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MEETING

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Chairman: Mr. Finn MOE (Norway).

**Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of
all armed forces and all armaments (A/1943,
A/C.1/667/Rev.1, A/C.1/668/Rev. 2, A/C.1/669,
A/C.1/677 and A/C.1/680) (*continued*)**

[Item 66]*

**International control of atomic energy : report of the
Committee of Twelve (A/1922) (*continued*)**

[Item 16]*

**CONSIDERATION OF THE REVISED DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED
BY FRANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED
STATES (A/C.1/667/Rev.1) AND AMENDMENTS THERETO
(*continued*)**

1. Mr. PALAR (Indonesia) said that his delegation had decided that its duty was to grasp every opportunity to bring together the two opposed Powers who in the final analysis would be responsible for whether there was to be peace or war. It was clear that the major rift between them still existed and that the situation remained as dangerous as it had been at the beginning of the discussion. A basic distrust impelled both sides to seek different means of attaining similar objectives.

2. In the circumstances, his delegation could fulfil its duty only by refraining from following either of the alternative courses proposed. While it would vote for any point on which agreement had been reached and would support any measure which would bring the two points of view closer together, it would abstain on all other matters. Mr. Palar voiced the hope that the commission, which both sides agreed should be established, would succeed in bridging the gap between them and in alleviating the current tension.

3. ANDRAOS Bey (Egypt) stated that the Egyptian amendment (A/C.1/681) had been submitted without the intention of favouring either of the two sides in the discussion ; it was intended only to widen the field of possible

agreement. The USSR point of view went much further than the Egyptian amendment which was a temporary measure to come into effect before the general scheme envisaged under the three-Power draft resolution. That amendment would lead to prohibition of the use of the atomic weapon, but it did not cover other questions such as the production and control of atomic weapons and their use for peaceful purposes. While recognizing that such a prohibition could have only a moral sanction, he considered that, in the final analysis, it would be necessary to rely upon the word of each State, since, even if control were accepted, a State could always refuse to allow investigation and could escape its obligations in other ways. The three-Power proposal was a detailed but rather complicated scheme which, apart from the like lihood of difficulties in the various stages envisaged, had little living spirit in it. The USSR proposal contained enticing ideas but did not appear to be workable. The Egyptian amendment, he thought, might prove to be practical.

4. The question of collective security, dealt with in the second paragraph of the preamble of the draft resolution, might well be left for discussion with the fourth item on the Committee's agenda (A/C.1/666/Rev.1), dealing with that subject. The representative of Egypt had no objection to collective security, however, if it were really collective.

5. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru), referring to remarks made at the 468th meeting by the representative of the Byelorussian SSR, emphasized that he had not favoured the humanising of the atomic weapon, but had merely pointed out that, in fact, nuclear energy, which originally had appeared to be catastrophic, was approaching the stage of peaceful use. Other weapons which might be equally as destructive as the atomic bomb must be considered, in addition to a real prohibition of the atomic weapon. The Peruvian delegation would always favour real prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, whether atomic or otherwise.

6. Turning to Mr. Vyshinsky's statement at the 469th meeting, Mr. Belaúnde remarked that it was not his fault that there was no mention in the USSR amendment of other major weapons of mass destruction. In that connexion, he observed that it was paradoxical that the USSR, which had

* Indicates the item number of the General Assembly Agenda.

supported resolution 41 (I) of the General Assembly referring to other weapons of mass destruction, had not made any reference to them in its amendment.

7. With regard to the question of unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons as compared to prohibition linked with control, to which Mr. Vyshinsky had made reference, Mr. Belaúnde declared that a mere declaration was not sufficient to achieve the aim unless the means to implement it were already in existence. Since that was not the case, an effective and tangible prohibition was necessary. Prohibition could not be separated from control, and the latter could not be separated from verification.

8. Declaring that what the peoples of the world wanted was an effective system of control which would ensure prohibition, Mr. Belaúnde stated that in view of the crisis of the last five years a moral declaration was insufficient. The problem of prohibition was the basic one facing the modern world, namely, that of setting up a supra-national authority. If such an authority were in existence, it would be possible to think of an unconditional prohibition. The USSR called for unconditional prohibition but drew back when unconditional international co-operation was necessary. It was terrified of the only real safeguard, namely, unconditional co-operation in the work of an international authority.

