



Monday, 28 January 1952, at 10.30 a.m.

Palais de Chaillot, Paris

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Chairman: Mr. Finn Moe (Norway)

Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of China and to the peace of the Far East, resulting from Soviet violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 14 August 1945 and from Soviet violations of the Charter of the United Nations (A/C.1/711) (continued)

[Item 23]*

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. BLANCO (Cuba), reviewing the previous action of the General Assembly regarding the item under discussion said that the USSR had been consistently unable to refute the charges levelled by China.
2. The policy of the USSR in China during the previous three years had merely confirmed the accuracy of the accusations. That imperialistic policy was in violation of resolution 291 (IV). The USSR was attempting to replace the legitimate representative of China in the United Nations by the representative of communist China, which régime had been created only because the USSR had violated the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 14 August 1945, as well as of the Charter.
3. As the Charter recognized, respect for international obligations was essential to international peace and security. The United Nations, which registered treaties and agreements among States, must also register proven violations of such treaties and agreements, since that was the only way in which it would be possible to ascertain which States did or did not respect their obligations. The General Assembly must recognize that the USSR had violated its treaty of 14 August 1945 with China. That treaty was still in existence and could not be put aside merely because the USSR had signed another treaty with the communist régime of China. Indeed, the latter treaty represented another violation of the 1945 treaty.
4. He therefore supported the Chinese draft resolution.
5. Mr. HRSEL (Czechoslovakia) said that the item under discussion had once again been included in the agenda, at

the behest of the United States Government, by the bankrupt Chiang Kai-shek régime which had no right to represent the Chinese people, in order to slander the USSR and to help the Government of the United States in preparing for war in the Far East.

6. Though it was unpleasant for United States imperialists, the Chinese people had brought about the independence and freedom of China and had expelled the traitorous Kuomintang régime. The presence of the Kuomintang representative was a flagrant insult to the Chinese people and was another proof of the aggressive character of the policy of the United States in the Far East. The essence of that policy had been revealed by numerous passages in the White Paper on China published by the United States State Department¹, which had betrayed cynical disregard of the fundamental rights of the Chinese people.

7. Reviewing United States policy in China following the end of the war with Japan, Mr. Hrsel said that the responsibility for the senseless protraction of the civil war and for the sufferings of the Chinese people, lay on the American Government circles, which, between 1945 and 1949, had covered more than 50 per cent of the expenditure of the Chiang Kai-shek Government. As Mr. Acheson had confirmed in the letter transmitting the White Paper on China, none of the battles lost by Chiang Kai-shek had been lost by any shortage of weapons or ammunition; they had been lost because the Kuomintang armies had lost the will to fight and the régime had lost the support of the people.

8. The report of General Wedemeyer revealed the nature of the so-called peaceful policy of the United States and the true motives governing American intervention in China by stressing the importance to the United States of bases in China. United States policy was designed to suppress the struggle for national liberation in Asia, to bring the colonial peoples back into slavery and to create favourable conditions for a third world war. American intervention in Taiwan (Formosa) an integral part of the Chinese State, constituted aggression against the territorial sovereignty of the Chinese People's Republic and represented an attempt by American imperialism to retain at least one part of China for military bases. American plans regarding

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

¹ See *United States Relations with China*, Department of State Publication 3573, Far Eastern Series 30, Washington, August 1949.

Taiwan had been explained by MacArthur, who had stressed the strategic importance of bases on that island.

9. United States interventionists, by crossing the 38th parallel, had endangered China itself. The American aggressive war in Korea represented a continuation of the policy designed to secure a controlling position for American monopolists in China; to that end the reactionary and corrupt Kuomintang Government had been foisted on the Chinese people. Along with attempts to transform China into a United States military base, American monopolists had endeavoured to secure complete control of the Chinese economy, Chinese national resources and Chinese policy. The industrial development of China had been regarded as a threat to the United States which must be countered at all costs. That was why the United States had so consistently supported the bankrupt Kuomintang régime.

