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Chairman : Mr. Finn MOE (Norway).

Measures to combat the threat of a new world war and to strengthen peace and friendship among the nations (A/1944, A/1947, A/C.1/698 and A/C.1/699) (concluded)

[Item 67]*

GENERAL DEBATE (concluded)

1. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the debates on the measures to combat the threat of a new world war and to strengthen peace and friendship among the nations had abundantly proved that certain nations were following a concerted plan designed to get rid of the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union.

2. The questions raised by various delegates had no other purpose than to prevent any real study of a problem which it was desired to relegate to the Disarmament Commission as soon as possible. Whilst asserting that the First Committee had not the time to consider the USSR proposal, several delegates had engaged in an oratorical battle that revealed their lack of interest, in practice, in a proposal for strengthening peace. Others had maliciously tried to mislead world political opinion.

3. Some, such as the representative of Haiti, had indulged in shameful fabrications concerning the Soviet Union's relations with the Slav countries and Finland. There was nothing new in such calumnies and it was common knowledge that, by falsifying documents, the United States State Department had tried to slander the Soviet Union. The facts had convicted the accusers, who had been caught in the act. The representative of Haiti had then criticized the Soviet-German pact of 1939. Had he forgotten that at that time, as a consequence of British and French policy, the USSR had no alternative but to agree to a pact of non-aggression with Germany? It had been a very wise move on the part of the Soviet Government and undoubtedly had had an influence on the triumphant end of the war. Of course everyone realized that the representative of Haiti had only spoken in that way in order to conform to the directives of his protectors, for whom historical accuracy was less important than indulging in calumny.

4. The Peruvian representative had stated at the 489th meeting that the USSR's tendency to expand was in the

very nature of things; the Soviet Union was in a sense obliged to follow an expansionist, in other words an aggressive, policy and that was why the United States was obliged to take defensive measures against that "pyramid of force". Mr. Belaunde thus presented the North Atlantic Treaty as being purely defensive and in conformity with the Charter. He had extolled Mr. Eden's speech at Columbia University as being, in his opinion, the fairest and clearest statement of the tasks and purposes of the "Atlantic bloc". In fact, Mr. Eden's speech was only a restatement of the "situations of strength" policy. However, there was nothing new in such attempts to camouflage the aggressive aims of the North Atlantic Treaty as a defensive instrument.

5. It had been affirmed that the North Atlantic Treaty was intended to prevent the outbreak of a third world war but the activities of the principal Member nations had been clearly visible even in the Far East. In the face of such facts it was absurd to maintain that the "Atlantic bloc" was a pacific organization.

6. Some representatives had attempted, by invoking Articles 51 and 52 of the Charter, to prove the legality of the North Atlantic Treaty by juridical arguments.

7. Article 51 referred to the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, but made it dependent upon an armed attack against a Member of the United Nations. Such an attack had not taken place and, in spite of the calumnies disseminated on that subject, the USSR had no aggressive intentions.

8. There was one fact which proved the aggressive nature of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Soviet Union had proposed to Norway that it should sign a non-aggression treaty. Norway had refused and had immediately joined the North Atlantic Treaty. It had feared that if it signed the proposed treaty, it would no longer be able to play the part assigned to it. That meant that the signature of a treaty of non-aggression was incompatible with the North Atlantic Treaty, which was therefore contrary to the United Nations Charter.

9. So-called jurists had sought to justify that treaty by invoking Article 52 of the Charter. Article 52 referred to regional arrangements; but it would be very difficult to describe the North Atlantic Treaty, the scope of which extended as far as the Middle East, as a regional arrangement.

10. If Articles 51 and 52 of the Charter provided no justification for the treaty, Article 53 formally condemned

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

it, for it stated that no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements without the authorization of the Security Council. Consequently, the Atlantic Treaty violated the Charter and should be treated accordingly.

11. The authors of the treaty had borrowed some of the wording of the Charter, but what was really the spirit of the treaty? Its advocates had tried to represent it as an organization for the common good. The United States Press itself had contradicted such statements and had also destroyed the legend that the treaty was defensive in character.

