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## AGENDA ITEM 27

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued) (A/6390-DC/228, A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1/Corr.1 and Rev.1/Add.2 and 3, A/C.1/L.374, A/C.1/L.377, A/C.1/L.378)

### GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN announced that, in accordance with the wishes of several heads of delegations, the draft resolutions on agenda item 27 would be put to the vote on Friday 18 November. Meanwhile, the Committee would go on to item 28 at the end of the debate on item 27.

2. Mr. IJEWERE (Nigeria) said that the past twenty years would go down in history as an era of freedom for colonial peoples, but also as a period in which man had devoted more resources to the accumulation of weapons and military preparedness than ever before. For that reason the poor areas of the world were more anxious than any others to see the dream of general and complete disarmament come true; not sharing the ideological prejudices of the older nations, they put economic and social development first. Unfortunately, since 1964 the question of general and complete disarmament had received little more than perfunctory treatment. Despite the efforts of some delegations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee—including the Nigerian delegation, which at the 192nd meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, on 23 June 1964, had proposed a formula calling for the acceptance of the concept of a "nuclear umbrella" at the earliest possible point in the disarmament process, coupled with a firm undertaking to eliminate all other means of delivery of nuclear weapons at the earliest possible time—the proposal for the establishment of an expert or technical working group to study the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles had been frustrated by the lack of agreement between the major Powers. The United Arab Republic had taken up the proposal again in Geneva, at the 271st meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, on 7 July 1966. His own delegation

was of the opinion that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should do its utmost to secure the establishment of such a body, especially now that the disarmament negotiations seemed to be on the right road.

3. The problem of general and complete disarmament was intimately linked with that of a nuclear disarmament programme. His delegation would support, as it had always done, any measure aimed at concluding a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. As he had pointed out to the First Committee (1442nd meeting), in signing a treaty on non-proliferation a non-nuclear Power would in effect be signing both a non-proliferation treaty and a comprehensive test ban treaty, whereas a nuclear Power would be signing only one treaty, forbidding it to disseminate nuclear weapons or information, but not to continue to produce and improve such weapons. The representative of Sweden had emphasized the same point (1451st meeting). He reserved the right to speak later on the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, but wished to say that in disarmament negotiations it was necessary to avoid giving the impression that there was a struggle for positions of privilege.

4. His delegation attached particular importance to operative paragraph 1 and 4 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1/Corr.1 and Rev.1/Add.2 and 3, of which it was a sponsor. By paragraph 1 the Assembly would request Secretary-General to prepare a concise report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of those weapons; by paragraph 4 it would recommend that the Governments of all Member States give the report wide distribution. The decision to use nuclear weapons would be taken by politicians, many of whom found it difficult to subordinate personal or national ambitions to the interests of humanity. It was therefore desirable to bring home to those who made policy in every country, as well as to those who elected them, that the interests of mankind transcended those of individual persons and nations, and that in any case a thermonuclear war was likely to put an end to every ambition, personal or national.

5. It was vain to hope that the major military Powers of the world would embark on a programme of general and complete disarmament so long as the People's Republic of China was not involved. After all, China would hardly consider itself bound by any agreement reached without its participation. Was not the answer to the dilemma obvious?