9. Mr. Vyshinsky had again condemned the theory of the balance of power. The evolution of mankind had revolved around the dilemma of either having a balance of forces or having an empire. Stressing the fact that the development of Europe and of western civilization was due in large measure to the principle of balance, Mr. Belaúnde stated that the dilemma was inevitable, and would have to be faced until the establishment of a supra-national authority. The USSR opposition to the principle of the balance of power in the existing situation was difficult to understand. If there was no such balance or equilibrium, what would there be? The alternative envisaged by Mr. Vyshinsky appeared to be that of USSR supremacy.

10. Mr. BARRINGTON (Burma), reviewing the discussion in the First Committee and in Sub-Committee 18, recalled that it had been hoped that the four Powers would be able to find common ground and remove the fear of another and greater holocaust. The result of the sub-committee's work, however, had not taken the Committee very far towards achieving that goal. The agreement that a commission should be established had been stultified by the failure to agree on the terms of reference to be given to the commission. In the situation that obtained, the danger was that any attempt to predetermine the commission's mandate would result in its being stillborn.

11. Since that result was to be expected from adoption of either the three-Power proposal or the USSR amendment to it, the delegation of Burma would not participate in the voting upon the draft resolution or on any of the amendments.

12. While it favoured the Egyptian amendment and would have supported it had it been presented as a separate proposal, his delegation had no choice but to adopt the same attitude towards it since it had been submitted as an amendment.

13. The Polish draft resolution, though less specific than the three-Power proposal, and though it would not represent any advance in the existing situation, would keep the door open and ensure that the commission was not stillborn. Provided the door was left open he was confident that the four Powers would rise to their responsibilities and be able to do in the commission what they had not been able to do in this Committee. He would therefore support the Polish draft resolution.

14. Mr. MOCH (France), referring to the Peruvian amendment (A/C.1/682), thought that it would be difficult to make the distinction implied by the use of the word "major" unless a profound study of the subject were made. The three Powers agreed with the implication that the matter should be studied by the proposed commission. But he pointed out that all weapons of the so-called conventional type were capable of producing mass effects if used in sufficient quantity.

15. While the intention to limit the scope of the addition was laudable, the result might be to lead the discussion away from the objective, namely, the elimination of weapons essentially designed for mass destruction of civilians. It was desirable to avoid any confusion on that point, since such weapons were to be eliminated and not simply controlled. The commission would have to study the whole problem and submit its conclusions. With that reservation, the three Powers were prepared to accept the Peruvian amendment.

16. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) accepted the interpretation given by Mr. Moch to the amendment submitted by his delegation. He asked that the summary record indicate that that interpretation was authentic.

17. Mr. WILSON (New Zealand), noting that it had been argued that it would be better not to have positive terms of reference for the proposed commission unless the great Powers agreed on them, stated that that would mean that the General Assembly would abdicate its responsibility with regard to the basic principles involved.

18. While the Polish draft resolution did not propose that the earlier decisions of the General Assembly should be revoked, there was no doubt that it would be argued that those decisions had been revoked if that proposal were adopted. The whole discussion had consisted largely of arguments against principles already adopted by the General Assembly but that fact had not prevented the agreement reached in the Sub-Committee, though he recognized the limited extent of that agreement.

19. He pointed out that the "Baruch plan" had not remained unaltered, for, while originally it had not taken the Security Council much into account, all now agreed that the Council should occupy a central position. He therefore considered that the General Assembly would not close any door to agreement by endorsing some general principles.

20. In conclusion, Mr. Wilson also paid tribute to Lord Perth.

21. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America), referring to the Egyptian amendment to the joint draft resolution, stated that in the view of the three Powers the central point of the question was that they could not rely simply on promises, and that there must be some kind of control system which would ensure that no State could use atomic weapons even if it would be willing to break its promise. Only then would the peoples of the world know that atomic weapons had in fact been eliminated.