10. With the rise of the Chinese People's Republic, the peoples of Asia could no longer be dictated to or addressed in the language of force. The United Nations was humiliated by its tolerance of the Kuomintang representatives and their fabrications, which should be rejected.

11. The representative of Czechoslovakia therefore endorsed the position taken by the USSR representative at the previous meeting.

12. Mr. COOPER (United States) said that, in the view of his delegation, the Chinese charges that the USSR had violated the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 14 August 1945 were sustained by the factual evidence given by the representative of China and by evidence available from non-Chinese sources.

13. A determination of that treaty violation was relevant and of great importance, since experience had revealed that peace and law could not be maintained unless nations acted in good faith. Treaties of non-aggression and non-interference had been used as deliberate camouflage for aggression by modern totalitarian States. While a determination by the General Assembly that the USSR had violated the Treaty of 1945 would not undo what had taken place in China, it would amount to a pronouncement by the United Nations of its insistence upon the solemnity of international obligations and its concern that they be observed.

14. The Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945 had been a pact of enormous importance between two great Powers. In addition to the benefits which had accrued to the USSR from the Chinese struggle against Japan, the Sino-Soviet treaty had given the USSR great advantages, especially in terms of the extension of its influence into Manchuria. In making such concessions, the National Government of China had had the right to believe that the USSR would keep its pledge to assist it in re-establishing its authority in the areas occupied by the Japanese forces and in the task of reconstruction and development. Citing passages of the treaty and its annexes, Mr. Cooper said that throughout that treaty ran the theme of USSR promises of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China and of non-interference in its internal affairs.

15. The USSR representative had refused to face the issue of the violation of those pledges by his Government, but had argued that the charge had no validity on the grounds that Mr. Tsiang was not the legal representative of the people of China. However, the status of the Chinese delegation was not an issue. Nor was the record of the National Government of China, although that record disclosed that that Government had kept its promises to the USSR.

16. The issue was whether the USSR had honoured its commitments under the 1945 treaty. There were four basic questions: (1) had the USSR worked in close and friendly collaboration with the Chinese National Government, as promised in the treaty? (2) had it provided all possible economic assistance to that Government, as promised? (3) had it provided the National Government with moral, material and military support, to the exclusion of all other political groups in China, as promised? (4) had the USSR shown respect for the complete sovereignty of the National Government of China over Manchuria, as promised in the treaty? The United States delegation considered that the USSR had not honoured those commitments and had thereby violated the 1945 treaty.

17. The most obvious violation of the treaty had been the looting of Manchuria during the period of USSR occupation. Citing excerpts from the report of the Pauley Mission to Manchuria in 1946 to investigate the removal of equipment and machinery by the USSR—against which the United States had protested early in 1946—Mr. Cooper said that the report had stated that Southern Manchuria, containing over 80 per cent of Manchurian industries, had been taken with little, if any, damage. Following the USSR withdrawal some nine months later, it had been left with much of its industry in ruin. By far the greatest part of the damage concerning which he quoted figures given in the report, had occurred during the USSR occupation, and had been primarily due to Soviet removals of equipment and to Soviet failure to preserve order. The Pauley Mission had concluded that the Soviet actions had been based upon long-range strategic reasons. The damage had been appraised conservatively at 2,000 million dollars.

18. Destruction of the industrial potential of Manchuria, from which the rehabilitation, development and unification of China could have been started, had been a body blow to the economic welfare of China and to the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945.

