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Chairman : Mr. Finn MOE (Norway).

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments (A/1943, A/C.1/667, A/C.1/668/Rev. 1, A/C.1/669 and A/C.1/677) (continued)

[Item 66]*

International control of atomic energy : report of the Committee of Twelve (A/1922) (continued)

[Item 16]*

CONSIDERATION OF THE REVISED DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY FRANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES (A/C.1/667/Rev.1) AND AMENDMENTS THERETO (continued)

1. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) observed that the work of Sub-Committee 18 had not only clarified the position of the Soviet Union on the one hand, and that of the three Powers on the other, but it had also brought out certain points of agreement. Differences of principle remained and rapprochement had been related more to procedural than to substantive matters, but it was evident that further efforts should be made. The main disadvantage of the work of the sub-committee was that it had failed to produce a draft resolution on the question of the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of international control. The work of the sub-committee accordingly could not be regarded as a great step forward and the changes which had been made by the three Powers in their draft resolution did not reflect changes in substance.

2. The revised three-Power draft resolution could not serve as the directive for the proposed commission since it passed over the question of the prohibition of atomic weapons. The text of the preamble should make clear the significance of the atomic weapon and the prominent position which its prohibition would take in any system

for the limitation of armaments. The prohibition of atomic weapons would lay the basis for agreements in other fields. Only prospective aggressors could oppose prohibition or subordinate it to the establishment of control in order that they might use the intervening period for the further production of atomic weapons.

3. The Soviet Union proposed that the decisions upon the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of control should be taken simultaneously, that the appropriate conventions should be signed simultaneously and that they should come into force simultaneously with agreements for the reduction of other armaments and armed forces.

4. The Soviet Union proposal for the reduction by one-third of all armaments and armed forces by the five permanent members of the Security Council within a year had also been rejected by the three Powers. As an alternative, they offered nothing concrete which would bring about a tangible lightening of the burden of armaments. The proposals of the three Powers to start with disclosures and their verification would do nothing to give reality to the objectives contained in the preamble.

5. The Polish delegation supported the proposal for the establishment of a single commission to succeed the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. There was no point, however, in reverting to the Baruch plan which had failed to solve the problem of atomic energy despite its support by a majority.

6. Although he had emphasized the points of disagreement, the positive results achieved in the sub-committee pointed to the usefulness of continuing to seek common ground. The new commission should not be hampered in its work but should be given clear directives to persevere with the work which had been begun. The revised three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/667/Rev.1) failed to meet these standards and required the addition of the Soviet Union amendment (A/C.1/668/Rev.1).

7. ANDRAOS Bey (Egypt) stated that the results of the work of the sub-committee had not brought the two points

*Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

of view much closer together, but at the same time, reflected a sincere effort to find common ground. The tone of the discussions of the four Powers in the First Committee, as well as in the sub-committee, promised a harmonious atmosphere.

8. The proposal that the sub-committee might continue should cause no objections if it was agreeable to the four Powers. However, the First Committee should shoulder its responsibilities. Although its decisions would be of little value unless accepted by the four Powers, they might make it easier for concessions to be made.

9. The three-Power proposal was generally constructive but it failed to deal squarely with the question of atomic weapons. That problem had to be dealt with if world tensions were to be reduced.

10. The Egyptian delegation suggested that, as an interim measure and in view of the length of time required for the establishment of a control system, they should distinguish between the production of atomic weapons and their actual use. There had been considerable success with humanitarian conventions which were enforced only by moral sanctions. Such a means might be found to prohibit the use of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The question could be passed to the Sixth Committee for a study of the legal and technical difficulties with a view to producing a draft convention at the present session.

11. Andraos Bey stated that the project had not been discussed with either bloc and if it commended itself to the Committee, he intended, at a later meeting, to present a suitable draft amendment. One difficulty of the proposal was that any treaty which might be drawn up would come into force only after the necessary Powers, including all who were producing atomic weapons, had ratified it. It would also be necessary to decide upon a definition of weapons of mass destruction.