22. He had understood the Egyptian representative to say that even under the three-Power draft resolution it would be necessary in the final analysis to rely on the word of individual States. But he thought that the Egyptian representative would recognize that an essential element of the United Nations plan was that it went beyond promises and would provide a system of international control whereby no nation would be left in possession of fissionable material or atomic weapons in such a manner as to make possible their use by any national authority. That plan would also give the world warning if any nation should seek to avoid the control system. The joint draft resolution insisted on

eliminating atomic weapons, and such a prohibition would become possible with control. As had been pointed out, however, a prohibition without control would be only a paper one. This was true whether the paper prohibition was contained in a treaty drafted by the Sixth Committee, as proposed by Egypt, or in a General Assembly resolution as proposed by the USSR. They would be derelict in their duty to the peoples whom they represented if they thought otherwise.

23. Any nation which was prepared to violate its most solemn obligation, the Charter of the United Nations, obviously would not hesitate to break other obligations. The examples of nazi Germany and of imperialist Japan showed that totalitarian nations found it easy to break their promises if that furthered their evil designs. In that connexion, Mr. Jessup wondered whether anyone really thought that the fascist dictators, who had broken all their other treaties with the allies, had refrained from using poison gas because of the conventions relating to it. The dictators had not used it because they had not believed it would be to their military advantage. When a totalitarian nation began a war, it did whatever it considered necessary to accomplish its purpose. Mr. Jessup added that he had not dwelt on the unreality of a separation of atomic from conventional weapons or on the effect upon peace of the prohibition of one weapon alone.

24. The three Powers were unable to accept or to incorporate the Egyptian amendment.

25. Faris EL-KHOURY Bey (Syria) said that it was clear that it would be futile to attempt to create agreement between the different viewpoints of the great Powers and that another year was likely to be added to the five years already lost.

26. However, he could not conceal his amazement at the tenacity with which each side had maintained its position, since, if the USSR had accepted the western proposals in 1946, it would long since have had prohibition of the atomic weapon, and, similarly, the western Powers would long since have had international control, had they accepted the USSR proposals at that time. Persistence in maintaining their respective courses would be sure to deprive both sides of the objectives they sought.

27. Since none of the proposals before the Committee was good enough to enable him to support it in good conscience, and none was bad enough to be opposed, he would abstain from voting.

28. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) said that in his intervention at the 469th meeting, the United Kingdom representative had rejected all efforts for the creation of a platform that would open the door to future attainment of agreed decisions. Mr. Lloyd had concluded with assurances to the effect that what had already been achieved in Sub-Committee 18 should not be lost and that the western Powers sought agreement and definite measures in the direction of peace. The burden of Mr. Lloyd's entire speech, however, was in direct contradiction to his concluding assurances. Further support of the three-Power proposals and rejection of the Soviet amendment as well as the Polish compromise proposal indicated that the three Powers wanted to saddle the First Committee with their own brand of solution. Although the Polish proposal would leave the proposed commission free to seek points of agreement in as broad a field as possible, as outlined by the report of the sub-committee, the United Kingdom representative still rejected it; indeed he characterized the quest for areas of agreement as inglorious, and one by which the Committee would abdicate its responsibilities.

29. Mr. Wierblowski could not understand the bewilderment of the United Kingdom representative as regards the origins of the Polish draft resolution. Had Mr. Lloyd carefully listened to the Polish statement made at the 467th meeting, he would not have had any reason for such bewilderment and would have also found that the Polish proposal was the best possible way out of the situation into which Mr. Lloyd and his friends had driven the Committee.

30. The adoption of the three-Power draft resolution would mean that the proposed commission would have to follow the clear United States directives laid down in that proposal and would eliminate the possibility of any additional suggestion. This made it obvious that paragraph 3 of the operative part of the joint draft resolution which ostensibly would permit the commission to discuss additional proposals, was mere phraseology which did not express any true desire to achieve an agreement.

31. A good part of Mr. Lloyd's speech was devoted to citing evidence of the flexibility which the three Powers had shown in the work of Sub-Committee 18. However, a close study of the Sub-Committee's report would show that if any agreement had been reached, it had been on secondary questions and that such an agreement had been possible thanks to the willingness of the USSR delegation to make concessions. On the other hand, the only concession on the part of the three Powers boiled down to the acceptance of a new name for the proposed commission. Other concessions were purely formal in nature and were fenced off by many reservations.

