

GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY

## SIXTH SESSION

## Official Records



MEETING

Wednesday, 28 November 1951, at 10.30 a.m.

INDEX UNIT

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Chairman: Mr. Finn MOE (Norway).

**Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments (A/1943, A/C.1/667, A/C.1/668, A/C.1/669 and A/C.1/670) (continued)**  
[Item 66]\*

**International control of atomic energy: report of the Committee of Twelve (A/1922) (continued)**  
[Item 16]\*

## GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. BARANOVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the attitude of the United States to the USSR proposals had until now prevented the First Committee from coming to any useful conclusions about disarmament.

2. By forming the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United States had built up a military league of aggression; the result had been a new armaments race and a worsening of international relations. The American plan for world domination had been presented by the Ecuadorian, French and United Kingdom representatives as a regional defensive union. The President of the United States had spoken of "a great crusade for peace". Such a policy of deliberate untruth must be unmasked. The military preparations of the United States, the armaments race, the formation of new aggressive blocs, the establishment of military bases on other countries' territory and finally the recent promulgation of the "mutual security act" setting aside \$100 million to pay for the criminal activities of American tools in the people's democracies were proofs of the chronic hostility of the United States towards the Soviet Union.

3. In his statement at the 455th meeting, Mr. Jessup had claimed to give exact information on the size of the USSR armed forces. If he was so well informed, why did he speak about concealment and secrecy? If he was not well informed, what was the basis for his figures?

4. The three-Power draft resolution ignored essential factors with regard to disarmament. Instead of an immediate prohibition of atomic weapons, there was an attempt to revive the obsolete Baruch plan, and that meant allowing the American imperialists to set themselves up as a world monopoly of nuclear power.

5. The opponents of the USSR proposals claimed that the reduction of armaments and armed forces by one-third would give the USSR a lasting superiority as it allegedly maintained at present the largest military forces. The argument had no basis in fact, for everyone knew that the USSR armed forces were greatly inferior to the military potential of the States of the Atlantic "bloc".

6. Mr. Moch had emphasized (at the 447th meeting) the essential matter of control. But no one was suggesting a reduction of uncontrolled armaments. Paragraph 7 of the USSR amendments (A/C.1/668) provided that within one year after the adoption of a reduction by one-third, both Member States and non-member States should submit to the international control organ complete information regarding the state of their armaments.

7. Mr. Acheson's proposed criteria for determining the level of armed forces (447th meeting)—the level adequate for defence or the industrial power of the country—were not acceptable. They would merely give an unreasonable advantage to the United States, which had the highest industrial potential.

8. Nor could the Ukrainian delegation accept paragraph 3 (a) of the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/667) which proposed a system of guarantees that would make it possible for those Powers to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. In its opinion, the international control organ should, in no circumstances, violate the sovereign right of States and should operate only in agreement with the governments. Under the three-Power proposal, the establishment of an international control organ would be considered by the disarmament commission, whereas it should be set up within the framework of the Security Council.

\* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

9. Finally, the conclusion of an international convention for the reduction of armaments would obviously be more effective than the bilateral agreements proposed in the three-Power draft resolution.

10. In supporting the USSR amendments, the Ukrainian delegation believed that a relaxation of the existing tension could be brought about if the delegations of the three Powers really wanted it. Atomic weapons should be forbidden forthwith and a decision taken to reduce the armaments and the armed forces of the great Powers by one-third. If such decisions were not taken, all the General Assembly's recommendations would be futile.

11. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom) observed that the discussion had lasted nine days and had made scarcely any progress. He was particularly sorry to have been unable to find in the statement made by Mr. Vyshinsky at the 453rd meeting any positive response or favourable reaction to the spirit in which the three Powers had made their approach.

12. The USSR delegation had made some play with the fact that the western Powers were openly engaged upon a programme of rearmament while discussing disarmament in the United Nations. The western Powers would be only too glad if the reasons for their rearmament which had been imposed upon them by the need to rebuild their defensive system, should cease to exist. Whereas between 1945 and 1948 they had stripped their defences to the minimum, the Soviet Union had brought into existence the Cominform with its avowed subversive aims and its openly expressed intention of obstructing any government that did not accept the Soviet ideology. In the United Nations the USSR had refused to join many of the specialised agencies and had even withdrawn from one, of which it had originally been a member.

13. The USSR was, moreover, maintaining armed forces which dwarfed the combined armed forces of the free world. The fate of Czechoslovakia in 1948 and the events in Korea were lessons which could not be forgotten if the present position of the western Powers was to be understood. The western Powers were aiming at a balance of armed forces at the lowest possible level, which was what was envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations. That was why the disarmament now contemplated could only be effected provided it was co-ordinated, verified and balanced.

14. Contrary to the main criticism advanced by the USSR that the three-Power proposals contained nothing new, they provided, in brief: first, the disclosure and verification of information on atomic weapons; secondly, the inclusion of atomic weapons in the general scheme of disarmament; and thirdly, a continued and progressive system of disclosure and verification.

