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Measures to combat the threat of a new world war and to strengthen peace and friendship among the nations (A/1944, A/1947, A/C.1/698 and A/C.1/699) (continued)

[Item 67]*

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. KISELYOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union (A/C.1/698) offered new evidence of the peace-loving nature of its foreign policy. Generalissimo Stalin had declared that the basis of that policy was the maintenance of peace and the fostering of business relations with other nations. The programme of affirmative measures submitted by the Soviet Union was based upon those principles and was in harmony with the interests of the peoples of the world.

2. The world political and economic situation had deteriorated since the close of the fifth session of the General Assembly. The Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union had presented and analysed the relevant facts and had shown that the reason for the aggravated situation was the policy of the "Atlantic bloc" headed by the United States.

3. The North Atlantic Treaty gave expression to the aggressive foreign policies of the United States for, despite the statements in its defence, events disclosed that the objective of the pact was to prepare a new war. All members of the "bloc" were increasing their military budgets, enlarging their forces and expanding their bases. Those activities were directed against the Soviet Union and the peoples' democracies. The ruling circles of the United States planned to use the people of western Europe as the cannon-fodder for the project as had been admitted by such leaders as Taft and Marshall whose statements Mr. Kiselyov proceeded to quote.

4. A so-called European army was being created and West Germany was to supply the striking force. Mr. Kiselyov quoted from American and French newspapers concerning statements made about West German military plans and the prospects of the inclusion of West Germany in NATO. The real intention was the revival of a German army, bent upon revenge.

5. The original plan for an army of 55 to 60 divisions together with naval and air forces no longer satisfied General Eisenhower who now sought a force of 100 divisions. A steady stream of armaments and equipment flowed into western Europe. Mr. Kiselyov quoted the figures given by General Marshall on 27 July 1951 to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concerning deliveries of arms abroad. At the same time United States troops were being dispatched to various European countries and military bases in foreign territories were being set up or expanded; that was an important part of the elaborate plan for a new war. No attempt was made to conceal the fact that the value of such bases was judged by their proximity to important centres in the Soviet Union. Mr. Kiselyov proceeded to quote from Dutch, French and American newspapers regarding the construction of military bases about the territory of the Soviet Union.

6. Such activities revealed the aggressive policies of the United States and showed that the North Atlantic Treaty was an instrument for the preparation of a new war against the Soviet Union and the peoples' democracies. It was accordingly clear that participation in the North Atlantic Treaty was in contradiction to the principles of the Charter and incompatible with membership in the United Nations.

7. The proposals of the Soviet Union for ending the Korean war were of great significance. Peace in Korea was vital for the maintenance of world peace, and the General Assembly should recognize the necessity of concluding an armistice and withdrawing all troops. Such proposals corresponded with the popular desire for the establishment of peace in Asia.

8. The representative of the United States had again alleged (487th meeting), without giving any evidence, that the war in Korea had been begun by aggression on the part of North Korea. That slander had often been disproved by the citation of documents showing that the Syngman Rhee régime had launched an assault on 25 June 1950 in accordance with United States plans. Mr. Kiselyov quoted a letter dated 3 December 1948 addressed to Syngman Rhee from his adviser on foreign affairs concerning a plan for the anti-communist struggle in Asia lead jointly by the forces of the United States, South Korea, Kuomintang China and Japan under a unified command. That plan included attacks in the direction of Vladivostok, Khabarovsk and the province of Shantung.

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

9. The United States intervention in Korea was a part of its larger policy for war in Asia. The extent of United States preparation had been revealed in *Life* magazine in August 1950; it had observed that within a few weeks more United States troops had been put into Korea than had participated in the invasion of North Africa.

10. The representative of the United States was seeking conditions under which the Korean war could be continued. On the other hand, from the outset, the Soviet Union had sought a peaceful settlement. In August 1950 it had supported the attempt of the Prime Minister of India to achieve a settlement. At the fifth session of the General Assembly it had put forward proposals¹ calling for an end to hostilities and the withdrawal of foreign troops. The negotiations for an armistice had been started on the initiative of the Soviet Union.

