56. If the question is put in that way very little is left of the important principle of peaceful coexistence: for if the nuclear weapon is truly the decisive deterrent factor, then how is it possible to speak of the prohibition of the use of atomic weapons in the face of this alleged aggression? A choice must be made here between two irreconcilable courses of action.

57. If nuclear weapons are the only means of combating aggression, which is represented as inevitable, then it is useless for us to discuss the prohibition of such weapons; alternatively, if it is worth while discussing this question, then nuclear weapons cannot be a means of averting that danger, and it is false to assert that the nuclear weapon is the only decisive means of dealing with and averting that danger.

58. The principle of coexistence is a paramount principle. When speaking of this truly important and far-reaching principle of Soviet foreign policy, however, we certainly were not trying to use it as a slogan or a propaganda device. All we were trying to do was to make it easier to gain a clear understanding of Soviet foreign policy and of the grounds and motives underlying the measures and proposals that the Soviet Union has been advocating.

59. We have been somewhat disappointed to see that among the representatives of some countries in this Assembly, and outside of it too, there are some who apparently held another point of view; they seek to sow the seeds of mistrust, suspicion and unfriendliness, and act like the Pharisee in the Gospel story of the Pharisee and the Publican. Fortunately, their efforts—we are firmly convinced—can have no influence at the present time on thoughtful men who are seeking to improve international relations instead of increasing international tension, which is incompatible with statements about peaceful aims and peaceful efforts.

60. But there are still others who, while recognizing the necessity of the peaceful coexistence of States irrespective of their social structure, at the same time

advocate measures in their foreign policy which, if implemented, might greatly complicate the situation. Such measures would hinder the solution of problems such as that at present before us, and of other problems as well. The same is true of those decisions of the General Assembly which are contrary to the principle of the peaceful coexistence of States irrespective of their social structures, and contrary to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples proclaimed in the United Nations Charter. We are bound to point out that the refusal to observe these important principles unquestionably hampers the work of the United Nations, especially that concerning such important questions and tasks as that of reducing armaments and prohibiting atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

61. I must state in this connexion that the task of reducing armaments and prohibiting atomic weapons is not made easier by the fact that the People's Republic of China is not participating in the preparation of appropriate measures for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, although that country's importance in matters of war and peace cannot be exaggerated, since it is a great Power with a population of 600 million.

62. In submitting its draft resolution of 30 September the Soviet Government was guided by the consideration that the proposals submitted by France and the United Kingdom on 11 June [DC/53, annex 9], with certain amendments, were not inconsistent with the principles advocated by the Soviet Union with regard to the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments; and it is important, of course, always to uphold the principles upon which some measure or decision can be based.

63. The Soviet Government, in its *aide-mémoire* of 22 September of this year [A/2738], in reply to the United States memorandum of 9 June, stated:

"The Soviet Government is of the opinion that, if the Government of the United States of America as well as the Government of the Soviet Union desires to lessen the threat of war and lighten the armaments burden, the efforts of both Governments should be directed toward the attainment of an agreement regarding prohibition of atomic weapons, with the establishment of strict international supervision over this prohibition, and regarding substantial limitation on conventional armaments of States."

64. As I have pointed out, the Soviet Government has repeatedly submitted proposals to that end in the United Nations. In doing so it was guided by the consideration that such proposals were a response to the growing demand of the peoples of the world that the armaments race should be halted and that immediate measures should be taken to save mankind from the threat of a destructive atomic war.

65. As the Soviet Government pointed out in its *aide-mémoire* of 22 September to the United States Government, "the circumstance that it has not been possible to reach such agreement up to the present time should not diminish the significance of efforts to reach the required agreement between interested States."

66. The correctness of that position was confirmed at the Geneva Conference, which also demonstrated the effectiveness of negotiations between States. For a

negotiation to be effective, however, the States must be truly interested in strengthening peace and international security, for only this approach can yield positive results and can contribute to the solution of many other important problems in both Asia and Europe. No one I think can now contest this statement.

