



Wednesday, 11 October 1950, at 10.45 a.m.

Official Records

Lake Success, New York

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Chairman: Mr. Roberto URDANETA ARBELÁEZ (Colombia).

**United action for peace (*continued*)**

[Item 68]\*

**GENERAL DISCUSSION (*continued*)**

1. Mr. QUEVEDO (Ecuador) said that he would restrict himself to general comments on the draft resolutions (A/C.1/576 and A/C.1/575). He reserved the right to speak again later when the details of the draft resolutions were discussed.

2. Judged from a legal point of view, the seven-Power draft resolution was perfectly acceptable. There was nothing in the Charter which expressly opposed it or was in implicit contradiction with the spirit behind it. The Assembly had, in fact, the power to make recommendations even in the case of questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. The General Assembly's power to make recommendations was not blocked by the last sentence of paragraph 2 of Article 11. The last paragraph of Article 11, moreover, confirmed that point. Nor was the draft resolution contrary to the provisions of Article 20 of the Charter which laid down that the Assembly could be convoked at the request of the Security Council or of a majority of the Members of the United Nations. Although, according to the draft resolution, seven members of the Council could request that a special session of the General Assembly should be convoked, in practice the Assembly would be convened only when the majority of Member States had approved that request.

3. With regard to the legal objections raised against the provisions relating to the maintenance of armed forces in the service of the United Nations, the fact was that the United Nations would not be able to order them to be used but that the General Assembly would at most be able to make a recommendation to that effect. The legality of such a recommendation could not be affected in any way by the clause in Article 43 of the Charter, according to which the armed forces were sub-

ject to the call of the Security Council. Although the recommendations of the General Assembly did not possess the binding force of decisions of the Security Council, their moral force was such that Member States would hesitate to disregard them.

4. Events had justified the attitude of those countries which, at San Francisco, had opposed introducing the right of veto. Fortunately, thanks particularly to the efforts of several countries including a number of Latin American States, the Charter, in recognizing the legality of regional arrangements, had given the General Assembly powers that were sufficiently elastic.

5. The maintenance of peace and the strengthening of collective security were such serious matters that the seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/576) could not be discussed simply as a legal document. It was essential that the draft resolution should be adopted. States which cherished no intent to overthrow the established order in other countries, nor any territorial ambitions, owed it to themselves to find a procedure which would enable them to act at any time as effectively as they had done on 25 and 27 June 1950, at the time of the aggression upon the Republic of Korea. The seven-Power draft resolution could not be regarded as dangerous by any State which was determined to respect the rights of others. It was certainly not intended to provide a devious means of enabling a majority to violate the interests of a minority. It was inconceivable that more than forty nations would agree to wage war on five or six other States because those five or six States had a different economic and social system from their own. Similarly, it would be equally absurd to suppose that more than forty nations could be transformed into docile instruments of five or six other States. History had already shown that two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations were essentially peace-loving and that the Great Powers only had the support of the other nations when they acted in accordance with justice and morality. Force could sometimes pre-

\* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

vail over justice for a certain length of time, but in the end it was only supported if it kept to the path of right and truth. The majority of Members of the United Nations would never lend their support to a policy of rapine and abuse. The seven-Power draft resolution could not harm the group of nations which might regard themselves as a minority within the Organization. On the contrary, if their intentions were essentially peaceful, the adoption of that proposal would ensure general support from the United Nations should one of them one day be the object of an aggression.

6. It was essential to ensure that a desire for perfection did not permit the current session of the General Assembly to come to an end without approving the draft resolution, which only needed one or two alterations to make possible the prompt establishment of machinery which would be of effective assistance in the maintenance of international peace and security.

