

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

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Chairman: Mr. Finn MOE (Norway).

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments (A/1943 and A/C.1/667) (continued)

[Item 66]*

International control of atomic energy : report of the Committee of Twelve (A/1922) (continued)

[Item 16]*

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the principles and the substance of the draft resolution presented by France, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/667) in no way differed from those in the tripartite statement (A/1943). Since the purposes and methods of the two documents were the same, one did not represent a step forward from the other nor reflect a more conciliatory attitude. The joint proposals should be related to the foreign policies of the three Powers. Although the proposals were said to offer a turning point in history, they avoided the basic problems of the reduction of armaments by entering reservations and evasions ; nor did the proposals rule out further increases in armaments.

2. The United States representative had asserted that there was no contradiction between the increase of armed forces and the objectives of peace.¹ He had further claimed that the three-Power proposals could lead to the solution of some other problems. In contrast to this, the Soviet Union Government in October 1951 had offered to discuss with the United States all important and outstanding questions with a view to improving relations between the two States. The three-Power proposals by no means represented the only road to peace, for the peoples of the world were not condemned by fate to bear the burden of armaments indefinitely. Indeed, if such a thesis were accepted, there could be no serious discussion of disarmament.

3. The policy of increasing armaments and forming aggressive blocs, while speaking of disarmament, was an

attempt to conceal warlike purposes. The proposal for a Middle East Command was an attempt to establish new bases and enlarge the forces in the Near East for aggression against the Soviet Union, and not for the alleged defensive purposes. However, the nations Middle East were aware of the sympathy of the Soviet Union in their struggle for national independence. Concrete evidence of the support of the USSR had been given in connexion with the evaluation of foreign troops in 1946 in the cases of Syria and Lebanon and again in 1947 in the case of Egypt.

4. Regardless of all the words which might be spoken, new facts concerning the policies of the " North Atlantic bloc " continued to emerge. Other obvious cases were Korea and Indo-China and most recently the conduct of the British troops in the Suez Canal Zone in contrast to the statements of the British Foreign Minister.

5. United States policy embodied a sort of worship of force. The President of the United States had stated that the establishments of areas of strength was their objective and that the Soviet Union should be dealt with by force rather than through agreement. This attitude had been reflected in his message to Congress in January 1951 and again in the address of the Secretary of State at the celebrations of Detroit's 250th anniversary. Mr. Vyshinsky warned that the use of force would not bring any results from the Soviet Union.

6. In order to deceive the nations of the " North Atlantic bloc ", slanderous statements had been made about the aggressive intentions of the Soviet Union. However Generalissimo Stalin had stated in an interview in February 1951 that the Soviet Union, just as was the case with other States, could not develop its civilian industries and proceed with its reconstruction projects and at the same time extend its forces and its military production without risking bankruptcy. The accuracy of that estimate could be seen in the evidence presented regarding the economic and financial position of France, the United Kingdom and others which had reached a critical point.

7. The under-developed nations also had moved backwards in the last decade through lack of capital because the greater part of the income from their resources had been sucked out by foreign monopolies. Yet, those nations would

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 335th meeting.

require only about one per cent of the military expenditures of the "North Atlantic bloc" to make substantial progress. That was a direct result of the foreign policy of the United States.

8. The basic objective of the United States was to avoid the reduction of armaments and to maintain a military preponderance, especially in air forces and atomic weapons. The Secretary of State of the United States had testified to that effect before Congress.

9. Mr. Vyshinsky referred to published reports concerning the meetings of commercial and industrial groups in the United States to show that those influential circles had urged the United States Government to direct its foreign policy in such a way as to ensure the availability of raw materials to United States industry for the speeding of arms production.

10. The foregoing represented facts which had to be taken into consideration in connexion with the assertion that a conciliatory hand had been extended to the Soviet Union.

11. It had been claimed that the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/667) was a bold new plan based upon experience. However, it conformed to the old worn-out Baruch scheme which would solve nothing. The three-Power plan was made to hinge upon preliminary conditions, implicit as well as explicit. Its sponsors had made reference not only to ending the war in Korea, but also to all political questions dividing the world. Yet it was plain from the remarks made in June 1951 by the United States Secretary of State, that the end of the war in Korea would not affect the United States armament programme. At that time Mr. Acheson had stated that even in the event of a settlement in Korea, the appropriations for the military assistance programme would not be reduced. Quite apart from asserting that disarmament could not take place until there was a settlement in Korea, the western Powers were dragging out the truce negotiations in Korea. The latest manoeuvre had been to insist that an agreement relating to prisoners of war was essential to the cease-fire. But plainly, a cease-fire in Korea depended only upon the United States.

12. A further condition for disarmament, which had been put forward, was a general abatement of tension in international relations. That was reasonable enough but there should be some regard given to the responsibility of the United States for the growing tension at numerous points all around the globe including Germany, Trieste, the Middle East, Korea and China. Moreover, the United States had broken agreements with the Soviet Union.