67. Following this line of thought, the Soviet Union Government has found it possible to submit its new proposals on the reduction of armaments of States and on atomic questions, taking as a basis the proposals submitted by France and the United Kingdom on 11 June 1954.

68. That is the source of those proposals. That is why we were prepared to take as a basis, not our original proposals, but the proposals which are new for us, but are in fact those which are here honestly and plainly mentioned as the proposals of the Anglo-French bloc, or I can just call them the Anglo-French proposals of 11 June 1954.

69. I should also mention that the Soviet Government, without making the fulfilment of the programme set out in these proposals conditional on prior agreement concerning the unconditional renunciation by States of the use of the atomic weapon—on which we have hitherto insisted as being an important step towards the complete prohibition of the atomic weapon and its elimination from the armaments of States—does nevertheless still maintain that such agreement would be of the greatest significance in facilitating and accelerating all the measures envisaged in the proposed convention.

70. The Soviet Government considers this all the more necessary as atomic and hydrogen weapons are becoming ever more destructive—we cannot shut our eyes to that. The matter is so serious that any frivolous approach to it would be out of place. The increasingly devastating effects of atomic and hydrogen weapons can hardly be doubted by anybody. It is a fact which every realistic politician who desires peace and international security must bear in mind.

71. In this connexion, I must also mention that the authors of sensational books and articles who elaborate and depict the scope of this destructive power, stressing the alleged superiority of the United States in the field—and who even advocate fantastic schemes for putting that force to use in the form of atomic and hydrogen bombs—are merely feeding and fanning the flames of war hysteria that endanger the political atmosphere.

72. Nothing can be more prejudicial to the solution of these problems arising out of a political atmosphere fraught with hatred and enmity, and tense with all kinds of absurd and sensational gossip. This unhealthy and dangerous position is unfortunately greatly aggravated by the large quantities of trashy writing now flooding the Western European and, especially, United States markets. I am not sure whether you have all seen one example of this, a book which appeared recently in New York, under the title *The Hydrogen Bomb* and which devotes 235 pages to a gloating description of the destructive power of the hydrogen weapon, which can devastate an entire country in the course of a few hours.

73. It might be argued that such trash should simply be ignored. But that is impossible, because these "literary" productions also offer open incitement to atomic and hydrogen warfare against the Soviet Union, as

can be seen from the text of this book, which I think it undesirable to quote here, since any genuine supporter of peace would find it too offensive. The publication of such a book cannot possibly be justified on the pretext of freedom of the press; this is not freedom of the press, but the encouragement of crime by abuse of the press.

74. As has already been pointed out, the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union on the "conclusion of an international convention (treaty)" is based on the joint French and United Kingdom proposals of 11 June 1954. It proposes the inclusion in the convention of certain basic provisions which it sets forth. It will be seen that, on analysis, these provisions follow in the main the lines of the French and United Kingdom proposals of 11 June 1954.

75. I should like briefly to touch on the question of how far and in what respects we believe the proposals of France and the United Kingdom of 11 June 1954 coincide with the proposals in our document of 30 September 1954.

76. The USSR draft resolution [A/C.1/750] proposes that States should "reduce their armaments, armed forces and budgetary appropriations for military requirements to the extent of 50 per cent of the agreed levels". It is proposed that this should be done in two stages: in the first stage, conventional armaments would be reduced by the first 50 per cent; and then, in the second stage, conventional armaments would be reduced by the remaining 50 per cent. At the same time, under this proposal, budgetary appropriations for military requirements would be correspondingly reduced.

77. Paragraph 6 (a) of the proposals of France and the United Kingdom of 11 June 1954 also provides for the entry into effect of one-half of the agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces. It is easy to see that in this respect we agree on the main principle, although there are some minor differences. For example, our draft resolution also provides for a reduction of budgetary appropriations for military requirements, in two stages of 50 per cent each; whereas in the French and the United Kingdom proposals there is no mention of a reduction of budgetary appropriations for military requirements.