7. Some consideration should perhaps be paid at once to the question whether the General Assembly ought to be given the power to study a question only if the Security Council had found it impossible to exercise its proper functions in respect of that question. As it stood, paragraph 1 of section A might result in paralyzing any move for action if it was interpreted as meaning that the General Assembly could adopt recommendations on a matter only after the Security Council had been seized of that matter; for under Article 12, the General Assembly could not make any recommendations with regard to a matter of which the Security Council was seized. The question should therefore be examined whether the General Assembly could deal with a matter under the powers conferred upon it by the Charter, without its intervention being subordinate to the exercise by the Security Council of the functions assigned to it.

8. However, if it was decided that it was necessary to retain paragraph 1 of section A of the draft resolution as it stood, it should also be pointed out that the Security Council would first have to take a vote before ceasing to deal with a matter and, consequently, before the General Assembly could make a recommendation on that matter. It followed that, if one of the members of the Council wished to block all action by the General Assembly, it would be able to achieve its purpose by using delaying tactics in the Council, which would be particularly easy if that member were to hold the presidency of the Council at a time of crisis. In order to avoid such an eventuality, it ought to be possible to amend the draft resolution so as to enable the General Assembly to be convoked at the request of any seven members of the Security Council, should they believe that the Council was not functioning effectively, even if the Council had not decided to shelve a matter, i.e., even if the lack of unanimity among the permanent members of the Council had not yet actually become manifest by the use of the right of veto.

9. A similar comment could be made with regard to paragraph 3 of section B. Under that paragraph, the peace observation commission could be utilized only if the Security Council was not exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter.

10. The text of section C, paragraph 8, of the draft resolution should be studied by Member States in the

light of their respective national constitutions. If no agreement or agreements of the nature mentioned in Article 43 of the Charter existed, an agreement should be concluded between the United Nations and the States concerned to provide for the training and equipment of the armed forces made available to the United Nations. The co-operation of States in the implementation of the plan necessarily depended in the last analysis upon their constitutional provisions.

11. The Ecuadorian delegation was in favour of amending the General Assembly's rules of procedure as provided for in the annex to the draft resolution (A/C.1/576).

12. The representative of Ecuador considered that the Chilean draft resolution (A/C.1/575) was just as important as it was useful.

13. The fifth paragraph of the preamble to that draft stated unquestionable truths: that conditions of stability and well-being were necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations and that those conditions in turn could only be achieved by higher standards of living, full employment for all and conditions of economic and social progress and development. The sixth paragraph of the preamble rightly recalled the urgent need for effective and collective action. Paragraph 1 of the operative part of the Chilean draft invited Member States to give consideration to the adoption of a pact which would strengthen the authority of the United Nations. It might perhaps be desirable to refer the draft resolution for study to a sub-committee which would work out the provisions of such a pact.

14. Paragraph 2 of the Chilean draft resolution should be given careful consideration in order to ascertain whether such a further provision consistent with the Charter might not be added to the seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/576).

15. Careful study should also be given to the alternative method of convoking the General Assembly provided for in the second sub-paragraph of paragraph 3 of the Chilean draft resolution (A/C.1/575).

16. The Chilean draft resolution might be a little too ambitious, but it was aimed at strengthening the Charter by expanding international economic and technical co-operation. It was the expression of a desire which would no doubt be achieved in the future.

17. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) thought that the paralysis which had stricken the United Nations had been caused by lack of unanimity among the five great Powers in the Security Council. It was the duty of the First Committee and the General Assembly to work out the appropriate methods of taking collective action for peace. The Iraqi delegation thought that three approaches to the problem should be studied simultaneously.

18. In the first place, both the First Committee and the General Assembly should endeavour once again to use the method of negotiation, mediation and conciliation among the permanent members of the Security Council.

19. In the second place, careful study should be given to the possible convocation of a General Conference of

the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the Charter so as to give greater authority to the United Nations by abolition of the veto. The right of veto was undemocratic; the argument that some Powers would withdraw from the United Nations if that right were abolished was unfounded. The seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/576), which was designed to render the veto ineffective, was in fact tantamount to a proposal for abolishing that right.