11. Plainly the United States did not desire a settlement and continually stalled the negotiations. From the outset the United States refused to consider the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops. It took six weeks to establish an armistice agenda and two months to demarcate a truce line. The United States had tried to interrupt the negotiations by bombing and strafing and sending armed patrols into the neutral zone where the negotiations were being conducted. The United States then brought up new demands in connexion with the exchange of prisoners of war and the repair and construction of airfields. The United States policy was a blind behind which it continued the armaments race, for the ruling circles feared that an end of hostilities would lead to lowering the tempo of rearmament.

12. The adoption of the proposals of the Soviet Union would lead to a solution of the problem of a peaceful settlement in Korea and elsewhere.

13. The attitude of the Byelorussian SSR delegation on the questions of disarmament and the prohibition of atomic weapons was well known. Concrete proposals had been submitted by the Soviet Union but they had been criticized by the representative of the United Kingdom on the ground that they represented no more than an old position to which the Soviet Union had reverted.

14. The records, however, showed that the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union at the fourth session of the General Assembly had sought to remove the obstacles to agreement by proposing that the conventions relating to prohibition and control should be concluded simultaneously. The records of that session also showed that the United Kingdom representative had found unacceptable the proposals of the Soviet Union.

15. It was clear that at the present time the United Kingdom representative was not interested in the question of the prohibition of the atomic weapon and again wanted first the establishment of the control system and then the discussion on prohibition. An attempt was now being made to transfer to the Disarmament Commission the proposals of the Soviet Union, with a view to burying them.

16. In a new effort to reach agreement with France, the United Kingdom and the United States, the Soviet Union had proposed that the prohibition of atomic weapons and international control should be put into effect simultaneously. It had further been proposed that the control organ should have the right to conduct inspection on a continuing basis. The Soviet Union had always advocated

an effective system of control and in 1947 had presented detailed concrete proposals to deal with the problem of possible violations of the convention prohibiting atomic weapons. Those proposals had been turned down by the United States and again at the present session the proposal for an unconditional ban on atomic weapons had been rejected. The Soviet Union had now brought forward fresh proposals with a view to removing the obstacles to agreement.

17. The adoption by the General Assembly of the proposal that draft conventions relating to the prohibition of the atomic weapon and control over the observance of that prohibition should be submitted by the Disarmament Commission to the Security Council not later than 1 June 1952 would be a significant move to reduce the threat of a new war.

18. The mad armaments race being conducted by States of the "Atlantic bloc" was a serious threat to the peace. Immense sums were being devoted to warlike preparations on the pretence that there was a need for defensive measures. However, even Mr. Attlee had stated that he did not believe the Soviet Union wanted war. Mr. Kiselyov quoted the *Economist* and the *New York Herald Tribune* as stating that the Soviet Union was not enlarging its armaments and armed forces. No threat existed on the part of the Soviet Union and the reduction of armaments was highly necessary to remove the threat of war.

19. The adoption of the Soviet Union proposals for the reduction by one-third of the armaments and armed forces of the five permanent members of the Security Council and the calling of a world conference on the question of armaments reduction would be a substantial step forward.

20. The Soviet Union proposals recognized the primary responsibility of the great Powers for the maintenance of peace, and accordingly called upon them to conclude a peace pact. Similar proposals had been submitted at the fourth and fifth sessions. Again in August 1951, Mr. Shvernik, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, had proposed such a pact in a letter to President Truman. It was evident that the settlement of their differences by the great Powers and the conclusion of such a pact was the essential basis for peace and a guarantee of the normal functioning of the United Nations.

21. The Soviet Union proposals should be approved in order to enable the United Nations to take the path of strengthening peace and friendship among the nations. The Byelorussian delegation supported the revised draft resolution submitted by the USSR and would vote in favour of it.