12. If the four-Power sub-committee were to continue, the Egyptian proposal might be laid aside. In that event, the terms of reference of the sub-committee might emphasize more explicitly the importance of prohibition of the atomic weapon.

13. The Egyptian delegation was unable to accept the proposal for a reduction by one-third of the present armaments. The size of population and the length and nature of frontiers offered better criteria than the actual strength of armed forces.

14. Mr. COSTA DU RELS (Bolivia) said that small nations could make little material contribution to a solution of the problem but could judge the merits of the various proposals.

15. The Soviet Union representative had asserted that there was no reason for the armaments race in view of the peace-loving nature of the Soviet Union and its freedom from aggressive intention. The Soviet Union representative had further alleged that the United States bore the responsibility for rearmament and its economic consequences. Such a statement demanded a review of events since 1945, when the Baltic States were engulfed, the Polish frontiers were revised, Rumania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were taken into the economic and political orbit of the Soviet Union and Eastern Germany was occupied. Subsequently, there had been events in various parts of Asia culminating in Korea. In the face of these facts, the Soviet Union was prepared to state that if the United States had no atomic weapons, peace would be secured.

16. If the Soviet Union proposals for the immediate prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction by one-third of the forces of the great Powers were adopted and acted upon, the result might be peace and order but it would be maintained by the army of the Soviet Union.

17. The Soviet Union rejected the theory of balance of power and maintained the policy that the dominance of the Soviet Union would be a guarantee of peace because it had no aggressive intentions. The Committee should bear in mind, however, the manner in which Hitler had maintained peace in Europe during the dominance of Germany. Peace was a burden which all nations had to shoulder together; they should seek neither a *pax sovietica*, nor a *pax americana*.

18. The revised three-Power draft resolution reflected the efforts of the sponsors to find an agreement. The Soviet Union point of view had been met on certain questions although divergencies continued to exist. However, it should be remembered that armaments were effects rather than causes.

19. The Bolivian representative considered that what was required was a modification by the Soviet Union of its policies in Europe and Asia and, indeed, its policies in general. If there were mutual tolerance, disarmament would gradually become a reality.

20. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America), referring to the statement made at the previous meeting by the representative of Iraq, thought that the objectives sought by France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America were quite clear. As Mr. Acheson had pointed out at the 447th meeting, the three Powers wanted an international system which would include the regulation and reduction of all armed forces and all armaments of all types, a system which would apply to all nations with substantial military forces, one which would both prohibit and actually secure the abolition of the use of atomic weapons, and which would include safeguards so that it could be put into effect with security for all nations involved. International security was not a problem for four or five Powers only, though some might be called upon to make greater contributions than others.

21. With regard to another point brought up by the representative of Iraq, Mr. Jessup stated that the three Powers sought a practical solution which would lead to some agreement upon results from which could be expected a general reduction of the world tension, rather than a merely theoretical result in the General Assembly. He cited Mr. Acheson's statement at the 447th meeting to the effect that the three-Power proposals were not ends in themselves but were proposals which provided a great opportunity to move toward peace and co-operation.

22. Noting that the representative of Syria had suggested (466th meeting) the setting up of a new disarmament commission with very general terms of reference, including only points of agreement reached in the sub-committee meetings, or, alternatively, the re-establishment of the sub-committee to permit agreement on such a resolution, Mr. Jessup stated that he could not agree with the idea, though he appreciated the concern which had prompted it.

23. Such an approach would involve giving up basic concepts and principles which had already been adopted by the General Assembly and had been re-affirmed for five years. He believed that, within the framework of those principles and with the flexibility left to the new commission by the revised tripartite draft resolution, solutions could be

reached in the commission. It was hoped that it would become apparent to the USSR from the negotiations in the commission that there was nothing in the programme advanced by the three Powers inimical to its own interests, or inconsistent with the independence and security of the USSR or any other state.