12. The USSR representative quoted several extracts from American publications, in particular the *Chicago Tribune* of 4 October 1951, which stated that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was not necessary for the security of the United States.

13. What then was the real purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization? Mr. Truman, on 13 January 1952, in his Economic Report to Congress, had said that, if energetic measures were not taken to raise new taxes, a deficit almost twice that of 1952 must be expected in 1953. He had stated that the 1952 deficit was \$8,000 million. That speech was very different from his Christmas message. In fact, it meant a new and very heavy burden for the people, due solely to the military programme.

14. At the 487th meeting, Mr. Lloyd, who had recognized the weight of the burden on his own country, had said that the Soviet Union was to blame. That was sheer invention. The security of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty needed no such sacrifices. Let those who were in a position to do so repudiate that suicidal course, which was of advantage only to a small handful of warmongers. The USSR was in no way to blame for that burden, which would crush those who assumed it.

15. Mr. O. K. Armstrong, member of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress, had recently said that an armaments race had never served the cause of peace. Other members of the United States Congress had protested against the tendency of the Government to try to suppress communism by armed force. They had thus revealed the real purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty.

16. Who could still maintain that the treaty was in conformity with the United Nations Charter? It represented in fact a policy of war, which had already been carried into effect in various parts of the world. It had been asserted that the North Korean troops had provoked the Korean war. That statement was untrue. In support of his argument, the United States representative had quoted a telegram from the United Nations Commission for Korea (487th meeting). But what was the position of the Commission? Men did what they were told or what circumstances compelled them to do.

17. Such a charge was not new. It had already been refuted by the Soviet Union delegation two years before, without eliciting any rejoinder. Mr. Eden had stated that American troops were in Korea and would remain there as long as necessary—the meaning of that statement was clear judging from similar declarations of the United Kingdom concerning British troops in Egypt.

18. It would be profitable to restate the facts relating to the outbreak of the Korean conflict.

19. In the National Assembly in Seoul, Syngman Rhee had said on 19 June 1950 in the presence of Mr. John Foster Dulles that, if they could not gain victory with a cold war, they would have to gain it with a hot war. In May 1950 the director of the Division of Korea Programme of the

United States Economic Co-operation Administration, Mr. Edgar E. J. Johnson, had stated in the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives that the South Korean Army of 100,000 men, with American equipment and trained by American military instructors, had completed its preparations and was in a position to start war at any moment. At the same period Syngman Rhee had stated that May and June 1950 would be the most critical months in the history of Korea. Documents and facts proved that that was no chance statement. In a letter to Syngman Rhee on 20 June 1950, that is, five days before the aggression against North Korea, Mr. John Foster Dulles wrote that he attached great significance to the decisive role South Korea could play in the great drama which was unfolding. The drama had not, however, then begun—it was a slip of the tongue, since it did not begin until four days later.

20. The former Minister of Internal Affairs in Syngman Rhee's Government had stated, after being captured, that General Roberts had informed him in January 1950: "The plan of campaign against the North has been decided. Although we are to begin the attack, some pretext, some legitimate-sounding reason must be found. In that connexion the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea is destined to play an important part; it will naturally submit a report favourable to the United States of America".

21. There was yet another set of documents, which had never been disputed and which disclosed the identity of the real aggressors—the maps of the chiefs of staff of Syngman Rhee's army, which were captured by North Korean divisions on the occupation of Seoul. The positions of Syngman Rhee's forces were clearly marked, as were the attacks they were intended to launch against North Korea once the order had been given.

22. Lastly, the *Cosmopolitan* had published an article in December 1951 by the former chief of the intelligence section at General MacArthur's Headquarters, General Willoughby, admitting that the entire South Korean Army had been ready a week before the start of operations and had taken up its positions along the whole length of the 38th parallel.

23. These facts and official documents had not been refuted by the United States representative, who preferred to confuse the issue by quoting the fallacious statements made by the United Nations Commission on Korea.