19. As for the assistance which the USSR had pledged itself to give the National Government to help the latter re-establish its authority in Manchuria, assistance to have been given entirely to the National Government, General Wedemeyer in his report to President Truman, which was sometimes used for quotation by the USSR, had referred specifically to USSR violations of both the letter and the spirit of the treaty. The USSR had assisted the Chinese communists in Manchuria by hindering the efforts of the Chinese Government to restore its control over the area, by the timing of the withdrawal of the USSR troops, and by making available to the communists, either directly or indirectly, large quantities of surrendered Japanese equipment. There had been no Chinese communist military forces in Manchuria at the time of the Japanese surrender, but those forces had been allowed to move in during the early period of the USSR occupation and become an important military factor. At the same time, movements of Chinese Government forces had been obstructed by the USSR, and their entry into Manchuria had been blocked by delay in the USSR withdrawal until long after the time promised by Marshal Stalin. The USSR actions in Manchuria alone sustained the case made by the Chinese delegation.

20. Reviewing the USSR record in connexion with treaty commitments, Mr. Cooper said that the violation of the treaty of 1945 was simply one more indication that the USSR disregarded such commitments when such conduct served its purposes.

21. The violation of the treaty had helped start a chain of events of direct concern to the United Nations. Manchuria had been used as a staging area from which had come spearhead divisions of the North Korean army when it had invaded the Republic of Korea, and through which had come the tanks and heavy artillery delivered to North Korea immediately prior to that aggression. The Chinese communist aggression had also been launched from Manchuria. Nor could it be predicted where the chain of events would stop. The Chinese communists had talked of "liberating" other Far Eastern countries in the name of the international communist movement headed by the USSR.
22. Mr. Vyshinsky's statement at the 477th meeting of the First Committee had included allegations to the effect that the United States was transferring Chinese Nationalist troops to Thailand, Burma and other areas in preparation for aggressive acts against the Chinese People's Republic, which would be called defensive measures against Chinese communist aggression.
23. Those allegations were entirely false and without foundation. Taken in the context of the USSR attempts to justify communist aggression in Korea, however, it must be asked whether those false charges presaged communist aggression in Indo-China, Thailand or Burma.
24. His Government had instructed him to state that any such communist aggression in south-east Asia, would, in its view, be a matter of direct and grave concern requiring the most urgent and earnest consideration by the United Nations.
25. The representative of the United States urged the Committee to adopt the draft resolution submitted by China (A/C.1/711).
26. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom) said that the charges made at the 477th meeting by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union were regrettable not only because they were untrue but also because they were not calculated to ease the tension in the Far East.
27. The United Kingdom delegation agreed that after the experience of Korea—where communist aggression had been accompanied by charges of aggression directed against the victim—the USSR allegations were ominous. Such charges against an invaded State were part of the normal vocabulary of an aggressor and it was to be hoped that they did not mean that the Soviet Union had persuaded communist China to undertake aggressive adventures in south-east Asia. If, however, aggression was contemplated it should be understood that the Government of the United Kingdom associated itself with the position just stated by the representative of the United States.
28. The British position had been made clear by Mr. Eden in his speech at Columbia University on 11 January 1952 when he had said that intervention by communist China in south-east Asia, even if carried out by so-called volunteers, would create a situation no less menacing than that in Korea. He added that the United Kingdom trusted that the United Nations would resist such aggression no less firmly.
29. In case there was an attempt to misrepresent the attitude of his Government, Mr. Lloyd wished to state that the United Kingdom had no aggressive intentions. It sought only peace and a reduction of international tension. The policy had been stated by Prime Minister Churchill in his address to the United States Congress on 17 January 1952.
30. The foregoing remarks did not affect the attitude of the United Kingdom toward the Chinese draft resolution which would be indicated at a later stage.
31. Mr. DEMCHEMKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said it had frequently been pointed out that there was no reason to discuss the illegally submitted Kuomintang libel on the Soviet Union.
32. The sole object of including that item in the agenda was to fabricate slanders designed to conceal the true reasons for the collapse of the Chiang Kai-shek clique by pretending that it had been overthrown by an external intervention. Facts and documents had however been produced to show that the fall of the Kuomintang régime had been brought about by the will and efforts of the Chinese people.
33. Even those who supported the remnants of the Kuomintang régime realized that it had fallen as a result of its own policy. The Secretary of State of the United States in the letter transmitting the White Paper on China had confirmed the fact that the Nationalist leaders had indulged in graft and nepotism and had relied on the United States to win the civil war for them. The Secretary of State had recognised that the results of the civil war had been beyond the control of the United States Government and had been caused by internal forces.
34. There had been intervention in China but it had been on the part of the United States as was evident from the course of its policy after the victory of the Chinese people. The United States continued to support and finance the Kuomintang clique and kept its representatives in the United Nations. It perpetrated acts of aggression against the People's Republic of China by occupying Taiwan (Formosa), bombing peaceful towns in north-east China, blockading the coast and violating the air frontiers. The political independence and territorial integrity of China and peace in the Far East were indeed threatened, but they were threatened by the expansionist and aggressive policies of the United States.
35. The Kuomintang representative in his libellous statement at the preceding meeting had alleged Soviet Union violation of the Sino-Soviet treaty of 14 August 1945. That complaint was groundless for the Soviet Union had complied with its treaty obligations as long as the Kuomintang Government had existed in China. However, the Chinese people had overthrown that government and in October 1949 had instituted the Central People's Government. That Government administered the entire country and the Soviet Union maintained the friendliest of relations with it. In February 1950 the two governments had concluded a treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance for it was clear that the previous treaty had lost its force after the political death of the régime which had concluded it.
36. It was a waste of time for the General Assembly to consider the slanders of individuals who represented no one and whose presence in the General Assembly was illegal. There was no reason for the United Nations to deal with those fabrications which would only bring discredit upon the Organization. The Ukrainian delegation objected to the consideration of the matter.
37. Mr. LACOSTE (France) said that the history of events and analysis of their causes which had been presented by the representative of China offered a number of lessons to the United Nations.
38. The draft resolution which had been submitted by the Chinese delegation did not, however, appear to be entirely

