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**Chairman:** Mr. Leopoldo BENITES (Ecuador).

## AGENDA ITEM 28

**Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (concluded)** (A/6390-DC/228, A/C.1/L.380 and Add.1-2)

### CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (A/C.1/L.380 AND ADD.1-2)

1. Mr. CORNER (New Zealand) said that his delegation had long stressed the importance of an agreement to end all nuclear tests and therefore strongly supported the draft resolution before the Committee (A/C.1/L.380 and Add.1-2). Two of its preambular paragraphs and operative paragraph 1 were concerned with adherence to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed at Moscow on 5 August 1963. That was a welcome inclusion, for it was important for the international community to express its concern that respect for that treaty should be universal.

2. New Zealand and its neighbours, including Western Samoa and the Cook Islands, had experienced great anxiety over the nuclear tests which France had undertaken during 1966 in the South Pacific. All possible care afforded by present scientific knowledge had been taken during those tests. Nevertheless, the risk of damage to the natural environment could not be entirely eliminated, and the political consequences

were potentially harmful. More serious, however, for the countries of Asia and the Pacific region, and, indeed, for the whole world, were the proclaimed successes of the Peking Government in the field of nuclear weapons, which could be greeted only with foreboding. As New Zealand was conscious of the fragility of the partial test ban treaty, it considered it more than ever necessary to take buttressing measures. By adopting a comprehensive test ban treaty, the present nuclear Powers would be making a significant gesture of restraint. He hoped, therefore, that during the following year the Eighteen-Nation Committee would seriously come to grips with the elaboration of such a treaty, as the draft resolution requested.

3. The draft resolution emphasized the possibilities for international co-operation opened up by the exchange of seismic data. New Zealand was willing to participate in the exchange of such data. As a geologically young country situated in a region subject to frequent seismic activity, it had considerable experience in seismology and possessed a well-developed seismographic network covering some thousands of miles from the Antarctic to the South Pacific. It was conducting active research on the origin of earthquakes, a branch of seismology which was of obvious importance for the problem of distinguishing underground explosions from natural earthquakes. It was greatly interested, therefore, in the Swedish proposals for a seismic "detection club" and welcomed the references to that question in the draft resolution.

4. While his delegation was aware of the reasons why the draft resolution referred to "national" evaluation of seismic data, it did not believe that the international community would be bound by that text forever. Although countries were merely on the threshold of linking national seismic systems, the world would see continued progress towards the perfection of international techniques of verification. International institutions might well have a role in the processing and evaluation of seismic data as, indeed, in other fields related to the implementation of disarmament measures.

5. Mr. BONDOC (Philippines) said that he was grateful to the sponsors of the draft resolution for the objectivity of its presentation. The preamble presented an accurate appraisal of the problem; it mentioned the various General Assembly resolutions on the question and the constructive joint memorandum of 17 August 1966 on a comprehensive test ban treaty submitted by the non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.<sup>1/</sup> It also emphasized that a comprehensive

<sup>1/</sup> See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1966, document DC/228, annex 1, sect. O.

test ban would help to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

6. As a signatory of the partial test ban treaty, his country was ready to pledge its co-operation in all efforts to defend the precious ground already won and to proceed further towards a comprehensive test ban treaty. It had good reason for regretting that certain Members of the United Nations had not adhered to the partial test ban treaty. In more ways than one, that situation blunted the moral force of the General Assembly's call to non-member States to accede to the treaty. If Peking preferred to lend a deaf ear to that appeal, it was to be hoped that France, which enjoyed great-Power status under the Charter, would affix its signature to the partial test ban treaty. Operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution was, therefore, timely and necessary.

7. Operative paragraph 2 was of great importance. Continued testing, in any environment, might not only lead to incalculable danger for human life from radioactive fall-out but also compromise the effectiveness of the partial test ban treaty. A rule of international conduct which was constantly breached could not long survive. Moreover, continued underground testing by signatories to the partial test ban treaty strengthened the suspicion that the principal nuclear Powers were not yet quite ready to conclude a comprehensive agreement for reasons of their own national security and that they would continue their efforts to perfect their nuclear weapons. That was an utterly senseless situation, since the nuclear Powers themselves stated that any major advance in the present technology of offensive and defensive nuclear weapons could only endanger the existing precarious balance of world power. The nuclear Powers must now be willing to assume their share of the responsibilities and obligations. The fact that the partial test ban treaty of 1963 had remained incomplete should not serve as an excuse for underground tests, but rather as an incentive to observe great restraint pending the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty providing for adequate verification.

