



Thursday, 3 January 1952, at 3 p.m.

Palais de Chaillot, Paris

CONTENTS

	Page
Tribute to the memory of Mr. Enrique Muñoz Meany, head of the Guatemalan delegation to the United Nations.....	129
Methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter : report of the Collective Measures Committee (A/1891, A/C.1/676 and A/C.1/688) (continued)	129

Chairman : Mr. Finn MOE (Norway).

Tribute to the memory of Mr. Enrique Muñoz Meany, head of the Guatemalan delegation to the United Nations

1. Mr. GONZALEZ (Venezuela), speaking as Chairman of the Latin-American group and as representative of Venezuela, offered his condolence to the delegation of Guatemala on the occasion of the death of its Chairman, Mr. Enrique Muñoz Meany.

Methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter : report of the Collective Measures Committee (A/1891, A/C.1/676 and A/C.1/688) (continued)

[Item 18]*

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

2. Mr. GONZALEZ (Venezuela) said that in the course of its participation in the work of the Collective Measures Committee, the Venezuelan delegation had always borne in mind the principles set forth in paragraph 10 of the Committee's report which stated, *inter alia*, that each Member had a duty to participate in accordance with the Charter in the maintenance of peace and security and to act collectively if States were to be able to count on the security which the United Nations Charter was intended to provide. The Venezuelan delegation had also supported the view stated in paragraph 23 that the measures which might be deemed appropriate would vary in different cases in accordance, on the one hand, with the circumstances giving rise to the threat or breach of the peace and, on the other hand, with factors such as the geographical location of the offending State, its economic self-sufficiency or its sensitivity to moral pressure.

3. Since it would be practically impossible to determine in advance the means to be used to deal with every conceivable act of aggression, the members of the Collective Measures Committee had felt that it was important at least

to draw up rules on which collective action by States Members could be based, bearing in mind the principle of equality of sacrifice.

4. As a member of the international community, Venezuela recognized its responsibilities in a field which had not hitherto been subject to international action and was persuaded that, if it wished to guarantee its own territorial integrity, it could not remain passive should another State be the victim of an act of aggression. That readiness to contribute to a common effort, which was certainly shared by all States, would not, however, suffice to ensure peace unless provision was made for an organization which could gradually develop into a system capable of being effectively applied whenever the need arose. The failure of the League of Nations in the field of collective security had been due primarily to its overlooking the fact that the geographical position of a victim of aggression implied duties for its immediate neighbours, and also the primary need for States situated in other areas not to weaken themselves if they were to avoid exposing themselves to possible aggression.

5. The Collective Measures Committee did not claim that it had reached final conclusions. Its report was intended to serve as a basis for further studies. Nevertheless, fundamental ideas had been developed in regard to both economic and military measures.

6. In the case of economic measures, three objectives had to be borne in mind. In the first place, the offensive power of the aggressor had to be reduced. Secondly, effective assistance must be provided to States opposing aggression. Lastly, the impact of economic measures must not involve States, which applied them strictly, in losses they could not support. The balance between the need to furnish contributions on the one hand and the need of self-defence on the other was a highly complicated problem. Although the Committee, in paragraph 132 of its report, recognized that the problem would require further study, section II B of chapter III laid down the principles on which future action in that field must be based.

7. In the case of military measures, the principle of equality of sacrifice was laid down in chapter IV and in chapter V, section C, paragraph (iv) (a) of which stated that the

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

special interest of participating States whose territory was situated in, or contiguous to, the area of hostilities should also be recognized.

8. The special position of countries far removed from the theatre of operations and the need to develop their production of strategic materials, when circumstances so required, should likewise be considered.