78. This difference, however, does not detract from the importance of the fact that the two texts coincide on the principle of a reduction to the extent of 50 plus 50 per cent of the agreed levels. You ask where we got the idea for these agreed levels? Here I can give Mr. Moch his answer immediately: from the French and United Kingdom proposals of 11 June. Incidentally, there is no mention in those proposals of the prescriptive levels of 1952. I might now well ask Mr. Moch and Mr. Lloyd: "Why do you speak in your proposals of 11 June of agreed levels, but make no mention of prescriptive levels?" Can it be because you consider that it would be unreasonable and inexpedient to insist on that point, and that new ways should be sought of making it really possible to establish an agreed level, that is, a level on which the parties agree. Let me invite you to follow that path. That is what we wish. We hope that you will not now strengthen your proposals in the sense of increasing the area of disagreement; but will on the contrary make an effort — I for my part am ready to promise to do everything that lies within my power — to remove the possibility of further disagreement, brushing aside

any immaterial points on which we might differ, and bringing into the foreground those matters of substance on which there is the possibility of agreement.

79. The Soviet draft resolution provides that "armaments and armed forces shall be reduced from the strength of armaments and armed forces existing on 31 December 1953". But the reference here to the level of 31 December 1953 has nothing at all to do with the establishment of a level under the 1952 plan. The two things are quite different. Of course, we know that it is impossible to decide on any reduction, even a proportional reduction, unless we decide on the level from which that reduction is to be made. And we propose the level of 31 December 1953.

80. Our draft resolution provides for the reduction of budgetary appropriations "from the amount of... expenditure on military requirements during the year ending 31 December 1953". It also provides that each reduction should take place in the course of six months or one year, whichever is agreed on between us. In other words the whole operation, from beginning to end, would be completed in one year or two years.

81. The question of time limits, let me say at this point, is dealt with in the USSR proposals with the clarity it demands. In the proposals of France and the United Kingdom the time limit is not specified in direct form, but is made contingent on the findings of the control organ: "As soon as the control organ reports that it is able effectively to enforce...". That is worth remembering.

82. I think I may be permitted not to enlarge upon this question at the moment; that is a matter for the future. We shall have time enough to deal with it. We cannot dispose of every question at once. It is easy enough to ask twenty-five questions of this kind, but it is a much more difficult matter to answer twenty-five questions at once, especially when they are all serious ones. Indeed, I see no special need for that. Some questions are much more important than others, and I was anxious not to have to put off my statement until tomorrow, since I wish to help expedite our work on this problem. Of course, it is always possible to prolong matters, especially when the general feeling is to be in not too much of a hurry.

83. As regards the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, I should like to clarify the position between us, now that the USSR has accepted your proposals as a basis. Under the USSR proposals a complete prohibition of such weapons would be put into effect; the production of such weapons would be discontinued, they would be entirely eliminated from the armaments of States, and all existing atomic materials would be used only for peaceful purposes. It is proposed that the carrying out of these measures must be completed not later than the carrying out of the measures taken for the reduction of armaments and armed forces referred to in paragraph 2 (a) of the Soviet draft resolution.

84. It is also laid down that "the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons shall cease immediately, as soon as a start is made with the reduction of armaments, armed forces and appropriations for military requirements in respect of the remaining 50 per cent". I do not know whether I rightly understood everything Mr. Moch said; I cannot guarantee I did: I was listening to the interpretation, and could not take shorthand notes of his speech. My notes may be slightly inaccurate, and