8. To achieve the aim set out in operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution, his Government was prepared to contribute its meagre resources in men and material towards an effective exchange of seismic data, in the hope that international co-operation in that field would eventually yield an acceptable method of verification.

9. Finally, the draft resolution as a whole should be unreservedly supported because it would be very difficult to proceed further along the road to general and complete disarmament unless the nuclear arms race, in its qualitative and quantitative aspects, was stopped.

10. The CHAIRMAN called on the representative of the USSR, who had asked to explain his vote before the voting.

11. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution. His Government's position concerning supervision of the observance of a treaty banning underground tests had already been stated at the Committee's 1452nd meeting. The Soviet Union unreservedly supported the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, including underground tests. It considered that modern seismological techniques pro-

vided countries with adequate national means for detecting such tests. The Soviet Union was prepared to make a compromise in that regard and to accept the United Arab Republic's proposal for the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests above a certain seismic magnitude accompanied by a moratorium on all tests below that level. Moreover, the Swedish proposal for a "detection club" was worthy of attention if it would contribute to the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of underground tests without inspection. The information could be provided on a voluntary basis and the assessment of the seismic data could be carried out by each State and not by an international organization.

12. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on draft resolution A/C.1/L.380 and Add.1-2.

*The draft resolution was adopted by 72 votes to none, with 1 abstention.*

13. Mr. ECOBESCU (Romania) said that his delegation's vote in favour of the draft resolution stemmed from the position of principle which it had already stated when the draft resolutions on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons had been adopted (1450th meeting).

14. The arms race and the continuing increase in the number of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their growing sophistication had engendered an unprecedented danger for all mankind. Hence, the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests—a partial measure which would not affect existing stockpiles and thus would not eliminate the nuclear danger—could only have real meaning if it was placed in the context of the efforts aimed at prohibiting the use of such weapons, destroying existing stockpiles and achieving nuclear disarmament. As the Romanian Government had repeatedly stated, speedy and effective action must be taken to prohibit and destroy nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

15. Mr. ALARCON DE QUESADA (Cuba) said that his delegation had been absent when the vote on the draft resolution had been taken by that, if present, it would have abstained.

## AGENDA ITEM 29

Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (A/6390-DC/228, A/C.1/L.384)

### GENERAL DEBATE

16. Mr. Endalkachew MAKONNEN (Ethiopia) said that he would like to open the debate on agenda item 29 by introducing draft resolution A/C.1/L.384 on behalf of the sponsors. In doing so, he knew that he was exposing himself to serious criticisms. He might be accused of introducing an unrealistic element into the debate. It might also be asserted that the proposal was an expression of pure idealism. Lastly, and above all, it might be argued that the proposal would tend to complicate discussions on disarmament problems.

17. The draft resolution was certainly prompted by idealism, but it was a reasoned and restrained idealism, born of the experience of the Ethiopian people, who, having been victims of chemical warfare on the eve of the Second World War, were convinced

that the use of weapons of mass destruction should be universally outlawed. There was a need for such idealism to be injected into a discussion proceeding from a supposed realism which came near to accepting with resignation the contention that the present highly precarious peace depended on the balance of power alone. In actual fact, the preservation of peace rested on the self-interest of the community of nations and not on the theory of the balance of power. It was to that collective self-interest that he was now appealing.

18. It might be asked what the purpose of the proposal was. First of all, a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would advance the cause of the rule of law in the international sphere by bringing to full development the process already under way of imposing limits on the means used in war. Such a convention would also give impetus to efforts to bring about general and complete disarmament. Finally, it would constitute not a collateral measure but a necessary condition for accelerating agreement on all collateral measures.

19. When the Ethiopian delegation, at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly,<sup>2/</sup> had submitted a draft declaration to lead to an international convention under which the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would be declared to be contrary to the laws of humanity, it had pointed out that its proposal was not an innovation in international relations but simply a logical step on the road opened up by declarations adopted at St. Petersburg in 1868,<sup>3/</sup> at Brussels in 1874,<sup>4/</sup> and at the Hague Conference of 1899,<sup>5/</sup> and by the Geneva Protocol of 1925.<sup>6/</sup>

20. The United Nations, under the Charter, had renounced resort to war as an instrument of national policy. Unfortunately, the trend in international thinking towards the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction seemed to have lost some momentum. Perhaps the advent of even more destructive weapons had rendered efforts in that direction vain. Also, perhaps, the use in war of some of the prohibited weapons had given such efforts an unrealistic character. In spite of Ethiopia's sad experience, his delegation was convinced that the fact that such prohibited weapons had been used was no reason for failing to encourage the auspicious trend in international thinking regarding warfare. A world war had broken out despite the League of Nations, but that had not prevented a new international organization from being created. The fact that weapons of mass destruction could be used made renewed efforts to strengthen the United Nations and prohibit the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons all the more imperative.

