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Chairman: Mr. Leopoldo BENITES (Ecuador).

AGENDA ITEM 26

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (concluded) (A/6390-DC/228, A/C.1/L.371/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.372 and Add.1-3, A/C.1/L.375, A/C.1/L.376)

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (concluded) (A/C.1/L.371/REV.1, A/C.1/L.372 AND ADD.1-3, A/C.1/L.375, A/C.1/L.376)

1. Mr. OWONO (Cameroon), replying to the Mauritanian representative's appeal to him at the 1449th meeting to withdraw his request for separate votes on parts of operative paragraphs 3 and 4 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.371/Rev.1, said that his motion concerned a procedural point only; he was not trying to submit in a new form the amendment which he had withdrawn, as the Byelorussian representative seemed to believe. Moreover, his delegation was not opposed in principle to the revised draft resolution. The small Powers had little say in the consideration of the disarmament problem, and Cameroon would support any decision which permitted even a little progress to be made. The Byelorussian representative's remarks were clearly unfounded—a fact which the Mauritanian representative's appeal had not taken into account.

2. Mr. OULD HASSEN (Mauritania) said that he had had two reasons for making his appeal to the representative of Cameroon. First of all, in his delegation's view, it would be linguistically impossible in French to vote on a phrase ending with the word "Etats" and then to vote on another phrase beginning with the words "non dotés d'armes nucléaires". Secondly, his delegation had believed that other delegations would join the forty-seven sponsors of the draft resolution in opposing a vote by division. Hence, if the Cameroonian representative withdrew his request for a vote by

division it would facilitate the Committee's work. He himself did not agree with the Byelorussian representative if the latter believed that the Cameroonian delegation had, in requesting a vote by division, introduced a new amendment; that was not his interpretation. However, if the text ended with the word "Etats", the result would be the same as if the previous Cameroonian amendment had been adopted.

3. The CHAIRMAN said that inasmuch as the question of non-proliferation was of great importance to mankind, questions of procedure should not be permitted to hold up the Committee's work unduly. He therefore hoped that the Byelorussian and Cameroonian representatives would put aside a purely linguistic issue so that agreement could be reached as quickly as possible.

4. Mr. GURINOVICH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that he had always supported the principle that every delegation had the right to request a vote by division. The Cameroonian representative's request, however, was not in fact a request for a vote by division. It was a question not of linguistics but of meaning. The deletion of certain words as the result of a vote by division might alter the meaning of a paragraph. Furthermore, if such a vote was taken the following situation might arise: those who were opposed to a formula prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons would vote against the first part of the sentence on principle; others would vote against it because the forty-seven sponsors of the draft resolution did not wish their text to be amended; yet others would vote against the first part of the sentence because they had not grasped the meaning of the discussion between the Cameroonian representative and himself. Thus, the first part of the paragraph would be deleted, leaving only the adjectives, which would obviously make no sense.

5. His delegation supported operative paragraph 4. He would ask the Chairman to announce that an amendment could not be submitted now, that the Cameroonian request was therefore out of order and that the draft resolution as a whole should be put to the vote, taking into account the United States request for a separate vote on operative paragraph 4.

6. Mr. OWONO (Cameroon) said that he remained convinced that what he had said in reply to the Mauritanian representative's appeal was valid. The Byelorussian representative, however, was wrong in regarding the Cameroonian proposal concerning voting procedure as an amendment and, indeed, as constituting resubmission of the amendment which had previously been withdrawn. From the standpoint of procedure, every delegation had the right to record its support or disapproval of the complete text of a

paragraph or of a part or a single word of that paragraph. His delegation could be reproached only for saying too much about a matter which did not concern it, i.e. the principle of denuclearization. It could not be said that he had proposed an amendment, since he supported not only the draft resolution as a whole but also the wording on which he had requested a vote by division. How could his request for a separate vote on a phrase lead some delegations, as the Byelorussian representative had asserted, to vote against the paragraph in spite of their support for the text as a whole?

7. The Byelorussian representative contended that confusion had arisen because the Cameroonian representative had introduced an amendment. In the circumstances, his delegation, which accepted the text of the revised draft resolution as it stood and wished only to support what was in its view the right wording by having it put to the vote, could not respond to the Mauritanian appeal to withdraw its request for a vote by division until the Committee recognized that there was no new amendment either in fact or in form.

8. As to the wording and interpretation of the English text, if a separate vote was not justified in the case of paragraph 4 it could not be justified in the case of paragraph 3 either.

9. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) said that the Cameroonian representative was apparently unwilling to withdraw his motion for division. He would therefore move the closure of the debate under rule 118 of the rules of procedure. His delegation would be the last to try to limit a delegation's right to request a vote by division, but, under the rules of procedure, if objection was made the motion for division had to be voted upon.

10. It should be recognized that a vote by division could sometimes alter the meaning of a whole paragraph and that the division of a sentence could sometimes make it unintelligible or even absurd. The Cameroonian representative had the right to give an explanation of his vote afterwards but not to put delegations in a difficult position. The Mexican delegation felt no misgivings in taking that attitude because it would have no difficulty in voting by division.

11. He had not been able to consult all the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.371/Rev.1, but all those with whom he had discussed the matter had authorized him to say that they were opposed to separate votes on phrases or isolated words in operative paragraphs 3 and 4. There was nothing objectionable in taking a separate vote on a whole paragraph, but it was inadmissible to divide paragraphs into phrases in such a way as to change the meaning of the text. The two paragraphs in question were the product of lengthy negotiations, and, in the opinion of the sponsors, each should be put to the vote in its entirety.

12. He therefore proposed that the debate should be closed and the Cameroonian representative's motion voted upon if it was not withdrawn.

13. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus), speaking on a point of order, said that the previous speakers had addressed themselves not to the substance of the item under discussion, within the meaning of rule 118, but rather to the actual conduct of the voting, which came under

rule 129. Rule 118, relating to the closure of the debate, was therefore not applicable in the present instance.

14. The Cameroonian representative had a perfect right to request a separate vote on a number of words, and if such a vote would make the text unintelligible it was for the Committee to vote down the request for division. For that very reason, rule 130 of the rules of procedure provided that if objection was made to the request for division—and in the present instance an objection had been made by the Byelorussian representative—the motion should be voted upon. He therefore proposed that the Cameroonian representative's motion for division should be voted upon, thus clarifying the situation.

15. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that he had not yet announced the beginning of voting and that, consequently, rule 129 of the rules of procedure did not apply. Moreover, the Byelorussian representative had not opposed the request for division under rule 130. Since the Mexican representative had requested the closure of the debate on the meaning of the Cameroonian proposal, he suggested, in conformity with rule 118, that the Committee should vote on that request and then apply rule 130.

16. He put to the vote the Mexican motion for closure of the debate.

The motion was adopted by 106 votes to none, with 1 abstention.

17. The CHAIRMAN announced that the debate was therefore closed. Under rule 130 of the rules of procedure, permission to speak on the Cameroonian representative's motion for division could be given to two speakers in favour and two speakers against. The Mexican representative had already spoken against the motion.

18. Mr. OWONO (Cameroon) recalled that when, at the previous meeting, he had requested a vote by division the Chairman had concluded that there was no objection on the part of the Committee, but the Byelorussian representative had then stated that the request was tantamount to submitting an amendment. He asked the Chairman to stand by the decision which he had taken at the previous meeting.

19. The CHAIRMAN said that he could not have taken a decision, since the rules of procedure did not permit him to do so, but that under rule 130 he had asked the Committee whether there was any objection. It was then that the Byelorussian representative had stated his opposition.

20. Mr. OWONO (Cameroon) said that he accepted that explanation.

21. Mr. GURINOVICH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) appealed to the Cameroonian representative not to maintain his proposal so that the Committee could end the interminable procedural debate. The Committee's task would be greatly facilitated if operative paragraph 4 was voted upon first and then the draft resolution as a whole.

22. The CHAIRMAN reminded the Committee that the debate on that question had been closed and that it now had to vote on the motion for division under rule 130.

23. Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) said that he was speaking against the motion and was doing so all the more objectively in that his delegation was not a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.371/Rev.1. He pointed out that operative paragraph 4 contained a proposal whose meaning would be profoundly altered if the Cameroonian motion were adopted.

24. The CHAIRMAN noted that two speakers had now spoken against the motion for division.

25. Mr. OWONO (Cameroon) said that his delegation had not responded to the Mauritanian representative's appeal because it wished it understood that its motion did not amount to a new amendment, as the Byelorussian representative had contended. The Chairman had not contradicted the latter's interpretation and was still not doing so. His delegation was not convinced by the arguments put forward against its motion for division but, in a spirit of conciliation, was nevertheless withdrawing it.

26. The CHAIRMAN assured the Cameroonian representative that he had never had the slightest doubt of the sincerity and propriety of his intentions and did not believe that he had meant to reintroduce his earlier amendment.

