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CONTENTS



Chairman: Mr. Finn Moe (NorwaY)

## Admission of new Members, including the right of candidate tate to pr ent proof of the condition requir d under Article 4 of the Charter (A/1887/Rev.1, A/1899, /1907, A/C.1/702/Rev.1 and A/C.1/703) (*continued*)

[Item 60]*

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Sir Keith OFFICER (Australia) said that all States which fulfilled the conditions of Article 4 of the Charter should be admitted to the United Nations in order to give the Organization the universal character which it had been designed to have. While he did not wish to single out specific ca e , h considered that the United Nations could not become really universal without the participation of States such as Italy, C ylon and Libya, among others.

2. The main cause of the existing situation stemmed from the introduction of extraneous conditions, in particular, the attempt to make the admission of some States dependent upon the admission of others. the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 28 May 1948[1] made clear, each case should be judged on its merits.

3. Regarding the procedural side of the question of admission, dealt with in par raph 2 of Article 4, his delegation had con i tently pointed out that the wording of that Article gave to the General Assembly a vital role as regards he question of membership. Although a recommendation from the ecurity Council was necessary, the Council had function of a limited kind in that respect and was not entitled to pronounce itself on a candidate's willingness and ability to carry out its obligations under the Charter, except wh re the maintenance of international peace and security were concerned.

4. There were cases in which all members of the Security Council had agreed as to the fitness of a given State for membership, but a recommendation had not been forthcoming because of the introduction of extraneous considerations by a permanent member.

5. In that connexion, Sir Keith Officer trusted that the remarks made by the r presentative of Czechoslo akia at the pre eding meeting concerning the relevance of the question as to whether or not a candidate had diplomatic relations with certain other States meant that that question would no longer be raised as an argument for or against admission. The u of the veto to prevent the admission of new Members was improper. A recommendation from the Security Council was necessary, however, as had been made clear by the advisory opinion delivered by the International Court of Justice on 3 March 1950[2].

6. While supporting the main lines of the draft resolution submitted by Peru (A/C.1/702/Rev.1), Sir Keith had som doubts regarding the drafting of some of the passages of the draft resolution. He suggested that the words " on objectiv reality decided upon ascertained facts ; and uch facts include such subjects " in the second paragraph, be replaced by the words " upon such matters ". It was necessary to take into account the whole international conduct of a tate which applied for membership, and it would be unwi to make a list of matters upon hich judgment hould be based since a list was bound to be incomplete. From that argument it followed that the judgment of the Organization on the conduct of a State v hich applied for membership depended, in the last resort, on a political decision by each of its Iembers, as had been recognized in the 194 opinion of the International Court of Justice. He therefor agre d with the suggestion that the word " juridical " in paragraph 1 of the operative part be omitted, and would welcome the omission of the second part of paragraph 3 of the operative part (beginning with the words : " and that the Security Council base its action... ").

7. The U SR draft resolution (A/C.1/703) could not be regarded as satisfactory since it contained no reference to some of the applicants for admission to the United Nations, such as th R public of Korea and Viet am Moreover, that draft resolution would become unnecessary if the Peruvian draft resolution were adopted. On the assumption that that would be the case and that the Security Council would therefore be recommended to reconsider all outstanding applications, h was prepared to abstain from voting on the U R draft resolution.

8. With regard to the am ndment submitted by the representative of Ar entina (A/C.1/704) to the Peruvian

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

[1] See *Admission of a State to the United ations (Charter, Article 4, Advisory Opinion,* I. . J. Reports 1948, p. 57.

[2] ee *Competence of the General Assembly for the admission of a State to the United ations, Advisory Opinion,* I. . J. Reports 1950, p. 4.

draft, his preliminary conclusion was that it would be unwise for the General Assembly to commit itself in advance to a special session, without reason to expect that it would have useful work to do.

9. Mr. CARIAS (Honduras) said that despite continual efforts, the attitude of the USSR on the question of the admission of new Members appeared to be as immovable as ever.

10. He agreed in principle with the general idea of the Peruvian draft resolution, but had doubts concerning the practical difficulties involved, as well as to the timeliness of the proposal. The delegation of Honduras, together with four others, had therefore submitted an amendment (A/C.1/706) to the revised draft resolution of Peru, the amendment being based on previous resolutions of the General Assembly.