13. Mr. Vyshinsky drew attention to the signature by the President of the United States of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 which provided for the financing of persons residing in or escapees from the Soviet Union and a number of other States in order to prepare them for service in the armed units of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or for other purposes. That act Mr. Vyshinsky described as an interference in the internal affairs of other States in contravention of international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the solemn treaty signed by the Soviet Union and the United States in 1933. Such policies on the part of the United States Government constituted an aggressive act and could only serve to worsen international relations. The Soviet Union had protested the act and formally requested its revocation. The Soviet Union also had requested that the matter be included on the agenda of the General Assembly as a matter of urgency. Despite such activities the United States representative spoke of a desire to reduce international tension and had maintained that such abatement was a prerequisite for disarmament.

14. The United States representative had claimed that the three-Power proposal provided for the prohibition of atomic weapons. In fact, however, what that proposal referred to was merely the achievement of effective international control to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons. Any reasonable person could plainly see that if there were no prohibition there would be nothing to control. Ever since January 1946 the United States and its supporters had been repeating the same hackneyed formula while the Soviet Union had repeatedly put forward proposals for the prohibition of atomic weapons. The basic difference at the present time between the Soviet Union proposals (A/1962) and the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/669) was that the latter made no provision for the prohibition of atomic weapons.

15. It had been stated that it would be useless to prohibit atomic weapons without first establishing control because of the danger of violations and evasions to States complying with the regulations. The Soviet Union accordingly had proposed that prohibition and control should be established simultaneously despite their earlier insistence upon immediate and unconditional prohibition. In view of the suspicions of other States, the USSR had asked that the prohibition be controlled and that both matters be dealt with in a single convention. It might be valid to claim that prohibition without control would be inadequate but it was equally true that control without prohibition was valueless.

16. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Stalin, had indicated to a correspondent that the United States would not be averse to having a monopoly in the production of atomic bombs since it would like the unlimited possibility of intimidating and blackmailing other countries. Partisans of the atomic bomb, Mr. Stalin had stated, would support the prohibition of the weapon only if they realized that they no longer had monopoly control. Of course, they could not change their position overnight, since those partisans thought it would be too great a step towards bringing about the deterioration of their position.

17. While it was true, as Mr. Acheson had said, that Mr. Baruch had suggested the cessation of the production of the atomic bomb and the destruction of existing atomic bombs in 1946, those ideas had not been submitted to the United Nations. It was well known that the question of the destruction of the atomic weapon stockpile and the use of nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes had been raised in 1947 in the Atomic Energy Commission by the USSR representative.² The plan had been agreed to by all the members of the Commission with the sole exception of the United States representative, who had declared that the provisions for control of atomic energy should be carried out step by step. Those facts made it clear that the United States invariably opposed proposals whenever the question of destroying atomic bombs arose. Thus, Mr. Acheson's 1946 letter³ showed that the United States would not regard itself as bound by any plan when the question of the prohibition of the atomic weapon arose, even in the event of the adoption and ratification of the Baruch plan. That plan obviously offered no assurance of the actual prohibition of the atomic weapon.

18. Not only would the system of stages of the Baruch plan allow the possibility of postponing prohibition of the atomic bomb forever, but the production of atomic energy,

² See *Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Second Year, Special Supplement, Part IV, page 88.*

³ See *A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy, Washington, D. C., March 16, 1946, pp. VII-X.*

even that not bearing a direct relation on the production of atomic weapons, would be placed exclusively within the ownership of the international control organ. Noting that Mr. Baruch had envisaged selection of the staff of that organ on a basis of competence and as far as possible, on the principle of balanced geographical representation, Mr. Vyshinsky observed that since the United States would always assume that its scholars were by far the most competent, the international character of that organ might well be unsatisfactory. He cited as examples what had happened in the arrangement of the Committee's agenda, on which the item proposed by the USSR logically should have been considered second, what had happened when Yugoslavia had been elected to the Security Council in contravention of the London Agreement, and what was contemplated at present, when Yugoslavia was to be replaced by Greece. These examples showed what could be expected of an international atomic control organ.

19. The majority of the Organization had evidently conducted a pro-American policy, and though individual delegations would in private admit that a given United States proposal was unfair, they would not vote against it. That being so, what could be expected of the control organ which would be likely to include even more American elements on the grounds of competence, when the interests of the Soviet Union would be at stake?

20. The very system of control in the Baruch plan was based exclusively on strategic consideration, rather than on the requirements of any country. That had been pointed out by Professor P. M. S. Blackett, who had remarked, in a study on atomic energy, that the United States Government would not have submitted such a proposal if it were not fully convinced that the western Powers would have a secure majority in the international control organ.

21. All that made it clear that the Baruch plan was concerned with the selfish interests of the United States and that any inspection under it would be entirely in the hands of the United States, with all the consequences thereof. Such a plan would destroy the world economy and would be harmful to countries such as the USSR which needed atomic energy for civilian industrial purposes, and was wholly unacceptable for any self-respecting State.

22. As the United States representative had admitted in 1946, the Baruch plan was incapable of ensuring genuine international control of atomic energy. Yet, it was still being urged upon States that had argued its inadequacy for years, quite apart from the fact that the plan sought ends utterly incompatible with international control.