27. Taking the proposals in the order in which they had been submitted, in conformity with rule 132 of the rules of procedure, he invited the Committee to vote first on operative paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.371/Rev.1, on which a separate vote had been requested by the representative of the United States.

Operative paragraph 4 was adopted by 98 votes to none, with 4 abstentions.

28. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to vote on draft resolution A/C.1/L.371/Rev.1 as a whole.

The draft resolution was adopted by 103 votes to 1, with 2 abstentions.

29. The CHAIRMAN said that the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.372 and Add.1-3 had accepted the Kuwaiti amendments (A/C.1/L.376). He put the draft resolution, as thus amended, to the vote.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

The United Republic of Tanzania, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: United Republic of Tanzania, Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Against: India.

Abstaining: United States of America, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Central African Republic, Ceylon, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey,

Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, France, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, Laos, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Poland, Rwanda, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic.

The draft resolution, as amended, was adopted by 46 votes to 1, with 56 abstentions.

30. The CHAIRMAN said that several representatives had asked to explain their votes.

31. Mr. PARDO (Malta) said that he had voted for the five-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.372 and Add.1-3), as amended, because a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States would give those States an opportunity to present their views and might lead to constructive results if properly timed and carefully prepared and if the participation of the main militarily significant non-nuclear States could be assured. He was certain that the date and arrangements for the conference would be studied with the greatest care by the preparatory committee which was to be set up by the General Assembly.

32. With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/L.371/Rev.1, his delegation interpreted operative paragraph 4 in the same way as did the New Zealand delegation and would also strongly commend to the consideration of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament the points raised by the Japanese representative.

33. Mr. MALITZA (Romania) said that the considerations which had prompted him to vote for draft resolutions A/C.1/L.371/Rev.1 and A/C.1/L.372 and Add.1-3 had been the same as in the case of the resolution concerning the renunciation by States of actions hampering the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (General Assembly resolution 2149 (XXI)). Any discussion of the many complex aspects of disarmament must be based on the incontrovertible fact that the nuclear arms race and the existence of atomic weapons, with their unprecedented destructive power, constituted the gravest threat to mankind. It was therefore urgently necessary to take effective measures with a view to reducing and then completely eliminating the nuclear threat. The prohibition of nuclear weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles should be among those measures. An awareness of that need had been reflected in the Committee's debates, during which many delegations had clearly stated that an agreement on non-proliferation should provide for disarmament measures or be followed by them. It was also important for the treaty to establish a mutually acceptable balance of responsibilities and obligations between the nuclear and non-nuclear States, and an essential provision would be one imposing an obligation on nuclear States never to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States. His delegation had therefore voted for proposals which had advanced the principle of equal security for all.

34. Mr. DENORME (Belgium) said he had voted for draft resolution A/C.1/L.371/Rev.1, which, in combination with resolutions 2028 (XX) and 2149 (XXI), once again showed how urgently the Committee

desired the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation. His delegation understood that the purpose of operative paragraph 4 was to invite the Eighteen-Nation Committee to examine without delay all suggestions and proposals which had been put forward or might in the future be put forward for dissipating the anxiety of the non-nuclear countries with regard to their security. It should therefore be understood that the expression "for the solution of this problem" referred to the general question of assurances or guarantees of security to be offered to the nations which did not possess nuclear weapons and which, in signing a treaty on non-proliferation, would be undertaking neither to manufacture nor to acquire such weapons. That question should be thoroughly studied by the negotiating committee in consultation with the other States Members of the United Nations.

35. His delegation had abstained in the vote on the five-Power draft resolution. It recognized that the proposed conference would enable the non-nuclear countries to state their opinions on various aspects of the problem of guarantees, but doubted that a satisfactory solution to the problem could be found in the absence of the nuclear Powers.

36. Mr. BURNS (Canada) said he had voted in favour of operative paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.371/Rev.1 and of the draft resolution as a whole although his delegation was not entirely satisfied with the wording of that paragraph it realized that great efforts had been made to reach a compromise satisfactory to the majority of delegations. Like the representative of Belgium, his delegation thought that the words "this problem" at the end of operative paragraph 4 referred to the problem of giving assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against nuclear attack, threatened or real. The representative of the Soviet Union had said the same thing when he stated (1449th meeting) that the Eighteen-Nation Committee was to consider proposals to solve the problem of guarantees for non-nuclear States in case of nuclear war.

