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Chairman: Mr. Leopoldo BENITES (Ecuador).

AGENDA ITEM 27

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued) (A/6390-DC/228, A/C.1/L.369, A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.374)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. SISSOKO (Guinea) said that his delegation regarded the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America as the most urgent of the six items relating to the problem of general and complete disarmament. He would confine his remarks chiefly to that item, not because he in any way underestimated the importance of the other five items, but because elimination of the bases was a prerequisite to any disarmament effort. His delegation welcomed the Soviet initiative in introducing the item and thereby showing its special interest in strengthening the independence and stability of the sovereign countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America.

2. By using puppets, imperialist and neo-colonialist Powers were attempting to keep the peoples of the "third world" in subjection, to impose their political ideologies, and thus to regain their former privileges. Although they pretended sympathy for the young States and made economic and technical assistance agreements with them, the sympathy vanished as soon as a young State embarked on the path of true political and economic liberation. They were using threats, corruption and conspiracy, inciting peoples to rebellion, and sowing confusion and disunity in the hope of reconquering the areas they had previously dominated. In his Government's view, the installation or maintenance of any foreign military base in an African, Asian or Latin American country was not a legitimate means of defence, as the invaders pretended, but a gross violation of the right of self-determination. It not only threatened the independence and sovereignty of neighbouring, or even remote States but also constituted flagrant interference in the internal affairs of the State where the base was.

3. The peace to which all mankind aspired could not truly be so long as there were Powers which sought to suppress the liberty and sovereignty of small countries. The criminal actions of the colonialists against a number of young nations were motivated by the fact that those nations had freely chosen the political and economic system which best suited them and refused to submit to the will of others. Imperialist Powers were establishing and strengthening strategic bases in other countries and using the bases to launch aggression and subversive activities, to exact political or economic concessions, and to violate the sovereignty of neighbouring States, in defiance of the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter. The dismantling of foreign military bases was therefore urgently required for the preservation of international peace and security.

4. At the same time, it was essential to abolish the military alliances among a number of European Powers and the United States, to ensure respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States and to prohibit all interference in the internal affairs of States anywhere in the world. The principles of sovereign equality and of protection of territorial integrity and political independence were embodied in the United Nations Charter, in Article 2, paragraphs 1 and 4, and in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), in article II, paragraph 1 (c). The Charter of the OAU also required all members to pursue a policy of non-alignment, which implied a refusal to conclude military agreements or to maintain foreign bases in their territory.

5. His delegation wished to emphasize the importance of the decisions on the preservation of world peace taken at the conferences of non-aligned countries; it also wished to reaffirm the fundamental principles of the Asian-African Conference held at Bandung which had condemned all violations of the sacred rights of men and of peoples and had called for absolute respect for the sovereignty of independent countries and for their security and territorial integrity.

6. Paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX) on the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of States and the protection of their independence and sovereignty declared that no State had the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, in the internal or external affairs of any other State, and it consequently condemned not only armed intervention, but also all other forms of interference. The existence of foreign bases was synonymous with armed intervention in the internal affairs of States, for the foreign military bases in the independent countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America were in fact used for direct or indirect

intervention in the internal affairs of peoples and to suppress the struggle of subject peoples for freedom and independence. The elimination of such bases would be not only a decisive step towards consolidating the independence of the young nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America, but also one of the essential conditions for safeguarding peace and avoiding a world conflict that could destroy all mankind. His delegation would therefore vote in favour of the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.369).

7. Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden) said that, although the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had been meeting for five years, no decisive success had been achieved or seemed likely to be achieved in the near future in solving the disarmament problem. Her Government was encouraged, however, by the progress made in 1966; there had been a noticeable improvement in the understanding of disarmament issues and their political and technical complexity.

8. A more hopeful atmosphere prevailed in the First Committee's disarmament debate at the current session. The conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons appeared closer to realization, and it was apparent from the two resolutions adopted by the First Committee and from the statements of three nuclear-weapon Powers that there was a definite political will to overcome hitherto forbidding obstacles. The Eighteen-Nation Committee should therefore be able to achieve substantial progress when it reconvened in 1967. Her delegation hoped that the great Powers would soon reach agreement on a draft treaty on non-proliferation.

