



Friday, 30 November 1951, at 10.30 a.m.

Palais de Chaillot, Paris

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Chairman : Mr. Finn MOE (Norway).

**Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments (A/1943, A/C.1/667, A/C.1/668, A/C.1/669 and A/C.1/670) (continued)**

[Item 66]\*

**International control of atomic energy : report of the Committee of Twelve (A/1922) (continued)**

[Item 16]\*

GENERAL DEBATE (concluded)

1. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) considered that the time had come to draw up a balance sheet of the discussion, to take a clear stand on controversial questions and to remove the artificial obstacles to an agreed solution of the problem before the Committee.

2. As was to be expected, the representatives of the three western Powers and their supporters had again made slanderous attacks against the USSR. Thus, in his statement at the 454th meeting, Mr. Moch had resorted to the falsification of texts in order to bring unfounded charges with regard to the annexation or occupation by the USSR of certain foreign territories.

3. Mr. Jessup had asserted at the 455th meeting that the United States wished to reduce international tension and to reach an agreement with the USSR. It was impossible not to draw a parallel between the honeyed words on co-operation among nations spoken in the First Committee by the United States representative and the bellicose utterances of a representative of the same country at the conference in Rome of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Mr. Dulles, too, in a recent speech, had asked for the creation of powerful shock troops, to be stationed along the frontiers of the USSR. Those shock troops, he had said, would be more necessary than all the defence forces of countries threatened by the USSR.

4. Mr. Jessup had stated that the United States delegation to the Conference of Deputy Foreign Ministers had proposed to include in the agenda the question of the level of armaments and armed forces. At first sight, it might be

thought that that proposal was really directed towards the reduction of armaments, but the fact that the western Powers had drawn out negotiations for over three months proved the contrary. It was the delegation of the USSR that had proposed at that conference an immediate reduction of the armed forces and armaments of the four Powers ; nevertheless, that proposal had been opposed by the three western delegations.

5. It was obvious that the attitude of the three western Powers had not changed ; on the one hand, there was the rearmament programme, and on the other hand, talk of disarmament. The two were fundamentally irreconcilable and could lead only to a deadlock.

6. As Mr. Jessup had pointed out (455th meeting), the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/667) was drawn up along the lines traced by the three western Powers at the Conference of Deputy Foreign Ministers. That meant that the trend of that draft resolution was again to establish levels of armaments, in the first place, and then to effect an increase or reduction of armaments. The purpose of the whole manoeuvre was to prove that the existing level of armaments was such that, if any Power had to reduce its armaments, it must be the Soviet Union alone.

7. The representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States in the First Committee had also made a series of statements which were contrary to the truth, especially with regard to the question of aggression in Korea and the question of their armed forces. Those statements tended to confuse the atmosphere and to side-track the Committee from the solution of fundamental questions.

8. Mr. Lloyd had asserted at the 457th meeting that for nearly six years the USSR had submitted no constructive proposals for assistance to under-developed countries. He had certainly forgotten that during the fifth session of the General Assembly the USSR had proposed the granting of assistance to under-developed countries through the agency of the Assembly. Despite the fact that a similar proposal had been adopted by the Economic and Social Council in 1949, the United Kingdom representative had maintained that the USSR proposal had been made for propaganda purposes, and that it had been rejected by the General Assembly for that reason.

\* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

Lloyd's accusation that the Soviet Union had participated in many specialized agencies was unfounded. It was true that the USSR did not participate in the International Refugee Organization, instead of repatriating refugees to their countries of origin, that organization was using them as labour for the benefit of foreign States. The Soviet Union would also participate in the International Trade Organization until amendments had been made in its constitution. It had, besides, left the World Health Organization, owing to the inutility of that organization. On the other hand, it was a member of the Universal Postal Union, the World Meteorological Organization and many other international organizations.

Mr. Jessup had taken it upon himself to draw a comparison between the armed forces of the USSR and those of the "Atlantic bloc". He had claimed that the United States armed forces did not exceed 1,500,000 men, but he had forgotten that President Truman had stated in his message to Congress that the United States Army had increased in strength by more than ten months and that its strength would be brought up to 3,500,000 men. To that number should be added the 2,000,000 United States Marine troops, the armed forces of the other members of the "Atlantic bloc" and perhaps the 400,000 Turkish troops who were ready to join the western forces. Mr. Jessup's arithmetical errors were quite obvious if the military bases set up by the United States and its stockpile of atomic bombs were also taken into consideration.

The USSR delegation had already pointed out in an early session that the armed forces of the USSR amounted to barely half of those of the United Kingdom, the United States and France. The USSR would obviously be prepared to provide all information on its armed forces and armaments within the framework of the plan for the reduction of armaments which it had submitted; but to divulge such data at that point in the discussion would be premature, the USSR delegation so as the western Powers seemed to regard themselves as fully informed on the matter.

The characteristics of the plan proposed by the three western Powers (A/C.1/667) were clearly stated in paragraph 3 of the operative part of the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/667), which stated that it was a primary objective of the United Nations to bring about the limitation and progressive reduction of all armed forces and all armaments to levels adequate for defence. It also stated that there must be progressive disclosure and verification of all armed forces and all armaments. Such verification, according to the three-Power plan, must be based on international inspection. In conclusion, the United Nations plan in other words, the Baruch plan must continue to serve as a basis for the control of atomic energy.

It had already been shown that the concept of levels of armaments was not in fact consistent with the reduction of armaments, as it allowed for the increase as well as the reduction of armaments. As for the criteria to which Mr. Acheson had allegedly adhered in fixing those levels, they would amount to arbitrary discrimination.