11. Mr. VON BALLUSECK (Netherlands), reaffirming his Government's view that the United Nations must be as universal as it could be in conformity with Article 4 of the Charter, stated that, as made clear by the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 28 May 1948, conditions not included in paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the Charter could not be used in order to oppose the admission of a State into the United Nations.

12. He therefore welcomed the draft resolution submitted by the representative of Peru, but entertained some doubts as to whether the evidence submitted by States seeking membership could be such as to constitute adequate and conclusive evidence of qualifications as prescribed under Article 4 of the Charter. Past experience with regard to certain States which had fulfilled all the juridical qualifications at the time of application, but which had subsequently shown themselves unable or unwilling to live up to the criteria of the Charter, underlined the importance of imponderable factors. Each Member State ought to retain the right to judge for itself whether or not a State was really peace-loving and able and willing to carry out the obligations of the Charter.

13. Mr. von Balluseck therefore supported the proposal to delete the word " juridical " in paragraph 1 of the operative part of the draft resolution. As the views he had set forth were inadequately expressed in the text of the second and fourth paragraphs and of paragraph 2 of the operative part, he would reserve his final attitude regarding the Peruvian draft resolution for the time being.

14. As had been pointed out, the USSR draft resolution was superfluous since the Peruvian draft resolution would recommend to the Security Council reconsideration of all pending applications. He would therefore abstain from voting on the USSR draft resolution.

15. The representative of the Netherlands recalled that the General Assembly had already recommended its resolution 289 A (IV), that Libya be admitted to the United Nations upon its establishment as an independent State, and by its resolution adopted at the 352nd plenary meeting (A/L.2), that the Security Council should give urgent consideration to the resolution concerning Italy's full participation in the Trusteeship Council, with a view to recommending the immediate admission of Italy to membership in the United Nations.

16. Mr. CHAUVEL (France) said his delegation would vote in favour of the Peruvian draft resolution (A/C.1/702/Rev.1). However, he did not feel that the General Assembly could state, as the draft resolution did, that the judgment of the Organization must be based exclusively on the juridical conditions set forth in Article 4 of the Charter. The conditions set forth in that Article could not be considered abstractly without reference to political considerations. He therefore would prefer omission of the word " juridical " in paragraph 1 of the operative part.

17. He also considered it preferable that the applicant States which deemed it proper to submit proof of their qualifications under Article 4 of the Charter should confine themselves to submitting documents for the information of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

18. The amendment submitted by Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras (A/C.1/706) to the Peruvian proposal would remove all substance from the latter, and he was unable to support it.

19. Nor could he support the Argentine amendment (A/C.1/704), since it would be rather impracticable to convene a special session of the General Assembly before 15 March.

20. If the Peruvian draft resolution were adopted, the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/703) would be superfluous, and the representative of France would therefore abstain from voting on it.

21. Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) recalled that his delegation had joined with those of Guatemala and Honduras in requesting the inclusion of the item under discussion in the agenda of the sixth session of the General Assembly.

22. Analysing the explanatory memorandum submitted by the three delegations (A/1906), he stated that the existing impasse at which the United Nations found itself with regard to the admission of the nine or ten States which were indisputably qualified for membership resulted from the fact that the USSR continued to flout the spirit and letter of Article 4 of the Charter and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in introducing conditions other than those set forth in Article 4. Even granting political considerations based on the difference between the régimes and systems of the East and West, the General Assembly could hardly consider countries which had been condemned for the repeated violation of human rights as meeting the conditions of Article 4 of the Charter. While the USSR admitted that countries like Italy, Ireland, Portugal and others fully met those conditions, there had been no such statements by those who had voted against admission of countries sponsored by the USSR. The USSR appeared to be adamant in its position that it would agree to the admission of other countries only if those which it sponsored were admitted.

23. In view of the wording of Article 4, Mr. Urquia questioned whether the principle adopted at San Francisco had been that of universality. Article 4 set out the conditions and procedure for membership, and of the four conditions laid down in paragraph 1 of the Article, only one was in effect left to the judgment of the Organization, namely, whether applicants were able to fulfil the obligations of the Charter. That judgment must be based on how certain obligations were carried out.