20. In the third place, use should be made of the methods advocated in the seven-Power resolution, although they could only serve as a temporary remedy.

21. The Iraqi delegation supported the seven-Power draft resolution, provided that it included the amendments which had already been proposed, or which would be proposed by the delegations of Egypt and Lebanon (A/C.1/581 and A/C.1/578). The measures proposed in the draft were in conformity with the provisions of the Charter, since the General Assembly, under Article 10, certainly had the right to appoint observers, to recommend the maintenance of armed units by Member States, and even to recommend appropriate military action when the Security Council failed to act.

22. Although the General Assembly had only the power of making recommendations, such recommendations had a moral influence on world opinion, which was not less effective than a definite command.

23. The provisions of the Charter on resistance to aggression were very far-reaching, involving as they did the right of legitimate individual or collective defence in the event that both the General Assembly and the Security Council failed to act.

24. The legal aspects of the seven-Power proposal did not present any difficulties for the Iraqi delegation. The proposal was intended to remedy a situation which might be fatal to world peace and security if the Security Council was paralysed by the use of the right of veto. In that case, the General Assembly should be able to meet immediately; the rules of procedure should therefore be amended accordingly.

25. It was important that the General Assembly should have an observation commission at its disposal. That commission should be selected on the basis of an equitable geographical distribution.

26. The Iraqi delegation considered that each Member State should survey the resources which it could place at the disposal of the United Nations. In that connexion, the delegation supported the Egyptian amendment (A/C.1/581) to establish standard rules for the training, organization and equipment of such special units. The Iraqi delegation also welcomed the idea of establishing a panel of military experts who would be available to Member States.

27. The proposed collective measures committee should also be selected on the basis of geographical representation. Mr. Al-Jamali stressed the importance of the Egyptian amendment which stated that that committee should consult not only the Secretary-General, but also each State directly concerned before reporting to the Security Council and the General Assembly.

28. The Egyptian amendment to give priority to the training and equipment of the national forces of States militarily under-equipped, deserved careful consideration. In short, the Iraqi delegation supported the seven-Power draft resolution, as amended by Egypt and Lebanon, as well as the draft resolution submitted by Chile. The delegation considered, however, that the Organization's principal duty was to seek preventive rather than remedial measures, or rather to seek both at the same time. The first and best preventive measure was to bring about a genuine understanding between the permanent members of the Security Council.

29. Mr. RETTA (Ethiopia) stated that his delegation supported the general principles underlying the seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/576). One of the most important purposes and principles of the Charter was the maintenance of peace by means of collective measures.

30. When the Charter was drawn up, it had been felt that the best instrument for peace would be agreement between the five great Powers, and their special position had been recognized when the rule of unanimity was laid down. Nevertheless, it was generally admitted at the present time that the mechanism of the Charter had shown certain weaknesses which should be remedied.

31. Ethiopia had unlimited faith in the principle of collective security although its confidence had already been shaken once, at the time of the Italian invasion. The Emperor of Ethiopia knew from personal experience what it was to struggle against aggression, and had always favoured the system of collective security, as he had re-affirmed (S/1555) in July 1950 in connexion with the situation in Korea.

32. It was in that spirit that Ethiopia welcomed the proposals providing for united action for peace.

33. The world should learn the object-lessons of the inefficient functioning of the League of Nations. He wondered, however, whether the weaknesses of the General Assembly and the Security Council were not caused by the lack of united action on the part of the great Powers. Perhaps an appeal should be directed to them, since it lay in their hands to ensure the welfare of the whole world.

34. United action for peace should not be restricted in either time or space and should not be directed against anyone or in favour of anyone.

35. Some Member States were neighbours of countries which had been the cause of conflict. The system of collective security was, therefore, of considerable interest to them, and to Ethiopia in particular.

36. The delegation of Ethiopia supported the principles underlying the seven-Power draft resolution. They would make it possible to increase the efficiency of the security mechanism provided by the Charter.

