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Chairman: Mr. Finn MOE (Norway).

Inclusion in the agenda of an additional item referred to the First Committee by the General Assembly (A/C.1/665/Add.1)

1. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to a letter from the President of the General Assembly (A/C.1/665/Add.1) transmitting to the First Committee the decision taken by the General Assembly at its 355th plenary meeting to include in the agenda of the sixth regular session and refer to the First Committee the following item :

“ Complaint of aggressive acts of the United States of America and its interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, as instanced by the appropriation of one hundred million dollars to finance the recruitment of persons and the organization of armed groups in the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania and a number of other democratic countries, as well as outside the territory of those countries ”.

2. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) recalled that his delegation had already expressed the desire that the item should be included in the agenda of the First Committee for consideration immediately after the discussion on disarmament. The charges made were slanderous, and he desired to refute them as soon as possible.

3. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) affirmed that there was nothing slanderous in the charges and he would undertake to demonstrate their truth. He agreed that the item should be discussed immediately after the one on disarmament.

4. The CHAIRMAN proposed that the new item referred to the Committee by the General Assembly be included as the third item on its agenda (A/C.1/666).

It was thus decided.

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments (A/1943, A/C.1/667/Rev. 1, A/C.1/668/Rev. 1, A/C.1/669, A/C.1/677 and A/C.1/680) (*continued*)

[Item 66]*

International control of atomic energy : report of the Committee of Twelve (A/1922) (*continued*)

[Item 16]*

CONSIDERATION OF THE REVISED DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY FRANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES (A/C.1/667/Rev. 1) AND AMENDMENTS THERE TO (*continued*)

5. Mr. KISELYOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic), speaking on the amendment submitted by the Soviet Union to the draft resolution proposed by the three Powers, regretted that point 3 of the amendment (A/C.1/668/Rev.1) had been rejected by the representatives of the western Powers. He deplored the fact that Mr. Jessup should have seen fit to comment ironically on the amendment proposed by the Soviet Union. In fact, the purpose of his irony was merely to confuse the situation.

6. By its insistence on the problem of control, the United States had succeeded in rejecting all proposals for the prohibition of atomic weapons advanced by the USSR. Mr. Jessup still defended the Baruch plan and had attempted to conceal the true policy of the United States behind considerations relating to international control. Everyone knew that in actual fact the United States wanted to lay hands on all the sources of atomic energy in the world by

*Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

establishing a "super-trust" which would obtain possession of all the possibilities of atomic production and be entirely dependent upon the United States. And even that would not be enough: always on the basis of the Baruch plan, which it refused to abandon, the United States would like to interfere in the electro-technical, metallurgical and chemical branches of production, and in all the economic activities of the various States.

7. The United States was spreading the rumour that the Soviet Union refused all control. Repeated statements by Generalissimo Stalin had proved the baselessness of such allegations. On the contrary, the Soviet Union was in favour of strict international control. The three Powers considered that the proclamation of the prohibition of the atomic bomb would be of no importance or effect unless the system of control was already in a position to operate. Mr. Moch had maintained that the order should be as follows: (1) establishment of control, (2) prohibition of the atomic bomb—and he was opposed to the USSR amendment for securing that prohibition. Actually, however, all that he had said was verbiage intended to conceal the determination of the three Powers to oppose any proclamation of the prohibition of atomic weapons. To judge by their words, the ruling circles of the United States were in favour of control and prohibition; actually they were supporters of the use of atomic weapons.

8. Mr. Belaúnde had stated at the 466th meeting that there would be something legal and humane about the use of the atomic bomb in the event of another war. That was the first time that an attempt had been made in the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations to justify the use of the atomic bomb. Such statements in such a place must be formally condemned.

9. The three Powers had attempted to prove that the revised text of their draft resolution represented a conciliatory approach towards the contention of the USSR. Actually, there was no change of position to be observed on the part of France, the United Kingdom and the United States. The western Powers were prepared neither to pronounce the prohibition of the atomic weapon nor to accept the proposals of the Soviet Union providing for practical measures to establish the control of atomic energy.

10. Whatever Mr. Lloyd might say, the adoption of the three Power draft resolution, based on the Baruch plan, could never succeed in achieving the prohibition of the atomic weapon. In actual fact, the purpose of the authors of that proposal was to prepare a new world war in which the use of the atomic bomb would enable them to establish their predominance.

11. The USSR had on many occasions done everything it could to persuade the three Powers that the proclamation of the prohibition of the atomic weapon would be to the advantage of those States which really wished to prevent the unleashing of a new war.

