



CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
<i>Agenda item 26:</i>	
<i>Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued)</i>	
<i>Consideration of draft resolutions (continued)</i>	<i>133</i>

Chairman: Mr. Leopoldo BENITES (Ecuador).

AGENDA ITEM 26

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued) (A/6390-DC/228, A/C.1/L.371/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.372 and Add.1-3, A/C.1/L.375, A/C.1/L.376)

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (continued) (A/C.1/L.371/REV.1, A/C.1/L.372 AND ADD.1-3, A/C.1/L.375, A/C.1/L.376)

1. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) said that the Malaysian representative's reference to the Monroe Doctrine, in the course of his statement at the previous meeting, might give rise to erroneous interpretations concerning the relations between the United States and the countries of Latin America. In fact, relations between the United States and the Latin American Republics were governed today by two treaties: the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and the Charter of the Organization of American States.

2. Mr. Amjad ALI (Pakistan) said that the sponsors of the five-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.372 and Add.1-3) had agreed to incorporate in the draft resolution the amendments submitted by Kuwait (A/C.1/L.376).

3. Since the Committee was about to vote, the sponsors felt that it might simplify matters if Sierra Leone did not press for a vote on its amendments (A/C.1/L.375).

4. Mr. COLERIDGE-TAYLOR (Sierra Leone) said that in view of developments since the submission of his amendments he was prepared to withdraw them and he would support the five-Power draft resolution together with the Kuwaiti amendments.

5. He regretted that operative paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.371/Rev.1 did not include a reference to the protection of all States. He had supported the Cameroonian amendments (A/C.1/L.373) to the original text, which would have made that operative paragraph more comprehensive, but unfortunately

the Cameroonian delegation had not resubmitted its amendments since the submission of the revised text. The meaning of operative paragraph 4 seemed to have been further limited by what the United States representative had said about it at the previous meeting. Nevertheless, he would support the revised draft resolution (A/C.1/L.371/Rev.1).

6. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) said that, if the proposed conference of non-nuclear States were to be held in July 1968 instead of July 1967, a treaty on non-proliferation could not be considered until after July 1968. That would be contrary to the desire expressed by many members that a treaty should be concluded as soon as possible. The problem was too urgent to admit of such delay.

7. The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation-Committee on Disarmament should be reconvened immediately after the First Committee's debates on disarmament were completed. He saw no need to wait until January or February to convene the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

8. Mr. TRIVEDI (India) said that his delegation's doubts about the five-Power draft resolution and the amendments thereto had not been dispelled by previous speakers' statements. The draft resolution was not in keeping with General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), which emphasized that a treaty on non-proliferation was not an end in itself, but only a means to an end. The draft resolution would in fact make only the question of preventing further proliferation an end in itself, as was clear from its preambular paragraphs.

9. A conference of 110 non-nuclear States was hardly the most appropriate method of safeguarding their security. There was also the question of the cost of such a conference, particularly when the conference was not likely to be effective and when the concept in the draft resolution was wrong. Furthermore, if there was to be a special conference for that purpose, would there be other conferences on, for instance, the banning of nuclear tests, foreign bases, a nuclear weapons freeze, reduction of the number of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and other isolated aspects of the problem now under consideration? Therefore, although the draft resolution contained some good ideas, his delegation would vote against it.

10. The CHAIRMAN invited those members who wished to speak in explanation of vote before the vote to do so.

11. Mr. MATSUI (Japan) reiterated his delegation's view that full attention must be paid to the security interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States in the negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty on non-

proliferation, so that as many countries as possible could accede to it. The security of the non-nuclear-weapon States was a problem which must be considered with the greatest care, taking into account all shades of opinion and the particular circumstances of each State.

12. His delegation therefore supported draft resolution A/C.1/L.371/Rev.1 and attached great importance to the provision in operative paragraph 4 that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should consider all proposals "that have been or may be made for the solution of the problem". The Eighteen-Nation Committee should not fail to consult, as frequently and in as much detail as might be necessary and possible, with all States which would be affected to a substantial degree by the treaty, because the results of its deliberations would have far-reaching and different effects on each nation.

13. In regard to the assurance to be given by the nuclear-weapon Powers, the Eighteen-Nation Committee should pay great attention to such questions as how, by whom and by what machinery or verifiable procedures the existence of nuclear weapons in the territory of a State would be determined. The practicability and credibility of the assurance would depend on the answers to those questions.