6. Mr. CERNIK (Czechoslovakia) said that general and complete disarmament remained the most important

task of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, but had not received the attention it deserved. It was essential that the first steps towards disarmament should create a situation in which the threat of nuclear war was eliminated. The Soviet proposals had been directed precisely to that aspect of disarmament. Nevertheless, despite the efforts of the socialist countries and the non-aligned States, the discussions on the subject had resulted in a deadlock, mainly because the Western Powers had taken a negative attitude towards all proposals aimed at solving the fundamental problem on the basis of a reasonable and mutually acceptable compromise. It should be recalled that the Soviet Union had made changes in the draft treaty it had submitted<sup>1/</sup> in order to satisfy the Western Powers, particularly as far as nuclear weapons and the means of delivery were concerned, but it had met with a negative response. It had become obvious that the Western Powers were not prepared to approve measures which would make prohibition of the use of force in relations between States possible. The United States draft treaty on general and complete disarmament<sup>2/</sup> was designed to allow that country to retain its nuclear weapons and to be capable of waging nuclear war. That was the main reason for the Western countries' opposition to the search for a compromise solution on nuclear disarmament within the framework of general and complete disarmament. It could hardly be expected that Western imperialist circles would change their attitude for the better now that they had adopted a policy of overt aggression. The war the United States was waging in Viet-Nam could lead only to intensification of the arms race and of opposition to the idea of general and complete disarmament. It was impossible to stand idly by while such developments took place; all proposals for general and complete disarmament must be supported. His delegation therefore welcomed the proposal submitted by Sweden in the Eighteen-Nation Committee that efforts should be concentrated first on the problems relating to the nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles which would be retained until the end of the final stage of general and complete disarmament. It also considered that the statement of the representative of the United Arab Republic in Geneva on the question of general and complete disarmament contained many positive ideas which should be developed in order to break the deadlock the Western Powers had created.

7. It was no accident that the various proposals put forward in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and the First Committee were hinged first of all on the question of nuclear weapons and the need to prevent nuclear war. The nuclear threat could not of course be finally removed by partial measures, and such measures were in any case no substitute for general and complete disarmament. But they could considerably reduce the nuclear danger. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was the most urgent of the partial measures concerned. It was now indispensable for a treaty to be concluded in which the nuclear and non-nuclear States would ratify the principles set forth in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) and in the draft resolution adopted by the First Committee on agenda item 26

(resolution 2153 A (XXI)). For its part, Czechoslovakia would spare no effort to see that that was done.

8. Another important measure to reduce the danger of nuclear war and create a favourable atmosphere for the negotiation of general and complete disarmament would be the drafting of an agreement on prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. In that matter, it was time the declaration on the subject adopted by the General Assembly in 1961 (resolution 1653 (XVI)) took the form of an international legal instrument with binding force. His delegation therefore greatly appreciated the initiative taken by Ethiopia and other non-aligned countries, and felt that a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons was essential. Meanwhile, it was desirable that the nuclear States should undertake not to have recourse to nuclear weapons. Signature of an international agreement prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons would improve the international situation and help solve the over-all problem of disarmament. It would also be conducive to agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and help to eliminate the danger of nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail against the non-nuclear States. Finally, it would make prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests and the creation of denuclearized zones easier. There was no serious obstacle to the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons since it did not involve control or raise the problem of the balance of power. Moreover, such an agreement would not threaten the security of any party to it and would above all serve the cause of world peace. In the circumstances, it was difficult to understand why the Western Powers persisted in their opposition to the proposal. The only explanation for the negative attitude of the United States and its allies thus appeared to be their refusal to abandon the possibility of waging nuclear war and applying a policy of nuclear pressure.

9. United States determination to keep a free hand over the use of nuclear weapons was the more disquieting because certain influential military and political figures in the United States had spoken of the need to use all available means to ensure victory in the aggressive war in Viet-Nam. The United States was already using chemical weapons in Viet-Nam in violation of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, opened for signature at Geneva on 17 June 1925.<sup>3/</sup> That prohibition had become generally accepted as a principle of international law binding on all countries. The Hungarian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.374) was therefore most timely and constituted a warning which could not be ignored. The United States representative's assertion that the use of chemicals as weapons had nothing to do with disarmament was absolutely unjustified, as were the systematic charges of propaganda levelled at the socialist States.

10. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.377, too, was dictated by the desire to safeguard the peace and security of nations. His delegation therefore fully supported draft resolutions A/C.1/L.374 and L.377. Furthermore, it was deeply concerned at the United States delegation's

<sup>1/</sup> See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965*, document DC/213/Add.1.

<sup>2/</sup> *Ibid.*, document DC/214/Add.1, sect. III.