12. The USSR delegation had repeatedly submitted proposals for the prohibition of the atomic weapon. On 19 June 1946, for example, it had submitted to the Atomic Energy Commission a draft international convention to prohibit the production and employment of weapons based on the use of atomic energy for the purpose of mass destruction. There had also been the proposal of 19 June 1946 concerning the organization of the Atomic Energy Commission's work, the draft resolution submitted to the General Assembly on 29 October 1946 for the general reduction and regulation of armaments, the proposal for the general reduction of armaments submitted to the General Assembly on 29 November 1946, the amendments to the first report of the Atomic Energy Commission submitted

to the Security Council on 18 February 1947, the proposal concerning the programme of work of the Commission on Conventional Armaments submitted on 21 May 1947, the proposals relating to the establishment of control of atomic energy submitted to the Atomic Energy Commission on 11 June 1947, and the proposals for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction by one-third of the armaments and armed forces of the permanent members of the Security Council, namely, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, France and China. The latter proposals had been submitted to the General Assembly on 25 September 1948.

13. The USSR had also submitted proposals for the establishment of effective international control over technical and scientific activities in the field of atomic energy. Unfortunately, however, the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France had quite arbitrarily rejected all the USSR proposals. They had given the impression that they were afraid that agreement might be reached on the prohibition of the atomic weapon. The same fear was manifesting itself at the current session of the General Assembly.

14. The Byelorussian delegation wholeheartedly supported the USSR amendment to paragraph 1 of the operative part of the three-Power draft resolution.

15. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) said that his delegation continued to believe that agreement between the great Powers was an essential condition for the solution of the problem of the regulation and reduction of armaments. Without such agreement, the world would be faced either with economic bankruptcy or with a world war.

16. The work accomplished by the sub-committee which had been set up on the initiative of the delegations of Iraq, Syria and Pakistan would, even though no agreement had been reached on essential points, enable the proposed commission to function.

17. The Pakistan delegation, which would be a member of that commission if the General Assembly approved its establishment, reserved the right to make its position clear at the proper time. It wholeheartedly endorsed the purposes which the three-Power draft resolution and the USSR amendments sought to achieve. It also agreed with several of the points proposed in each of the two texts. It considered it preferable, however, that the terms of reference of the new commission should not be cast in too rigid a mould, so as to enable agreement to be more easily reached between the great Powers.

18. In those circumstances, his delegation would abstain from voting on the three-Power draft resolution and the USSR amendments.

19. Mr. BARANOVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) pointed out that paragraph 3 of the operative part of the three-Power draft resolution represented a fundamental divergence from the USSR amendment. In that paragraph it was intended to establish a system of atomic energy control based on the Baruch plan which had been severely criticized by the USSR. If the western Powers pressed for the adoption of that plan, it was precisely because they knew that it would not be accepted by the USSR.

20. The essential feature of the Baruch plan was that it conferred upon a so-called international control organ the ownership of all atomic undertakings, together with the task of determining what quantities of nuclear materials could be dangerous, the establishment of production quotas, and the setting up of principles to form the basis

of a convention relating to the production and stock-piling of nuclear materials and to the utilization of atomic energy.

21. The three-Power draft resolution would give a monopoly of atomic raw materials and atomic plants to the United States for the purpose of preparing for a new war and destroying the national sovereignty of Member States of the United Nations. It was quite clear that the so-called international control organ would be a United States body, operating exclusively in the interests of the United States and designed to achieve for it world hegemony. Its personnel would for the most part be representatives obeying the orders of the United States. The three-Power draft resolution, as revised, was in effect the Baruch plan, even though it was given a different name.

22. The representative of France had stated at the 464th meeting that the USSR had rejected the Baruch plan without offering any alternative scheme for control. He must have forgotten that, as far back as 11 June 1947, the USSR representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission had made concrete proposals based upon the control of atomic energy. Those proposals listed measures of control and inspection for which the international organ would be responsible, in order to ensure compliance with the terms of the convention on the prohibition of the atomic weapon. Under the terms of those proposals, the international control organ would be responsible for carrying out investigations in atomic factories, for checking their accounts and stocks of raw material and the information furnished by them on the production of atomic energy, for undertaking special enquiries in the case of infringement for making recommendations to governments concerning the production, stock-piling and utilization of atomic energy and for informing the Security Council if the convention were violated.

23. Doubts had been expressed as to the value of a control which was not continuous. The system of control proposed by the USSR was certainly not permanent, but it allowed of repeated inspections and frequent visits when the international control organ had reason to suspect any violation of the convention.

24. The USSR had been submitting concrete proposals for the control of the prohibition of the atomic weapon for over four years. Under pressure from the United States, however, those proposals had been rejected by the States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

25. Under the terms of paragraph 3 (a) of the joint draft resolution, a system of stages was established, and thus the prohibition of the atomic weapon was postponed to some future hypothetical date. In that way the United States, through the intermediary of the international control organ, could obtain the information it desired on the conventional armaments at the disposal of States not in possession of weapons of mass destruction, without having to reveal its secrets on the atomic weapon. That idea was on a par with the increased efforts being made by the United States to produce more atomic bombs and was favourable to its aggressive plans. It might be remembered that Senator McMahon had recently asked that the United States budget should be increased from \$1,000 million to \$6,000 million to provide for atomic production. He had added that the United States must have an atomic navy and air force; he had also requested that the United States delegation to the sixth session of the General Assembly should make an effort to bring about the establishment of an effective control of conventional armaments.