germane in the light of the previous deliberations of the General Assembly. In its resolution 291 (IV) concerning the strengthening of peace in the Far East the General Assembly, had given adequate expression to its feelings with respect to the whole situation described by the representative of China. Since that resolution was adequate the French delegation would abstain from voting on the Chinese draft resolution submitted at the 502nd meeting.

39. With regard to the allegations made at the 477th meeting of the First Committee by the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union asserting that French policy in Viet Nam was aggressive and referring to concentrations of Chinese troops on the borders of Yunnan, Mr. Lacoste wished to issue a denial. French policy in south-east Asia was not aggressive but was opposed to aggression. For five years France had been making sacrifices alone in the defence of freedom. As the late Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny had said, France played the role in Indo-China that the United Nations was playing in Korea.

40. In the opinion of the French Government, an intervention from outside to support the forces opposing those of France and Viet Nam should call for immediate and effective intervention by the United Nations.

41. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said his delegation would not have participated in the debate on an item which was on the agenda illegally had it not been necessary to refute the false charges.

42. In the course of past sessions, evidence had been given to prove that events in China were the results of the will and desires of the Chinese people. The facts were known even by those who supported the reactionary Kuomintang clique. On 4 June 1951 the Secretary of State of the United States, speaking before a Congressional committee, had recognised that the military collapse of the Nationalist Government had been largely due to its inept leadership and the lack of a will to fight in its army. Mr. Acheson had further stated that United States observers had said that only unlimited aid, including the use of United States troops, and considerable control over the administration would enable the Kuomintang to keep a foothold on the mainland any longer. Those views were confirmed by other reports such as those of generals Marshall, Stillwell and Wedemeyer.

43. Such a policy could not, however, have been adopted by the United States because it would have met popular opposition, not only throughout Asia but also at home. The United States had therefore attempted to strengthen the Kuomintang with military supplies and had contributed twice as much, since the surrender of Japan, as it had during the entire period of the Sino-Japanese conflict.