37. The CHAIRMAN announced that the list of speakers would be closed at the end of the meeting.

38. Mr. PEARSON (Canada) stated that the USSR's professions of faith in peace were not sufficient to allay the fears of States which judged the intentions of the Government of the USSR from its policy and

actions. Contrary to Mr. Vyshinsky's assertions (357th meeting), it was not the principle of the unanimity of the five permanent members of the Security Council which was at issue but the inactivity and paralysis of the Security Council owing to abuse of the veto.

39. If it were true, as Mr. Vyshinsky claimed, that the veto had been a means of protecting the rights of the minority, the Canadian delegation would have had perhaps even more sympathy for that institution than Mr. Vyshinsky had shown at the Belgrade Conference, where he had been one of the majority. References had been made *ad nauseum* to the so-called automatic majority. But should the Committee not ask what was the opinion of the delegations of India, Egypt, Ecuador, Burma, Yugoslavia, Syria and others who did not wish to belong to any bloc of States and who had demonstrated the truth of that statement by their voting record? While Mr. Vyshinsky showed himself so solicitous of the rights of the minority, he flouted the rights of the majority, which, according to him, automatically made illegal, scandalous and unjustifiable recommendations when it did not include the five delegations of the minority.

40. As to the USSR representative's reference to the inactivity of the Interim Committee, did that argument not contradict its author, who had formerly opposed the establishment of that Committee on the pretext that it was intended to by-pass the Security Council? If the United States of America had had the power which Mr. Vyshinsky attributed to it, why had it not compelled the Interim Committee to supplant the Security Council?

41. Mr. Pearson paid tribute to the high initiative of the Chilean delegation and hoped that its draft resolution would be studied in conjunction with the seven-Power draft.

42. The aggression provoked in Korea in June had revealed the great danger confronting the United Nations because of the lack of any system of collective security. Undoubtedly, the Security Council's action had been effective, but that action had been due solely to a fortunate combination of circumstances. As soon as the representative of the USSR had returned to the Council, its activities had again been paralysed by systematic obstruction. Events had also shown that most of the Members had not been prepared to participate in prompt action to combat aggression.

43. One lesson which could be learned for the future from that experience was that, in order to maintain peace, other organs of the United Nations, and in particular the General Assembly, must be strengthened to counteract delays or shortcomings of the Council. That did not mean that the vital role which the Charter gave the Security Council must be eliminated. The General Assembly should not be substituted for the Security Council, but should only assume its functions if the Security Council failed to carry out its task or was prevented from doing so. It was clear that in such cases the United Nations could not watch the Organization fail without attempting to remedy the situation. Recourse to a system of regional arrangements would not suffice. What was needed was to reinforce the United Nations itself. It was a matter of supporting right with might in order to stop aggressors and ensure the im-

plementation of Assembly recommendations accepted by the Members. It was clear that the Assembly could only make recommendations; but those recommendations could have great force when they were based on right and justice.

44. Contrary to Mr. Vyshinsky's assertion, the seven-Power draft resolution was not illegal. The Charter expressly provided for the powers it was proposed to give to the General Assembly. Moreover, the Assembly would only use them if the Security Council failed to act. If Mr. Vyshinsky's viewpoint were adopted, the Committee would have to resign itself to admitting that the United Nations could not take any measures to safeguard peace and security when the Security Council was unable to act because of the veto of one of its permanent members. The Canadian delegation could not admit that the Charter sanctioned such a ridiculous contention.

45. The seven-Power draft resolution did not contain a revolutionary interpretation of the Charter. It merely made provision for the use of certain powers which the General Assembly already had under the Charter, in order to avoid certain situations in which the United Nations might be paralysed.