<sup>2/</sup> See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session (part I), First Committee, 1098th meeting, paras. 12 and 13; and *ibid.*, Fifteenth Session, Annexes, agenda items 67, 86, 69 and 73, document A/C.1/L.254 and Add.1-3.

<sup>3/</sup> Declaration renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles under 400 Grammes Weight, signed at St. Petersburg, 29 November-11 December 1868.

<sup>4/</sup> Declaration on the Rules of Military Warfare, adopted at Brussels on 27 August 1874.

<sup>5/</sup> Declaration (IV.2) concerning Asphyxiating Gases, signed at The Hague on 29 July 1899.

<sup>6/</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, opened for signature at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

21. The reasons why it was necessary to ban the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons were obvious. The destructive power of such weapons was well known. Unless man chose to disarm, he would soon have the means to extinguish all forms of life on the earth in a war in which there would be neither victor nor vanquished. The United Nations could not remain morally indifferent in the face of such a situation. It must speak out on the matter.

22. He was not so naïve as to suppose that the mere prohibition of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would guarantee that they would not be used. Such a prohibition, which would not in itself constitute a practical measure of disarmament or bring about the solution of the enormous problems involved, should nevertheless be adopted because it was morally required of the United Nations, and because it was morally right in itself.

23. It was true that the prohibition would have to remain an act of conscience until general and complete disarmament was achieved. It would, however, establish a legal and moral norm governing relations between States. The international community admittedly could not enforce such a norm of conduct, any more than it could enforce other rules of international law. That did not prevent international law from existing, since it was based not so much on the prospect of sanctions as on the collective self-interest of the international community. The prohibition of nuclear weapons by means of a convention which would eventually become part of international law would indeed be in the interest of the world community. Such a prohibition would promote—in a positive if not in a tangible way—the climate necessary to hasten agreement on disarmament measures.

24. Since the problem was not a practical one, the prohibition could not be regarded as a collateral disarmament measure. It was a valid moral act in itself. The prohibition of poison gas and other means of chemical or bacteriological warfare had not, in the past, been accompanied by, or linked with, actual disarmament with regard to weapons in those categories. The majority of nations had nevertheless accepted the banning of such weapons as part of international law.

25. The draft resolution did not touch on the substance of the convention to be drawn up. It was nevertheless timely because the consultations so far undertaken by the Secretary-General in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI) had not been conclusive. It was also understandable that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, whose task was essentially to deal with practical problems, had not made much headway in its consideration of the matter. It did not seem, therefore, that it would be timely to request an immediate conference for the signing of a convention. Furthermore, the forthcoming world disarmament conference could facilitate the continuation of the consultations envisaged in General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI). That conference would probably not be in a position to do more than tackle the basic problems involved in disarmament. The question of a prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons through a convention was one such basic problem. At the same time, in view of the possibility that the agenda of the world disarmament

conference would be overburdened by its inclusion, the sponsors of the draft resolution had avoided giving the impression that the consideration of the question at the conference would be conclusive.

26. Mr. LEKIC (Yugoslavia) said that it was five years since the adoption by the General Assembly of the declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons (resolution 1653 (XVI)), in which it had declared that the use of such weapons was inconsistent with the United Nations Charter and contrary to the laws of humanity and the rules of international law. Unfortunately, no further progress had been made in the solution of the problem, while the danger of nuclear war was constantly increasing. The arms race had brought the nuclear super-Powers to the brink of a new race of building up anti-ballistic-missile systems. The persistent fear of the possible use of nuclear weapons was constantly putting pressure to bear on many States to maintain their own nuclear weapons. Efforts made so far to avert the dangers of the armaments race had been far from satisfactory. The Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed at Moscow on 5 August 1963, had remained an isolated measure with limited effects. Many believed that, on account of the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons, a general nuclear conflict was becoming unacceptable to both sides. It would be a mistake, however, to believe that the "balance of terror" could guarantee peace. The risks of a miscalculation, such as that made by Nazi Germany, fascist Italy and Japan in the case of the Second World War, were even greater today, when in many countries the army had become a factor of exceptional importance in the conduct of foreign policy. It was therefore essential to bring about general and complete disarmament. For that reason his delegation held the view that it would be wrong and extremely dangerous to believe that the existence of the "balance of terror" could serve as a safeguard against the outbreak of a suicidal war. The prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would constitute a measure of the utmost importance for halting the armaments race and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and a measure initiating the process of disarmament in general. There were now good grounds for thinking that some nuclear Powers were evolving in the direction of accepting the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons as one of the possible initial measures. It should be feasible for the remaining differences of view to be overcome through negotiations.