37. The Canadian delegation had been able to vote in favour of the five-Power draft resolution because the principal difficulties it had seen in that document had been removed as a result of the amendment submitted by the representative of Kuwait and accepted by the sponsors. It noted the suggestion of the representative of Japan that the negotiators at Geneva should keep in close touch with other nations not represented in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and inform them fully of the progress of negotiations, particularly in regard to questions of security and the other questions mentioned in operative paragraph 1 of the resolution. If, as was to be hoped, the Eighteen-Nation Committee was able to produce a draft treaty on non-proliferation within the early months of 1967, it would be necessary to make arrangements for discussing the draft with other nations not represented in the Committee, in which case the conference proposed in the five-Power resolution might fulfil a useful purpose. In any case, the preparatory committee would no doubt do its work with full regard for the intentions stated in the preambular paragraphs of the resolution.

38. Mr. ACHKAR (Guinea) said he had been obliged to abstain in the vote on the amended five-Power

draft resolution because his delegation had doubts concerning some of its provisions. For example, what was the real reason for the nuclear arms race referred to in the third preambular paragraph? It was that as long as there were nuclear Powers that had not renounced such weapons, other States might be tempted to try to obtain them. The penultimate preambular paragraph therefore stated an obvious truth, but the document's inconsistency became apparent when it went on to speak of a conference of non-nuclear Powers alone. Thus, in operative paragraph 1, the United Nations was asking only some of its Members to do something. That would not be in accordance with the most desirable procedure, which was that all the States Members of the United Nations should be assembled whenever problems of such importance were to be solved. If what was required was an expression of opinion by one group of States regarding the problem of dissemination, a procedure similar to that which had resulted in the covening of conferences such as those of the non-aligned countries could be adopted. But where the United Nations was concerned, it was proper that any action proposed should be considered by the entire membership.

39. In particular, the best way of examining the problem of the security of non-nuclear States to which operative paragraph 1 (a) referred was to do so in conjunction with the nuclear Powers, in order to find out exactly how it would be possible to give the non-nuclear States all the protection they desired.

40. Mr. PONNAMBALAM (Ceylon) said he had wholeheartedly supported operative paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.371/Rev.1 since, in his opinion, it implied that a series of guarantees or assurances should be given by the nuclear Powers to the non-nuclear Powers. The paragraph would have been no less deserving of support if, without any guarantees, the balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations could be interpreted as meaning a reduction in the nuclear armaments of the nuclear Powers themselves.

41. His delegation had abstained in the vote on the five-Power resolution because, in present circumstances, nothing should be done, however well intentioned, which might possibly delay the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation.

42. Mr. COLLAS (Greece) said he had voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.371/Rev.1 on the understanding that operative paragraph 4 concerned the whole problem of guarantees to non-nuclear States, and not only the matters indicated in the first part of the paragraph. He had abstained in the vote on the five-Power draft resolution because, while appreciating the reasons which had prompted its submission, he thought that nothing should be done at present which could in any way hamper the efforts of the nuclear Powers to reach an agreement on non-proliferation.

43. Miss FAROUK (Tunisia) said she had voted in favour of the five-Power draft resolution because the apprehensions aroused by the original text had been partly dispelled by the Kuwaiti amendments incorporated into it.

AGENDA ITEM 27

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (A/6390-DC/228, A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.374)

GENERAL DEBATE

44. Mr. PARDO (Malta) said he would like to know, before the debate on the question of general and complete disarmament ended, whether the preparatory committee constituted in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 2030 (XX) had taken any steps towards convening a world disarmament conference and whether the results of its work had been brought to the notice of all countries in conformity with paragraph 3 of that resolution. He also asked whether the conference in question would be convened in 1967, in which case he would like to know what arrangements had been made, or whether, if the conference were not held in 1967, resolution 2030 (XX) would become null and void and a new General Assembly resolution would be required in order to convene a world disarmament conference.

45. The CHAIRMAN said he could not give an immediate answer to those important questions. As soon as he had obtained the required information, he would convey it to the Committee.

46. Mr. HAMBRO (Norway) said that the problem of disarmament was uppermost in the minds of the Norwegian people. It could of course be argued that the armaments race had been caused by mutual distrust and conflicts of interest, and that the causes must be removed if disarmament was to be achieved. But it was equally true that a halt to the expansion of military power would create a lessening of tensions, which in turn could break that vicious circle. His people and Government felt that it would be idle to wait for a thaw in international relations or for a perfect solution to all disarmament problems. An attack must be made on what was currently the most acute problem, that of arms control, and the spread of nuclear weapons must be stopped before it was too late. His delegation therefore urged that top priority should be given to work on a treaty on non-proliferation.