24. The representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Philippines were not interested in bringing the Panmunjom talks to a successful conclusion; that accounted for their efforts—successful efforts—to prevent discussion of the Korean question in the First Committee.

25. They were also attempting to mislead world public opinion by asserting that there were few outstanding questions in the armistice talks and that those questions could be settled quickly. That was not the opinion of General Van Fleet, commander of the American Eighth Army in Korea, who had said that the armistice talks had aroused great disappointment. The military chiefs did not, however, make any attempt to be consistent. According to the Associated Press, General Van Fleet had recently said that he was satisfied that North Korea had been so destroyed that there were shortages of food, housing or clothing, and its situation was critical. Such statements could hardly be reconciled with a genuine desire to end hostilities. The Korean war was certainly the most shameful chapter in the history of the United Nations. Other chapters were marked by the rejection of Soviet Union proposals.

26. General Van Fleet was under General Ridgway, who was in turn under the United States Government. In the face of such facts, was it not correct to say that the "Atlantic bloc" had an aggressive character altogether incompatible with the purposes and principles of the United Nations?

27. It was ridiculous to state that an armistice in Korea depended solely on the Soviet Union. The facts spoke for themselves. Could anyone reasonably be expected to exchange 14,000 prisoners for an equivalent number, while leaving the remaining 150,000 in enemy hands? The United States Government had, however, signed the Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war in 1932, and had signed a similar convention in 1929, Article 75 of which provided that governments were required to repatriate all prisoners of war on the conclusion of an armistice. A new Geneva Convention had been signed on 12 August 1949, at Geneva, on the same subject. The United States, however, disregarded international agreements if inconvenient to it itself, but nevertheless accused the Soviet Union of infringing treaties.

28. On whom then did the conclusion of hostilities depend? On those who were putting forward unfair, unjust and illegitimate demands incompatible with international law and signed agreements. Those facts were sufficient evidence that the assertion that the responsibilities for the success of the armistice negotiations lay with the Soviet Union, was merely a demagogic manoeuvre which could deceive no one and which was intended to reassure public opinion. It was quite clear from the American Press that the people of the United States were dissatisfied with that military adventure, which was to the advantage of a small circle only.

29. The French representative had alleged that the USSR delegation's criticism of the North Atlantic Treaty was intended to "paralyse" that treaty. However, no one would deny that the North Atlantic Treaty was becoming paralysed because of disagreement among its members, lack of co-operation between States, the economic and financial dependence of the weakest States, and the peoples' opposition to the aggressive policy followed by their governments in the "Atlantic bloc".

30. As the paper *Combat* stated on 15 January 1952, it was not by chance that the western Powers, whose position in NATO had become critical, wished to set aside the new USSR proposals for the prohibition of atomic weapons, the control of the enforcement of that prohibition and a genuine reduction of armaments and armed forces.

31. The western Powers had put forward a number of reservations and limitations and had looked for pretexts to prevent the First Committee from studying the fundamental problems set forth in the Soviet Union's proposal.

32. At a press conference on 16 January 1952, Mr. Acheson had said that the purpose of the USSR proposal was to secure the prohibition of atomic weapons. That statement was correct. But he had added that the USSR wished only to have that prohibition on paper, namely, without any genuine control.

33. The western Powers had claimed, prior to the submission of the new USSR proposals, that the declaration of the prohibition of atomic weapons would be no guarantee unless control of those weapons was put into effect simultaneously. Now that the Soviet Union had submitted a new proposal on the simultaneous putting into effect of the prohibition of atomic weapons and the control of that prohibition, the United States, United Kingdom, French and other delegations still claimed that it was a prohibition on paper. In those circumstances, it might be asked what constituted a genuine prohibition of atomic weapons. The

answer could certainly not be found in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly (A/L.25), which merely envisaged the setting up of an international control system which might eventually serve to prohibit atomic weapons.

34. The Canadian representative had asked at the 491st meeting whether the international control organ referred to in the USSR draft resolution and the inspections to be carried out by that organ would be of a permanent character. It was clear that the control organ envisaged would be a permanent and not a temporary body. Furthermore, it was laid down that inspections would be carried out on a continuing basis. The questions of the Canadian representative were therefore unnecessary.