9. She suggested that any draft agreement on non-proliferation worked out by the Eighteen-Nation Committee should be divided into two parts, which would eventually become either two separate treaties or two parts of the same treaty. The first part would be concerned with non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, that is, prohibition of their transfer to non-nuclear-weapon countries and of their acceptance by such countries. The second would be concerned with non-proliferation in the sense of non-manufacturing of nuclear weapons by countries which had not embarked on their production. The reasons for the distinction were practical. First, the non-dissemination part seemed to be feasible almost immediately, since it would merely formalize the present rapprochement between the major nuclear-weapon Powers. The non-manufacturing part, on the other hand, would undoubtedly be delayed for some time by difficulties involving verification; she believed that the United Kingdom representative's assertion at the 1432nd meeting that the problem of verification was not raised by a treaty on non-proliferation had reference to the non-dissemination part of such a treaty.

10. The suggestion of a two-step procedure was intended merely to speed up the work, so that the world community could see an early sign of real progress in stemming the armaments race. However, the work must not rest there. The Eighteen-Nation Committee must turn also to other items of unfinished business, selected from among the partial measures it had already discussed and which formed

integrated parts of a step-by-step progress towards disarmament. The work should not be tied to any fixed order of priorities in regard to individual partial or collateral measures of disarmament. The preparatory deliberations on certain other partial measures must be carried on while the detailed work on non-proliferation was continuing.

11. The joint memorandum of 19 August 1966 of the non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee^{1/} mentioned two important partial measures: a comprehensive test ban, and cessation of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. If those two measures could be combined with the treaty on non-proliferation, the result would be a near-freezing of the nuclear situation and a fair political balance.

12. Her Government, like the other non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee and many other Governments, believed that the obligations assumed by the nuclear-weapon Powers and the non-nuclear-weapon Powers should be mutual and balanced. That attitude should not be interpreted as a bargaining position. Sweden had led no one to believe that it would produce nuclear weapons, and its growing atomic energy programme was organized for peaceful purposes exclusively. It wanted a "balance of obligations" in order that the freezing of the number of nuclear-weapon States should be accompanied by a freezing and reduction in the capacity to develop new weapons and in the production of additional stockpiles. Such progress in nuclear disarmament could not be made without the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon Powers.

13. The three measures she had mentioned were closely interrelated. First, if a non-nuclear-weapon country signed the treaty on non-proliferation, it thereby automatically agreed to a comprehensive test ban. It was therefore reasonable to expect the nuclear-weapon Powers to sign a comprehensive test ban treaty at the same time. Probably more than a hundred States were prepared to sign such a test ban treaty even though—or because—it amounted to a non-proliferation undertaking on the part of the have-nots.

14. Secondly, a cut-off of production of fissile material for weapons purposes would serve as a non-proliferation measure by preventing any independent manufacture of nuclear weapons by countries which did not now possess them and it would give the world an assurance that the armaments spiral was definitely turning downwards.

15. Thirdly, the control measures for the comprehensive test ban and for the fissionable materials cut-off were closely related to a treaty on non-proliferation. It seemed to be clear to everyone that if any control was established along with the treaty, it must be in the form of international safeguards such as those already available through the International Atomic Energy Agency. Her delegation was gratified at the interest expressed in extending the IAEA safeguards system by the Netherlands

^{1/} See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1966, document DC/228, annex I, sect. P.

representative and other members of the Committee and by the representative of IAEA.

16. In the case of the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, drafts had been submitted in August 1962 and agreement had been reached a year later; similarly, on the non-proliferation issue, drafts had been submitted in 1965 and now in 1966 there were high hopes for early final action. The same procedure should be followed in the Eighteen-Nation Committee in the case of the agreements on a comprehensive test ban and on the cut-off of production of fissionable materials. Draft texts were essential so that the positions of various delegations could be clearly stated. They were also needed to demonstrate the sincere desire of the great Powers to proceed rapidly with an unbroken series of negotiations. She hoped that the three nuclear Powers active in the Eighteen-Nation Committee would submit drafts on the collateral measures she had mentioned.

17. The Eighteen-Nation Committee should also be ready to embark soon on serious and intensive negotiations for the major task of general and complete disarmament. However, to be realistic, the Committee must give precedence to the partial disarmament measures which would be more readily feasible and which together would signify a real turn in the tide of nuclear armaments.

18. Mr. TOMOROWICZ (Poland), introducing draft resolution A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1, said that the Eighteen-Nation Committee's last report (A/6390-DC/228) had made it clear that the Committee had been unable to reach any specific agreement on questions of general and complete disarmament or on measures aimed at the lessening of international tension. Although there had recently been some hopeful developments in the matter of collateral measures, especially with regard to the prohibition of the spread of nuclear weapons, the arms race continued unabated and the danger of nuclear war had increased.