14. His delegation would support the five-Power draft resolution together with the Kuwaiti amendments.

15. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), referring to the five-Power draft resolution, said that the USSR strongly favoured a positive solution of the problem of guarantees to non-nuclear States against nuclear attack. That was abundantly clear from the message of 1 February 1966 from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to the Eighteen-Nation Committee,^{1/} from the USSR position on nuclear-free zones and related guarantees and from the USSR stand on other aspects of nuclear disarmament. His delegation could not support the proposal made in the draft resolution, however, because it did not think that the problem of guarantees against nuclear attack could be appropriately settled without the participation of the nuclear Powers. Moreover, draft resolution A/C.1/L.371/Rev.1 already covered questions that would be considered at the proposed conference of non-nuclear States. Under operative paragraphs 3 and 4 of that draft resolution, the Soviet proposals and other proposals that had been or might be made for the solution of the problem of guarantees of the security of all States, including guarantees for non-nuclear States in case of nuclear war, would be examined.

16. It should also be borne in mind that there already existed bodies in which the problem of guarantees for non-nuclear States could be successfully resolved. The General Assembly had adopted resolution 2030 (XX) concerning the convening of a world disarmament conference; that conference was one of the important bodies in which the problem might be successfully dealt with. The General Assembly and the First Committee considered all aspects of disarmament, including guarantees. There was also the Disarmament

Commission, comprising all States Members of the United Nations, and there was the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. In the circumstances, it was inappropriate to convene a special conference.

17. His delegation would abstain in the vote on the five-Power draft resolution and the amendments thereto. It had stated its position on the main draft resolution (A/C.1/L.371/Rev.1) earlier and would vote for it.

18. Mr. ALHOLM (Finland) understood and shared the deep concern of the sponsors of the five-Power draft resolution about the security of the non-nuclear Powers, but felt that at the present stage all efforts to solve the most urgent disarmament problem—the proliferation of nuclear weapons—should be concentrated in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, which was the appropriate negotiating body for both nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. At a time when agreement seemed closer than ever before, any less promising steps should be avoided. His delegation could not therefore support the draft resolution as amended.

19. Mr. Endalkachew MAKONNEN (Ethiopia) agreed with the idea set forth in the five-Power draft resolution, although the first preambular paragraph should have specifically recalled and reaffirmed General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) and the last preambular paragraph should have referred to the conclusions of "an agreement", rather than "arrangements". The key paragraph, however, was operative paragraph 2, for the preparation of the conference would to a large extent determine its success or failure. The conference itself should be regarded as a preparatory meeting leading not only to negotiation with the nuclear States, but also to the conference on disarmament and the agreement on general and complete disarmament. In that respect, the Kuwaiti amendments (A/C.1/L.376) were very appropriate.

20. His delegation was opposed to any idea of a "nuclear club" or a "non-nuclear club", and to any idea of a confrontation between the two groups of countries. It was only understanding and co-operation that could lead to the desired agreement.

21. The three questions posed in operative paragraph 1 of the five-Power draft resolution required careful study, and the conference would provide an excellent first opportunity for non-nuclear Powers to consult together and to study ways and means of expediting the achievement not only of an agreement on non-proliferation, but of the final disarmament agreement as well. His delegation would vote for the draft resolution as amended.

22. Mr. CORNER (New Zealand) thought that operative paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.371/Rev.1 did not actually say what it was presumably intended to say. The last words—"this problem"—appeared to relate specifically to the proposal mentioned in the first part of the paragraph and not, as he believed had been the intention, to the more general question of how the security of non-nuclear-weapon States might be assured. He would vote in favour of the draft resolution but had wished to place on record his delegation's understanding of what the paragraph was intended to mean.

^{1/} See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1966, document DC/223, annex I, sect. F.

23. Mr. ESCHAUZIER (Netherlands) said that his delegation would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.371/Rev.1, but had two reservations with regard to operative paragraph 4. First, that paragraph referred to the proposal made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR;^{1/} it was regrettable that no reference was made to the declaration by the President of the United States to the Eighteen-Nation Committee,^{2/} since such a reference would have made for a more balanced text. His second reservation was the same as that stated by the New Zealand representative; he, too, took it that "this problem" meant the problem of ensuring the security of non-nuclear weapon States.