<sup>3/</sup> League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138.

attitude towards the proposals submitted by the socialist countries in the First Committee and the General Assembly. At the 1452nd meeting of the First Committee, for instance, the United States representative had described as propaganda agenda item 92 (Strict observance of the prohibition of the threat or use of force in international relations, and of the right of peoples to self-determination)—an item which had been included in the agenda of the twenty-first session on the initiative of Czechoslovakia and had been supported by the United States. There were already thirteen sponsors of the draft resolution submitted under that item. If any draft resolution unacceptable to a particular delegation was to be described as propaganda and its sponsors accused of malicious motives, the work of the First Committee and the United Nations would surely be paralysed.

11. Another important measure that would help to reduce international tension and bring disarmament nearer was the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests, inasmuch as the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed at Moscow on 5 August 1963, had not stopped the improvement of nuclear weapons. His delegation believed that the time was ripe for the application of the provisions of that Treaty to underground tests. Some States already had the national resources needed to verify that all States parties to the treaty were complying with a prohibition of underground tests. However, the United States continued to insist on on-the-spot inspection, as if the security of the United States could be threatened by the absence of such inspection. The real reason for the negative United States attitude to agreement on the prohibition of underground tests was that it wanted to keep the door open to the improvement of nuclear weapons. That conclusion was confirmed by the large-scale programme of underground tests which the United States had carried out since the signing of the partial test ban treaty and which it was planning for the years to come. That was also the reason why the United States and its NATO allies had taken a negative attitude towards such constructive proposals as that of the United Arab Republic calling for the prohibition of underground tests above a certain seismic magnitude, together with a moratorium on tests below that magnitude, which his delegation had welcomed as opening the way to an immediate cessation of all underground tests without threatening the security of any State party to such an agreement. Sweden's efforts in the same matter were also worthy of note.

12. Lastly, the creation of denuclearized zones would help reduce the danger of nuclear war. Czechoslovakia had already repeatedly stressed that it fully supported the creation of such zones, especially in Europe, where the question was of particular urgency. Adoption of the Polish proposal for the freezing of nuclear weapons and the creation of a denuclearized zone in central Europe would reduce the danger of nuclear conflict there and contribute effectively to the strengthening of European security.

13. His delegation had joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1/Corr.1 and Rev.1/Add.2 and 3; it approved not only the main idea in the draft, but also the various pro-

visions aimed at bringing the consequences of the possible use of nuclear weapons home to the international community. A study made on the basis of that draft resolution would strengthen the forces for peace throughout the world and that could not but have a positive influence on the attitude of some Governments to nuclear disarmament.

14. Mr. CASTAÑEDA (Mexico) said that progress towards a programme of general and complete disarmament was certainly not encouraging. At the same time he did not have an impression of irremediable failure. Efforts were apparently being made to find new ways of attaining the same final goal of general disarmament. But the path was indirect and the journey was proceeding by fits and starts. In recent years the United Nations had been thinking in terms of collateral measures and had concerned itself little with a direct programme of general and complete disarmament.

15. Since the signing of the partial test ban treaty in 1963, the disarmament negotiations had been directed towards an agreement that would complete it by prohibiting underground tests, and towards a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and agreements on the establishment of denuclearized zones. But the over-all framework was still the preparation of a programme of general and complete disarmament, and there the United Nations had practically come to a halt in the past few years. His delegation hoped the United Nations would resume such efforts in order to break the vicious circle in which negotiations on general and complete disarmament were trapped. The circle might be broken by even a partial agreement.

16. Looking back, historians would be able to say that the partial test ban treaty had been the first step towards halting the arms race. In any event, a treaty on non-proliferation and an agreement prohibiting underground tests would certainly do much to encourage negotiations on general and complete disarmament. Only agreements of that scope could generate the confidence needed for the great military Powers to consider the possibility of general disarmament.