27. The prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons fell into the category of partial measures which could be adopted in a relatively short period of time, since no long preliminary work would be required to evolve modalities of control, inspection, methods of application or verification of existing stockpiles, production, etc. There would be no risk of upsetting the balance of power, since no Power would actually be deprived of its nuclear armaments. The adoption of such a measure would be facilitated by the fact that it did not require the simultaneous settlement of a number of related questions as would be the case with some other measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. The prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would be of particular importance not only as a measure that

would have a value in itself, but also as a measure in the process of disarmament which, once adopted, could have a wide range of positive effects. The logic of the process of disarmament was that after prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons it would be much easier to undertake gradual dismantling, destruction and conversion of stockpiles, carriers, etc. At the same time, the danger of more States seeking to become nuclear Powers would diminish, since the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would render those weapons unnecessary. Therefore, on the one hand, it would become much easier to discontinue further production, and on the other, to forgo the beginning of production. Furthermore, fear would give way to confidence among States, and the slowing down of the arms race would create favourable conditions for the gradual conversion to peaceful purposes of nuclear energy produced for military purposes. Substantial decreases in military budgets would become natural and logical, and would release resources for financing speedier economic development on a world scale, and in particular for an accelerated development of less developed areas of the world. Prohibition without delay of the use of nuclear weapons, in the form of a treaty, would constitute the most effective solution. It was, however, also possible to reach such an agreement by first making unilateral statements. Such a measure, in its limited scope, would no doubt have to constitute part of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Yugoslavia, which had already suggested to the Disarmament Commission, in its memorandum of 3 May 1965,<sup>7/</sup> that the use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited, had joined in sponsoring the draft resolution before the Committee (A/C.1/L.384).

#### CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (A/C.1/L.384)

28. The CHAIRMAN called on the representative of Romania, who wished to explain his vote.

29. Mr. ECOBESCU (Romania) reaffirmed the support that Romania had always given to the proposal that the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons should be prohibited, for it was convinced that such a prohibition was a measure which was likely to have the most favourable effect on disarmament and the improvement of the international situation. History showed that in the struggle of ideas between those who sought to prohibit the use of inhuman weapons and those who invoked military necessity, the former had always triumphed. After the Second World War, the awareness of the danger which nuclear weapons constituted had inspired the efforts made both in the United Nations and elsewhere to outlaw such weapons. Those efforts had resulted, on 24 November 1961, in the adoption by the General Assembly, on the initiative of Ethiopia, of a declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. Romania had whole-heartedly supported that declaration and had since then constantly advocated the convening of an international conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The fact that it had not yet been possible

<sup>7/</sup> See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965*, document DC/216.

to conclude such a convention should strengthen the desire of everyone to achieve that objective. For all those reasons, Romania would support the draft resolution before the Committee.

30. Mr. BURNS (Canada) asked that the vote on the draft resolution should be postponed until later, since some delegations had not yet had time to consult their Governments on the subject.

31. The CHAIRMAN said that since there was nothing in the rules of procedure that covered such a request, he would consult the Committee.

32. If there was no objection, the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/L.384 would take place the following day, at the afternoon meeting.