35. The delegation of Canada had also asked what was meant by strict international control. It was easy to point out that it meant a system of important and effective measures. Inspection of atomic energy establishments would include auditing of accounts, checking stocks of atomic raw materials and semi-finished products, checking regulations governing technological control (the control organ would have the right to issue instructions to atomic energy enterprises: it could lay down, for any enterprise dealing with atomic energy, rules which the control organ felt should be prescribed); in addition, the control organ would collect data on the production of atomic energy and on the finished product, and carry out inspections in case of violation of the regulation on the prohibition of the atomic weapon.

36. That simple list proved that the USSR's point of view as regards international control could meet any honest and impartial criticism.

37. It was surprising that the United States representative (487th meeting) had been able to state that his delegation would submit important proposals to the Disarmament Commission, since the United States Secretary of State had said at his last Press conference that he was unaware of any such proposals.

38. Why did the United States, United Kingdom and French representatives follow different methods in regard to procedure? Why had they objected to their draft resolution on the disarmament question being sent to the Disarmament Commission without any directive from the General Assembly, while they now wished to prevent the First Committee from giving directives to the Disarmament Commission on the USSR draft resolution?

39. The French representative had stated, at the beginning of December, that the prohibition of atomic weapons could not be accepted by France unless adequate guarantees were given; he had added that an agreement would, however, be possible provided an understanding was reached that prohibition and the control of the enforcement of prohibition were simultaneous. In order to reach agreement on that point, the USSR delegation was proposing that prohibition and control should be simultaneous. The French representative did not, however, wish to study the USSR proposal.

40. Certain representatives had stated that in 1948 and 1949 the USSR had suggested that the prohibition of atomic weapons and the control of prohibition should be simultaneous. They forgot that at that time the USSR delegation had proposed that two conventions should be signed simultaneously: one on the prohibition of atomic weapons, the other on the creation of an international control system. The revised USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/698) was different since it stipulated that the General Assembly should proclaim without delay the prohibition of atomic weapons and that, in order to allay any suspicion in the minds of those who genuinely wished atomic weapons to be prohibited,

that proclamation should take effect simultaneously with the entry into force of the international control of prohibition.

41. Representatives who sought by various methods to prevent the prohibition of atomic weapons had asked what the expression "put into effect" meant in the USSR draft resolution. It was sufficient to reply that "put into effect" applied to the system of control and meant "begin to function". Nevertheless, certain of those representatives had advocated that prohibition of the atomic weapon should be dependent not on the putting into effect of international control but rather on its "effective functioning". It was clear that, in that way, it could always be claimed that control was not functioning effectively. In proof of his statement, he recalled that Mr. Frederick H. Osborn, the United States representative on the Atomic Energy Commission, had declared in 1949 that atomic energy could never be effectively controlled.

42. Resort to the idea of effective control was a mere pretext for declining to consider the prohibition of atomic weapons. If that idea were accepted by the USSR, the representatives of the western Powers would still find other pretexts for not proclaiming the prohibition of atomic weapons. That was not surprising, since the resolution adopted by the General Assembly (A/L.25) only treated prohibition with many reservations and restrictions.

43. The objections which had been made to the USSR draft resolution were unfounded. All difficulties and all danger of trickery had been removed from it, and the draft resolution was not, therefore, confined to a mere statement of principle.

44. The draft resolution submitted by the USSR provided that the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of control over the enforcement of such prohibition should be put into effect simultaneously. The General Assembly should, however, proclaim the principle of prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of international control over the enforcement of such prohibition without delay. Such a proclamation would reduce international tension and would cleanse the atmosphere which had been poisoned by atomic-war propaganda.

45. The Soviet Union energetically rebuffed the suggestion that it would be impossible to establish control in States where freedom of the Press was said not to exist. It regarded that manoeuvre as an inadmissible attempt, contrary to the principles of the Charter, to modify the domestic régime of such States.