23. It was said that the fact that the plan infringed upon the sovereignty of States was inevitable because higher purposes were being pursued. These higher purposes, however, aimed merely at ensuring the control of United States monopolies. Naturally, every international agreement entailed limitations of sovereignty, but such limitation could be made only in the common interests. A limitation which would amount to the annihilation of sovereignty for the benefit of one State could not be accepted.

24. Mr. Acheson had referred to the five-Power report regarding atomic energy, issued in 1949⁴ which had declared that the USSR proposal for a system of international control would be dangerous for international security. That was a wholly untenable position which had been repeatedly disproved. The Baruch plan, on the other hand,

contained an implicit danger to peace, in that, if implemented, it would allow the majority to determine that fictitious violations existed in order to find a pretext for launching a new world war. In that connexion, Mr. Vyshinsky cited declarations such as that of Mr. Bullitt, who had seen aggressive intentions in the USSR decision to increase its steel production to 60 million tons a year. That was evidence of what could be seized upon to furnish such a pretext.

25. Urging that the Committee take a look at the real substance of the matter, Mr. Vyshinsky requested the authors and supporters of the three-Power proposal to answer the following questions:

(1) Would they agree that the General Assembly should declare itself in favour of an unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of that prohibition?

(2) Would they agree that the General Assembly should instruct the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments to draw up and submit to the Security Council, not later than 1 February 1952, an appropriate draft convention on that subject?

(3) Would they agree that the draft convention should provide for measures which would ensure the implementation of the General Assembly decisions on the prohibition of the atomic weapon, the cessation of its production, the use, solely for civilian purposes, of atomic bombs already produced and should provide for the establishment of strict international control over the implementation of the convention?

(4) Would they agree that the General Assembly should recognize that any sincere plan for a substantial reduction of all armed forces and armaments must include the establishment, within the framework of the Security Council, of an international organ of control?

(5) Would they agree that that international control organ should be responsible for control of the reduction of all types of armaments and armed forces and for control of the enforcement of the prohibition of all kinds of atomic weapons, so that such prohibition should be carried out with meticulousness and in good faith; that that international control organ should obtain and disclose information on all armed forces, including para-military, security and police forces; that it should obtain and disclose information on all arms including atomic weapons; and that effective international inspection should be envisaged under the instructions of the above-mentioned international control organ?

(6) Would they agree that the international control organ for the prohibition of atomic weapons should carry out, immediately after the conclusion of the above-mentioned convention, an inspection of all establishments for the production and stock-piling of atomic weapons for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the said convention?

26. Affirmative answers to those clear questions would provide the most effective evidence of readiness to prohibit the atomic bomb. Then it would be possible to go ahead.

27. In conclusion, Mr. Vyshinsky submitted several amendments (A/C.1/668) to the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/667), which could not, in its existing form, serve its ostensible objectives.

28. Mr. SANDLER (Sweden) reviewed the establishment of the Committee of Twelve and recalled that his delegation had voted in favour of that Committee's mandate at the fifth session of the General Assembly, in order to seize whatever chance there was of removing the impasse

⁴ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Session, Supplement No. 15, document A/1050.

in the work of the Commission on Atomic Energy. The misgivings expressed by the Swedish representative at that time, however, still remained.

29. It was not clear that the chances of reaching a solution would be improved if all the obstacles to be found in the varied field of conventional armaments were to be added to the well known difficulties in the field of atomic energy. Observing that it was astonishing to find the documentation of the League of Nations work on disarmament absent from the records submitted by the Committee of Twelve, he observed that the League experience was useful in that the problems which would have to be faced in the United Nations had been the subject of considerable technical study.

30. Though the text of the draft resolution proposed by the Committee of Twelve (A/1922) contained no reference to it, an interesting document presented by the United States^a on co-ordinating the work of the Commission on Atomic Energy and the Commission for Conventional Armaments had been before the Committee of Twelve and had envisaged the creation of committees by the new commission. According to this document, those committees were to be created bearing in mind the difference between atomic weapons and non-atomic ones and between biological weapons and other warlike instruments requiring co-ordinated systems for regulation and control. That seemed to be a realistic approach and he assumed that special provision would be made for the control of atomic energy.

^a See document A/AC.50/1.

31. Citing the fear that concentration of the complex problem affecting all weapons in a single commission might retard vital work in the field of atomic energy, he thought it important that special machinery be established to deal with that question. It was essential that the directives of the General Assembly should leave the door open to the achievement of progress, technical and political conditions permitting. Mr. Sandler noted with satisfaction that nothing in the three-Power draft resolution ran counter to such an interpretation. Pointing out that the technical developments were altering the nature and position of the atomic weapons, he said that it was to be feared that if timely advantage were not taken of the existing special and favourable conditions, a solution would be beyond reach.

32. Turning to the question of stages, he noted that the three-Power proposal required no priority for less important categories. Citing the work done by the League of Nations in attempting to define offensive weapons, and mentioning the inter-dependence between various types of arms, he observed that the proposed commission would have to examine whether it would be possible to establish a system to secure information on all effectives at first, leading to the subsequent control of atomic weapons.

33. The Swedish delegation considered the tripartite draft more realistic than the other proposal before the Committee; it contained nothing which would make it difficult to accept.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.