may perhaps be affected by my own personality. I have no written Russian translation of the speech; and consequently conditions are not very favourable for polemics between two persons speaking different languages. But my task is made easier by the fact that it is not my intention to engage in polemics. My only intention has been to grasp Mr. Moch's basic idea, which is as follows. He saw something contradictory in the introductory part of paragraph 2 of our draft resolution, which reads "on completion of the measures referred to in paragraph 1" — that is, on passing to the second stage — "the following measures shall be taken simultaneously" (the measures in question are those outlined in sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c)). I stress the word "simultaneously". He added that the text might be interpreted to mean that operations would be "phased", i.e., consecutive and not simultaneous. I think he was labouring under a misapprehension; our draft resolution retains the principle of simultaneous action. He made my task easier; for being very practical, as always, he put his question in terms of dates. Suppose we take 1 July of the given year. Six months would bring us to 31 December of the same year. Within one year all the measures specified in paragraph 2 of our draft resolution would have to be carried out. What does this mean? It means that as soon as the second stage has commenced — that is, on completion of the first stage, the measures specified in paragraph 1 — we should have to proceed to the reduction of armaments, armed forces and military appropriations by the remaining 50 per cent. Such a reduction could not, of course, be carried out very rapidly; obviously it would take some time, but the space of time we have suggested is long enough — six months. And the period mentioned by Mr. Moch was 1 July to 31 December.

85. Simultaneously, that is, within the same period of six months, the complete prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction would be declared. It is laid down that the carrying out of these measures must be completed not later than the carrying out of the measures taken for the reduction of armaments and armed forces; so that the point that the prohibition of atomic weapons is to take place at the same time as the reduction of armaments is stressed once again. Of course, we do not know exactly how much time that will take; it is one thing to declare a prohibition, and another to put into effect a whole system of measures; nevertheless, all these measures have to be completed during this same period.

86. Finally, sub-paragraph 2 (c) goes on to propose the institution of a standing international organ for the supervision... etc. When would that organ be instituted? Simultaneously with the prohibition of atomic weapons. There was a time, you will remember, when it was maintained on one side that the prohibition of atomic weapons must come first and the setting up of the control organ second, and on the other that the setting up of the control organ must come first and the prohibition second. Ultimately the possibility arose of advancing a new formula capable of reconciling these two different points of view: prohibition of atomic weapons and the setting up of the control organ should take place simultaneously. Of course the question of timing then arises, because we cannot set up a control organ in the five minutes it would take us to sign an order prohibiting atomic weapons. There must in any event be some difference in scheduling, because the two operations differ in scope and in regard to the conditions

under which they will be effected; what is important is that the same final date should be set for both.

87. It seems to me therefore that there is room for more specific proposals on this point; perhaps some of my colleagues have some suggestions to make. They should be studied carefully, if there is a genuine wish to reach agreement. But it seems to us that there is no incompatibility, no unbridgeable difference or contradiction, between the two sets of proposals. At least I see no such contradiction.

88. Under the French and United Kingdom proposals, the complete prohibition of atomic weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States would be postponed until a somewhat later stage, namely to the period after the reduction of conventional armaments to the full extent of the agreed levels has been effected.

89. We consider such a postponement to be unwise, absolutely unwarranted and even dangerous, because it might result in an unpropitious political situation, which, as I have already pointed out, might have its effects on the whole course of subsequent operations.

90. Under the Soviet Union draft resolution, on the other hand, the complete prohibition of atomic weapons would not be postponed to such a late stage. That resolution provides for the complete prohibition of atomic weapons and their elimination from armaments, to be carried into effect simultaneously with the reduction of conventional armaments by the remaining 50 per cent of the agreed levels; that is laid down in paragraph 2 of the draft resolution from which I have already quoted. I would reiterate that the Soviet Union draft resolution provides for these measures to be carried out simultaneously, that is, within a strictly limited period of time. The term "simultaneously" does not mean that both measures should be carried out — say, the moment the clock strikes seven, which would obviously be impossible. A meeting may rise at exactly 7 p.m., but it is not possible for all of us to leave the room at exactly 7 p.m. Some of us are bound to leave at five minutes past seven and others at ten minutes past. The facts impose a certain degree of relativity in this respect.

