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Chairman : Mr. Finn MOE (Norway).

Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of China and to the peace of the Far East, resulting from Soviet violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 14 August 1945 and from Soviet violations of the Charter of the United Nations (A/C.1/711) (*continued*)

[Item 23] *

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) recalled that at previous sessions of the General Assembly his delegation had supported the proposals submitted by the delegation of China on the same question for even then it had considered that the Chinese representative had supplied sufficient evidence to support his charges.

2. It was true that Soviet violations of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance concluded with China on 14 August 1945 were known and had been considered before. But the violations of the treaty did not constitute an isolated fact; they should be linked with all the events to which the imperialist policy of the Soviet Union gave rise in Manchuria, and with the change in the structure of the Chinese Government. The change of régime in China had in turn led to aggression in Korea, the invasion of Tibet, support for Vietnamese rebels, not to mention the threat to Burma, Thailand and Asia generally.

3. Since the United Nations had taken action to restore peace and security in Korea, it could not say that it was incompetent to deal with the question raised by the Chinese representative, for it could not separate the different aspects of one and the same matter. It was therefore qualified, as a political entity, to consider the accusations made by the National Government of China against the Soviet Union.

4. Clearly, whatever had been the shortcomings of the National Government of China, its overthrow by a government subservient to the imperialist policy of the Soviet Union would have been impossible but for the intervention of the Soviet Union. The change of régime in China had shortly afterwards led to Chinese aggression against Korea.

5. The USSR delegation, in its defence, was merely repeating inaccuracies and slandering the United States. In the face of such an attitude, it was essential that the United Nations, and in particular the First Committee, should make truth prevail in order to denounce the aggression in Korea and the threats to Asia due to the attitude of the Soviet Union. The modern threat was no longer colonialism but rather the resurgence of the ideals of Genghis Khan backed by an unprecedented military machine.

6. Sufficient evidence of Soviet violations of the treaty of 14 August 1945 had been supplied. Such violations had later been confirmed by a series of political events in the Far East. The Peruvian delegation would therefore support the draft resolution submitted by China (A/C.1/711).

7. Mr. ASTAPENKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) recalled his delegation's earlier protest against placing Kuomintang slanders against the Soviet Union on the agenda of the General Assembly. Indeed, no valid reason existed to consider the slander since the Kuomintang representative was not speaking in the name of China. Yet, for the third time, a discussion of an illegal charge brought by a plaintiff who had no legal standing had been forced on the Assembly.

8. It was not difficult to guess, behind the representatives of the Kuomintang, the presence of the ruling circles of the United States. The object of such slanders was to conceal the aggressive activities of the United States in the Far East and to camouflage Chiang Kai-shek's failure, but they were vain, for the Kuomintang had been expelled by the Chinese people and the treaty of 14 August 1945 no longer existed.

9. The Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic had been set up in 1949 with the support of the entire population. It had been recognized by many governments and was the only lawful government of China. It maintained friendly relations with the Soviet Union with which it had concluded, on 14 February 1950, a treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual aid, which automatically superseded the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 14 August 1945. The agreement of 14 February 1950 proved that the Soviet Union had no designs on the independence and the territorial integrity of China.

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

10. General Marshall had admitted on 11 May 1951, before a committee of the United States Senate that there was no tangible evidence to prove that the Chinese communist armies had used equipment coming from the Soviet Union. By contrast, the United States had fully supported Chiang Kai-shek in his struggle against the Chinese people. The threat to peace in the Far East and to the independence of China did not come from the Soviet Union but from the United States which, for the past year, was committing aggression against Korea, occupying the island of Taiwan (Formosa) and bombing Chinese territory.

11. The United States was also opposing representation of the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic in the United Nations. Clearly, such an abnormal situation should end at the earliest possible moment. It would further the cause of peace in the Far East if a representative of the Chinese people were admitted to the United Nations and the Kuomintang representative expelled.

12. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR associated itself with the USSR delegation's request that the First Committee should cease to consider the slanders of the Kuomintang.

13. U MYINT THEIN (Burma) said that he had been forced to intervene in the debate because his country had been referred to by various speakers and because it was apparent that Mr. Vyshinsky's statement at the 477th meeting of the First Committee about Kuomintang troops had given rise to speculation, culminating with the statements of the representatives of France, the United Kingdom and the United States that their Governments would take a serious view of any communist aggression in south-east Asia.