17. Since general and complete disarmament could not be achieved at a single stroke, it should be so planned that none of the parties concerned need fear finding itself at a military disadvantage at any of the stages or while passing from one stage to the next. The aim must therefore be to maintain a balance between factors which might seem well-nigh incommensurable: conventional armaments, nuclear weapons, armed forces, military bases, delivery systems, military budgets and so forth. Every State would naturally be inclined to believe that the area in which it was required to make reductions was of greater military importance than the cut-backs required of its potential enemy. Such difficulties would be compounded by the necessity to match the scope of the controls with the degree of disarmament achieved. The risks could thus not be expected to disappear entirely, and to make a start on general and complete disarmament would require an act of faith from each of the countries mainly concerned.

18. Hence the importance of the psychological factor. The establishment of mutual trust by means of partial agreements seemed the most promising solution. But public opinion would also have to be thoroughly alerted to the possible consequences of the use and acquisition of nuclear weapons. That was why it was desirable to prepare the report provided for in draft resolution A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1/Corr.1 and Rev.1/Add.2 and 3, of which Mexico was a sponsor. In other times the use of force had been thinkable. The choice between diplomacy and war had depended on the interests at stake and on the prevailing balance of power. With the appearance of nuclear weapons, the relationship between the end and the means had undergone a radical change. The large-scale use of nuclear weapons would cause total destruction, which no purpose could justify.

19. The world, it seemed, was passing through a transition period, in which it was becoming aware of the new international reality. But statesmen were still speaking and acting as though weapons were a mere refinement of conventional weapons. In spite of the extraordinary prudence and caution States possessing nuclear arsenals had displayed, the world was still faced from time to time with isolated cases of atomic threats which would not have arisen if mankind had already been fully aware of the realities of the nuclear age. Another proof of the dichotomy between the real nature of atomic weapons and the policies pursued by the great Powers was the nuclear arms race itself. It had frequently been stated that the accumulation of nuclear weapons beyond a certain point would no longer provide any military advantage or increase the security of a nation. To go beyond that point was senseless. That consideration might finally lead the great Powers to accept a quantitative limitation of the arms race. Unfortunately, there were powerful pressures driving them in the opposite direction.

20. For all those reasons his delegation had joined in sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1/Corr.1 and Rev.1/Add.2 and 3, by which the Assembly would request the Secretary-General to prepare a report not only on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons but also on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of those weapons. It was sure that the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers would provide the experts and the information the Secretary-General needed to carry out the recommendation in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution. The co-operation of the nuclear Powers was indispensable if the desired results were to be achieved.

21. Mr. TOMOROWICZ (Poland) wished to say a few words about draft resolution A/C.1/L.377. The present-day world was one of striking paradoxes. On the one hand, it had been agreed that nuclear weapons should be banned from outer space (General Assembly resolution 1884 (XVIII)); a partial test ban treaty had been concluded to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radio-active substances; and the non-nuclear Powers were demanding security guarantees in connexion with a treaty on non-proliferation. On the other hand, flights by aircraft carrying weapons of mass destruction were still permitted; such weapons, if jettisoned in an emergency, could

pollute considerably larger areas than those contaminated by nuclear weapon tests; no guarantee, however sincere, against a nuclear attack could protect a State from an explosion resulting from an unpremeditated fall of a bomb. His delegation did not wish to detract from the value of the treaties already concluded or about to be concluded. It merely wished to point out that nuclear bombs lost by accident or error could make a number of existing treaties ineffective and any further agreements futile. Accordingly, he was suggesting that the nuclear Powers should give a clear-cut undertaking to refrain from flights of aircraft carrying weapons of mass destruction, if not in general, then at least over the territory of foreign States, particularly without the explicit consent of the States concerned. The appeal to that effect would supplement the Committee's earlier appeal to all States to refrain from any action which might hamper the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (resolution 2149 (XXI)).