24. The examples of evidence mentioned in the Peruvian draft resolution were hardly adequate as a criterion for that judgment. He had two objections to that proposal : in the first place, the requirement that applicants should prove that they met the conditions of Article 4 would place them in a very difficult and humiliating position, which the founding Members of the Organization had not had to meet; and in the second place, the evidence submitted would have little influence on the attitude of those States responsible for the existing situation.

25. Despite the hope that the deadlock in the Security Council might be broken by a fresh effort on the part of the General Assembly, the recent meetings of the Security Council dealing with the admission of Italy[3] demonstrated that there had been no alteration in the situation. As long as the admission of new Members was not considered as a procedural question, there was no way to solve the problem unless some friendly agreement were reached.

26. In that connexion, Mr. Urquia regretted that the representative of Cuba, in his analysis of Article 27 of the Charter (495th meeting), had failed to submit a concrete proposal, since, sooner or later, if a satisfactory solution were not reached at the current session, a reasonable and legal way out of the deadlock would have to be found.

27. In the meantime, the delegation of El Salvador had joined four other delegations in sponsoring an amendment (A/C.1/706) to the Peruvian draft resolution to the effect that the question of the admission of new Members be kept on the agenda of the Security Council in the hope that there would be a change in the attitude of certain countries.

28. Mr. ARDALAN (Iran) said the question before the Committee was of great importance because it concerned securing the co-operation of all States in the maintenance of peace and security.

29. The representative of Peru had given the legal reasons why applicants who were qualified should not be refused admission for extraneous reasons and had interpreted the feelings of all when he had requested the permanent Members of the Security Council to consider applications objectively.

30. Iran favoured the principle of universality and would support any resolution directed to that end. According to the spirit of Article 4 of the Charter, the United Nations should embrace all States which could contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. The Article prescribed five conditions for membership in the United Nations : applicants should be States ; they should be peace-loving ; they should accept the obligations of the Charter ; they should be able to carry them out ; they should be willing to carry them out. Those who met those conditions were qualified to become Members and the Organization as a whole was to be the judge.

31. Political considerations had prevented certain States from becoming Members of the Organization. It was unfortunate that the Security Council had not followed the recommendation of the General Assembly [resolution 197 A (III)] to conform to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of May 1948. The problem had to be solved in order to secure the co-operation of qualified States. The Iranian delegation agreed in principle with the Peruvian draft resolution.

32. With regard to the Soviet draft resolution and the various amendments, the Iranian delegation would be guided by its adherence to the principle of universality.

33. Mr. PHARAON (Saudi Arabia) supported the principle of universality and endorsed the idea that States should be admitted to the Organization without discrimination. The deadlock in the Security Council should be broken, but the General Assembly had already made recommendations in the matter without result. A dangerous situation existed when the two main organs of the United Nations could not harmonize their actions.

34. The Saudi Arabian delegation approved and reaffirmed the right of admission for qualified States.

35. The General Assembly had allotted the administration of Somaliland to Italy and the Trusteeship Council had admitted Italy to its deliberations. That was another case of lack of harmony between the various organs of the United Nations because the question of the admission of Italy was still in abeyance.

36. Again, Jordan had been concerned with one of the principal problems of the United Nations and had participated in the discussions in the First Committee.

37. It was at variance with the principles of the Charter to make admission dependent upon political, economic or ideological considerations.

38. With regard to the pending applications, the Saudi Arabian delegation would be moved by the principle of universality and the belief that the United Nations should harmonize its various organs. That delegation would support any resolution that would end the deadlock.

39. Mr. Pharaon declared that his delegation would support the application of Libya for membership in the United Nations.

40. Mr. MICHALOWSKI (Poland) said the discussion had shown that delegations regarded the situation as unsatisfactory since some States were excluded from membership in the Organization. The situation reflected the different attitudes which the great Powers had adopted toward the Charter and toward their international obligations.

41. The Soviet Union had long urged the admission of all candidates regardless of their political régime, and regardless of the sometimes doubtful qualifications of the nominees of the United States. In the past, Poland also had refrained from discrimination and had supported the principle of universality. It had wished to fill the gaps in the Organization and remove a source of friction.

42. On the other hand, the United States had discriminated against five applicants of whose political system it disapproved, despite their qualification to be Members of the Organization. That was not only a breach of the Charter, but also of international agreements inasmuch as the peace treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania provided that they should be admitted to the United Nations. That matter had also been dealt with in the Potsdam Agreement. The United States attitude towards Albania and the Mongolian People's Republic had also been based on discrimination against their political systems.