24. The revised tripartite text, in paragraph 3 (c) of the operative part, provided that the commission would be ready to consider any proposals or any plans for control which might be put forward, involving either conventional armaments or atomic energy. The problem of control embraced questions of inspection and other safeguards and methods of determining priority and practical steps.

25. The tripartite proposal gave the proposed commission the broad, general terms of reference desired by the representative of Syria, but within the framework retaining the necessary guideposts established by past General Assembly sessions.

26. The three Powers accepted the Lebanese proposal (A/C.1/678, point 1) to include a new first paragraph in the preamble of the tripartite draft resolution. With regard to point 2 of the amendment which involved some changes in the existing first paragraph, Mr. Jessup recalled that agreement had been reached in the sub-committee on the text of the existing first paragraph. The three Powers preferred, therefore, not to commit themselves to any changes in that paragraph unless it appeared that the USSR was also willing to accept the new first paragraph and thus to accept the consequential changes in what would become the second paragraph.

27. Mr. MACAPAGAL (Philippines) welcomed the agreement reached by the four Powers on the first paragraph of the preamble to the tripartite draft resolution. His delegation also supported the new second paragraph envisaging a collective world security system. Until such a system was established on a global basis, his Government supported the establishment of regional security arrangements sanctioned under the United Nations Charter, and would be glad to associate itself in a Pacific pact for common defence, towards which a start had been made with the conclusion of the mutual defence pacts between the United States and the Philippines and between the United States, Australia and New Zealand. The rest of the preamble dealt with the problem of atomic weapons and the reduction of conventional armaments.

28. A test of the two positions with regard to the atomic weapon, namely, that of the three Powers calling for the establishment of effective control first and prohibition later, and the USSR position of prohibition first and effective control later, would be to see which of the two was more in consonance with the common security of nations. That test compelled the conclusion that the formula suggested by the western Powers was superior, since it would not jeopardize the security of any State even should negotiations collapse, whereas the USSR formula might seriously endanger the security of the western powers. The frailty of the USSR plan lay in the stress on immediate and unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons.

29. Noting references that had been made to the fact that poisonous gas had not been used in the Second World War, Mr. Macapagal observed that in his view that had been due to the fear of retaliation inherent in such a horrible weapon. The prohibition of the atom bomb was thus not of extreme urgency since the dreadfulness of the weapon, to some extent, carried its own prohibition. What was really urgent was the formulation of effective machinery for control.

30. The USSR proposal for the mechanical reduction of armed forces and armaments unknown in size and quantity obviously did not warrant additional comment.

31. In conclusion, the representative of the Philippines declared that without the good faith enjoined upon all Members of the United Nations by Article 2 (2) of the Charter, there would be no end to the problem of the regulation, limitation and reduction of armaments.

32. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) expressed satisfaction with the answer given by the representative of the United States, whose point of view he fully shared. He hoped that a reply would be forthcoming from the representative of the USSR, so as to permit agreement on machinery and on a plan for action.

33. Faris EL-KHOURY Bey (Syria) also welcomed the explanation given by Mr. Jessup, especially as regards paragraph 3 (c), which took into account the remarks he had made at the previous meeting.

34. The CHAIRMAN stated that the general debate on the preamble of the joint draft resolution was closed.

35. He invited the Committee to consider the separate paragraphs of the preamble and the amendments thereto.

36. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) considered that the first paragraph under point 1 of the USSR amendment was really a matter to be included, if accepted, in the operative part of the draft resolution.

37. Mr. MOCH (France) thought that the revised text of the paragraph noting the recommendation of the Committee of Twelve was in substance the same as that of the USSR amendment on that point (A/C.1/668/Rev.1, point 2).

38. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to consider the operative part of the three-Power draft resolution, as well as the relevant USSR amendments.