46. It was strange that Mr. Vyshinsky should claim, on the basis of Article 11, paragraph 2, of the Charter, that the Assembly should automatically refer any question requiring action to the Security Council without even using its right of discussion under Article 10. Was it not he who had proposed on numerous occasions, that the Assembly should adopt important measures on questions which were or might be on the agenda of the Council? A week earlier (352nd meeting), he had asked that the Assembly should recommend the withdrawal of United Nations troops from Korea. That was nevertheless a question requiring very serious action. Clearly, the statements of the USSR representative were characterized neither by logic nor by scrupulous respect for the provisions of the Charter. In fact, the action referred to in Article 11, paragraph 2, was that which the Security Council could take under the Chapter of the Charter which defined its functions. That action was not, therefore, to be confused with the recommendations which the Assembly was empowered to make to Member States under the provisions of that same Article 11, paragraph 2. Moreover, such recommendations would only be made if the Security Council failed to take definite action. The seven-Power draft resolution merely provided that the Assembly should make the legal and constitutional recommendations it deemed appropriate.

47. It appeared that section A of the draft resolution (A/C.1/576) commanded almost unanimous approval. It was right that it should be possible for the General Assembly to be convened within twenty-four hours, in case of emergency, so as to prevent an aggressor from deriving advantage from a surprise attack. The interval was not too short, even for the USSR delegation, the more so since that delegation's permanent representative on the Security Council might automatically represent his government at a special session of the General Assembly.

48. Section B, relating to the establishment of a peace observation commission, seemed to have received the approval of the USSR delegation, which had, however,

stated that the proposed commission must not be the tool of any one group of States. That was a point well taken, and it was to be hoped that all States, including the USSR, would remember it.

49. Section C, particularly paragraph 8 of that section, was of particular importance, for it placed a police force at the disposal of the United Nations and enabled small States, who normally did not have land forces available, to defend themselves against the aggressor in case of surprise attack. That paragraph did not establish an international armed force as such, but it did provide for the formation of national contingents which might be used by the United Nations while being at the same time available for the national defence of each State. It was not true, as Mr. Vyshinsky had claimed, that that provision violated the Charter. On the contrary, it might be said that it did not go far enough. It was true that the General Assembly could only make recommendations and that the States Members would have to decide whether they accepted or rejected them. It might, however, be hoped that a recommendation based on justice and a true knowledge of the facts would have such authority that no loyal Member of the United Nations could ignore it.

50. The Government of Canada had immediately sent naval and air forces to Korea to repel the aggressor. At the time, that Government did not have sufficient land forces at its disposal. Since then, the Parliament of Canada had authorized the establishment of a special force to carry out the undertakings which Canada had assumed in virtue of its participation in the United Nations. All Member States should take similar steps.

51. Section D of the joint draft resolution was complementary to section C. It was quite reasonable to suggest that a temporary *ad hoc* committee should report to the Security Council and the General Assembly before its next session on the methods by which the principles set forth for the formation of national contingents might be worked out. That committee might, for example, consider the arguments for and against an international force composed, not of national contingents, but of United Nations volunteers. No question arose, in that section, of the United Nations making strategical plans, of placing armed forces at the disposal of the Secretary-General, or of conducting an inquisitorial investigation of the resources of Member States. The doubts raised by the Australian representative (356th meeting) with regard to that section of the joint draft resolution were probably due to the fact that he was attributing to the committee far more extensive powers and responsibilities than had been contemplated by the authors of the proposal.

52. It was surprising that the alternative suggested by the USSR delegation to the joint seven-Power draft resolution was that the Military Staff Committee should be asked to resume its work and that the Security Council should be asked to work out military agreements under Article 43 of the Charter. Actually, it was obstruction by the delegation of the USSR which had hitherto prevented the Military Staff Committee from functioning and military agreements from being concluded. If the USSR delegation was modifying its point of view and desired to co-operate with the other members of the Security Council in applying Chapter VII

of the Charter, that might be regarded as excellent news. If that was not the case, the USSR proposal had no practical value.