26. The Ukrainian delegation could not accept any of the provisions of paragraph 3 of the three-Power draft

resolution. It gave its full support to point 6 of the USSR amendment which listed the duties of the international control organ and provided for the immediate setting up of inspection for all undertakings without recourse to a system of stages.

27. The fears voiced by the representative of the Philippines and others, that as soon as atomic weapons had been prohibited the USSR would refuse to participate in the regulation and reduction of armaments and in a system of control, was without foundation since under the terms of point 5 of the USSR amendment, the international control organ would be responsible for checking and verifying information relating to all armaments and all armed forces.

28. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the operative part of the three-Power draft resolution, which would result in the application of the Baruch plan, mentioned—under another name—in paragraph 3 of that draft resolution, were unacceptable for the reasons already put forward. The Ukrainian delegation would, on the other hand, support points 5 and 6 of the USSR amendment, which provided for the immediate establishment of an international control organ.

29. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) pointed out that paragraph 3 of the three-Power draft resolution referred to two kinds of armaments: those which must be subject to regulation, limitation and reduction and those which must be prohibited. If the two resolutions 1 (I) and 41 (I) on the regulation and reduction of armaments adopted by the General Assembly in 1946 were taken as a basis, reference should also be made to the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction.

30. The representative of Peru, therefore, submitted a draft amendment (A/C.1/682) the terms of which proposed to insert the words "for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction" in the introductory sentence of paragraph 3 of the operative part of the draft resolution, after the words "all armed forces and all armaments".

31. A corresponding change would be made in the third paragraph of the preamble in which would be inserted the same words after "all armed forces and all armaments".

32. The CHAIRMAN called for discussion of paragraph 4 of the operative part of the draft resolution submitted by the three Powers.

33. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) pointed out that only the acceptance of the USSR amendments by the three Powers would guarantee an efficient system of control which would neither lead to interference in the domestic concerns of States nor put any one State or group of States in a privileged position.

34. The USSR amendment also contained practical proposals free from ambiguity and not involving delay in regard to the reduction by one-third of the armaments of the five great Powers. The main importance of such a reduction was that it would immediately yield concrete results by slowing down the armaments race. The criticisms passed on it by the United States representative were groundless, since that reduction would oblige the States concerned to submit to the proposed commission complete and verifiable information as to the position of their armaments.

35. It was surprising that the United States and United Kingdom representatives had opposed the USSR amendment relating to the prohibition of atomic weapons by adducing the argument that they did not wish to deprive themselves of a weapon which gave them the strongest

guarantee of security; but, at the same time, they had also opposed the proposal for a reduction of conventional armaments on the grounds that in that class of weapon their strength was inferior. Thus any and every argument served the representatives of the western Powers to justify their refusal to reduce their armaments and ban atomic weapons.

36. The Polish delegation considered that the First Committee should decide to set up one single commission on atomic energy and on conventional armaments and should transmit to it all controversial proposals. It would be wrong for the First Committee and the General Assembly to adopt a resolution which was not supported by all the great Powers.

37. Although the United States representative had declared that the adoption of the three-Power draft resolution could not be interpreted as prejudging the work of the new commission, it was nevertheless to be feared that, if that draft resolution were adopted, it might be used by some delegations to give a certain orientation to the commission's work.

38. That was why the Polish delegation had submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/680) according to the terms of which the General Assembly would establish an atomic energy and conventional armaments commission, dissolve the two existing commissions, and submit to the new commission the three-Power draft resolution and the USSR amendments to it.

39. The CHAIRMAN invited discussion on paragraph 5 of the operative part of the three-Power draft resolution.

40. Mrs. SEKANINOVÁ-ČAKRTOVÁ (Czechoslovakia) pointed out that although the three-Power draft resolution on the one hand and the USSR amendments on the other both contemplated the setting up of one commission, the two texts contained fundamental differences with regard to that body's term of reference. The USSR amendments aimed at the prohibition of the atomic weapon, the establishment of a system of control over such prohibition, and the reduction of armaments. The three-Power draft resolution, on the other hand, had as its first aim the disclosure and verification of information on a progressive and continuing basis. Such a system of disclosure by stages would amount to postponing *sine die* information on the most important points. Furthermore, the disclosure of information could in no way usefully contribute to strengthening peace unless preceded by an agreement on the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the reduction of armaments.

41. The USSR amendments therefore provided first of all for practical measures at the earliest possible date. After that information on all armaments would have to be furnished to the international control organ which would be in a position to verify it.