19. The basic disagreement related to nuclear disarmament. The General Assembly was faced with a dilemma; should nuclear disarmament be complete in order to eliminate the threat of nuclear war as quickly as possible, or should nuclear stockpiles—whatever their size—be permitted to exist indefinitely? Disarmament talks were, unfortunately, influenced more by considerations of military strategy than by the interests of people and their demands. Most people did not realize that live nuclear weapons designed to go off at a moment's notice were being transported in military aircraft and submarines, while inter-continental ballistic missiles were scattered around the globe. There was constant danger of a nuclear explosion. Mankind was not sufficiently aware of the catastrophic consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. As the Chairman of the Polish delegation, Mr. Gomulka, had stated in 1960,^{2/} the United Nations had a duty to spread the truth about the real effects of nuclear weapons in order to make it easier for all nations to combine their efforts in the struggle against the threat of war and for general and com-

plete disarmament. Today the need to convince mankind of the dangers confronting it was even greater. The Secretary-General, in an address to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe at Strasbourg in May 1966, had suggested that a wider understanding of the probable effects of a nuclear war might help to mobilize more widespread and popular support for nuclear disarmament and world peace.

20. In order to strengthen the nations' determination to achieve disarmament, a persuasive report on the possible effects of the use of nuclear weapons should be prepared in accordance with the following requirements. It should be concise and written in simple language, to enable Governments to distribute it widely in many languages and using all the media of mass communication. It should be transmitted to Governments by the middle of 1967 for consideration at the twenty-second session. Accessible material, properly selected and analysed, was adequate. It should be prepared with the assistance of a small group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General. Its cost should be kept to a minimum. The work could be done by the Secretariat. The report would also include the security and economic implications of the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons. That should not affect the size and intelligibility of the report and the time needed for its preparation.

21. The draft resolution that had been submitted by Poland on 25 October (A/C.1/L.370) had now been submitted in a revised form (A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1), sponsored jointly by Canada, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway and Poland.

22. Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) said that his Government attached the highest importance to general and complete disarmament and was firmly resolved to try and achieve that goal as soon as possible.

23. The Eighteen-Nation Committee had been unable to spend as much time as it would have wished in drafting a treaty on general and complete disarmament on the basis of the United States and Soviet drafts and the proposals submitted by the non-aligned countries. Nevertheless, it had reaffirmed that its goal was still general and complete disarmament. That was a valuable pledge and would encourage all nations to continue their efforts. General and complete disarmament necessitated the maintenance of a balance of military strength during the stages of disarmament, the establishment of appropriate international inspection and control and the organization of world security.

24. The Eighteen-Nation Committee had concentrated mainly on the first two elements: balance, and inspection and control. The difficulties encountered had seemed insoluble because the third element, the organization of world security, had been somewhat neglected. Without a knowledge of what collective system of safeguards would be established progressively in order to reduce armaments and without some first signs of agreement on the final structure of such a system, the obstacles to the gradual reduction and controlled elimination of armaments would be insurmountable. Progress could be achieved only if there was a general confidence in

^{2/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session (part I), Plenary Meetings, 874th meeting, para. 91.

the functioning of an appropriate organization of collective security endowed with an international peace force.

25. The danger inherent in any disarmament arrangements in which the necessary military balance and the control were unsatisfactory might be attenuated or even eliminated by the possibility of recourse to a higher international authority possessing adequate means of maintaining international peace and security. The Eighteen-Nation Committee had not studied the problems of establishing such an authority sufficiently. The "troika" proposal in the Soviet draft treaty^{3/} was unacceptable and the Soviet Union had not put forward any new constructive proposal. The United States draft treaty,^{4/} however, contained far-reaching and realistic provisions which required further elaboration more in keeping with the present stage of the negotiations. Although the study of a complex subject related to the final stages of a very long process of world disarmament might not seem to be an urgent task, it should be started soon in order that arrangements for the organization of collective security might proceed in step with the progressive elimination of arms. The study should begin with the existing situation in order to determine where, how and by what means the United Nations could be strengthened and adapted to the new situation which would arise in a completely disarmed world. The ultimate aim, of course, would be to provide complete security for all, especially the smaller States, which must be protected from threats, blackmail and subversion. In the Eighteen-Nation Committee at Geneva, his delegation had proposed the establishment of a working group to examine those problems, but nothing had been done so far. The United Nations might be able to help the negotiators at Geneva, and he hoped it would do so as soon as possible.

26. The resolutions to be adopted by the First Committee at the end of its debate would undoubtedly give fresh impetus to the Geneva talks on general and complete disarmament. He hoped that the resolutions would also stress the links between disarmament and the economic and social progress of all peoples, particularly in the developing countries. Unanimous and constructive resolutions would greatly help the Eighteen-Nation Committee to achieve the results which everyone desired.

27. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary) noted that, in the discussion on agenda items 97 and 26, nearly all delegations had said that a treaty on non-proliferation should be considered merely as another step in the direction of general and complete disarmament. His delegation shared that view, and was glad that the Eighteen-Nation Committee, as it had stated in its report, considered it to be a primary goal of its future work to continue efforts to develop a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.^{5/}

28. Unfortunately, with the exception of the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed at Moscow on 5 August 1963, the results of disarmament negotiations during the past years, both in and outside the United Nations, had been marginal. At the same time, the arms race in conventional and nuclear weapons alike was gathering momentum and the disarmament problem was becoming increasingly difficult to solve.

29. What was needed above all was an atmosphere of confidence among States which would encourage them first to agree to partial measures such as the reduction of military budgets and armed forces, the discontinuance of all military activities abroad, the withdrawal of armies from the territories of other States, and various denuclearization measures. After those partial measures had been taken, the world would perhaps be able to move gradually onwards towards the broader programme of general and complete disarmament. At present, however, neo-colonialist policies and foreign intervention in the domestic affairs of States were aggravating political tensions. The United States, by continually escalating its aggressive war in Viet-Nam, had created an extremely dangerous international situation which was not conducive to progress in the direction of general and complete disarmament.

30. Nevertheless, his country would continue its efforts to facilitate agreement on disarmament, and hoped that others would do likewise. It attached great importance to collateral disarmament measures, all of which would contribute to the achievement of the ultimate goal. The publication of a concise report on the dangers of nuclear weapons, as proposed in draft resolution A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1, would act as a powerful stimulus to negotiations on nuclear disarmament. His delegation whole-heartedly supported that draft resolution.

31. In its efforts to secure the final abolition of nuclear and conventional weapons, the Committee should not overlook the equally urgent need to prohibit the use of other weapons of mass destruction such as asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases and to outlaw bacteriological and biological warfare. That problem, also, could legitimately be considered within the framework of general and complete disarmament and should receive more attention than it had been given in recent years.

32. There were, of course, specific instruments of international law governing the choice of weapons to be used in war. The use of weapons of mass destruction was contrary to the basic principles set forth in the Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land annexed to The Hague Conventions respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1899 and 1907. In article 5 of the Treaty relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare, signed at Washington on 6 February 1922,^{6/} the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan had all declared their assent to the prohibition of the use

^{3/} See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965*, document DC/213/Add.1.

^{4/} *Ibid.*, document DC/214/Add.1.

^{5/} *Ibid.*, Supplement for 1966, document DC/228, para. 6.

^{6/} See *International Legislation*, Manley O. Hudson (ed.) (Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1931), vol. II, p. 797.

in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices, and had expressed the hope that the prohibition would be universally accepted as a part of international law. In the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, opened for signature at Geneva on 17 June 1925,^{7/} the contracting parties had agreed to extend the prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare which, by analogy, included biological methods as well. Furthermore, on 8 June 1943 Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt, then President of the United States, had stated categorically that his country would under no circumstances resort to the use of poisonous or noxious gases in war unless they were first used by its enemies.

33. Notwithstanding those agreements and declarations, Fascist Italy had used gas in the 1935-1936 war against Ethiopia, although both parties had accepted the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Fascist Germany had used gas with unsurpassed savagery in a campaign of mass genocide. Chemical and bacteriological weapons were being produced in the present armaments race and some of them were actually being used in the war in Viet-Nam. In a report published by the South Viet-Nam National Liberation Front on 22 July 1966, the Committee for the Denunciation of War Crimes Perpetrated in South Viet-Nam by the United States of America had noted that the 406th mobile unit of the United States Bacterial and Chemical Warfare Institute had been transferred from Japan to South Viet-Nam, and that the number of people killed and poisoned in some of the areas affected by the chemicals used had risen by 30 per cent. More than half the population in those areas were suffering from diseases of the alimentary tract following the consumption of poisoned foodstuffs and about three-quarters from bronchitis. Nursing mothers had lost their milk and pregnant women had had miscarriages. On 10 September 1966, The New York Times had reported from Saigon that the United States Air Force had sprayed "non-toxic herbicide" over more than half a million acres of jungle hideouts and cropland in South Viet-Nam, and was intending to increase the capacity of its chemical defoliation and crop-destruction missions.