*It was so decided.*

### AGENDA ITEM 98

Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America (A/6399, A/C.1/L.369)

#### GENERAL DEBATE

33. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the elimination of foreign military bases was a question which called for urgent settlement. History showed that the foreign bases established by certain Powers belonging to Western military blocs were one of the main instruments of their aggressive policy and one of the sources of international tension. The establishment of military bases in foreign territory was contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter, to normal relations between countries and to the will of peace-loving peoples. The bases which had been established in Asia, Africa and Latin America served as a means of direct or indirect interference in the internal affairs of States and were an instrument of colonialism and neo-colonialism. As in the past, the Soviet Union was in favour of the elimination of all foreign military bases in Asia, Africa and Latin America, as also in Europe. The bases established by the United States on the European continent were a serious threat to international peace and security and represented a profoundly abnormal situation more than twenty years after the end of the Second World War. Despite that, certain NATO Powers rejected any proposals for the removal of military bases in foreign territory. That was why the Soviet Union, in the face of the fear evinced by many States, proposed as a first step that foreign military bases should be eliminated in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. That partial elimination would help to start things moving on the whole question of foreign military bases and would ease the struggle of the peoples to attain their ultimate objective.

34. Foreign military bases were a legacy of colonialism, and the network of bases established by the United States and its immediate allies, especially the United Kingdom and Portugal, covered Africa, Asia and Latin America. Thus Washington had more than 2,000 military strong-points at its disposal in foreign territories, and large American bases had been es-

tablished in dozens of countries. The aggressive policy of the United States in Viet-Nam was connected with the use of military bases; in fact, the whole southern part of Viet-Nam which had not been liberated by the Viet-Nameese patriots had been transformed into a vast United States military base. The war of aggression being waged by Washington in Viet-Nam, which was beginning to extend to Laos and Cambodia, exposed the true role of United States military bases, which were hotbeds of war and tension. It was from the numerous bases in South Viet-Nam, Thailand, Okinawa and certain other regions of South-East Asia, the Pacific Ocean and the Far East that the United States was bombing the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and carrying out air raids against some areas of Laos and Cambodia. For example, the United States was using more than one hundred bases and military strong-points on Japanese territory alone. United States bases in South Korea had been expanded and the United States was transforming the Marshall, Caroline and Mariana Islands—in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands—into military outposts. In addition to the existing United Kingdom military bases in the Maldives Islands, the United Kingdom and the United States were planning to establish a network of joint bases in the Seychelles and Mauritius. The bases in that part of the world constituted a direct threat to the countries of Asia and Africa. The United Kingdom base at Singapore continued to be the essential element in the United Kingdom's "east of Suez" policy.

35. The events which were taking place in South-East Asia were a warning to Asia, Africa and Latin America. The United States military bases, which had been established under the pretext of "joint defence", in fact threatened to draw the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America into military adventures which were contrary to their national interests. Viet-Nam and Thailand were not the only examples. A glance at the map of modern Africa was enough to show that the régime of Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia was simply an enormous military base serving the interests of international colonialism, and that the racist régime of Vorster in South Africa was a base from which the forces of imperialism were trying to keep the African peoples under colonial domination. That was particularly dangerous since South Africa might in the near future become an atomic base for the defence of colonialism. As for the Portuguese colonies, they were the military bases of Salazar and the aggressive NATO bloc. It was well known that, thirteen days after the proclamation of the independence of the Congo, Belgian paratroopers had been landed near Leopoldville, at an airfield which formed part of a network of Belgian and NATO air bases. All those examples, which had been selected from among so many others, showed that the military bases established in Africa played an important role in punitive operations directed against the national liberation movements and in provocations against independent African States.

36. Complaints had been received by the Security Council at various times concerning provocations committed by the Portuguese colonialists against Senegal, Guinea, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Congo (Brazzaville), the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia. For example, in a complaint submitted by the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 3 October

1966,<sup>8/</sup> it was stated that Angola was being used by Lisbon as a base of operations for foreign mercenaries. The establishment of military bases by Portugal was being made possible through the co-operation of the South African racists who, for their part, were building an air base in the Caprivi Strip, in South West African territory between Zambia, Botswana and Angola. The President of Zambia had said that the South African air base was a threat to peace in the African continent and to international peace in general.

37. During the post-war period, the United States had set up additional military bases in Spanish colonies in West Africa, in the territory of certain African countries. Washington also intended to transfer some of its European bases to North Africa.

38. Although the United Kingdom had promised to close its base in Aden, it actually intended to transfer it to Bahrain. Also, in the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, the United Kingdom had constructed military supply bases and aerodromes that were being used against the national liberation movement in Oman.