14. He recalled that at the time of the Japanese invasion of Burma, some Chinese troops had remained in Kengtung, the eastern tip of Burma which jutted into Indo-China and Thailand. They had not returned to China even in 1945, when Burma had been liberated. At the time of the Kuomintang collapse in 1949 thousands of troops had moved south and south-east, and thousands had been interned in Indo-China. Some had taken refuge in Burma and had been disarmed and interned, but some, under the orders of the Formosa Government, had not surrendered. The Burmese troops had therefore come into conflict with them. The Kuomintang troops had again and again disappeared into the thick jungles and mountains of Kengtung and over friendly borders, but had reappeared from time to time.

15. In April 1951, most of them had left Burma; but it had later been discovered that they had gone into Yunnan under the command of a Kuomintang General, Li Mi, who had admittedly been sent from Formosa via Bangkok to the place of operations. Those troops, however, had been badly mauled and defeated, and had retreated back into Burma, where they were now killing Burmese, looting their grain and raping their women.

16. It did not appear to be true, however, that those troops had been reinforced by air. Nor did it appear to be true that they were being maintained by governments other than that of Formosa. Unfortunately, it could be deduced that those troops were being maintained from outside, as otherwise they could not have survived or have remained active in wild terrain over such a long period. There could also be no doubt that foreign nationals were involved. He must warn the governments concerned that they were playing with fire. They should withdraw their nationals. The People's Republic of China was alive to the state of affairs, but had adopted a correct attitude and had not embarrassed

Burma. Yet the presence of those troops might be taken for the nucleus of an army to be used in a third world war, and therefore the position was extremely dangerous.

17. Burma would resist any attempt to make that country a base for an attack on any country, even though it meant the death of thousands of Burmese. He hoped that the statement that communist aggression in south-east Asia would not be tolerated was intended to cover any form of aggression.

18. Burma was facing aggression. He appealed to the countries which were befriending Nationalist China to persuade the latter to withdraw its troops from Burma.

19. Burma had often thought of bringing the matter before the United Nations, but had hitherto refrained in order not to aggravate the tension in a part of the world where stresses were already intense.

20. The Chinese complaint concerned past history, discussion of which would be academic and a waste of time.

21. Mr. KHOMAN (Thailand) recalled that at the 477th meeting, Mr. Vyshinsky had made a reference to Thailand in connexion with assistance given to Kuomintang units. The Polish representative had made a similar statement at the preceding meeting.

22. The delegation of Thailand had been instructed to declare that those statements were quite unfounded. Thailand was not responsible for the supply and maintenance of the Kuomintang troops in question.

23. Mr. Y. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said he would confine himself to answering the slanderous statements of the Kuomintang representative, which had been supported by the representatives of the United States, Cuba and Peru.

24. First of all, the agreements relating to the Changchun railway did not cover the entire Chinese railway system but only the main railway lines in Manchuria. Those agreements had in no way violated the principle of equality between the two partners since provision had been made for joint ownership and operation. The board of directors had been composed of five Soviet and five Chinese members. The inspection committee had likewise been composed of an equal number of members, the chief inspector being Chinese. In short the entire administrative system had been settled on the basis of absolute equality and division of responsibility.

25. The system had been respected by the USSR up to the time of the Kuomintang Government's overthrow by Chinese troops. He doubted if any American, English or French company would have set up and respected an administrative system on the basis of equality with the nationals of the State in whose territory it was operating. Furthermore, the Chinese had been responsible for the security of the railway; profits or losses had been shared equally and the company had paid taxes to the Chinese Government.

26. It was not correct to say that Port Arthur had been occupied by the USSR. Under the agreement of 14 August 1945, Port Arthur was to be administered by a Chinese-Soviet commission composed of an equal number of Soviet and Chinese representatives. However, the Kuomintang had not appointed any representatives and had sabotaged the negotiations. The Kuomintang had violated the agreement from the outset by sending armed forces to Port Arthur although it had been provided that the Port's defence should be entrusted to the USSR.

27. During the consideration of the question at the fifth session of the General Assembly the USSR delegation had quoted from notes from the Foreign Minister of the Chinese Nationalist Government to prove that the USSR had co-

operated with the Chinese authorities in Manchuria and that Soviet forces had been withdrawn within the set time-limits. The notes showed that the Soviet command had invariably given the Chinese Government prior notice of the withdrawal of troops. That truthful statement once again demonstrated that the USSR had strictly observed the provisions of the treaty signed by it and eschewed any intervention in the domestic affairs of other States.

28. The United States representative had alleged at the preceding meeting that in Manchuria the USSR had destroyed or appropriated property worth 2,000 million dollars. It was also said that the total would reach 350 million dollars. The discrepancy showed how much reliance could be placed in the accuracy of the information; the sole object was to attempt to sow discord between the USSR and China. Those figures had been established by the Pauley Mission, sent to Manchuria and North Korea in 1945 ostensibly to assess war damages in those countries.