43. For four years, there had been manœuvres to avoid a just decision. Twice the matter had been referred to the International Court of Justice. In 1948, an attempt had been made to have the Court instruct sovereign States as to how they should vote. The later attempt to secure an opinion which was clearly contrary to the Charter, had been thrown out by a large majority of the Court.

44. At the present session, the manœuvres had passed on from the field of law to that of philosophy and rhetoric. The representative of Peru had tried to prove that the peace-loving nature of States was a purely subjective matter to be decided only by the government concerned, and not by the Security Council. In other words, the statement by a State that it was peace-loving should be accepted. Although that argument was groundless, it might be asked why the representative of Peru believed that proofs should be given, if that was his opinion. The fact was that Article 4 referred to the " judgment of the Organization ".

45. The representative of Peru had tried to use an equivocal decision of the Court to give the Charter a juridical

[3] See *Official Records of the Security Council, Sixth Year*, 568th and 569th meetings.

interpretation. The Charter, however, was essentially a political document and could not be reduced to legal formulae.

46. Mr. Belaúnde had also stated that his draft resolution represented only a first step : it was clear that it was a step in the direction of admitting States in contravention of the Charter and an attempt to by-pass the principle of the unanimity of the great Powers.

47. When the Soviet Union exercised its right of refusing admission to certain States, its vetoes were counted. But when the Soviet Union had proposed the admission of all thirteen applicants in 1949, a collective veto had excluded them all. The performance had been repeated in the following year. The situation could not be corrected by legal or philosophical tricks. The only way out of the impasse was to admit all fourteen candidates.

48. The Polish delegation called upon all the representatives to support that course, in order to remove a cause of discord, since eventually the matter would have to be solved in that manner.

49. Mr. GROSS (United States of America) said that his Government had always been in favour of the admission of all qualified States. The Peruvian proposal would enable candidates to speak for themselves and enable the Members to arrive at a judgment. The technique proposed would be a generalization of the practice of the Security Council where answers had been sought to the questions dealt with in the Peruvian draft resolution. That procedure would not be an imposition upon States, for they would not be required to submit information but would only be invited to do so.

50. The denunciation of the draft resolution by the representative of the Soviet Union reminded Mr. Gross of the statement made on 18 August 1948 in the Security Council by the Soviet Union representative, when he had complained about the lack of information on the application of Ceylon [4]. At that time, the Soviet Union representative had stated that in the Committee on the Admission of New Members he had proposed that no recommendation on Ceylon be made until sufficient information had been received and he had submitted a draft resolution in the Security Council calling for the postponement of the question of Ceylon's admission until further information had been received. That incident showed that the idea contained in the Peruvian draft resolution was not a mere " Anglo-American manœuvre ".

51. There were many qualified applicants for admission. Of particular interest from the United Nations point of view were Italy, the Republic of Korea and Libya. Italy had been given responsibilities in the field of trusteeship but was prevented by the Soviet Union from taking its rightful and necessary place. The Republic of Korea had been fostered by the United Nations since its creation and United Nations forces were now fighting for its preservation. The Republic of Korea was excluded from membership in the United Nations only by the Soviet Union. Libya was even more a creation of the United Nations and it appeared from the statement of the Soviet Union representative that its application also would be blocked.

52. The Soviet Union would have the General Assembly recommend that the Security Council reconsider the applications of thirteen States omitting the Republic of Korea. No delegation could give even tacit approval to a list containing Outer Mongolia—which favoured the aggression against Korea—and omitting the Republic of Korea—victim of the aggression. Moreover, it was clear that the Soviet Union proposed that the Security Council reconsider those applications favourably : the General Assembly would not merely ask the Security Council for a re-examination.

53. The United States opposed that procedure. The principle of the Charter was that each application should be examined on its merits. The qualifications required by Article 4 were simple, but basic. Rule 60 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council clearly showed in paragraph 1 that each application should be considered separately. The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of May 1948 held that Members should judge applicants on the basis of Article 4 of the Charter. The practice of the Soviet Union of voting against applications unless others were accepted also was in contravention of the Charter, the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, as well as the resolutions of the General Assembly.