39. The recent events in the Dominican Republic testified to the role played by United States military bases in Latin America. Thus, the purpose of the Guantánamo base was to threaten the people of Cuba and to engage in provocative acts, such as those of May 1966, against the Republic of Cuba. The representatives of the United States and of other Powers asserted that the military bases had been set up by virtue of agreements with the Governments in whose territory they were situated. If that was so, then the United States would have to explain why it stayed at Guantánamo when the Cuban Government and people were calling for the elimination of the base there. The Soviet Union and all other peace-loving States gave full support to that request of the Republic of Cuba.

40. The Panama Canal Zone had been transformed into a United States military base, and in the Assembly's general debate at the current session (1423rd plenary meeting), the Minister for External Relations of Panama had called for the re-establishment of his country's sovereign rights over the Zone.

41. The Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo in October 1964, had declared its full support of the countries that were seeking the evacuation of foreign military bases on their territory.

42. The elimination of foreign military bases was a pressing problem in South-East Asia, the Near and Middle East, Africa and Latin America. The Summit Conference of Independent African States, held at Addis Ababa in May 1963, had adopted a resolution calling for the end of military occupation of the African continent and the elimination of military bases and nuclear tests as steps constituting a basic element of African independence and unity. The proposal for the elimination of foreign military bases was likewise in conformity with the objectives set out in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity.

43. The existence of foreign military bases was also incompatible with the General Assembly's Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (resolution 1514 (XV)) and the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty (resolution 2131 (XX)). In resolution 2105 (XX), the General Assembly had requested the colonial Powers to dismantle the military bases installed in colonial Territories and to refrain from establishing new ones. Despite that appeal, the United States and the other colonial Powers were endeavouring to retain their bases and to establish new ones in the colonial territories and in foreign countries. They thus showed their contempt for the decisions of the United Nations and the wishes expressed by many countries.

44. It was apparent that the colonial and imperialistic Powers would not voluntarily give up their bases and would not give back to the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America the territories they had taken from them for the purpose of setting up military bases. Some countries wanted to rid themselves of those bases and of one-sided agreements, but not all Governments would be able to do that by themselves. The United Nations must therefore help the various peoples and States in that struggle.

45. In proposing the consideration of that question, the Soviet Union, as its Minister for Foreign Affairs had said in the Assembly's general debate (1413th plenary meeting), was not defending its own narrow interests. The Soviet Union was a Power which had everything it needed to defend its security and to meet the threats created by the foreign bases of certain Powers belonging to the Western military blocs. The Soviet Union was concerned for the peace of the new developing nations and of the peoples still under the colonial yoke.

46. The problem was more acute than ever before. All those who truly wanted the authority of the United Nations to be strengthened could not but be in favour of the Organization's taking a clear decision to request the States having military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America to eliminate them without delay and to refrain from establishing new ones. The draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union (A/C.1/L.369) was based on that specifically formulated demand by the peoples of the world. It also emphasized that foreign military bases in the territory of independent States of Asia, Africa and Latin America were used for direct military intervention in the internal affairs of peoples, for suppression of their struggle for independence and freedom and for dangerous activities which threatened world peace. The elimination of the bases would contribute to a relaxation of tension, the re-establishment of normal relations among States, the elimination of one of the sources of conflict, a strengthening of the independence of the young States of Asia, Africa and Latin America and their protection from interference in their internal affairs; it would also contribute to the eventual success of the fight for the total elimination of colonialism.

47. The Soviet delegation appealed to the members of the First Committee to do their duty to the peoples of the world by supporting that important proposal.

<sup>8/</sup> See Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1966, document S/7524.

48. Mr. FOSTER (United States of America), speaking in the exercise of his right of reply, said that the assertions regarding what the representative of the Soviet Union called "foreign bases" had no basis whatsoever in the Charter; indeed, they were completely contrary to the principle of collective security provided for in the Charter. He reserved his right to reply in detail to the unfounded charges that reflected the one-sided approach pursued by the Soviet Union and were clearly designed to give it a military advantage and to justify what it called "wars of national liberation". Once again the Committee had been subjected to a propaganda broadcast which could only serve the ideological purposes of the Soviet Union. It was indeed tragic that the Soviet Union, in its alleged peace-loving desire to reduce tension, re-

sorted to unfounded attacks which had exactly the reverse effect.

49. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the position of his delegation was based on undeniable facts and irrefutable evidence. The decision of the General Assembly would be determined by the importance it accorded to the item under discussion. All his arguments rested on obvious facts and could not be refuted by hasty statements.

50. Mr. FOSTER (United States of America) said that reverting to charges that had been previously disproved did not necessarily give them the status of facts.

*The meeting rose at 1 p.m.*