91. Let me remind you that when we were arguing in the past on this very matter you took the line — if my memory does not fail me — that all our strength lay in land forces, that we had millions of men under arms, infantry etc., etc.; that we would crush everything in our path, whereas your own land forces were very small. In his speech at Blackpool, Sir Winston Churchill said that the land forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were no match for the Soviet Union. Salvation therefore lies in the atomic bomb. Firstly, however, salvation does not lie in the atomic bomb; you cannot console yourself with the thought of the atomic bomb, because it is not a monopoly; and if it is not a monopoly, it cannot represent salvation.

92. Secondly, as regards your assertion that the absence of any reduction in armaments places those who have larger land forces at a certain advantage, our proposal is that we should begin by reducing them. We are in fact proposing that we should begin by reducing armed forces. Consequently the atomic bomb will, alas, continue to flourish. I should like to see it done away with immediately, but it will continue to flourish for some time to come. We are willing to begin with the reduction of armaments. In other words, that reason for objection disappears. The advantage which the opponents

of our proposals see for us in the event of proportional reduction does not exist in reality; indeed, if we begin with such a reduction, your main strength will remain, while the main strength of the others will be taken out of their hands. But then the time will come, at the second stage, when we prohibit atomic bombs; and by that time—or at least within a strictly defined period, which we have put at six months or one year—the control organs will have been created.

93. The French and United Kingdom proposals of 11 June also contained an important provision to the effect that the States concerned should regard themselves as prohibited from the use of nuclear weapons, and should recommend the inclusion in the disarmament treaty of an immediate acceptance of this prohibition by all signatory States, pending the total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. As I have said, this provision is important. The Soviet Union draft resolution proposes that the Disarmament Commission should be instructed to study and clarify this question and submit its recommendations. What is the reason for this proposal in the Soviet draft resolution? Why is clarification necessary, clarification of the formula used in the French and United Kingdom proposals, namely, “in defence against aggression”? It is necessary, we believe, because such a formula could itself offer a basis for sanctioning the use of atomic weapons on the pretext of defence against aggression where there was no such defence in reality; and that might actually occur if this formula is not sufficiently clarified and defined. Therefore, we feel that this matter has to be clarified in order that we may be perfectly clear whom and what we are discussing. There is no such clarity here. I think that this will be one of our next tasks.

94. Naturally, the question of the establishment of the international control organ is very important. This question, too, has been raised today. The Soviet Union draft resolution attaches great importance to international supervision of the fulfilment by States of the obligations assumed by them in connexion with the reduction of armaments, armed forces and appropriations for military requirements, and provides for the establishment at the first stage of a temporary control commission, as a sufficient and useful step.

95. We are asked: “Why do you want two organs?”. Because there are two different tasks, two different phases. We never insisted on phases; it was you who insisted on phases. We never insisted on stages; you insisted on stages. We always objected to stages; you argued that stages were necessary. We met you half way. We accept two of your stages instead of three or four — indeed, I can count as many as five of your stages. We say, moreover, that supervision must now be established in relation to the tasks of each stage. In the first stage, when only conventional armed forces are being reduced, and not completely, we must create a control organ. You say you cannot take anyone’s word; very well, do not take anyone’s word; in some situations men will even stop believing themselves. So be it then; we will proceed on the premise that you will not take anyone’s word. I repeat, we must create a control organ that will supervise this field, that will work on this task. If we create a standing control organ to exercise supervision in regard to atomic weapons, the organ so established would operate at the first stage solely in regard to conventional weapons, a position which we regard as unacceptable. Consequently, the control organ should not be assigned at the first stage the functions envisaged for the second stage of

reduction and prohibition. The type of supervision will not be the same. The methods of supervision will not be the same. The form of supervision will not be uniform. Each stage must of necessity have its special qualities, hallmarks, peculiarities, methods and modes of operation, its own procedures. Let us assume, for example, that agreement is reached to reduce, let us say, artillery weapons by n per cent. What will reducing them mean? They can be reduced by being hauled off to ordnance depots, placed under seal and then destroyed and melted down, just as they used to make bells into cannon, cannon into bells, swords into ploughshares, ploughshares into swords, and so on.