24. Mr. Amjad ALI (Pakistan) said that, first of all, he agreed that neither the guarantees nor the other matters mentioned in operative paragraph 1 of the five-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.372 and Add.1-3) could be achieved without the co-operation of the nuclear Powers. The purpose of the suggested conference, as the Ethiopian representative had explained, was to harmonize the views of the non-nuclear countries on the very important questions referred to in the draft resolution and thereby facilitate the elaboration of a treaty on non-proliferation, which did not seem likely to be concluded in the immediate future even though the general climate now seemed more favourable.

25. Secondly, his delegation was prepared to accept the Kuwaiti amendment proposing a date not later than July 1968, instead of July 1967, for the conference. He hoped that the amendment would allay fears that the conference might interfere with the work now being carried on by the two super-Powers and by the Eighteen-Nation Committee for the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation.

26. Lastly, referring to the Indian representative's statement, if separate conferences on individual aspects of disarmament could successfully reduce armaments step by step, then each conference could make a very useful contribution towards the goal of general and complete disarmament, which, as everyone recognized, could not be achieved at a single stroke.

27. Mr. BOUATTOURA (Algeria) said that in his statement at the 1438th meeting he had indicated his delegation's view that any progress in disarmament was linked to the political atmosphere prevailing in the world rather than to the technical aspects of the problems involved and that any treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would constitute a step forward in the process of general and complete disarmament, both nuclear and conventional. Such progress obviously required the participation of all countries, including the two nuclear Powers which were not at present taking an active part in the negotiations.

28. A treaty on non-proliferation would be meaningless unless it was universal, since it was natural for countries not possessing nuclear weapons to seek guarantees for their own survival. In supporting the five-Power draft resolution, however, his delegation believed that the proposed conference signified not

an isolation of the non-nuclear States but an undertaking on their part to co-operate with all countries, particularly with the nuclear Powers, in seeking adequate solutions to the problem of disarmament.

29. Moreover, the conference of non-nuclear States must pave the way for a world conference on disarmament, which had, in principle, found wide acceptance in the Committee. Adoption of the draft resolution would not hinder the current negotiations but would, instead, provide a new impetus for the speedy conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation.

30. His delegation welcomed the Kuwaiti amendment which formed a sort of bridge between the objectives of the five-Power draft resolution and the First Committee's efforts to arrive at a treaty on non-proliferation.

31. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) said that his delegation would abstain from voting on the five-Power draft resolution because it did not feel that its adoption at the present time would help in achieving the most urgent goal before the First Committee, which was the elaboration of a treaty on non-proliferation. The abstention was not an expression of a definite opinion held by his delegation regarding the advisability or inadvisability of convening a conference of non-nuclear States at an appropriate time.

32. Mr. KHALAF (Iraq) said that his delegation would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.371/Rev.1 because it met an urgent need and satisfied the hopes of mankind for the prompt conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation.

33. His delegation had had some misgivings at first about the five-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.372 and Add.1-3) but they had been dispelled by the Kuwaiti amendments, the first of which would change the date of the conference from 1967 to 1968, allowing more time for preparation of the conference and avoiding the risk of interfering with the current negotiations for a treaty on non-proliferation. The second Kuwaiti amendment, by which the preparatory committee would consider the question of the association of nuclear States with the work of the Conference, recognized the importance of the role those States played. His delegation would therefore give its full support to the draft resolution, as amended.

34. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) wondered whether any of the non-nuclear countries that were to participate in the conference in 1968 would be willing to sign a treaty on non-proliferation if one were concluded by agreement between the nuclear Powers before that time, or whether they would be more likely to wait until after the conference.

35. Mr. AUGUSTE (Haiti) said that, as every measure tending to curtail the expansion of military arsenals was a valuable contribution to disarmament and peace, his delegation would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.371/Rev.1. It would also vote for the five-Power draft resolution.

36. Mr. RAFAEL (Israel) also supported the five-Power draft resolution, which reflected the feeling of a large number of delegations that there should be closer and fuller consultations between the non-nuclear countries on problems of security and dis-

^{2/} Ibid., sect. D.

armament, particularly nuclear disarmament. It might be advisable for the preparatory committee proposed in the draft resolution to establish contact with and co-ordinate its work with that of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

37. His delegation agreed with the New Zealand representative that the words "this problem" at the end of operative paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.371/Rev.1 should be taken as referring to the problem of the security of the non-nuclear Powers in general, and not merely to the specific proposal mentioned in the same paragraph.