46. Some representatives had asked what was meant by the USSR proposal to set up an international control organ which was not entitled to interfere in the domestic affairs of States. It was sufficient to state in reply that that meant exactly the same as the idea expressed in Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter.

47. In that connexion, it was odd to note that the United Kingdom representative had not appeared to be satisfied with that formula, and the only possible explanation for his anxiety was that if such a principle were put into effect, the United Kingdom and others would be prevented from interfering in the domestic affairs of other States.

48. Finally, a number of representatives had expressed doubts as to what was meant by the expression "inspection on a continuing basis". They might just as well have asked that question of the United Kingdom representative who, at the beginning of December, in Sub Committee 18, had indicated what he meant by that expression and had asked the Soviet Union to accept the principle. Mr. Lloyd had explained that the word "continuing" was preferable to

"permanent", and had added that the expression "inspection on a continuing basis" would be the proper one, since in his view it would permit the carrying out of inspection at any time. The USSR draft resolution now reproduced that idea of "inspection on a continuing basis" proposed by the western Powers. There should therefore be no more room for doubt. But that did not prevent the United Kingdom representative from asking a number of questions on that subject or from expressing the view that it should first of all be referred to the Disarmament Commission.

49. After reviewing the various paragraphs of the USSR draft resolution, Mr. Vyshinsky argued at length that the five-Power peace pact, would be an unprecedented historical act. Those who were bent on rejecting it were wrong in opposing it to the United Nations Charter, for several bilateral or multilateral pacts and treaties had been concluded outside the Charter.

50. The USSR draft resolution was a step forward towards removing the threat of a new world war and strengthening international peace and friendship.

51. The CHAIRMAN declared the general discussion closed. He announced that any representatives who wished could explain their votes.

VOTE ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (A/C.1/698 and A/C.1/699) AND AMENDMENTS THERETO

52. Mr. FRANCO FRANCO (Dominican Republic) thought that the North Atlantic Treaty was a natural reaction in defence of peace and security in the presence of danger from outside. Accession to the treaty and the establishment of military bases abroad were not therefore incompatible with membership in the United Nations. He would therefore vote against paragraph 1 of the USSR draft resolution.

53. He would also vote against paragraph 2. The First Committee had already decided to postpone consideration of the Korean question. Mr. Franco Franco added that the postponement should prevent those who had the power from bringing their influence to bear, for genuinely pacific purposes, on the aggressors who had attacked the Republic of Korea.

54. Paragraphs 3 to 7 of the USSR draft resolution contained a number of modifications that were interesting in relation to previous Soviet proposals, although it seemed at first sight that the proposed international control organ would have only limited powers and that the one-third reduction of the armaments of the great Powers would again confirm USSR superiority in conventional armaments. In any event those questions would have to be considered by the Disarmament Commission. For procedural reasons, therefore, the delegation of the Dominican Republic, would be unable to accept paragraphs 3 to 7 if they were to have the meaning and range of effect which it was now proposed to give them.

55. Although his delegation had always favoured agreement between the great Powers, it would be unable to vote for paragraph 8 of the USSR draft resolution, which did not place that agreement within the framework of United Nations action to promote security and peace.

56. For the reasons deriving from what had been said in connexion with paragraphs 3 to 7 inclusive, the delegation of the Dominican Republic would vote for the draft resolution submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/699) and the addition proposed by Bolivia (A/C.1/700).

57. U MYINT THEIN (Burma) said that, as a representative of a small nation, he did not wish to be drawn into the question directly.

58. He would abstain from voting on paragraph 1 of the USSR draft resolution so as not to become involved in the charges that were being exchanged.

59. His delegation had always favoured an armistice in Korea; nevertheless it would abstain from voting on paragraph 2 of the USSR draft resolution because, the Panmunjom talks seemed to be making some progress, and because the First Committee had only recently decided to postpone the item relating to Korea which had come up in the usual way to the First Committee. Finally, the Security Council could examine the question at one of its periodic meetings in the light of the resolution recently adopted in connexion with collective measures.