96. Is that what you have in mind? Do you think the same kind of control procedure can be used in atomic plants producing atomic energy? I wish you would read the recently published book by Bernard Baruch, *A Philosophy for Our Time*, which I have quoted before and which deserves attention. There you will find a statement to the effect that a flick of the wrist could change seemingly peaceful fissionable material into a means of international blackmail and destruction.

97. In this case, therefore, entirely different methods are called for. We take this factor into account. You say: yes, perhaps it must be taken into account but the position must be clarified. All right, let us clarify it. But we are only at the beginning of our work. These are only the first approaches. We have proposed most important principles. Let us begin our work on this basis. Various proposals may, of course, be put forward. This is the approach we propose to our work and the one we consider most important.

98. You asked why we have proposed two control commissions. My answer is that they are of different kinds, because in one case the tasks are of one kind and in the other case they are different. You answer that the methods will be the same. No; the methods will be different. During the last world war even button factories at least, in my country — began to make weapons to fight Germans, and they did so successfully. Do you suggest that with a view to the reduction of armed forces and armaments we have to supervise every factory making buttons for ladies’ suits and men’s trousers? Is that how you envisage the situation? That, it seems to me, would be a crude oversimplification of the matter.

99. At this stage we should be dealing with these questions on a basis of principle; the organ for supervising the reduction of conventional armaments, which as we see it should be entrusted to a temporary control commission, will have somewhat different functions and methods of work from those of the supervisory body that we call the standing international control organ. This latter organ will be established when the need arises for supervision to ensure the use of atomic energy exclusively for peaceful purposes.

100. In my view, that is quite logical. Of course, there may be still other ideas, other proposals, and we shall have to subject them to adequate examination and study. However, as I was asked the question, I have considered it possible to give a preliminary reply in the foregoing terms.

101. There were some other questions asked about supervision. I consider it useful to deal with them also. They were questions about the veto. I am not quite clear about what Mr. Moch said on this point; but as I understood it he asked two questions: will

the unanimity principle be applied in the control commission itself, or the control organs, in deciding questions connected with supervision; and will the unanimity principle or, as it is called, the veto, be applied in the Security Council in connexion with reports of the control commission relating to the timing of reduction and prohibition measures.

102. If my understanding is correct, I must point out that with respect to the control commission, Mr. Molotov, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, said as early as 26 November 1946, that the "principle of unanimity" which applied in the Security Council quite clearly had nothing to do with the work of the control commissions themselves.

103. Hence it is quite wrong to contend that any State having the right of veto would be in a position to hamper the carrying out of supervision or inspection. It would be wrong to say that any State which is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council would be able by means of the veto to hamper the carrying out of supervision or inspection. As Mr. Molotov said, the control commissions are not the Security Council; accordingly, the statement that any Power would be in a position, through its use of the veto, to hamper the carrying out of supervision, is absolutely unwarranted. Any attempt to obstruct the work of supervision and inspection undertaken by decision of the Security Council would in effect be a violation of Security Council decisions.

104. Thus the position on this point is quite clear. But another question arises: the question whether the principle of unanimity will apply in respect of Security Council decisions on matters emerging in connexion with the work of the control commissions.

105. I think that, too, is stating the question inaccurately, because the Security Council operates in accordance with the Charter; in accordance with those Articles of the Charter which define its voting procedure in respect of both procedural and substantive — or non-procedural — matters. If a matter relating to the operation of the control procedure is referred to the Security Council by a commission in the form of a report by the commission or a proposal by the Disarmament Commission or the control commission (provided that the matter in question is not directly connected with control functions, which would not be dealt with in the Security Council since they are the independent province of the control organ), then of course the Security Council must act in accordance with the provisions of Article 27. It cannot do otherwise.