53. It was even more surprising that Mr. Vyshinsky should have recalled the provisions of Article 106 of the Charter, dealing with the transitional security arrangements which the Allied Powers were to make jointly immediately after the war. Did Mr. Vyshinsky mean that the transitional period should last for as long as the USSR could frustrate action in the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee? If, on the contrary, the representative of the USSR desired that genuine consultation should now take place under Article 106, such a tendency could only be applauded.

54. The Canadian delegation reserved its right to speak later on the two draft resolutions submitted by the USSR delegation (A/C.1/579 and A/C.1/580). It welcomed there and then, however, some ideas in those draft resolutions, which were not incompatible with the seven-Power draft, but supplementary to it.

55. That draft resolution (A/C.1/576) could obviously be improved. Its sponsors would therefore regard favourably any amendment that might make it still more effective.

56. HASSAN Pasha (Egypt) said he was happy to support any effort on behalf of peace and against aggression. The Egyptian delegation had always been in favour of the broadening of the powers of the General Assembly, since extraordinary powers had been given to the five permanent members of the Security Council, and the principle of the sovereign equality of States should be respected in the United Nations.

57. It was necessary to provide for effective measures to prevent the calamitous consequences of an aggression that might start at any time and at any place in the world. No one, therefore, could object to the aims of the various draft resolutions submitted for the purpose of instituting an international force capable of repelling aggression.

58. *Prima facie*, the seven-Power draft resolution seemed to be the most practical. The Egyptian delegation had therefore submitted an amendment (A/C.1/581) designed to make it more effective.

59. General ROMULO (Philippines) thought that the objections to the seven-Power proposal expressed by the representatives of Australia (356th meeting) and of the USSR (357th meeting) deserved a detailed reply.

60. The representative of Australia was opposed to section D of the draft resolution on the ground that the functions assigned to the collective measures committee were too vague and that the reports to be submitted by that committee might in some cases be insufficient and in others so detailed that they might provide information which could be of value to a potential aggressor. If paragraph 10 of the draft resolution was not clear enough, the necessary drafting corrections would of course have to be made. The danger indicated by the Australian representative would, however, be allayed if paragraph 10 of the draft resolution were read in relation to paragraph 7. It was not the proposed committee, but the individual States, which would have to survey

their resources and decide what they could place at the disposal of the United Nations. The report of the collective measures committee would be based on the information submitted by the various Member States to the Secretary-General. Paragraph 7 should perhaps be made clearer in that respect. Thus, the information gathered could not be of great value to a potential aggressor, but would probably be such as to deter him from carrying out his aggressive intentions.

61. The danger entailed by that method was not greater than that entailed in the application of Article 43 of the Charter, nor than that incurred by the various States Members when they were called upon to state the nature and scope of the assistance they were able to contribute to the United Nations action against aggression in Korea. The danger of the disclosure of strategic plans was also illusory. Since the essential purpose of the draft resolution was to avoid the recurrence of a situation that might compel the United Nations to improvise action in face of an attack prepared long before, it was time to begin preparing plans for repelling any potential aggressor. There could be only advantage and no danger in that.

62. The delegation of the Philippines was prepared to accept Mr. Spender's suggestions that the Security Council should be asked to make a fresh effort to conclude the agreements referred to in Article 43 of the Charter, and that the five great Powers should be invited to consult together concerning the transitional arrangements foreseen in Article 106. However a time-limit should be set for those consultations and for the conclusion of the military agreements so as not once more to reduce the United Nations to impotence at a particularly critical moment.

63. The sponsors of the draft resolution would certainly support any amendment proposed by the Australian representative with a view to including in the seven-Power draft a reference to the right of individual or collective self-defence and to the provisions contained in the Charter for regional arrangements and agencies.