39. Mrs. SEKANINOVA-CAKRTOVA (Czechoslovakia) said that point 3 of the USSR amendment, together with the measures proposed for the reduction of armaments and armed forces, covered matters of major significance in respect of which the Chairman of the sub-committee had reported the existence of fundamental divergencies. The USSR proposal offered a solution of the most important questions facing the Committee. The amendments embodying it were typical of the whole peace effort of the USSR delegation, being based on its deep knowledge of the problem concerned, on a careful attitude towards the document to which they related, and on a great desire to achieve positive results in the cause of peace. The most important deficiency of the three-Power draft resolution was its lack of any provision for the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and for the establishment of strict international control over the implementation of that prohibition, which should be the basis for the control of atomic energy. The USSR amendment presented the General Assembly with a great opportunity to fulfil the task entrusted to it in Article 11 of the Charter.

40. The USSR proposal was not limited to the declaration of the prohibition of atomic weapons, which was important enough in itself, but it set forth practical steps for the implementation of that declaration. A precise and early time limit was set for carrying out those practical steps. Whereas the USSR started from the principle that agreement could be reached and that a draft convention could be prepared by 1 February 1952, the representatives of the three Powers maintained that the proposal was completely

unrealistic, since the same questions to be covered in the convention had been discussed by the United Nations for five years without any agreement having been reached. Contrasting the two attitudes, Mrs. Sekaninova-Cakrtova recalled that the United Kingdom representative had declared at the 463rd meeting that it would be impossible to reach agreement as proposed by the USSR. That representative had also said that the three Powers did not intend to give up the atomic weapon. In that connexion the Czechoslovak representative cited various Press reports.

41. The USSR proposed the only correct and possible procedure, namely to discuss the question in detail, to adopt a decision and to implement it speedily and honourably. The proposal was typical of a country with a planned economy, which used atomic energy for the good of mankind, though it was prepared to defend itself against aggression with the same weapons that aggressors would use. The USSR proposal reflected the important basic principle of respect for, and willingness to undertake, obligations which the USSR had been applying consistently.

42. The attitude of the three Powers reflected the contradiction between their words and actions and was based on the anticipation that decisions would be violated. The proposal of the USSR, in addition to its tremendous moral significance, showed all the signs of being practicable and would ensure that atomic energy would serve only the well-being of humanity.

43. Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) drew attention to point 4 of the Lebanese amendment (A/C.1/678) to the joint draft resolution. In connexion with the latter, he pointed out that there was nothing to prevent the commission from requesting any necessary changes in its terms of reference when submitting its first report.

44. Mr. MOCH (France), noting that the amendment proposed by Mr. Malik would restore the original title proposed for the commission by the three Powers, pointed out that the name in the revised text had been accepted during the discussion in the sub-committee. Naturally, the three Powers would be very happy to accept the Lebanese proposal should the USSR representative also find it acceptable.

45. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) said that point 3 of the USSR amendment represented the atomic half of the USSR magic formula for disarmament and the banning of atomic weapons. That point, the language of which was reminiscent of the so-called Stockholm peace appeal, was divided into two paragraphs, one providing for declaring the unconditional ban and the establishment of international control, and the other directing the new commission to prepare a draft convention regarding the implementation of the ban and the establishment of international control.

46. The fact that the two matters were separated in the USSR amendment showed the remote connexion which existed in the thinking of the USSR delegation between the so-called decision and the actual putting into force of a system of control. Even the USSR representative in the sub-committee had admitted that there would be a time lag between the two. Mr. Jessup submitted that the length of time between the proposed magic resolution and the actual putting into force of any control system would not be a matter of only a month or two as the USSR representative appeared to think.

47. He called attention to the fact that for five years the Soviet Union had been inflexible in its opposition to the atomic energy control plan endorsed by the General Assembly. While he could agree that a decision of the General Assembly had great moral, political and legal force, he was not convinced that that force would be the same for the USSR as it would be for the United States and various other countries which respected the decisions of the General Assembly. Greater confidence in the force of that resolution would result from acceptance by the USSR of the General Assembly decisions contained in its recommendations and resolutions on Korea, in the "Uniting for peace" resolution 377 (V), and in a number of other resolutions which he specified.