106. That is why it is proposed that the control organ should be within the framework of the Security Council. Do you think any other arrangement is possible? I do not know; but let us look into the matter. I do not think that any other plan is possible. Why not? Because if we take, let us say, the document to which Mr. Moch referred — if I am not mistaken it is entitled "Working paper... on methods of implementing and enforcing disarmament programmes" [DC/53, annex 4, para. 41]; I believe it is in Mr. Patterson's document, the one submitted by the United States — we find the following clause:

"The Authority should be empowered to take action as appropriate... to remedy any violations or infractions in connexion with the enforcement of the provisions of the treaty establishing the system for

the control of atomic energy. Such action would include:

"...

"(b) Bringing about the suspension of the supply of nuclear materials to the offending State".

This means that the control commission may decide to suspend the supply of materials to the offending State. Can such powers be granted to the control commission? You might reply in the affirmative. My position, one which I trust is shared by others, is that the control commission cannot be vested with such powers.

107. We come to the next point:

"(c) Closing of plants utilizing nuclear materials in the offending State".

Can the control organ be given such authority? In my opinion, no; because that is a punitive measure fraught with very serious consequences. Only the Security Council, which has primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace, has been given the power to take punitive action against States which fail to comply with the Charter or which violate international agreements. The Security Council is the only organ which can do that. For that reason Articles 41, 42, 43, 44 and 45 of the Charter empower it to take urgent military action and provide for making available special armed forces for that purpose. We are all bound under these Articles to assist those forces.

108. These provisions have long been by-passed; other types of organizations are now in existence which have armed forces but are not under the Security Council. The purpose of these armed forces is to combat alleged breaches of the peace when such action is deemed fit by the close group of States which have combined in these military blocs. All this, of course, is illegal. The Charter is the Charter, and under the Charter, provision is made for the Security Council. The Security Council deals with certain problems and has specific responsibilities — that is all clearly and specifically laid down in the Charter.

109. That being so, Mr. Moch, the control organ cannot be assigned such functions as those mentioned here in this connexion. I notice that Mr. Moch is nodding in agreement. Clearly, then, this document must be carefully worked over. But that is only one example; I could mention many others necessitating similar consideration.

110. Accordingly, this document cannot be accepted and we do not propose to accept it. We cannot accept it. We propose different measures.

111. Let me now conclude. It seems to me that I have answered nearly all the questions put to me. I will merely point out to Mr. Moch that the textual difference between the Soviet draft resolution as it appears in the verbatim record of the 484th plenary meeting and document A/2742 does not affect us. It is simply a matter of an error in the French translation which was corrected in a subsequent French text. This does not concern us at all. There are no corrections and no errors in the Russian text. Hence this misunderstanding does not necessitate any action on our part.

112. I believe that I have answered the most important questions. I have not replied to some because I have simply not had the opportunity to read carefully what Messrs. Moch and Lloyd said before we adjourned this morning. I apologize, but I presume that

I shall have the opportunity to offer further clarification if called upon to do so.

113. I must say, in summing up, that the Soviet Government's purpose, aim and intention in submitting its draft resolution is to facilitate the solution of those important problems which are causing us anxiety and concern.

114. In submitting this proposal—based, as is now well known and as we have said, on the French and United Kingdom proposals, the basic provisions of which have become the basis of our own suggestions—we cherish the hope that it will provide a path to that success which, we are firmly convinced, is so strongly desired by all peace-loving peoples. We hope that other delegations, too, will follow the same path and, like the Soviet Union and a number of other States Members of the United Nations, will strive to achieve agreed solutions of the important international problem dealt with in our draft resolution of 30 September—the strengthening of international peace and security. That,

as we all know and we all agree, is a question of the greatest importance and urgency, affecting the vital interests of all mankind. We are all aware of this, talk about it and understand it; but the time has come to act in accordance with our realization of the importance of this high and noble task.

115. We hope that the First Committee too will bring its work on this task to a successful conclusion.

116. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): The situation is as follows. Today we have heard three of the five States represented on the Sub-Committee established in April 1954 by the Disarmament Commission—the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union. The representative of the United States will speak tomorrow and the representative of Canada on Wednesday. If any other representative wishes to speak tomorrow, I ask him to give his name to the Secretary of the Committee.

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.