54. There was, moreover, the practical consideration : when the protegés of the Soviet Union had been admitted, it could not be foreseen what new synthetic States would be brought forward by the USSR for admission when other qualified States applied in the future. The General Assembly should not succumb to blackmail because of a feeling of frustration.

55. Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania failed to meet the simple requirements of membership. Their own actions prevented their admission. The Soviet Union representative had asked at the 495th meeting how those States could give evidence of good relations with the United States in view of the United States' attitude. Mr. Gross stated that such evidence could easily be given by their ceasing to support the aggression in Korea, by dissolving the conspiracy against Yugoslavia, by entering into normal relations with Greece, by ceasing to flout the recommendations of the General Assembly in respect to human rights, by ceasing to molest United States diplomats and citizens and, in the case of Hungary, by reversing the sentences on the American fliers who had been imprisoned. It was difficult to make any suggestions about Outer Mongolia, which did not maintain relations with any State other than the Soviet Union.

56. The Soviet Union representative had asked (495th meeting) what evidence there was of Italy and Portugal being more peace-loving than Soviet Union " satellites ". Mr. Gross replied that Portugal had not acted as a base for guerrilla attacks on its neighbours and Italy had carried out the terms of its peace treaty. Moreover, the Soviet Union had admitted that membership in NATO was compatible with membership in the United Nations by agreeing that those two countries were qualified to enter the United Nations. Further, the Soviet Union satellites subscribed to the Cominform, which had as its purpose to bring pressure against their neighbours with a view to overthrowing their legal Governments.

57. The United States attitude was that if the States sponsored by the Soviet Union so acted as to show a desire for friendly relations, they might achieve the support of a majority in the Security Council and the General Assembly. The United States policy was not to frustrate the will of the Organization by opposing an application that had sufficient support.

58. The use of the veto by the Soviet Union reflected its normal policy of contempt for the views of other States. The Organization should judge which applicants met the conditions of Article 4. The United States gave its position

[4] See *Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year*, No. 105.

in each case and stated that the Security Council and the General Assembly should decide. The Soviet Union had vetoed the admission of Italy on four occasions because Bulgaria had never succeeded in getting a majority. It seemed now that that would be the fate of Libya also.

59. With regard to the consideration of draft resolutions and amendments, Mr. Gross thought that the word " reconsider ", which was used by the authors of the texts, was not used in the same sense in all the drafts. While the representative of Peru, in his draft resolution (A/C.1/702/Rev.1), apparently intended that applications should be dealt with individually, it seemed that the Soviet Union desired that the applications of a list of thirteen candidates should be reconsidered, with a view to favourable action by the Security Council. If that was the intention of the USSR, the United States would vote against the draft resolution submitted by that delegation (A/C.1/703).

60. As for the amendment submitted by Argentina (A/C.1/705), it would not remedy the evil in the USSR draft resolution. In asking that the Security Council make a report to the General Assembly before the end of the present session, it did not go to the root of the problem.

61. The delegation of Argentina had also submitted an amendment (A/C.1/704) to the draft resolution of Peru. It called for a special session of the General Assembly which seemed to suggest that the Assembly, whether or not any action had been taken by the Security Council, might decide that certain States were or should be Members. The United States could not accept that procedure, since, according to the Charter, action was required both by the Security Council and by the General Assembly.

62. With regard to the amendment sponsored jointly by the five Latin American Powers (A/C.1/706), the United States awaited the reaction of the representative of Peru. However, it did raise the following questions : was Viet Nam to be included in " pending " applications and was it intended that each case should be dealt with individually ?

63. The United States would support the Peruvian draft resolution and oppose that of the Soviet Union. The Peruvian proposal would help in the process of growth of the United Nations. Up to the present time, all authoritative interpretations of the Charter, including those of various Presidents of the Security Council, had maintained that a veto prevented the adoption of a recommendation. The International Court of Justice had held that the General Assembly could not act without a recommendation from the Security Council.

64. The United States would continue to seek procedures for the admission of qualified States and hoped that those whose own actions prevented their admission would alter their policies. Only in that way could they achieve the maximum membership for the United Nations.

65. Mr. HENRIQUEZ UREÑA (Dominican Republic) said that the admission of new Members had been a perennial problem since the first applicant had been excluded, not because of failure to secure a majority in the Security Council, but because of the negative vote of a permanent Member. It was in this connexion that the greatest opposition to the veto had arisen.