48. Mr. Jessup thought that the three Powers could not be unduly criticized if they were not ready to place their security and, indeed, the safeguard of world peace, solely on the possibility that the USSR would comply with some new resolution of the General Assembly undertaking to prohibit the atomic weapons and, by fiat, to establish international control.

49. Since there was no discussion on paragraph 2 or the introductory sentence of paragraph 3, the CHAIRMAN called for discussion on the sub-paragraphs of paragraph 3.

50. In connexion with paragraph 3 (a), Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon) inquired whether the term "all armaments" included bacteriological weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

51. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom), on behalf of the sponsors, confirmed that that was the intention.

52. Mr. COATON (Union of South Africa) wished to re-state his Government's position on the control of atomic energy in connexion with sub-paragraph (c).

53. In the Union of South Africa uranium was a by-product of the goldmining industry and it was not clear to what extent the United Nations plan would cover their case and how much interference there would be with gold production.

54. While the Government of the Union of South Africa had no objections to the broad aims of the plan in so far as it envisaged the prohibition of the atomic weapon, it would, however, have to reserve its Government's position and would, therefore, have to abstain from voting on that sub-paragraph.

55. Mr. MOCH (France) dealt with point 7 of the Soviet Union amendment regarding the reduction by one-third of the armaments and armed forces of the permanent members of the Security Council, which was to be inserted after paragraph 3. That proposal had already been discussed at length and he merely wished to reiterate the fact that when a disproportion existed, a reduction of that nature would only serve to increase the advantages of the party with the larger force. Less naïve methods were required to put an end to distrust. What was required was an international agreement to establish for all Powers levels of armaments and forces which would be adequate for defence but not for aggression.

56. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) said that point 5 of the Soviet Union amendment did not reflect any serious difference from the three-Power position. However, the Soviet Union amendment would determine clearly the tasks of the international control organ which had been obscured by the three Powers.

57. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) observed that many comments had been made in connexion with the revised three-Power draft resolution and the Soviet Union amendments. His delegation wished to reserve its right to reply later to those comments.

58. Mr. KOSANOVIC (Yugoslavia) drew attention to a difference between points 5 and 6 in the USSR amendments. While the former made certain references to conventional armaments, the latter in dealing with the responsibilities of the control organ made no reference to conventional armaments. The question was whether that omission was intentional.

59. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom) pointed out the ways in which the three Powers had attempted to include the ideas contained in point 5 of the amendment in the revised draft resolution.

60. The reference to all armaments and all armed forces was contained in the introductory sentence to paragraph 3 of the joint draft resolution. The formula for the establishment of the control organ within the framework of the Security Council was in paragraph 4. The responsibilities of the control organ had been dealt with in a slightly different manner and the three Powers had stated in paragraph 4 that it should ensure the implementation of the treaty or treaties. The point about eliciting information was dealt with in of paragraph 3 (a) and the provision for effective international inspection was included in paragraph 3 (b). The only point on which they did not correspond was the formula concerning atomic energy

control. In that respect, the three Powers had followed the phraseology which had been repeatedly used by the General Assembly, namely that there should be effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. The three Powers considered that that phraseology included the ideas expressed in the USSR amendment and maintained the position set forth in the United Nations plan ; namely, that an international agreement to prohibit atomic weapons should be an integral part of any effective system of control.

Allocation to the First Committee of an additional agenda item (A/C.1/665/Add.1)

61. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) raised a point of order in connexion with the allocation to the First Committee (A/C.1/665/Add.1) of the Soviet Union's complaint against the United States.

62. He would request the Committee to consider at the beginning of its next meeting where the item should be dealt with on the agenda. The United States was prepared to discuss the matter at the conclusion of the present item.

63. The CHAIRMAN stated that, as there were no objections, the Committee would discuss where to place the new item on their agenda at the beginning of the next meeting.

The meeting rose at 2 p.m.