34. In the circumstances, the General Assembly should reaffirm the principles of international law which prohibited the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Some might argue that the prohibition was binding only on the fifty or so States which had actually acceded to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. But a leading authority on international law had stated that the cumulative effect of customary law, and of the existing instruments such as the 1925 Protocol, was probably such as to render the prohibition legally effective upon practically all States.^{8/} Again, it was sometimes argued that the Geneva Protocol referred to circumstances existing in 1925, and not to the present situation when

new types of gases, including comparatively harmless riot-control gases, had been invented. But practising riot control and conducting warfare were two distinctly different problems. The former fell within the domestic jurisdiction of each State, whereas the latter was governed by international law.

35. The gases being used in Viet-Nam were intended to undermine morale, destroy health, spread disease and create starvation. They were being used mainly in populated areas where they were likely to affect more people, and more civilians than soldiers. It had been asserted that able-bodied persons could recover quickly from the effects of the gases. But for elderly and sick people, pregnant women and children, the effects were very grave and sometimes fatal. Indeed, the use of such mass weapons verged upon genocide. Other chemical weapons, such as napalm, caused suffocation, serious burns and disfigurement; and food and drinking water were being poisoned by toxic herbicides. Biological and bacteriological weapons were not yet being used to any great extent in the war but, with further escalation, they might be.

36. The hollow pretexts given for using riot-control gases in Viet-Nam had been rejected by world public opinion and by the international scientific community, including scholars in the United States itself. Weapons of that kind could be, and were being, used in other parts of the world as well as Viet-Nam, against peoples fighting for their independence and freedom. Furthermore, they were difficult to control and might affect those who were using them, as well as those against whom they were used.

37. Accordingly, his delegation had submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.374) in which the General Assembly, after recalling that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 had been recognized by many States, would declare that the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons for the purpose of destroying human beings and the means of their existence constituted an international crime. A solemn declaration to that effect would be in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, held at Geneva from 1932 to 1934, and by the League of Nations Assembly at its nineteenth ordinary session in 1938; it would contribute to the progressive development of international law; and it would be a step in the direction of other collateral disarmament measures.

38. Mr. BARODY (Saudi Arabia) whole-heartedly supported the Hungarian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.374). He wondered if the Hungarian representative would be prepared to add a phrase or paragraph condemning the use of ultra-modern weapons of mass destruction which were now in the development stage, such as the laser beam and ultrasonic waves.

39. The purpose of the report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons, proposed in draft resolution A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1, was laudable; but it was not enough to recommend Governments of States Members to give wide distribution to the report in their respective languages. The essential points of the report should be broadcast by the United Nations

^{7/} League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138.

^{8/} See L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, H. Lauterpacht (ed.), 7th ed. (London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1952), vol. II, p. 344.

constantly in all languages. Daily broadcasts by the United Nations itself on the dangers of all modern weapons, including those mentioned by Hungary, might convince the world that the General Assembly was no longer content merely to draft and adopt resolutions on disarmament, but was anxious at last to give practical application to article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, wherein it was stated that "Everyone has the right to life". That article had been violated every day since the Universal Declaration had been adopted in 1948.

40. Mr. FOSTER (United States of America), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, was sure that he was not alone in deploring the Hungarian representative's remarks. He had hoped that all delegations would approach the remaining disarmament items on the Committee's agenda with the same seriousness of purpose and mutual goodwill that they had displayed in the debates on the question of non-proliferation. His delegation viewed with serious concern any initiatives or statements which tended to revive the sterile polemics of earlier sessions. Polemics and propaganda had not in the past created conditions conducive to agreement on urgent arms control and disarmament measures, and they could not do so now.

41. Allegations that the United States was using poison gas in Viet-Nam were completely unfounded. Moreover, references to the use of non-toxic chemicals

were obviously not designed to expedite the Committee's work but had been introduced for propaganda purposes. That approach was propaganda, pure and simple.

42. He would regretfully be obliged to deal in detail at a later stage with the wholly unfounded charges contained in the Hungarian representative's statement.

43. Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary) did not understand how the United States representative could ignore widely known facts regarding the methods of warfare used in Viet-Nam, or could argue that the issue was not serious enough for the Committee's consideration.

44. The war in Viet-Nam was at present the only major war in the whole world. Efforts to curtail military activities in Viet-Nam should be welcomed by everyone in and outside the United Nations.

45. Mr. FOSTER (United States of America) said that what the Hungarian representative had described as facts were not facts but elaborate distortions.

46. The Hungarian representative had been quite right, on the other hand, in referring to a universal desire for peace. The United States had made it perfectly clear that it was willing at any time to enter into negotiations to terminate the hostilities in Viet-Nam, which had been caused by aggression from the north.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.