The Baruch plan, which set up a control body as a part of the United States, provided for the progressive and constant verification of the reduction of armaments in successive stages. That method of successive stages was known to be ineffective and unacceptable. Moreover, it was not its *raison d'être* since the United States had lost its monopoly of atomic weapons.

15. The United Kingdom representative had stated at the 457th meeting in his criticism of the USSR proposals that a prohibition could not be effective if it was based solely on a declaration by the States concerned. Mr. Lloyd had falsified the meaning of the USSR proposals, the purpose of which was that the General Assembly itself, and not any specific States, should proclaim such prohibition.

16. The plan proposed by the USSR was clear enough. It proposed an immediate prohibition of atomic weapons, the establishment of an effective supervision of that prohibition and the preparation of practical measures to ensure that prohibition and measures for control. That plan was in conformity with the clearly expressed opinion of the peoples. Those who opposed it were those who wished to use atomic weapons for aggressive purposes.

17. Mr. Lloyd had answered at the 457th meeting the six questions which had previously been put to the three western Powers by the USSR delegation. With regard to the first question concerning the immediate prohibition of atomic weapons and the strict supervision of such prohibition, Mr. Lloyd had eluded the difficulty by stating that the plan of the three western Powers provided for the prohibition of atomic weapons on the basis of the Baruch plan. Yet, everyone knew that that plan did not in fact provide for the prohibition of atomic weapons. Thus, the United Kingdom representative's reply to that question was purely negative, since no agreement could ever be reached on the basis of the Baruch plan.

18. With regard to the question of practical measures to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the supervision of that prohibition, Mr. Lloyd had stated that the three-Power draft resolution went further than the USSR plan. He added that the international control organ already provided for in the Baruch plan would be responsible for stock-piling all raw materials and all equipment for the manufacture of atomic weapons. He was forgetting that the Baruch plan no more provided for the prohibition of atomic weapons than it did for their control. Obviously, to place all the factories and all nuclear raw materials in the hands of a so-called international control organ would be tantamount to placing in the hands of the United States the entire economies of the States which possessed atomic resources.

19. The United Kingdom representative had given no direct reply to the question about the establishment of an international control organ within the framework of the Security Council. He had merely stated that that point would be settled in the clauses of the treaty establishing that organ and had added that any system whereby that organ could be paralyzed by the veto would be unacceptable. Yet on 14 December 1946 the General Assembly had unanimously adopted resolution 41 (I) stipulating that an international control organ should be set up within the framework of the Security Council. Furthermore, the representative of the USSR, Mr. Molotov, had stated as far back as 1946 that the principle of the unanimity of the five permanent Members of the Security Council had nothing to do with the functioning of the control commission. Thus, the allegation that a State possessing the power of veto would be able to prevent supervision was false. It was hardly necessary to add, in connexion with the veto, that Mr. John Foster Dulles had stated in a book published in 1950 that the United States would use the veto when it needed it.

20. Mr. Lloyd had not replied to the question about the immediate inspection of factories for atomic weapons.

He had confined himself to stating that inspection would be carried out at subsequent stages, without specifying when that would be.

21. The three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/667) thus brought the solution for the prohibition of atomic weapons and their control no nearer. Consequently, the USSR delegation had submitted draft amendments (A/C.1/668) designed to fill the gaps and remedy the shortcomings of the draft resolution.

22. It had become evident that there were serious differences between the views expressed by the three western Powers on the one hand and the USSR on the other. But an endeavour should be made to remedy that state of affairs. Accordingly, the USSR was ready to make further efforts in that direction and to take part in the work of the proposed sub-committee.

23. It hoped that the amendments it had submitted would enable the proposed sub-committee to solve the problems submitted to it and to fulfil the unanimous desire of all the peoples longing for peace.

24. Mr. JESSUP (United States of America) said that the resolution submitted by the representatives of France, the United Kingdom and the United States had been explained in detail to the First Committee. Many of the Committee members had commented favourably on the tripartite proposals. He thought all of those who had spoken were fully cognizant of the extent to which these proposals had been misrepresented or misinterpreted by Mr. Vyshinsky.

25. It must be observed, moreover, that, contrary to the USSR representative's statements, the three Powers had already proposed and had been in favour of a reduction of armaments at the Conference of Deputy Foreign

Ministers held in Paris in the spring of 1951. The subject which they had proposed for discussion was: "The existing level of armaments and armed forces and measures to be proposed jointly by the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and France for the international control and reduction of armaments and armed forces". The joint draft resolution submitted to the First Committee brought up again the problem of reduction and added to it that of the level to which there should be reduction.

26. Although the discussion had revealed obvious disagreement so far, the effort to establish a disarmament commission should be continued and should make it possible to broaden the area of agreement. The representative of the USSR had declared at the end of his statement, however briefly, that he was ready to take part in the work of the sub-committee proposed by the delegations of Iraq, Pakistan and Syria. That decision was certainly welcomed. At the same time the intransigence revealed in Mr. Vyshinsky's statements at the 453rd meeting and at the present one made it clear that the task of the sub-committee would not be easy.

27. The United States delegation believed that that sub-committee should concentrate on the establishment of the procedure and terms of reference of the proposed disarmament commission. To go deeply into the substance of disarmament would transform the sub-committee itself into a disarmament commission and would place upon the sub-committee the impossible task of resolving all the substantive problems in a brief space of time.

28. The co-sponsors of the three-Power draft resolution intended to submit their observations concerning the USSR amendment during the sub-committee's debate, and, if necessary, at subsequent meetings of the First Committee.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.