22. Some critics of the draft resolution claimed that flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons were needed to protect the security of the countries over which they were carried out, but failed to explain how the protective system was supposed to work. They had made vague references to geographical factors, which seemed to be irrelevant and invalid in the age of intercontinental ballistic missiles. It was difficult to see how a State could be defended by flying nuclear weapons in its skies. In fact, the life and property of its citizens were exposed to constant danger. The pilots of the aircraft were only human and could make mistakes and the technical equipment of the aircraft could fail at any time. It had also been alleged that special electronic locks ensured foolproof control over thousands upon thousands of nuclear warheads. But there were several examples to show how dangerous it was to place too much reliance on technical, even electronic, devices. Some representatives had complained that the scope of the draft resolution was too narrow, as it referred only to aircraft. The sponsors had, indeed, decided to focus the Committee's attention on flights of aircraft, because they considered that that particular means of transporting nuclear weapons was the one most likely to provoke serious international incidents. But they had an open mind on the subject. They were also open-minded in regard to proposals that the draft resolution should refer only to States which had not given explicit consent to the flight of foreign nuclear-armed aircraft over their territories. Finally, some delegations had even tried to dismiss the issue altogether on procedural grounds. They had argued that no proposals for partial or tension-reducing measures should be made during the discussion on general and complete disarmament. But one of the principles in the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations issued on 20 September 1961<sup>4/</sup> stated explicitly that "efforts to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total programme". The Eighteen-Nation Committee had been considering various col-

<sup>4/</sup> See Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 19, document A/4879.



lateral measures in accordance with that principle and some of them had been included in the General Assembly's agenda under the all-embracing item "general and complete disarmament". That practice had been followed for years, and there was no reason why it should cease to be applicable now. If flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons were necessary for training, the territories of the nuclear Powers themselves were large enough for that purpose, and there was no need for flights to go beyond national frontiers. The international situation was already tense, and the Committee should make every effort to reduce existing dangers.

23. His delegation whole-heartedly supported draft resolution A/C.1/L.374, which reaffirmed the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 condemning chemical and bacteriological warfare.

24. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) said that, as stockpiles of nuclear and conventional weapons were growing and world expenditure on armaments was approaching an estimated figure of \$200,000 million, the hopes of the peoples were once again focused on the United Nations. Once again, the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee was substantially negative. The resolutions on the subject adopted by the General Assembly at the twentieth session had not been implemented in any degree. There was still no treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests or preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. No arrangements had been made to convene a world disarmament conference and no progress had been made towards the denuclearization of Africa.

25. After the hopes aroused in 1961 by the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations and the inclusion of eight non-aligned members in the disarmament negotiating committee, and the further optimism engendered in 1963 by the conclusion of the partial test ban treaty, the establishment of the "hot line" between Washington and Moscow and the joint declaration of intention not to place weapons of mass destruction in outer space (resolution 1884 (XVIII)), there had been an anticlimax of continuous frustrations and a sudden reversal in the situation. For three years running, the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had not registered any tangible progress. In spite of laborious negotiations, no agreement had been reached on collateral measures, and general and complete disarmament had receded into the background. The five nuclear Powers had continued their nuclear weapon tests, some in the atmosphere and some underground. Vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons had continued. The pace of the arms race had increased and the escalation of existing war situations was increasing the threat of nuclear war. The New York Times had recently described the latest developments in the anti-missile missile race and experiments with anti-anti-missile missiles. If not arrested, that frenetic race would inevitably get out of control and might suddenly bring mankind to its doom.

26. If that trend was to be halted and the current deadlock broken, consideration would have to be given to the three main aspects of the problem before the First Committee: first, the political will to

disarm; second, the technical requirements of disarmament; and third, the negotiating modalities.