38. Mr. OULD HASSEN (Mauritania), referring to the five-Power draft resolution said that, if the proposed conference of non-nuclear countries were held in July 1968, as suggested in the first Kuwaiti amendment (A/C.1/L.376), there would be sufficient time both to prepare for the conference and to enable the major nuclear Powers to reconcile their points of view on non-proliferation. If before 1968 the two major Powers were able to conclude a treaty offering the necessary guarantees to non-nuclear States such as his own, Mauritania would gladly accede to it.

39. Lord CHALFONT (United Kingdom) said that his delegation would vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.371/Rev.1.

40. With regard to the question of nuclear-free zones, which was mentioned in operative paragraph 3, his delegation had made it clear that the United Kingdom Government favoured the creation of nuclear-free zones wherever geographical and other conditions were suitable. In the First Committee and in the Eighteen Nation Committee, it had already expressed the hope that a nuclear-free zone could be established in Latin America. As the United States representative had pointed out at the 1448th meeting, the question of commitments or recognition by outside Powers would arise only when a nuclear-free zone had actually been established in a particular region. But his Government would approach the question of nuclear-free zones in a constructive spirit.

41. With regard to operative paragraph 4 of the revised draft resolution, he had already drawn attention (1445th meeting) to some of the difficulties which would have to be solved in order to provide appropriate guarantees for the non-nuclear States and he had mentioned some of the drawbacks of the USSR proposal. Like the United States representative, he regretted that operative paragraph 4 still referred only to that proposal and did not give comparable weight to some of the other proposals. Nevertheless, he was glad that in the revised text the Eighteen-Nation Committee was requested to consider the whole range of possible measures of assurance, which included the positive assurances suggested in the message of 27 January 1966 from the President of the United States of America to the Eighteen-Nation Committee. In view of the doubts expressed as to the exact meaning of operative paragraph 4, he wished to make clear that his delegation interpreted it as meaning that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should consider any proposals for the solution of the problem of guarantees, and not merely the proposal specified in that paragraph.

42. With regard to the five-Power draft resolution, he could not accept the Malaysian representative's asser-

tion that the United Kingdom delegation had been inconsistent in asking the non-nuclear States to explain what kind of assurances they need for a treaty on non-proliferation, and, at the same time, objecting to the same States holding a conference to discuss the problem of assurances. As the Indian representative had pointed out, there was no basic inconsistency in that position. In any case, his delegation's objections to the draft resolution had been, first, that the timing of the proposed conference might hamper the early conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation, and, secondly, that the draft resolution made an unrealistic and undesirable distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. Both those objections had been largely met by the Kuwaiti amendments, and his delegation would vote for the draft resolution as amended.

43. He was still somewhat concerned at the implications in the draft resolution that some special machinery was needed to acquaint the nuclear Powers with the views of the non-nuclear Powers. Such machinery already existed in the General Assembly, in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and in various other forums, including bilateral and multilateral contacts of many kinds. He hoped that adoption of the draft resolution would do nothing to weaken other lines of communication.

44. He radically disagreed with the Cypriot representative's suggestion that the postponement of a conference of non-nuclear Powers until 1968 was inconsistent with the urgent need for a treaty on non-proliferation and that there could be no treaty until the conference had been held. Such an interpretation of the amended draft resolution was quite inconsistent with the aims expressed by the Pakistan representative in introducing the proposal. He earnestly hoped that a treaty on non-proliferation would be signed before 1968. But, if it had not been signed by then, a conference of the non-nuclear Powers would give added momentum to the negotiations; and, if a treaty had been signed by 1968, the conference would still have a valuable function to perform, for instance in reviewing the implementation of the treaty and in considering further steps in the general non-proliferation strategy, of which the treaty would be only the first step.

45. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus), replying to the United Kingdom representative, pointed out that he had not said that a treaty on non-proliferation would not be signed before 1968 if the conference of non-nuclear Powers were postponed until 1968. He had merely asked whether non-nuclear countries intending to participate in a conference in 1968 would be prepared to sign a treaty on non-proliferation if one were concluded by agreement between the nuclear Powers before that time; and he had hoped to receive a definite answer to that question. According to the United Kingdom representative, the Pakistan representative had stated that the non-nuclear countries would sign a treaty immediately it was concluded, regardless of when the conference was to be held. But the Cypriot delegation had not heard any explicit statement to that effect by the representative of Pakistan.