22. Mr. GUNDERSEN (Norway) said that the Soviet Union proposals had been anxiously awaited because no other government was in a better position to dispel the fears of the world. The problem of strengthening peace and friendship among nations was, however, a question of confidence and required a minimum of respect for the views of other nations. The statement of the Soviet Union representative gave little evidence of these requirements for he had attributed only evil designs to the leaders of the western world. It was to be hoped that the Soviet Union representative did not believe his own words.

23. The revised draft resolution began by inviting the General Assembly to brand as an "aggressive bloc" a defensive union such as the North Atlantic Treaty. That was the first move made by the Soviet Union to strengthen friendship among the nations.

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Annexes, Agenda item 24, document A/C.1/567.*

24. The next point was concerned with Korea. Mr. Gundersen associated his delegation with those who believed that a political discussion could not assist the armistice negotiations.

25. With regard to the disarmament proposals, there were three modifications to be observed : first, the convention on prohibition and the institution of international control should come into effect simultaneously ; secondly, the Disarmament Commission should submit the draft convention by 1 June rather than 1 February ; and thirdly, the control organ would have the right to conduct inspection on a continuing basis. It was obvious that these matters should be laid before the Disarmament Commission. Even the Soviet Union foresaw a threefold task for the Commission : first, concrete proposals would have to be evolved ; secondly, agreement would have to be reached on the organization, powers and functions of the control organ ; thirdly, conventions would have to be formulated to make the system legally binding.

26. With regard to the final clause in paragraph 6 relating to non-interference by the control organ in the domestic affairs of States, Mr. Gundersen believed that the full meaning was not clear. He did not take issue with the general thesis but it was a matter which should be examined in the Disarmament Commission and not adopted as a principle until its effect upon the work of the control organ had been studied.

27. It would therefore be only natural to refer the USSR proposal on disarmament and any other proposal of a similar nature to the Disarmament Commission.

28. Mr. Gundersen said that the USSR proposal for a one-third reduction in the arms of the great Powers, as had been pointed out repeatedly, was both unreal and unacceptable since it would leave unaffected the considerable military superiority of the USSR and the danger to the security of other nations would remain the same. Once an effective system of disclosure and verification was in operation, fair and balanced reduction of arms would become possible.

29. With regard to the USSR proposal for a peace pact, he pointed out that, to refrain from war and to seek peaceful solution of problems, a more solemn undertaking than the Charter could hardly be drafted. The need was for genuine settlement of outstanding issues.

30. Returning to the North Atlantic Treaty, Mr. Gundersen said that it was based on the undisputed right of self-defence under international law which had been reaffirmed in Article 51 of the Charter. It was clear that every country had the right to join with others to prepare common defence against aggression ; that was what Norway had done in signing the North Atlantic Treaty. That Treaty was one of the main stabilizing forces in the world and events might have been otherwise had such a force existed in 1914 or 1939. Any aggressor would know that an attack on any part of the North Atlantic area would be regarded as an attack on the whole area and would be resisted by all the nations parties to the Treaty.

31. The effort to build up defences involved a great burden for the peoples of the western countries, who did not wish to carry the load any longer than necessary. The western Powers were always ready to enter into *bona fide* negotiations for the settlement of outstanding issues.

32. The representative of Norway would vote against the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/698) and in favour of the draft resolution submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/699).

33. Mr. SANDLER (Sweden) would support the three-Power draft resolution, since the new Disarmament Commission created by the General Assembly was intended to deal with proposals such as that of the USSR.

34. He drew attention to three points regarding that proposal which should be elucidated by the Disarmament Commission : 1. was the present USSR proposal substantially different from that advanced by the USSR in 1948², at which time it had been evident that the real differences concerned the scope and nature of the control system ? 2. did the new formula mean that the USSR had abandoned its previous proposal for regular inspection of factories declared by the State in question to be producing fissionable materials ? 3. would the control organ have executive powers ? If not, who would have those powers ? In that connexion, Mr. Sandler recalled Mr. Gromyko's reply³ to the United Kingdom questionnaire.