9. The representative of Venezuela also stressed the importance of certain raw materials produced in Venezuela, such as petroleum and iron ore. The special position of countries producing such commodities would require further study, since the importance of their contribution to any international effort had not yet been exactly assessed. Mr. Gonzalez recalled the statement made in Washington in April 1951 by the Venezuelan Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had said that in the event of international conflict Venezuela would spare no effort to defend its sources of production against any attempts at sabotage as well as against external attack. Although the report of the Collective Measures Committee dealt with the imposition of an embargo on exports of strategic materials, it dealt nowhere with the production of such materials for supply to a victim of aggression. Such production was, however, of undeniable military importance and the problems it raised should be further studied.

10. In those circumstances, the Government of Venezuela wished to state that Venezuela would be obliged to pay very special attention to the defence of its own territory and that it could only despatch forces to neighbouring territories in specific cases and subject to agreement.

11. In conclusion, the representative of Venezuela said that the members of the Collective Measures Committee had been guided by the view that aggression should be discouraged before it took place. Nevertheless, the United Nations must be in a position to assist, where necessary, the victim of aggression and to repel the aggressor. Mr. Gonzalez expressed the hope that the eleven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/676) would receive the support of a majority of the members of the First Committee.

12. Mr. PALAR (Indonesia) stated that his delegation shared the views expressed by the representatives of Burma, Egypt and Mexico who, although members of the Collective Measures Committee, had not joined with the eleven other members of the Committee in sponsoring the joint draft resolution. His delegation shared the views of those three countries regarding questions dividing the great Powers.

13. Mr. Palar hoped that the Security Council would be the body to decide, in accordance with the principles set forth in the United Nations Charter whether a threat of aggression or breach of the peace had been committed in a specific case, since that would indicate agreement between the great Powers. If the question had to be referred to the General Assembly, it would be a sign of division between the great Powers and the world situation would be dangerous.

14. The representative of Indonesia recalled that the resolution entitled "Uniting for peace" stressed the duty of the United Nations, before resorting to the application of collective measures, to seek the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means through the procedures laid down in the Charter. He also stressed the role of the Security Council in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security and the duty of the permanent members to seek unanimity and to exercise restraint in the use of the veto. It was a fact, however, that in the event of a breach of the peace, the Security Council was still without the apparatus and forces to act, since it had not yet carried out its obligation to negotiate the agreements provided

under Article 43 of the Charter. It was for that reason that the General Assembly, at its fifth session, had adopted recommendations regarding the study of collective measures which might be applied pending the conclusion of such agreements.

15. As the Chairman of the Collective Measures Committee, the representative of Brazil had said that that Committee's report was an inquiry into methods, procedures and techniques which might guide United Nations action in co-ordinating and integrating the resources of Member States. It was not a political proposal calling upon the General Assembly to act. That report, adopted unanimously by the Member States comprising the Committee, showed the need for further study of the matter. The Committee's work should accordingly continue. The conclusions reached by the Committee should be of assistance to the Security Council in discharging its duties, not only until the agreements mentioned in Article 43 of the Charter had been reached, but also after their conclusion.

16. Although the General Assembly, following some serious rift among the permanent members of the Security Council, might succeed in gathering the requisite majority for a vote regarding the application of collective measures, that majority might well be only in votes and might prove ineffective so long as the power of the two opposing parties remained nearly equal.

17. It had never been the intention of the United Nations to line up the major Powers on opposite sides. When the United Nations had come into being, there had been a solid belief that great-Power agreement was essential for the settlement of issues concerning international peace and security. The application of collective measures must be viewed in that light. The implementation of a General Assembly recommendation for recourse to collective measures might create a situation liable to develop into world war and to precipitate the very thing that the United Nations was intended to avoid.

18. The Indonesian delegation believed that situations might arise wherein it would feel quite justified in opposing the application of collective measures and in adopting a mediator's role, preferably in co-operation, so far as possible, with other countries. Indonesia would of course always seize the opportunity to abide by any resolution adopted by the General Assembly, as it had shown by its compliance with the embargo imposed by the General Assembly on trade with China, although it had abstained from voting on that question.