44. The Kuomintang group would stop at nothing in its attempt to regain power. It would have no place in a peaceful world and accordingly aimed at provoking a conflict. Li Tsung-jen, former Acting President of China had stated that Chiang Kai-shek's policy was to provoke a third world war in the hopes that it would save him from the communists. Such activities would not be tolerated without the encouragement of the United States and that fact showed that the Kuomintang clique continued to have a role in the United States plan for the conquest of China and the subjugation of all Asia.

45. China had given an example to all colonial nations, for the Chinese people all realised that the days of monopolistic imperialism had come to an end. The revolutionary changes had had wide repercussions; resentment against

the United States armies of occupation was growing. Even the advocates of an expansionist policy had recognised the facts. In that connexion Mr. Katz-Suchy referred to the opinion given by Walter Lippmann on 25 January 1952 in the *New York Herald Tribune*.

46. On the other hand the Chinese people had long known that the Soviet Union from the beginning had always fought for the self-determination of all nations, including China. Proof of the friendly relations between China and the Soviet Union were shown in the agreements of March 1950. For the first time the interests of both nations were preserved on an equal footing and without any advantages being taken by the more developed nation. Those agreements were a continuation of the friendly policy which the Soviet Union had always shown towards the interests of the Chinese people. That friendship had been expressed also by the fulfilment by the Soviet Union of all its obligations to participate in the war against Japan.

47. No government could undertake an obligation to defend the Kuomintang group against the Chinese people. The obligations deriving from the treaty of 1945 could not have been against the Chinese people, struggling for their independence and against their oppressors.

48. The United States wished to discuss only "treaty violations" and not the corrupt internal situation in Kuomintang China. The United States admittedly had great experience in treaty violations—especially since the end of the Second World War—but its interest in the matter was not academic. The victory of the Chinese people over the Kuomintang was the greatest defeat ever suffered by United States policy. The White Paper published by the United States Department of State admitted the defeat to a certain extent but today, perhaps under the pressure of the China lobbyists in Washington, an attempt was being made to explain the defeat: it was asserted that a treaty violation had caused the defeat. Such hypocrisy would deceive no one and merely meant that the United States had decided to show its hand.

49. The open support of the United States for the Chinese draft resolution revealed the place of the United States in the Organization. When the problem of China had first come up in 1949 the United States had not taken a stand in the conflict. At the present the United States was giving full support to the Kuomintang policy. At the same time United States forces were occupying Taiwan (Formosa), which was Chinese territory, and were preparing an attack on the mainland. Those preparations were being accelerated as had been noted in the 20 January 1952 issue of the *Observer*. That issue had noted that the 93rd Kuomintang division, which was in Burma, was being reinforced and equipped in order to launch an assault on Yunnan. It was small wonder, therefore, that the United States was uneasy about the statement of the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union (477th meeting) which had revealed the plans for an attack on China.

50. The statement made by the representative of the United States carried the smell of a threat of aggression. The United States was trying to force the General Assembly to adopt the Kuomintang draft resolution although it admitted that the proposal by itself would not undo what had been done. It was plain that the United States regarded the draft resolution as a first step in that direction and was preparing to continue its acts of aggression. The United States representative had not denied transporting Kuomintang troops to Burma nor supplying those troops with American arms.

51. The aims of the United States had been made clear and it was no surprise that the United Kingdom and France had supported them. The General Assembly should take warning of the attempt to prepare new aggressions under cover of allegations of treaty violations. Leaders in the United States were speaking about the full-scale bombing of Manchuria and United States aviators had already begun the project. Those facts showed that the threat to China came from the United States which was working towards war in Asia. The Kuomintang slander was merely further evidence of whose interests that clique was serving. The charges should not merely be rejected but it should be ensured that those that brought forward such charges

should be deprived of the opportunity of fomenting international discord.

52. The United Nations should put an end to the situation and cease to allow the Organisation to be used for making propaganda in favour of a third world war. The United Nations must stand firm in its desire for the maintenance of peace in Asia ; it must give warning that the actions of the United States which had been announced at the preceding meeting would not be tolerated.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.