15. Unfortunately, there had been no trace in Mr. Vyshinsky's statement of any change in the Soviet Union's position. The latest USSR statement had nothing positive to add about the crucial factor of control. Mr. Vyshinsky wanted each State to declare that it would stop manufacturing atomic bombs and dispose of any it had already produced. The USSR delegation seemed to think that a mere declaration was sufficient. Obviously, in existing circumstances, no responsible government would consent to risk its security on a mere declaration unsupported by effective safeguards. An effective control system was the crucial point upon which it had hitherto proved impossible to reach agreement, Mr. Vyshinsky having rejected it as an unwarrantable infringement of national sovereignty. Yet, contrary to what the USSR representative had stated, the

United Nations scheme provided for a real control applied to all phases of the production of atomic weapons.

16. On behalf of the three Governments sponsoring the draft resolution (A/C.1/487) Mr. Lloyd would reply as follows to the six questions asked by Mr. Vyshinsky in his statement at the 453rd meeting:

#### Question 1

Would the three Powers agree that the General Assembly should declare itself in favour of an unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of that prohibition?

#### Answer

The adoption of the three-Power draft resolution by the General Assembly would clearly be a declaration in favour of the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons enforced by strict international control.

If the nations of the world were to proceed seriously to the task of disarmament they must not only make promises and enter into treaties, but must also ensure that all nations and all peoples would know that what was being promised was actually being carried out.

#### Question 2

Would they agree that the General Assembly should instruct the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments to draw up and submit to the Security Council, not later than 1 February 1952, an appropriate draft convention on that subject?

#### Answer

The three Powers had included in their proposed resolution instructions to the new commission to start work promptly on proposals for a draft treaty or treaties.

If the Soviet Union was genuinely prepared to move forward on the basis of the United Nations plan for atomic energy, or some no less effective plan, there was no reason why there should be any long delay. However, the suggested date of 1 February 1952 appeared unrealistic because it was not practical.

#### Question 3

Would they agree that the draft convention should provide for measures which would ensure the implementation of the General Assembly decisions on the prohibition of the atomic weapon, the cessation of its production and the utilization of atomic energy for civilian purposes only, and should provide for the establishment of strict international control over the implementation of the convention?

#### Answer

The tripartite proposals went further. The three Powers agreed that the manufacture, possession and use of atomic weapons would be prohibited; that, to ensure such prohibition, and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only, an international control organ would take charge of all stocks of fissionable material and all facilities for its manufacture; that moreover there would be continuous inspection.

The United Nations had repeatedly recognized that prohibition could only be made effective by such measures of control.

#### Question 4

Would they agree that the General Assembly should recognize that any sincere plan for a substantial reduction of all armed forces and armaments must include the establishment, within the framework of the Security Council, of an international organ of control?

#### Answer

The three Powers agreed that the General Assembly should recognize that any sincere plan for the substantial reduction of all armed forces and armaments must include the establishment of an international organ of control.



Whether the international control organ would be within the framework of the Security Council would depend on the terms of the treaty which established it and defined its functions and powers and its relationship to the United Nations.

If by the phrase "within the framework of the Security Council" Mr. Wyshinsky had in mind a plan under which the whole operation of the control system could be paralysed by the veto, this would, of course, be unacceptable.

#### Question 5

Would they agree that that international control organ should be responsible for control of the reduction of all types of armaments and armed forces, and for control of the enforcement of the prohibition of all kinds of atomic weapons, so that such prohibitions should be carried out with medical business and in good faith; that that international control organ should obtain information on all armed forces, including paramilitary forces, security and police forces; that it should obtain and disclose information on all arms including atomic weapons; and that effective international inspection should be envisaged under the instructions of the above-mentioned international control organ?

#### Answer

The international control organ which would be established under the tripartite plan would certainly do all the things which Mr. Wyshinsky suggested in this question.

#### Question 6

Would they agree that the international control organ for the prohibition of atomic weapons should carry out, immediately after the conclusion of the convention, for the prohibition of the atomic weapon, an inspection of all establishments for the production and stockpiling of atomic weapons for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the above-mentioned convention?

#### Answer

The three Rovers proposed that the control organ, immediately after the conclusion of a convention or treaty, would proceed with the inspection and verification on a continuing basis of all aspects of atomic energy, as well as all armaments and armed forces, in accordance with the successive stages agreed upon in the convention or treaty.

Mr. Ubyd repeated, however, as he had already stated in the answer to question 3, that such inspection and verification would not of themselves be sufficient to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons.

197. Mr. Ubyd reaffirmed the continuing good will of the three Rovers and their desire to reach an agreement. The delegations of the United States, France and the United Kingdom accepted in principle the suggestions submitted by Iraq, Rumania and Syria for a sub-committee consisting of the President of the General Assembly and of the four Rovers principally concerned. He thought that, if that proposal were accepted, a time limit should be set for the sub-committee's discussions.

198. The debate had reached a deadlock which it was essential to break. He hoped that the USSR delegation had not said its last word. In formulating their proposals, the delegations of the Western Rovers had tried to take into account the difficulties which the Soviet Union was facing and to dispel its suspicions. They hoped that the USSR delegation would endeavour to take the same attitude with regard to them.