19. The Indonesian delegation supported the purposes and principles set out in the preamble of the eleven-Power draft resolution. With regard to the sixth paragraph of the preamble, Indonesia had no constitutional machinery enabling it to maintain elements within its national armed forces which could be made available for United Nations service. Furthermore, its armed forces were for the moment essential for maintaining order within the country. Again, Indonesia would not be able to comply with the recommendations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the operative part until it had the necessary constitutional machinery.

20. Those circumstances would explain the Indonesian delegation's vote on the draft resolution as a whole and on its various parts.

21. Mr. WILSON (New Zealand), in analyzing the work of the Collective Measures Committee, emphasized that it had been particularly concerned with methods for the application of sanctions against an aggressor. The analysis of the problem involved in applying sanctions of a political,

economic or military character and the listing of the various kinds of measures which might be taken in any such case, would retain its value whether the measures which were called for by the Security Council under the Charter or recommended by the General Assembly acting in default of the Security Council. The report of a committee set up by the General Assembly was exactly like any similar report that might have been submitted by a special committee constituted under a unanimous resolution of the Security Council.

22. The Committee's work had been essentially technical and its report was of a very high order, particularly if allowance was made for the fact that the Committee had had to consider practical methods of dealing with a series of hypothetical situations. Should the United Nations ever decide to draw the net of collective measures around an aggressor, it would only have to look at that report to find guidance in any situation that might arise. The writers of the report had, moreover, successfully drawn upon the history of the past thirty years.

23. Mr. Wilson pointed out that the principles set forth in paragraphs 7 and 10 of the general conclusions (chapter V) of the report were of particular importance, especially the statement that the success of any collective security effort depended upon the will and determination of individual States and that, to be most effective, United Nations collective action should be as nearly universal as possible. The collective military action undertaken by the United Nations for the first time in a specific case had been real and substantial. Unfortunately, some States had opposed that action; the abstention from participation of certain others must be noted. If such a spirit of opposition and abstention were to show itself anew, and perhaps even increase in some subsequent case of aggression, the principle of collective security and the future of the United Nations would be in jeopardy. New Zealand fully realized the practical difficulties of certain States and to some extent shared them, but believed that the only hope lay in the generalization of collective action when approved, and expected that all Member States would gradually come to recognize their duty to participate actively therein.

24. Mr. Wilson was glad to see that the Committee's report gave special prominence to the idea that the immediate objective of the collective military measures would be to go to the aid of the victim of aggression in defence of its territorial integrity or political independence. A wording on those lines had been proposed by the New Zealand delegation at San Francisco for insertion in the first Article of the United Nations Charter. Although that passage of the report did not, of course, constitute an amendment to the Charter, it did nevertheless mean that the precise objective of United Nations action could be defined not in abstract terms, but as being assistance to a State in defence of its territorial integrity and political independence.

25. As regards the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/676), Mr. Wilson, in considering paragraph 2 of the operative part, said that, with reference to the renewed appeal to Member States to earmark armed forces, the strength of such forces which New Zealand could devote to collective military action was indicated in annex II of the report of the Collective Measures Committee. His delegation regarded that appeal as addressed to Member States in general, and in particular to those Members which had not yet seen their way to participate in the collective action of the United Nations. Though his delegation was prepared to re-examine any appeal made by the General Assembly, its acceptance of that paragraph was given subject to the observation he had made.

26. As regards paragraph 9 of the operative part, which directed the Committee to continue its work for another year, the delegation of New Zealand would not oppose the adoption of the paragraph though it would not expect new studies to add substantially to what had already been achieved, and it shared the views on that subject expressed at the 476th meeting by the United Kingdom representative.

27. Mr. MELAS (Greece) associated himself with the tribute paid to Mr. Muñiz, Chairman of the Collective Measures Committee, and to his colleagues on that Committee. He also wished to pay tribute to the memory of Mr. Léon Bourgeois whose pioneer work on the problem of applying collective military measures must still be within the recollection of all.

28. He thought that the setting up of a collective security system was the main purpose of the United Nations. Not until all countries felt themselves solidly supported by each other could confidence reign throughout the world.