32. Mr. Lloyd had declared that he rejected mere promises. But never in the history of the United Nations had there been a more "paper" promise than the one contained in the tripartite proposal, and the declarations of the United States representative regarding the question of control, when the three Powers had not the slightest intention of giving up the atomic weapon.

33. In speaking of collective security, Mr. Lloyd had defended the North Atlantic Treaty, which was only a conspiracy against collective security and peace. The Polish delegation wanted collective security, but only within the framework of the United Nations.

34. The Polish representative felt that it was obvious that only the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the reduction of armaments such as would enjoy the support of all the great Powers could yield positive results. Moreover, in view of the fact that numerous representatives of the small Powers had stressed the necessity for exploring new avenues for agreement, the Polish draft resolution was the only way providing for further efforts towards agreement.

35. In the circumstances, his delegation would support the USSR amendment as well as the Egyptian amendment to the three-Power draft resolution.

36. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) recalled that his delegation had raised (466th meeting) two points, namely, whether the interested parties wished to work for an agreed solution, or to adopt an ideal resolution with no practical results. This query had been answered by the United States representative, whereas no reply had been given by Mr. Vyshinsky. In this instance, he ventured to ask the USSR representative the following question: should the USSR amendment be rejected and the joint draft resolution be adopted, would the USSR delegation be willing to co-operate?

37. Should the answer be in the negative, Mr. Al-Jamali suggested that the Committee should not dispose so quickly of such an important item, but should postpone voting and appoint a committee composed of representatives, such as

India, Mexico and Sweden, with a view to mediating between the two parties and finding a practical resolution which would command unanimous approval.

38. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he had answered the query made by the representative of Iraq by implication in his statement (469th meeting) regarding the Polish draft resolution and the USSR amendment. He recalled that his delegation had declared that the work of Sub-Committee 18 had yielded positive results. He had also quoted Mr. Nervo, the Chairman of the Sub-Committee, who had said that despite the disagreement which existed "on a number of matters of major importance", it seemed clear that there was "some agreement on a number of aspects of the two opposing views"; the discussions in the Sub-Committee appeared "to have helped to widen the areas of agreement on some points of the two proposals".

39. That earlier statement had led him to declare in the course of the previous meeting that his delegation had every reason to support the Polish proposal, which was based on the belief in the existence of further opportunities towards future agreement.

40. Mr. Vyshinsky believed that the query made by the representative of Iraq had been answered. However, should Mr. Al-Jamali go further and ask whether the USSR was prepared to accept the three-Power draft resolution, the question would hardly warrant an answer, for whenever the USSR objected to a proposal, such an objection meant that the USSR delegation was not prepared to accept that proposal as a basis for future work. That did not, however, mean that the USSR would not participate in the work of the Committee of Twelve or any other committee, in the hope that other questions and proposals would be submitted there that might lead to the elimination of disagreement. Naturally, disagreement could be eliminated more easily if the proposed commission were to have an entirely free hand, and was not beset with obstacles.

41. The position of the USSR, therefore, was that it could not follow the path that the three Powers desired, nor could it be bound by the decision of a majority of the Committee if a majority adopted the joint draft resolution, nor could it promise that it would work on that basis towards the solution of a problem for which the USSR had a solution in its own plan.

42. As to the suggestion made by the representative of Iraq that the question be further considered and discussed and that the Committee should not hurry in voting upon the different drafts and amendments thereto, but should appoint a mediatory body, the USSR delegation had never objected to the proposition that it was inappropriate to hurry in the case of important questions, or for that matter of small questions, and it was a reasonable thought that the Committee ought to work more on the issue. The USSR delegation had never refused to work on this or other questions.

43. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) said that the course of action which the Committee had been undertaking did not indicate any undue haste; indeed, never had the First Committee devoted so much time to the first item on its agenda as it had for the present one.

44. The three Powers had made numerous changes in their draft resolution in the hope of widening the area of agreement with the Soviet Union, and they recognized that there were still areas in which the opposing viewpoints had not been brought together. In the circumstances, he

welcomed Mr. Vyshinsky's statement to the effect that his delegation was always prepared to continue to work on such an important problem or any other great problem affecting international peace. For their part, the three Powers assured Mr. Vyshinsky that they would enter the discussion of the proposed commission with that same spirit of friendly accommodation and of effort to agree as had prevailed in Sub-Committee 18.