35. Examination of those points by the Disarmament Commission would make any differences clearer.

36. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) said that Mr. Vyshinsky's latest statement, though it had dealt with the recent statements made by Mr. Truman and Mr. Acheson, had made no reference to the statement made in the last few days at Columbia University by Mr. Eden ; the latter was a felicitous presentation of the policy of the western Powers. Mr. Eden, recognizing that the USSR was influenced only by facts, had pointed out that the outstanding fact in the present situation was that the western Powers were prepared to defend themselves and would not allow the USSR to extend its hegemony over the whole world.

37. Mr. Vyshinsky had acknowledged the peace-loving character of the declarations made by the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty, but had avoided dealing with the legal foundations of the Treaty, realizing that that Treaty came within the framework of Article 51 of the Charter and was an expression of the natural right of self-defence. The western Powers had come face to face, following the Second World War, with an undeniable fact : the establishment of a vast centralized military Power with unlimited resources and the fervour of a pseudo-democratic movement of a " Messianic " kind at its disposal. The aggressive and expansionist attitude of the USSR, its evident intentions and the recent record had made the North Atlantic Treaty an inevitable and necessary reply.

38. Mr. Vyshinsky had discussed the Korean problem, which the Committee had decided not to consider for the time being in order to avoid interfering with the negotiations in progress in Korea. That statement had increased the anxiety as to the decision which the USSR alone could take to make possible an armistice. One word from the USSR would be enough. Dilatory tactics would merely lead to an aggravation of the situation obtaining in the world. The Korean problem constituted the acid test of the USSR's readiness to diminish international tension and to co-operate with the rest of the world on an equal footing. Until the USSR had given the order for an immediate armistice, the confidence of the world could not be revived. There could be no point in sterile discussion of the Korean question when all that mankind wanted was peace in Korea.

39. The least attempt to bring the Soviet Union point of view closer to that of the rest of the world was to be welcomed, and Mr. Belaunde observed that the USSR

² See document A/C.1/310.

³ See *Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Third Year, Special Supplement*, p. 27.

proposal appeared to constitute in part such an advance. The USSR now seemed ready to accept making prohibition of atomic weapons dependent upon establishment of effective control and to accept the principle of inspection on a continuing basis.

40. Many important points of difference remained, however—for example, the reservation to the effect that the control organ was not to interfere in the domestic affairs of States. Nothing was more difficult to define than the domestic affairs of a State and the Disarmament Commission would have to clarify the matter. The programme adopted by the General Assembly was indivisible and must apply to all weapons. The text of Mr. Vyshinsky's speech seemed to imply that the USSR accepted that principle.

41. However, paragraph 5 of the USSR draft resolution would make the process of disclosure of the situation of armaments and armed forces subsequent to prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of control. In Mr. Belaúnde's opinion, disclosure must take place simultaneously with the rest of the programme.

42. Moreover, an automatic one-third reduction of armaments and armed forces, as provided for in paragraph 4 of the draft resolution, would be unjust and such a decision would be unrealistic. The question of armaments must be dealt with as a whole, and a balanced reduction must be carried out on a basis of true and just proportion.

43. Mr. Belaúnde hoped that there was no reason for pessimism with regard to the implications of Mr. Vyshinsky's comparison of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its 358th plenary meeting by which it created the Disarmament Commission and the resolution creating the Interim Committee. He hoped that the USSR would participate in the work of the Disarmament Commission which would be the appropriate body to consider the USSR draft resolution. He was sure that the USSR proposal would receive serious consideration in the Commission. The policy followed by the western Powers had as its aim to establish an equilibrium in the world which would be most favourable to the real interests of the USSR.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.