60. Paragraphs 3 to 7 of the USSR draft resolution gave undeniable evidence of a spirit of compromise, but they could more suitably be studied in the calmer atmosphere of the Disarmament Commission.

61. The Burmese delegation supported paragraph 8 of the USSR proposal although it was aware that the existence of two Chinese Governments might prove to be an obstacle in bringing together the States that were to be parties to the peace pact. The principle, he thought, was good.

62. It also supported the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/699).

63. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) stated that the North Atlantic Treaty constituted a threat of war and small or medium-sized States, such as the one he represented, could not remain silent in the face of such a threat.

64. He added that all representatives had had to admit that the new USSR proposals demanded careful study. Accordingly, one might have expected the Committee to study the matter so as to enable the General Assembly to make its decisions. However, the three western Powers had sought, by submitting their draft resolution, to dismember the USSR draft proposal—which represented an integral whole—and to refer to the Disarmament Commission, without giving it any instructions from the Assembly, the parts of the proposal concerned with the prohibition of atomic weapons, the control of such prohibition and the reduction of armaments.

65. The threat of a new world war could be averted not only by denouncing participation in the Atlantic bloc but by putting an end to hostilities in Korea, taking a decision on the prohibition of atomic weapons and, finally, by the conclusion of a peace pact among the five great Powers.

66. Mrs. SEKANINOVA-CAKARTOVA (Czechoslovakia) thought that the substance of the USSR proposals was in accordance with their title. They constituted one great whole which was aimed at achieving peace. Not only were the principles advanced shared by all peace-loving peoples, but the proposed practical measures of implementation were proof of the efforts of the USSR for co-operation among all States, small or large.

67. The three-Power draft resolution which was based on the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 11 January 1952 (A/L.25), asked the General Assembly to renounce its basic rights and duties, as laid down in Article 11. This underlined the fact that the USSR draft resolution would enable the Assembly to take decisions of fundamental significance for world peace.

68. The CHAIRMAN stated that he was going to put to the vote the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/698), as well as the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/699) and the Bolivian amendment to the latter (A/C.1/700).

69. Mr. GROSS (United States of America), speaking on behalf of the sponsors of the joint draft resolution, announced that he accepted the Bolivian amendment.

70. He asked the Committee to vote first on the three-Power draft resolution. The resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its 358th plenary meeting (A/L.25) provided that the Disarmament Commission should consider any proposals presented to it. The USSR draft resolution fell within that provision. Again, the adoption of the joint draft resolution would make it unnecessary to vote on paragraphs 3 to 7 of the USSR draft resolution.

71. Mr. BLANCO (Cuba) supported the procedural motion of the United States delegation. To the arguments adduced by Mr. Gross he added that, if the USSR draft resolution were put to the vote first and rejected, it would be illogical to refer to the Disarmament Commission, paragraphs 3 to 7 of the draft resolution, as proposed in the joint resolution.

72. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the United States procedural motion.

The motion was adopted by 45 votes to 5, with 10 abstentions.

73. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/699) as amended by Bolivia (A/C.1/700).

The draft resolution was adopted by 53 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions.

74. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/698).

75. Mr. DE PIMENTEL BRANDAO (Brazil) proposed that paragraphs 3 to 7 of the USSR draft resolution should be referred to the Disarmament Commission without being put to the vote.

76. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the procedural motion of Brazil.

The motion was adopted by 45 votes to 5, with 9 abstentions.

77. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote paragraph 1 of the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/698).

Paragraph 1 was rejected by 46 votes to 5, with 7 abstentions.

78. Mahmoud FAWZI Bey (Egypt) asked for a division of paragraph 2 of the USSR draft resolution.

79. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote paragraph 2 (a) of the USSR draft resolution.

The paragraph was rejected by 42 votes to 5, with 12 abstentions.

80. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote paragraph 2 (b) of the USSR draft resolution.

The paragraph was rejected by 42 votes to 7, with 10 abstentions.

81. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote paragraph 8 of the USSR draft resolution.

The paragraph was rejected by 35 votes to 11, with 13 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 6.5 p.m.