29. That mission's real aim, as exposed by the United States Press in 1951, had in fact been to draw up military maps and plans of North Korea. Those maps and plans were now being used by the United States in its aggression against Korea. General Wedemeyer, addressing a committee of the United States Senate, had said that he had prepared plans for the occupation of North Korea. It was thus clear that the United States, immediately after the end of the Second World War, had begun preparations for a third war. The real object of the Pauley Mission, sent on the pretext of assessing war damage in Korea and Manchuria, had been to prepare topographical surveys of Korea.

30. As for the allegation that the USSR had supplied the Chinese communists with arms, it should be remembered that, before the intervention of the USSR in the war, before the defeat of Japan, the People's Liberation of China had possessed a substantial military potential. It had seized its arms from the Japanese and subsequently from the Kuomintang troops. During the fifth session, the representative of the People's Republic of China had offered to the First Committee evidence to show that the arms used by his Government had been of American manufacture seized from Kuomintang troops.¹ Moreover, General Marshall had testified on 11 May 1951 before the joint session of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate to the effect that he had tried to obtain evidence in 1946 of the presence of Soviet equipment in the hands of Chinese communist troops, but that he had never received any evidence showing that substantial quantities of Soviet equipment had been supplied to the Chinese communists. It had been acknowledged by the National Assembly of the Kuomintang in a resolution adopted on 22 April 1948, by the United States State Department in its White Paper on China² and by the United States Secretary of State in a letter accompanying the White Paper, that most of the equipment supplied to the Chinese Nationalist Government by the United States had fallen into the hands of the communists.

31. Surely those official sources of the Kuomintang and the United States were sufficient refutation of the slanderous statements uttered in the Committee by the representatives of those same Governments.

32. The Kuomintang representative had claimed that the Mongolian forces had tried to invade Chinese territory. It should be sufficient to recall in that connexion that as

Mr. Malik said at the 498th meeting, Osman had not been the chief of State, but a bandit chieftain who had carried out a raid on Mongolian territory at the instigation of the United States consul.

33. Whereas under the treaty between the USSR and China of 14 August 1945 the Changchun railway had been jointly owned and operated, the agreement of 14 February 1950 returned to China, free of compensation, all rights in the assets and operation of the railways after 31 December 1952. The agreement of 14 August 1945 had stipulated that Port Arthur was to be a joint naval base, but under the agreement of 14 February 1950 the Soviet forces were to be withdrawn from Port Arthur and all the equipment handed over to the Chinese Government after the conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan, or in any case, not later than 31 December 1952. The agreement of 14 August 1945 had provided that part of the port of Dairen should be handed over to the USSR and that the port officer should be a USSR citizen. The agreement of 14 February 1950 stipulated that the entire port should be handed over to the Chinese authorities.

34. A comparison of the terms of the two treaties showed that not only had the USSR not violated its undertakings, but had made every effort to restore China to full enjoyment of its sovereignty as soon as circumstances had permitted.

35. The United States was making slanderous charges against the USSR in order to disguise its own policy of aggression. On 8 December 1949, the General Assembly of the United Nations had adopted, under United States pressure, resolution 291 (IV) which was supposed to promote the stability of international relations in the Far East. The resolution had recommended that States should not trespass on the rights of China, that they should allow it to choose its own institutions and to set up its own government without pressure from any side. Lastly, no State was to seek to obtain special rights or privileges within Chinese territory. All those provisions had been flagrantly violated by the United States which had transformed Taiwan (Formosa) into an American naval and air base, was supporting the puppet régime of Chiang Kai-shek, was preventing the Chinese Government from having a representative in the United Nations and was seeking to stir up dissension among the Chinese.

36. The question of the relations between the USSR and China was their own affair and should not be discussed in the United Nations. Those stable and friendly relations were a guarantee of peace in the Far East. China now possessed a normal régime. It had established diplomatic relations with a score of States and ought to be represented in the United Nations. For the first time in a hundred years it possessed a government which had driven out the foreign oppressor and established Chinese sovereignty over Chinese territory.

37. The United States representative had claimed falsely that the USSR had not respected articles 5 and 6 of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance concluded with China on 14 August 1945. He had forgotten to mention article 1 of that treaty which put into effect the basic provisions of the Yalta agreement. Indeed, it was in pursuance of the Yalta Agreement that the USSR had agreed to enter the war against Japan on the side of the Allies three months after the surrender of Germany, to conclude a treaty of friendship and alliance with the Chinese Government and to help in liberating China from Japanese occupation. It was of course not true to say that the USSR had pledged itself to help the Chinese Nationalist Government in the civil war which it was then fighting against the army of national liberation, for the USSR always abstained from intervening in the domestic

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 70, document A/C.1/661.