199. Mr. KOSANOVIC (Yugoslavia) said the disarmament problem was only one aspect of the wider question of international peace. Disarmament based on a mechanical formula, on a reduction of armaments and armed forces and a ban on the manufacture of certain weapons even if it were

practicable, would not mean very much unless accompanied by the necessary political and psychological conditions. It would not eliminate war unless world tensions were at the same time relaxed. Such a state of tension encouraged aggressors, even those possessing only rudimentary weapons. Racist declarations alone, sincere though they might be, might be politically dangerous, as almost all European States which were the victims of Hitlerian aggression knew from tragic experience.

220. The United Nations campaign for peace must take into account existing forces. Aggression must be forestalled and prevented by mobilizing the collective will of the United Nations. The prohibition of the use of the atomic bomb was not in itself a panacea with the help of which an era of peace could be brought into the world. Hitler's crimes were not less odious because he respected the ban on the use of asphyxiating gases on the battlefield, while using them in the concentration camps.

221. It was for those reasons that Yugoslavia had always advocated that the subject of atomic weapons should be studied in conjunction with that of conventional types of armament. To concentrate exclusively on atomic weapons was an attempt to divert the attention of mankind from the real causes of conflict and from the necessity of removing those causes. That was all the more true when the proposal to prohibit the atomic bomb went hand in hand with a policy aimed at the destruction of other States.

222. Yugoslavia was prepared to support every realistic effort for disarmament, to contribute to it within the limits of its capabilities and to seek the most effective and comprehensive solutions. The draft resolution submitted by the United States, France and the United Kingdom (A/C.1/667) was of the utmost interest. The Yugoslav delegation, while not regarding the draft resolution as perfect or as likely to solve the problem in its entirety, accepted it in principle, subject to reservations on certain particulars. Yugoslavia would contribute to the best of its ability to drawing up the final text.

223. The amendments proposed by the Soviet delegation merely reiterated the point of view it had previously expressed. They would disappoint not so much those who possessed the means of producing atomic bombs as the millions of human beings everywhere who were looking so hopefully to the United Nations to avert the threat of war, the millions for whom a relaxation of the present international tension would mean a marked improvement in their living conditions. The danger from the atomic bomb was greatest for countries possessing large industrial centres. Countries with small, scattered communities had more to fear from conventional armaments.

224. But, although the Soviet Union liked to pose as spokesman of the underprivileged section of humanity, the USSR amendments laid most stress on the prohibition of atomic weapons, whilst tending to neglect other forms of disarmament. In its amendments the USSR proposed, for example, to delete from the three Rovers draft the phrase stating that it was the primary purpose of the United Nations to reduce armaments and armed forces to a level adequate for defence but not for aggression. If the USSR amendments were adopted as they stood, they would do nothing to improve the precarious world situation. In fact, there was no reference to the threat of aggression, except in point 3, which proposed to prohibit the use of the atomic weapon as an instrument of aggression. Yet that threat was the main, perhaps the only cause of the tension responsible for the armaments race. The elimination of that threat, and the renunciation of aggression and of the use of force, were

elementary principles which no Member of the United Nations could deny. If those principles were applied, disarmament would follow as a matter of course.

25. The Yugoslav delegation would support the joint draft resolution submitted by the representatives of Iraq, Pakistan and Syria (A/C.1/670), despite doubts about the chances of the four great Powers reaching agreement on disarmament so long as the existing political tension persisted.

26. In the course of an exchange of views between Mr. BATLLE BERRES (Uruguay) and the CHAIRMAN regarding the order of speakers, the representative of Uruguay said that, before speaking in the debate, he would be interested to hear the Soviet representative's reply to the statement made by the United Kingdom representative earlier in the meeting. The Committee would profit by hearing the views of both sides.

27. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he could not accept the theory that the Committee was a tribunal or that there were two parties. He reserved the right to speak later, but did not want to commit himself to do so at the moment.

28. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that it was for each delegation to decide when it would participate in the discussion. Accordingly, it would not be correct procedure to adjourn in the expectation of a particular speech.

29. Mr. LOPEZ (Philippines) thought the time had come for the great Powers most directly concerned to discuss the fundamental issues of disarmament in a less strained atmosphere. He referred to the remarks made on the subject by the representative of the Philippines, General Rómulo, in the plenary meeting on 16 November.<sup>1</sup>

30. His delegation would, with the other delegations which had already done so, support the joint draft resolution submitted by Iraq, Pakistan and Syria. Despite the doubts certain persons had expressed regarding the possibility of the four great Powers reaching an agreement, no effort must be spared; one must not resign oneself fatalistically to failure.

31. The representative of the Philippines hoped the proposed sub-committee would meet as soon as possible and would have the widest possible latitude in regard to procedure and as to whether it should meet in open or in closed session. He also referred to an earlier suggestion made at the preceding meeting that a time limit should be set for the submission of the sub-committee's report.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 348th meeting.