66. The matter revolved around Article 4 of the Charter. Paragraph 1 of Article 4 established the conditions and clearly any State which fulfilled them had the right to membership. Paragraph 2, however, was crucial because it established a procedure which required a recommendation by the Security Council.

67. The word " recommendation " had already been analysed on many occasions. It was to be found, either as a noun or a verb, twenty-six times in the Charter. On twenty-one occasions, it was concerned with the adoption of a resolution dealing with general matters rather than specific cases. Mr. Henriquez Ureña specified a number of the Articles concerned. In the other five cases, however, a more restricted meaning relating to concrete cases was the evident intention. Article 5 provided that the Security Council should make a recommendation in cases of suspension of a Member. In Article 6 similarly, there would be a recommendation in cases of expulsion. Under Article 97, in cases of appointments, a recommendation of the Security Council would be required. In the foregoing cases, the recommendations were positive, rather than negative. Under Article 4, the meaning of the word " recommendation " appeared to be similar, from the legal point of view.

68. It had been maintained that the recommendation of the Council might be favourable or unfavourable and that the Assembly could reject a favourable recommendation or reverse an unfavourable one. That was a dubious interpretation. From the practical point of view, moreover, it should be noted that the Security Council had not adopted unfavourable recommendations : it had merely failed to reach a decision. It was not possible to visualize a practical situation in which the Security Council would recommend that a State should not be admitted. The Assembly therefore would not be faced with any recommendations but merely a note that certain candidates had failed to win the required votes.

69. Mr. Henriquez Ureña quoted opinions expressed by some judges of the International Court which maintained that the General Assembly could decide if the veto had been abused and proceed to admit a candidate. Another thesis had been that any seven votes in the Security Council would empower the General Assembly to admit an applicant. The latter theory raised the question of the interpretation of Article 27 and it could hardly be maintained that the admission of new Members was a procedural matter in view of the importance attached to it specifically in Article 18, paragraph 2. Such theories had been based upon declarations made during the drafting of the Charter. However, the Charter in its adopted form should be interpreted as a whole and not according to the supposed intentions of isolated participants in its preparation.

70. Article 27 provided that the affirmative vote of the permanent members of the Security Council was necessary. The International Court of Justice stated, in its advisory opinion of 28 May 1948, that negative votes could be cast only on the basis of Article 4, and not because of unrelated reasons. If the sponsors of the Charter had had other considerations in mind, those considerations would have been included. Political conditions had not been laid down and no discretion in that respect had been allowed. Those who insisted upon other conditions were abusing a privilege, but the only sanction against such action was the censure of public opinion.

71. The United Nations had been established on the principle of a conditional, rather than absolute universality. It should admit all peace loving States who were ready and able to carry out the provisions of the Charter. Provision had been made for the suspension or expulsion of any State which failed to fulfil its obligations. To hinder the admission of qualified States violated their rights as well as the spirit and letter of the Charter.

72. The Peruvian delegation, in its draft resolution, proposed that applicants should give evidence of their

qualifications and it asked the Security Council to re-examine the applications. Perhaps a suitable formula could be found for the submission of evidence. It might be satisfactory if applicants made a declaration in more solemn terms concerning their ability and willingness to carry out their obligations. Mr. Henríquez Ureña believed that actions were more important than words and evidence was not necessary. They should not appear to be establishing a tribunal.

73. The text of paragraph 1 of the operative part of the Peruvian draft resolution might advantageously be amended to avoid having the General Assembly interpret an Article of the Charter in general terms. Mr. Henríquez Ureña proposed the following text :

" *Takes note* of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, according to which a judgment of the Organization on the admission of new Members ought to be based exclusively on the conditions contained in Article 4 of the Charter ".

74. By merely " taking note " of the opinion of the International Court the General Assembly would avoid what would amount, for all practical purposes, to an amendment of the Charter. It would establish a standard, but that would be more flexible.

75. The delegation of the Dominican Republic supported the Peruvian draft resolution and would vote for it, since its implementation might well have a most important sequel.

76. With regard to the various amendments and the Soviet Union draft resolution, Mr. Henríquez Ureña reserved the right to give his views subsequently.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.

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