47. The prohibition of the transfer of control of nuclear weapons ought to mean that no control must be transferred either to individual countries or to groups of States; but it was obvious that a ban of that kind would not prevent members of an alliance from consulting among themselves on all questions relating to their defence.

48. The problems of verification that would arise from a ban on proliferation could, to a large extent, be solved by applying the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and by further development of the safeguards which it provided. It was desirable that as many countries as possible should forthwith declare themselves prepared to submit all their present and future peaceful activities in the field of atomic energy to the IAEA safeguards system. That would lead to a further relaxation of tension and would promote mutual confidence among the non-nuclear Powers. The widest possible use of the IAEA system would increase the Agency's experience and make it better able to meet

the verification problems which would be raised by the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation.

49. His Government supported the suggestion made by the representative of Japan that the Assembly might request IAEA to report on the part the Agency might play in regard to the prevention of proliferation and the effectiveness of the existing safeguards system. The statement made by the representative of IAEA at the 1437th meeting and the information given by the Netherlands delegation (1438th meeting) had been most interesting. He particularly welcomed the practical suggestions of co-operation between IAEA and Euratom. He was grateful to the delegations, among them those of the United States and the Netherlands, which had supported the Norwegian Government's appeal that the non-nuclear States should place their peaceful nuclear activities under the IAEA safeguards system. That would obviously be a very limited step, but it would in no way interfere with the application of more comprehensive measures. His Government was ready to enter into an agreement with IAEA for that purpose. It had wondered whether to take an initiative in the matter during the current session of the General Assembly but, after consultation with other delegations, had decided to take no initiative which might in the slightest degree disturb the delicate talks in progress and therefore to withhold a formal proposal for the time being. In the meantime, his delegation would favour a programme of action to promote the application of the IAEA safeguards system.

50. A solution to the remaining obstacles to a comprehensive test ban treaty must be found as soon as possible. It was of the utmost importance to achieve early agreement on a halt, or at least a reduction, in the production of fissionable material for military purposes and the gradual reduction of existing stock-piles of such material. But agreement in one or more of those fields should not be a precondition for the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation; such a treaty would be extremely useful even if it was not possible at the same time to arrive at agreements on regulations limiting the nuclear Powers' own armaments. The strengthening of international security which a treaty on non-proliferation would bring about would benefit the non-nuclear Powers in no less a degree than the nuclear Powers, as the representative of Ceylon had so eloquently expressed it (1445th meeting). The almost unanimous approval of the resolution on renunciation of actions hampering the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation (resolution 2149 (XXI)) amply stressed the urgent need of reaching early agreement on that vital issue.

51. His Government was not losing sight of the fact that the ultimate goal was to rid the world of the danger of self-annihilation. A prerequisite to general and complete disarmament was the relaxation of tension and the gradual build-up of mutual trust and goodwill. Norway was seeking to contribute to such relaxation by promoting and taking part in closer co-operation in all fields of activity between the countries of East and West, particularly in Europe.

52. As the Norwegian Foreign Minister had declared in the Assembly's general debate (1430th plenary meeting), Norway warmly supported the Secretary-

General's suggestion for a study of the impact and implications of all aspects of nuclear weapons.

53. He was therefore happy to state that, as a result of friendly consultations, the Polish delegation, which had submitted a draft resolution on the question of the effects of the use of nuclear weapons (A/C.1/L.370), had agreed to revise its text, which was now sponsored by Canada, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway and Poland (A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1). The revised draft resolution would be formally introduced by the representative of Poland at the following meeting. The study it called for was intended to contribute to the efforts to limit and control the production of nuclear weapons; it would be conducted by recognized experts, and a document could be produced which might serve as a neutral and authoritative source of information to Governments and the public generally. The sponsors therefore believed themselves justified in hoping that the draft resolution would receive the support of all delegations.

54. Mr. KABANDA (Rwanda) said that the results already achieved and the unanimous determination to arrive at a definitive and lasting solution of the problem under discussion were grounds for optimism. Neither a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons nor a treaty on general disarmament were ends in themselves. General and effective disarmament must be achieved, for true peace was impossible so long as men lived under the threat of total destruction. It was not enough to reject the possibility of war for war to become impossible.