46. Mr. VELLODI (Secretary of the Committee), in a statement on the financial implications of the two draft resolutions before the Committee, said that the 1967 budget estimates submitted by the Secretary-General

to the General Assembly^{3/} already included in section 2, chapter I, a request for funds for the meetings of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in 1967. Accordingly, adoption of the forty-seven Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.371/Rev.1) would not entail any additional expenditure in 1967.

47. With regard to the five-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.372 and Add.1-3), it was not possible to submit any detailed estimates at the present time, in the absence of more precise information on the location and duration of the proposed conference and the nature of the services it would require. Those details would, presumably, be considered by the proposed preparatory committee.

48. If the conference were held in 1968, no undertaking could be given that any of the conference servicing requirements could be met from existing staff resources, owing to the heavy programme of meetings already scheduled at Headquarters and Geneva. Temporary assistance requirements, if confined to interpretation and the provision of summary records, would involve at Headquarters a weekly expenditure of about \$30,000. That would exclude any provision for other documentation, which would involve further costs for translation, revision and so on.

49. The Pakistan representative had stated that the sponsors of the draft resolution accepted the Kuwaiti amendments (A/C.1/L.376); and, if the draft resolution were adopted with those amendments the proposed conference would not take place until 1968. Such meetings as the preparatory committee might hold in 1967 and/or 1968, and the submission by the preparatory committee of a report to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session, were not expected to give rise to any additional costs which could not be met generally from resources already requested.

50. The CHAIRMAN said that, as the Committee was required to vote on proposals in the order in which they had been submitted, he intended to put draft resolution A/C.1/L.371/Rev.1 to the vote first. The United States representative had requested a separate vote on operative paragraph 4.

51. Mr. OWONO (Cameroon) requested a separate vote on the preamble as a whole, a roll-call vote on the beginning of operative paragraph 3 up to and including the words "... contre des Etats" in the French text, a separate vote on the beginning of operative paragraph 4, also up to and including the words "... contre des Etats", a separate vote on operative paragraph 3 as a whole and a separate vote on operative paragraphs 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8.

52. Mr. GURINOVICH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) wondered if the Cameroonian representative's request in regard to operative paragraph 4 was in order at the present stage. It was surely tantamount to the resubmission of a Cameroonian amendment which had been withdrawn.

53. Mr. VELLODI (Secretary of the Committee) said that the Cameroonian representative's request in re-

gard to operative paragraph 4 did present some difficulties, in the sense that in the English text the words "non-nuclear-weapon" came before the word "States", while in the French text the corresponding phrase came after the words "des Etats".

54. Mr. IDZUMBUIR (Democratic Republic of the Congo) observed that the Cameroonian representative had requested a separate vote on certain words in the French text. In English and the other working languages, the separate vote should be taken on the corresponding words.

55. The CHAIRMAN asked the Cameroonian representative to clarify his proposal in regard to operative paragraph 4.

56. Mr. OWONO (Cameroon) believed that it was perfectly in order for delegations to ask for a separate vote on certain words or phrases in the texts of draft resolutions. The sole object of his proposal in regard to operative paragraph 4 was to enable his own and other delegations to express their views on the text of the paragraph up to and including the words "... contre des Etats" but excluding all the remaining words in the paragraph.

57. Mr. GURINOVICH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) thought that, as the revised draft resolution had originally been submitted in English, the Cameroonian representative's request should be related to the English text. If the Cameroonian representative were asking for a separate vote on the beginning of operative paragraph 4 up to the word "States" but omitting the words which qualified the word "States", then he was undoubtedly submitting an amendment to the original text. Once the Chairman had announced his intention of putting a draft resolution to the vote, the Committee should not consider any further amendments, and particularly not amendments which had been submitted earlier and then withdrawn.

58. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) agreed with the Byelorussian representative. Furthermore, he doubted if operative paragraph 4 could reasonably be divided in the way suggested by the Cameroonian representative. The paragraph referred, first, to a specific proposal for assurances to be given precisely to non-nuclear-weapon States without nuclear weapons on their territories. If the word "States" were separated from the qualifying phrases "non-nuclear-weapon" and "without nuclear weapons on their territories", the whole meaning of the paragraph would be changed.

59. Mr. OULD HASSEN (Mauritania) said that he and other sponsors of the revised draft resolution would be grateful if the Cameroonian representative were to withdraw his request for separate votes on parts of operative paragraphs 3 and 4.

60. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) moved the adjournment of the meeting.

The motion was adopted by 77 votes to 2, with 11 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.

^{3/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 5.