42. As for the reduction by one third of the armaments of the great Powers, the Bolivian representative had said at the preceding meeting that such a method was not acceptable since it would help to maintain inequality between the armaments of the USSR and those of the other Powers. That argument had already been used in 1946 when the USSR delegation had appealed for the reduction of the armaments and armed forces in all countries in order to promote confidence throughout the world. Mr. Costa du Rels had added that a reduction of armaments must be balanced, and that the balance of power had, for instance, been destroyed because Czechoslovakia was allied with the USSR and because the colonial peoples wanted independence or were striving for national liberation. The

balance which the Bolivian representative hoped for was clearly unacceptable. Czechoslovakia would continue to support the USSR and its endeavours in the cause of peace.

43. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) said that his delegation supported point 8 of the USSR amendment calling for deletion of paragraph 5 of the revised three-Power draft resolution.

44. The text of that paragraph adhered to the Baruch plan's principle of stages which was being fought not only in the United Nations, but by the Association of Scientific Workers (Great Britain) and the Association of Atomic Physicists (United States). The three western Powers were attempting, despite those pertinent criticisms, to set up a system of stages for the regulation and reduction of armaments only to disguise the obstacles they were placing in the way of a reduction of armaments.

45. The CHAIRMAN called for discussion of paragraph 6 of the three-Power draft resolution.

46. Mr. KOSANOVIC (Yugoslavia) recalled that his delegation had submitted an amendment which would have the effect of clarifying the meaning of paragraph 6 (b) of the draft resolution.

47. The amendment (A/C.1/679) proposed the insertion in sub-paragraph (b) of the words "by negotiation" after the word "agree", and the words "the determination of the over all limits and restrictions referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above and after" the word "concerning".

48. Mr. MOCH (France) stated on behalf of the sponsors of the draft resolution that they accepted the amendment submitted by Yugoslavia.

49. The CHAIRMAN called for discussion of paragraph 7 of the draft resolution.

50. Mr. RAFAEL (Israel) thought that the revised text of the draft resolution was a distinct improvement on the original draft because it introduced the concept of a time-limit for submission of the proposed commission's first report. To enable it to work rapidly and effectively, the new commission's competence should be established both in clear terms and with definite time-limits. Accordingly, the authors of the three-Power draft resolution had agreed to make the commission's terms of reference more flexible, so that new proposals could be considered.

51. In its amendment, the USSR reflected the general desire to achieve a reduction in armaments as soon as possible. It might be dangerous, however, to provide too rigid a time-limit. The commission should not be forced, for example, owing to lack of time, to report that no results had been achieved at the end of three months. While the matter was urgent, it was inconceivable that a series of practical measures for the implementation of the resolution on the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armaments could be worked out within three months.

52. World public opinion would surely be satisfied if the commission could report definite progress in the field of disarmament by 1 June 1952. Such progress would help to decrease international tension and facilitate further progress towards disarmament.

53. The delegation of Israel hoped that the USSR delegation would be able to accept the date of 1 June 1952 provided in the revised text of the three-Power draft resolution.

54. The CHAIRMAN called for discussion of paragraph 8 of the three-Power draft resolution.

55. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) thought that the proposed conference on the reduction of armaments should be convened as rapidly as possible with the greatest possible number of States participating. Paragraph 8 of the revised three-Power draft resolution did not specify the date of the conference and did not prescribe the work it would have to do. The USSR amendment, on the contrary, set a time-limit for convening the conference. The Polish delegation would therefore support point 11 of the USSR amendment.

56. Mrs. SEKANINOVA-CAKRTOVA (Czechoslovakia) noted that both the draft resolution and the USSR amendment called for the convening of a world conference on the reduction of armaments. The draft resolution, however, implied some delay and uncertainty which could be avoided by adopting point 11 of the USSR amendment.

57. The Czechoslovak delegation therefore supported the USSR amendments.

58. The CHAIRMAN observed that the Committee had completed its paragraph-by-paragraph consideration of the draft resolution and the USSR amendment to the draft.

He added that the USSR representative had asked to speak on that subject at the next day's meeting.

59. If there were no other speakers after that, the draft resolution and the USSR amendment would be put to the vote at the meeting on the following afternoon. Representatives would, of course, be free to speak on the draft resolution submitted by the Polish delegation (A/C.1/680) and on the amendment submitted by the representative of Egypt (A/C.1/681).

Tribute to the memory of Lord Perth

60. Mr. COSTA DU REIS (Bolivia) paid tribute to the memory of Lord Perth, known as Sir Eric Drummond when he was serving as Secretary-General of the League of Nations, who had died in London on 15 December 1951.

61. The CHAIRMAN was sure that the members of the First Committee would wish to associate themselves with the Bolivian representative's tribute.

The-meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.