55. It was true that the United Nations had already succeeded, through its role as mediator and conciliator, and thanks to the common determination of States, in preventing several wars, but it was still necessary to settle the problem of disarmament. If he remained optimistic it was because, weapons being the work of man, man could also destroy them; and he believed in man. The atmosphere created by the cold war resulting from the division of the world into hostile blocs was gradually clearing and giving place, for the greater good of mankind, to an atmosphere of relaxation and international co-operation—to a climate of greater goodwill, as the Tunisian representative had put it at the 1446th meeting. The conclusion of the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed at Moscow on 5 August 1963, was proof of that. But long and painstaking negotiations must take place before the problems could be solved.

56. Returning for a moment to the question of non-proliferation, he wished to make it quite clear that what his delegation meant by a treaty on non-proliferation was one aimed at preventing both the vertical and the horizontal increase or multiplication of nuclear weapons. Disarmament problems concerned the nuclear Powers as much as the non-nuclear Powers; it was therefore necessary to avoid giving the expression a purely geographical significance.

57. Referring to the partial test ban treaty—an important stage in the process of general disarmament—he recalled the unfortunate fact that, as indicated by the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee in their joint memorandum of 17 August 1966 on a comprehensive test ban

treaty,^{1/} not all States had yet adhered to the partial test ban treaty, all nuclear weapon tests had not been suspended, and nuclear tests in the atmosphere and underground were continuing.

58. Thus the United States Press had referred to the beginning of a series of underground nuclear tests in Nevada. Such explosions could be injurious to human, animal and plant life and could destroy the resources of the subsoil, apart from the fact that they brought about "the development and sophistication of nuclear weapons", that they had "unforeseeable consequences in regard to imbalance and mistrust in the relationship between States", and that they diverted "human and material resources for purposes of war".^{1/}

59. He therefore believed that, as a follow-up to the partial test ban treaty, an agreement on the prohibition of underground nuclear tests would be a very important step towards general and complete disarmament. It would also serve the interests of mankind by freeing material and human resources which, as the Chairman of the Rwanda delegation had said in the Assembly's General debate (1428th plenary meeting, para. 17), would mean more effective weapons against poverty, ignorance and famine, which threatened two thirds of mankind.

60. That view was shared by the Soviet Union, as could be seen from the message of 1 February 1966 from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament^{2/} pointing out that it was on the initiative of the USSR that the General Assembly had adopted a resolution on a broad disarmament programme which would make it possible to increase the well-being of all the peoples of the world within a short time. Several statements by the President of the United States, particularly his message of 27 January 1966 to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,^{3/} the expressed similar views.

61. That realistic approach to the disarmament problem was shared by Rwanda, whose Permanent Representative to the United Nations had stated time and time again that the disarmament question could not be settled on a lasting basis as long as sources of tension existed in the world, and considered assistance to the developing countries to be the most positive sign of a policy of peace.

62. Some sources of tension were the artificial boundaries imposed on certain countries following wars, the existence of military blocs which perpetuated the cold war, and the presence of military bases in foreign countries.

63. He deplored the fact that at a time when a dialogue was beginning with a view to seeking a solution to the disarmament problem, certain Powers were carrying out nuclear weapon tests. He felt that it was the duty of every State not to encourage them along that road.

^{1/} See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1966, document DC/228, annex 1, sect. 0.

^{2/} Ibid., sect. F.

^{3/} Ibid., sect. D.

64. The delegation of Rwanda believed that general disarmament could be achieved only in stages, and that the first should be the gradual reduction of military budgets, and particularly allocations intended for the manufacture of atomic weapons. Furthermore, in order for the treaty to be effective, several conditions would have to be met. First, the parties to the treaty should designate or recognize an authority which would prepare an inventory of existing armaments and stocks to be destroyed, and supervise the destruction of such weapons. That authority would also serve as a depositary for fissile materials derived from the destruction of nuclear weapons. Secondly, the authority—whether it was the International Atomic Energy Agency or some other body—should undertake not to receive orders or instructions from any party acting separately or without the authorization of the others. Thirdly, the area in which the designated authority would assign the fissile

materials for peaceful purposes should be specific. Fourthly, the provisions of the treaty should be in keeping with the national security requirements of the States involved.

65. Finally, he expressed his delegation's satisfaction at the proposal by the United States that the United States and the Soviet Union should transfer 60,000 kg and 40,000 kg respectively of U-235 to be used for peaceful purposes. Agreement in principle by the Soviet Union would mean that a very important stage of the disarmament process had been completed.

66. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.370/Rev.1 seemed to him to merit consideration by the Committee, inasmuch as the study it would call for would lead to a better understanding of the danger inherent in nuclear armaments.

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.