27. Disarmament was possible only if enlightened national consciousness was coupled with a paramount world consciousness. Humanity as a whole stood above all nations, for national interest were served only by serving the interests of the world community, which was becoming a reality and a concrete entity. The political will to disarm could develop only under certain conditions. First of all, nations had to stop taking national security measures; if they were to do so, they would need some assurance of international security, which could be found only in a developing law and order through a strengthened United Nations making disarmament a reality. Next, public opinion had to exert its influence to the full. The peoples had an instinctive abhorrence of war and of the sight of millions thrown away on weapons. The public had to be made aware of the growing threat of nuclear weapons to the very existence of humanity. There was therefore great merit in the suggestion made by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report for 1965-1966 (A/6301/Add.1) that an appropriate United Nations body should "explore and weigh the impact and implications of all aspects of nuclear weapons". The study should be widely publicized in all countries and in all languages. Once awakened to the grim realities of today's world, the public might help to create a climate for the political will to disarmament and peace. Inasmuch as draft resolution A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1/Corr.1 and Rev.1/Add.2 and 3 adequately reflected the Secretary-General's suggestion, his delegation fully supported it, while bearing in mind the Canadian representative's observations as to how the proposed study should be carried out.

28. The technical requirements of disarmament were manifold and should be examined in the light of the collateral measures proposed in the draft resolutions before the Committee.

29. It was unfortunate that the draft resolution on chemical and biological warfare had led to controversy. The supposed motives of the sponsors of the draft resolution and the arguments advanced in its behalf in no way undermined the importance of the problems of chemical and biological warfare. The Fourteenth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, held at Venice in April 1965, had shown that biological weapons might become more devastating than nuclear weapons. Once perfected, they might be much cheaper and easier to produce than nuclear weapons, thus placing greater destructive capability in the hands of many countries. It would thus soon be no longer possible to maintain any distinction between incapacitating weapons and lethal weapons. The significance of the problem had been shown several years earlier, with the establishment of the Pugwash Study Group on Biological Warfare, part of whose work was being done by the Swedish International Peace Research Institute at Stockholm. The Institute was studying methods of inspection and detection of biological weapons as part of a plan to prevent research and development of such weapons, as well as their stockpiling and use. In fact, in 1966, four trial inspections of microbiological laboratories had been carried out in Austria, Sweden, Denmark and Czechoslovakia.

30. Two forms of recommendations on the modalities of disarmament had been made during the discussion. Some States believed that formal and informal negotiations should be undertaken with nations not members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. The Indonesian representative had suggested that the Committee should be transformed into a disarmament council, as a principal organ of the United Nations under Article 7 of the Charter. It would thereby be possible to bring disarmament negotiations more closely within the United Nations and to ensure rotation of members as in the other United Nations organs. Changes involving amendment of the Charter, however, were not feasible at the moment, but some adjustments could be made in the Eighteen-Nation Committee's procedures in order to enhance their effectiveness.

31. The International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace in London had recently released a report on the Eighteen-Nation Committee's work. The six conclusions of the report had been supported by prominent personalities in several countries. The report had recommended, first, that the People's Republic of China should be invited to join the Eighteen-Nation Committee and that France should be persuaded to take its seat there again; secondly, that with the addition of China, the membership of the Committee should be slightly enlarged to include another aligned Power and one or more additional non-aligned States; thirdly, that the Committee should open its plenary meetings to the Press, to accredited non-governmental

observers and to the public; fourthly, that the Committee should meet each year at regular intervals; fifthly, the Committee should set up regular working committees to increase its technical productivity; sixthly, the Committee should explore new modes of operation such as the appointment of a rapporteur or a chairman for the month or the adoption of other procedures used in similar international conferences to increase the likelihood of agreement.

32. His delegation believed that a world disarmament conference must be considered in any discussion of modalities for disarmament negotiations. Efforts should be made to persuade the People's Republic of China to take part in the conference. Means should also be found to ensure the participation of other militarily significant States which were not yet members of the United Nations. No single State should prevent the calling of a world disarmament conference, but at the same time the conference should not be convened if its results would be further to isolate certain States which might refuse to attend.

33. The draft resolution submitted by the eight non-aligned nations (A/C.1/L.378) would no doubt receive general support; his delegation earnestly hoped that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament would be able to report some tangible achievement to the General Assembly at its next session.

*The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.*