45. In conclusion, Mr. Jessup wished to assure the Committee that the revised joint draft resolution would allow the proposed commission to consider all the various ideas or plans submitted to it. In the long run, the commission's work would be more fruitful if the Assembly adopted the joint draft resolution than if it adopted the plausibly simple path suggested by the Polish draft resolution.

46. Mrs. SEKANINOVA-CAKARTOVA (Czechoslovakia) said, in reply to the remark made by Mr. Lloyd at the 469th meeting, that when, in 1948, some reactionary political groups within the parties represented in the Government, on the direct initiative of the representative of one of the western Powers, made an unconstitutional attempt at a *coup d'état*, the Czechoslovak people had unanimously shattered that attempt. Moreover, the people of Czechoslovakia could not forget the time when the tragic Munich policy of the United Kingdom had sacrificed them. On the other hand, it was the Soviet Union which had, at that time, stood firmly behind Czechoslovakia and brought it freedom and peace.

47. Turning to the amendment which her delegation had submitted (A/C.1/683), Mrs. Sekaninova-Carktova said that that amendment had been based on the view expressed by various delegations to the effect that the solution of such vital questions was impossible without the unanimous agreement of the four Powers. The amendment aimed at including in the resolution the points on which agreement had been reached and at making possible further discussion on points on which agreement had not been reached.

48. Mr. SANDLER (Sweden), in reply to the suggestion made by the representative of Iraq, stated that he did not believe that a small mediation group could accomplish any useful work in view of the very clear-cut divergence of opinion. As regards the possible participation of Sweden, the answer would be in the negative. His delegation was prepared to vote in favour of the three-Power draft resolution.

49. Mr. MOCH (France) said that the amendment submitted by the representative of Czechoslovakia merely put forward a Czechoslovak version of the Polish draft resolution. It was only natural that the authors of the three-Power draft resolution would reject it as energetically as they rejected the Polish draft resolution.

50. Sir Benegal RAU (India) declared that since his delegation had submitted its draft resolution (A/C.1/669), the Second Committee had adopted a somewhat wider resolution which included a substantial part of the Indian proposal.

51. In the circumstances, he would withdraw the draft resolution submitted by his delegation.

52. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) believed that the Polish draft resolution should be granted priority in voting since it would exclude substantive issues inasmuch as it would transmit the whole problem to the proposed commission.

53. Consequently, he requested that his draft resolution should be put to the vote first.

54. The CHAIRMAN said that the proposal made by the representative of Poland was governed by rule 130 of the rules of procedure.

55. He then put to the vote the Polish motion.

The motion was rejected by 39 votes to 6, with 13 abstentions.

56. The CHAIRMAN explained that he would request the Committee to vote first on the revised three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/667/Rev.1) and then on the Polish draft resolution (A/C.1/680). As for the various amendments, the order in which they were to be considered was governed by rule 129 of the rules of procedure.

57. Finally, he suggested that, in order to save time, representatives should explain their votes after the voting had been completed on the joint draft resolution and the amendments thereto, and not after the voting on each paragraph.

58. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) suggested that explanations of vote should be given after the votes on the various paragraphs with regard to which any representative might wish to offer an explanation. Should the Committee follow the Chairman's proposal, the representatives would be deprived of their right to enlist support, thereby placing the minority at a still greater disadvantage, as compared with the majority.

59. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote his proposal that explanations of vote should be given only after the com-

pletion of the voting on the draft resolution and the amendments thereto.

The proposal was adopted by 29 votes to 5, with 24 abstentions.

60. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) wondered whether the Committee could not allow those representatives who had submitted proposals or amendments, by way of an exception, to make such explanations while the vote was being taken.

61. The CHAIRMAN replied that the suggestion of the representative of Lebanon ran counter to rule 127 of the rules of procedure, which stated, *inter alia*, that "the Chairman shall not permit the proposer of a proposal or of an amendment to explain his vote on his own proposal or amendment".

62. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) formally moved the adjournment of the meeting.

63. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) disagreed with the Chairman's interpretation of rule 127.

64. He seconded the proposal for adjournment.

65. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the motion of the representative of Iraq for adjournment of the meeting.

The motion was adopted by 25 votes to 19, with 13 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.