29. The draft resolution before the First Committee might appear to be modest in view of what would still have to be done when those objectives had been achieved; but it must be considered in the light of the position before June 1950 and before the adoption of the "Acheson proposals", when there had been no collective security provisions at all. The really important task for the moment in connexion with the United Nations' efforts to secure the adoption of a definite system of collective measures, was the creation of a calm and objective atmosphere in which it would be possible to appreciate the justice of those efforts and which would make it clear that they were in the interest of all, including the States farthest away from possible areas of conflict. It was, moreover, an elementary truth, though one still challenged in some quarters, that provision for effective measures against a possible aggressor was the surest and least costly way of preventing aggression. Greece considered it possible to establish a system of international solidarity against aggression and was demonstrating that conviction in Korea at the present time.

30. The Greek delegation would support the eleven-Power joint draft resolution.

31. Mr. WEI (China) considered that the report of the Collective Measures Committee was one of the best that had been submitted to the General Assembly. As the Chairman of the Committee on Collective Measures had pointed out (462nd meeting), the Assembly should not regard the report as a political proposal, but should consider it as an analysis of measures for collective defence and co-ordinated action by the nations which were resolved to defend the purposes of the United Nations Charter.

32. Examination of the report would have to deal with three questions: first, whether the method followed by the Committee in its study should be approved; secondly, whether it was advisable to recommend that the Committee should continue its work; and, thirdly, what measures should be taken to advance its work.

33. The Chinese delegation approved the Committee's method of approach and also approved in principle the conclusions it had reached. Nevertheless, it doubted whether it would be desirable to adopt the latter now, since the Committee itself wished to devote more time to the study of the question. He thought that the Committee should be invited to continue its work for at least a year and to enjoy the greatest possible latitude within its terms of reference.

34. But he believed that priority should be given to the study of the question of the panel of military experts. He strongly hoped that the arrangements for the appointment

of the panel of military experts would be completed at the earliest possible date.

35. The Chinese delegation would support the eleven-Power draft resolution, on the understanding that its approval of the conclusions of the report was only temporary.

36. Mr. BELLEGARDE (Haiti) recalled that he had already stressed the fundamental importance of the problem of collective security. The will for domination in Hitlerite Germany had awakened the sense of self-preservation of the other Powers at the time of the League of Nations. Unfortunately, the League of Nations' conception of maximum disarmament had been illusory. The French had understood better the problem of peace. According to Mr. Herriot, peace could be guaranteed only by the compulsory arbitration of all disputes and by the establishment of an effective system of collective security. That course had not been pursued. The results had followed rapidly; it was the policy of the "scrap of paper", which had engendered the total lack of confidence from which the world was again suffering.

37. Nevertheless, that confidence existed among the republics of the American continent. They had, in fact, undertaken to settle any disputes which might arise among them by peaceful methods. That should also be the attitude of all the signatories of the United Nations Charter. At the fourth Meeting of Consultation the Ministers of Foreign Affairs held at Washington in 1951, the American States

had re-affirmed their faith in peaceful principles. Nevertheless, owing to the warning of the aggression against Korea, they had decided to train units in their own armies, which might be made available to the United Nations for the defence of peace. Another resolution had shown their determination to co-operate within the United Nations in order to prevent and, if necessary, to punish any new aggression. The American republics had thus undertaken to support the United Nations in the organization of a system of collective security.

38. The First Committee's task was not that of drafting an academic treatise on morality. What was essential was the provision of immediately applicable sanctions against the guilty parties. The Organization of American States was really democratic and based on the principle of equality because it did not countenance the right of veto, which would be regarded as an inadmissible privilege. The fact that a great Power which was a member of the Security Council could attack a small nation and prevent the functioning of the United Nations by its right of veto was evidence of a defective system of collective security, which would have to be amended.

39. The Haitian delegation would give every support to the Collective Measures Committee and would encourage it in pursuing its task.

The meeting rose at 4.35 p.m.