² See *United States Relations with China*, Department of State Publication 3573, Far Eastern Series 30, Washington, August 1949.

affairs of other States. In accordance with the Yalta Agreement, the USSR had declared war on Japan within the prescribed time. It had launched an offensive against first-rate Japanese troops in Kwantung. After the capitulation, the Soviet forces had continued to fight against those Japanese troops which had not surrendered. Thus the USSR had fought until victory was won and had granted all necessary assistance to the Chinese Government. At the time the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States had welcomed the USSR's entry into the war. It was therefore false to claim that the Soviet Union had not fulfilled its obligations under the Yalta Agreement or under the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 14 August 1945.

38. The part played by the Soviet Union in speeding the end of the war against Japan had been described to the Senate of the United States by Senator McMahon who had quoted from the memoirs of Mr. Henry L. Stimson, the former United States Secretary of War. According to Mr. Stimson in July 1945 it was estimated that the war against Japan would not be over before the end of 1946, and that it would cost the United States alone a million lives. Mr. Acheson himself, addressing the joint session of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate on 4 June 1951, had said that the entry into the war of the Soviet Union at the crucial moment had been extremely important because it had made sure that the 1,300,000 Japanese then in China would not be recalled to defend Japan against the attack which the United States was preparing.

39. Thus, the United States Government had recognized the important part played by the USSR in the war against Japan. The slanders of the United States and Kuomintang representatives would not wipe out the gratitude which the American people felt towards the Soviet people for having saved a million American lives.

40. The reasons for the collapse of the Chiang Kai-shek régime had also been raised before the United States Senate at that time. On 7 June 1951, Senator McMahon had read a statement made by the United States General Barrett in March 1949 to the effect that the collapse of the Chinese régime was manifestly due to the disintegration, stupidity and corruption of its Government. Such statements should confound the United States and Kuomintang slanderers and convince any impartial person.

41. Representatives who had attended the 503rd meeting of the First Committee had heard the statement by the representative of the United States, the United Kingdom and France in which those countries had admitted that they were preparing war against the nations fighting for their freedom in Asia.

42. The United States representative had mentioned the fact that at the 477th meeting the Soviet Union delegation had brought to the notice of the members of the Committee that, according to Press reports, the American command on Formosa had sent armed forces to the southern parts

of China, to Thailand and Burma, in order to prepare an attack against China from the south.

43. At that time the United States representative had made no comment, presumably so as not to disturb the conversations taking place at Washington on a plan of attack in the Far East. Since then those facts had been still further confirmed. On 21 January 1952, the *Continental Daily Mail* had forecast an attack by the Chiang Kai-shek troops concentrated on the Burmese frontier in April. The United States now sought to deny that.

44. Newspapers of the most varied shades of opinion gave many and specific details. Thus, it was known that troops from Formosa were being organized under the command of an American general and were ready to intervene at the end of April. In Burma, six Kuomintang divisions, in areas which were known, were awaiting the order to attack. An aerodrome was being constructed there. It was also known that those forces were supplied from Thailand, where there was an important American headquarters. Two generals, seven colonels and twenty-seven American majors were serving as instructors in Burma.

45. Such were, according to Burmese and American leaders as reported in the Press, the aggressive manoeuvres of those who claimed to be defending peace. When information regarding the two recent meetings which had been held at Washington was added to what was already known, it was clear that they were in fact careful preparations for war. According to an article published in the French newspaper *Ce Matin le Pays* on 9 January 1952, it was the object of the Washington conversations to plan defensive action in the case of an attack by Chinese communists against any of the States of south-east Asia. That meant that the preparations for attack were camouflaged under the cover of defence. The system was not new. The problems raised by the attack on Korea and the invasion of Formosa had been dealt with in the same way: those who resisted the aggressors were being represented as the aggressors.

46. The establishment at Singapore of the headquarters of the army of south-east Asia which covered China, Korea, Malaya and the territories of the Viet Minh, the establishment of a so-called defensive system including Australia and New Zealand, and lastly the United States representative's statement at the preceding meeting all that was evidence suggesting that the free peoples or peoples fighting for their freedom were faced with a grave threat.

47. It was in the light of those facts that the First Committee should regard the draft resolution submitted by the Kuomintang. The draft resolution should be rejected as being likely to encourage the preparation of war in the Far East.

48. Mr. TSIANG (China) said that his delegation would wait until the next day before speaking again.

The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m.