64. In the USSR representative's view, the principle of the unanimity of the five permanent members of the Security Council was justified by the fact (which was quite true at the end of the Second World War) that an act of aggression or breach of the peace could be prevented only by the joint action of those States which had at once the necessary political, economic and military power. There were, however, two types of aggression: (a) the case where an act of aggression or breach of the peace was committed by a permanent member, in which case the United Nations could not prevent the dispute, Articles 41 and 42 could not apply, and Articles 51 and 52, relating to the classical remedies of self-defence and military alliances, could alone afford the victims of aggression any security; and (b) the case of aggression committed by a State other than one of the five permanent members. It was highly probable that the aggressor or the victim would always be able to obtain some support from one of the permanent members of the Council. In most cases, therefore, the Council would deal with questions affecting one or more great Powers. That applied in the case of Korea, where the veto had been avoided purely by chance. Previously,

in the dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia, a Power other than the USSR had also used its veto.<sup>1</sup> The conclusion was therefore to be drawn that a breach of the peace or act of aggression by any nation great or small would never be punished by the Security Council, because of the probability of disagreement between the great Powers and of the use of the veto by one of them.

65. Such, unfortunately, were the actual political conditions at the present time, caused by the ever-increasing divergence between East and West.

66. The draft resolutions submitted by the delegation of the USSR (A/C.1/579 and A/C.1/580) for the renewal of consultations between the five permanent members and for the application of the military agreements provided for in Article 43 of the Charter, would appear in some measure to meet the wishes of the Australian representative. Those draft resolutions were not at first sight incompatible with the draft resolution submitted by the seven Powers, provided, however, that if no agreement between the great Powers were reached within a certain period of time, the other Members of the United Nations were able to consider other action to safeguard their own security and world peace.

67. Fortunately, the provisions of the Charter were sufficiently flexible to enable the General Assembly to perform its functions with regard to the maintenance of peace and security. The effect of the seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/576) was by no means to weaken the Security Council; it was not possible to weaken a body which already had so little power. That draft did not take away any of the Security Council's powers, but merely provided for a supplementary procedure for maintaining international peace and security if the Security Council failed to act.

68. The Security Council acted on behalf of all the States Members of the United Nations. If the Council was unable to reach a decision, the Member States were obviously entitled to contemplate an alternative procedure. The seven-Power draft resolution, in conformity with Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the Charter, did not substitute one body for another, but established a second line of defence in case the first failed.

69. The General Assembly's power of discussion and recommendation was not impaired by the provision in the Charter whereby any question on which action was necessary was to be referred to the Security Council. The action taken by the General Assembly on the several questions of Spain, Greece, Korea and Palestine constituted so many precedents which had laid down the first legal principles confirming the Assembly's power to take action for the maintenance of peace and security without prior or subsequent reference to the Security Council. General Rómulo would agree to reference being made in the resolution to the fact that it would be transmitted to the Security Council, but that would not mean that any recommendations in the resolution would have to be submitted to the Council for approval.

70. The convening of a special session was a procedural matter. The Charter said nothing to the contrary.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Second Year, No. 83.*

In any case, that was a small matter, for in an emergency, the necessary majority of the Member States would surely take the initiative of convening a special session.

71. The representative of the Philippines was glad that the USSR representative supported sections A and B of the draft resolution in principle. Mr. Vyshinsky's objection regarding the time-limits for calling a special session should not stand, since the question was one of calling a session in an emergency, with a view to preventing an aggressor from accomplishing his purposes. Moreover, in the absence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the permanent representative of the USSR at the United Nations would certainly be able to represent his delegation satisfactorily.

72. General Rómulo agreed with the view of the USSR representative that the peace observation committee should be constituted on as broad a basis as possible, but felt that the committee had to be a means to an end. It was not sufficient for such a committee to observe and report to the Security Council and the General Assembly on any situation likely to endanger the peace; adequate guarantees must also be given that the evidence collected by the proposed peace observation committee would lead to effective action by the Security Council in the first instance and then, should the latter fail to act, by the General Assembly. Observation and action, the means and the end, must be made interdependent. Otherwise, the United Nations would be doomed to impotence.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.