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*Chairman: Mr. Leopoldo BENITES (Ecuador).*

**AGENDA ITEM 26**

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued) (A/6390-DC/228, A/C.1/L.371/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.372 and Add.1-3, A/C.1/L.373, A/C.1/L.375)

**GENERAL DEBATE (continued)**

1. Mr. ARKHURST (Ghana) said that the Committee had been quite right to give priority to the question of non-proliferation. A treaty on non-proliferation was an indispensable first step in the direction of nuclear disarmament. It was, naturally, disappointing that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had not been able to submit an agreed text of a treaty to the General Assembly. But the Eighteen-Nation Committee's work during the past year was satisfactory and it should now be encouraged to continue its efforts with greater vigour.

2. The differences between the major nuclear Powers on the subject of non-proliferation were still considerable. But, as they related to intermediate rather than ultimate objectives, they did not seem to be unbridgeable. The serious efforts now being made by the United States and the Soviet Union to agree on the basic terms of a treaty were particularly encouraging. The non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee also deserved credit for the contribution they had made to the significant advances already achieved.

3. Without security guarantees for the non-nuclear States and without some assurance that it would lead directly to nuclear disarmament and eventually to complete disarmament, a treaty on non-proliferation would not be acceptable to States which did not at present possess or desire nuclear capability, and it would not be really effective. The treaty should also contain provisions ensuring that there were no loop-holes which any States or group of States could use to frustrate the objectives of non-proliferation through multilateral defence arrangements. Above all, the treaty should be concluded

without delay. The international political situation was far from stable as it was, and it would be seriously aggravated if any more States were to acquire nuclear capability or the control of nuclear weapons. The fact that France and the People's Republic of China were not represented in the Eighteen-Nation Committee was a serious handicap to the negotiation of a universal treaty on non-proliferation. But he hoped that France would soon decide to take part in the negotiations and that the General Assembly would invite the People's Republic of China to play its legitimate role in all United Nations bodies.

4. In the belief that the Eighteen-Nation Committee's attention should be directed once again to the principles laid down in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), his delegation had joined in sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/L.371/Rev.1, and hoped that the Committee would adopt it unanimously. The revised text seemed to take account of most of the amendments submitted by Cameroon (A/C.1/L.373); his delegation would also agree to the replacement of the words "non-nuclear-weapon States" by the words "other States" in operative paragraph 3, as had been proposed in the second Cameroonian amendment.

5. On the other hand, he doubted whether the suggestion in the five-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.372 and Add.1-3) was opportune at the present moment. He fully understood the motives of the delegations concerned and, like them, he was anxious that a treaty on non-proliferation should guarantee the security of non-nuclear States. He also recognized the important role which the non-nuclear Powers could play in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and agreed that nuclear energy should be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes. But the objectives referred to in the five-Power draft resolution could be achieved only by the joint efforts of nuclear and non-nuclear States. It would be better to give the Eighteen-Nation Committee a little more time to complete its work satisfactorily. Any overlapping efforts would further complicate an already complex problem.

6. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) was disappointed by the Eighteen-Nation Committee's failure to reach agreement on a treaty on non-proliferation, or indeed to achieve any tangible progress in disarmament. The question of non-proliferation did not brook delay.

7. There was some consolation, however, in the fact that certain non-nuclear countries had shown commendable restraint in not seeking to become nuclear Powers, although they were fully capable of doing so and had, in some cases, been subject

to considerable provocation. Moreover, the very atmosphere in which the present discussions were being conducted also gave grounds for optimism. The two major nuclear Powers seemed to be less concerned than they had been at the last session with the problem of possible loop-holes for proliferation through collective nuclear defence arrangements within military alliances. There were positive signs, too, that the other major difference of opinion, over safeguards and inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency, could be settled without great difficulty. The adoption of resolution 2149 (XXI) on the preceding item had shown that the Committee was almost unanimous in believing that a treaty on non-proliferation should be concluded as a matter of priority, and at the 1445th meeting the Soviet and United Kingdom representatives had renewed their appeals for an immediate solution before any developments outside the negotiations could make agreement more difficult, or even impossible.

8. The Eighteen-Nation Committee was due to meet in January 1967 to deal with the problem of disarmament in general, but by that time the momentum towards agreement on non-proliferation might have completely disappeared. Accordingly, the Eighteen-Nation Committee should be requested to reconvene in New York immediately for the specific purpose of preparing a draft treaty on non-proliferation, and to report to the General Assembly before the end of the present session. The signing of a treaty during the present session would greatly enhance the image of the United Nations in the twenty-first year of its existence and would be a collective contribution to the general endeavour to persuade the Secretary-General to allow himself to be nominated for a further period of office.

9. Of the five principles enunciated in paragraph 2 of resolution 2028 (XX), the first, regarding the elimination of possible loop-holes in a treaty, seemed now to present fewer difficulties. His delegation would have liked the treaty to include a provision banning the transfer of nuclear weapons by one nuclear Power to another, as well as to non-nuclear States. But, to avoid delaying the conclusion of a treaty, it would not insist on that proposal.

10. With regard to the second principle, the incorporation in a treaty on non-proliferation of agreements on other collateral disarmament measures would involve protracted delay, which was undesirable at the present stage. The treaty should, however, contain some form of commitment by the nuclear Powers that they would proceed with determination to seek agreement on other collateral measures as part of a continuous and uninterrupted disarmament process. As a further safeguard, the treaty could be reviewed at regular intervals. The concept of national security based on armed force was meaningless in the nuclear age, but the fact remained that the policies of Governments were still based on out-dated concepts of material force. No effective steps had yet been taken in the direction of nuclear disarmament and no collective security system had yet been developed by the United Nations. In the circumstances, it was only natural for the non-nuclear—and especially the non-aligned—countries to require the nuclear Powers to guarantee their

security against the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The exact nature of the guarantees to be provided should be determined by the body negotiating the treaty.

11. The third principle in resolution 2028 (XX) was indispensable. A treaty on non-proliferation should be followed, first, by a comprehensive test ban treaty, which the Disarmament Commission had given equal priority in 1965; next, by a freeze on the development of nuclear weapons; and then by a cut-off in the production of nuclear weapons and a reduction in stockpiles. General and complete disarmament should always be the ultimate goal.

12. With regard to the fourth principle, he supported the Japanese representative's proposal that IAEA should be asked to report to the General Assembly on ways in which it could help to prevent proliferation. The Netherlands representative's suggestion for an enlargement of the IAEA safeguards system was also a useful contribution, as was the recent offer by Poland, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic to accept IAEA safeguards if the Federal Republic of Germany was prepared to do likewise. To establish a genuine balance of obligations, safeguards should be applied to reactors in nuclear and non-nuclear countries alike. The United States had already taken unilateral initiatives in that direction.

13. The fifth principle in resolution 2028 (XX) should obviously be incorporated in a treaty on non-proliferation, and he regretted only that progress towards regional denuclearization during the past year had been relatively limited. The Latin American countries should be commended for their efforts; he hoped that denuclearized zones would soon be established in that and other areas. Cyprus would not accept nuclear weapons in any form, strategic or tactical, and would under no circumstances permit other States to place nuclear weapons on any part of the island.

14. In 1963, after long years of laborious negotiations on nuclear testing, the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water had been concluded in a few days, once the two major Powers involved had realized that the right psychological moment had arrived and that a treaty would be in their national interests and in the interests of all mankind. Though it provided for only a partial test ban, it had helped to dispel anxieties and had been signed by more than a hundred States. Similarly, if agreement were reached on a simple instrument banning the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the existing apprehensions of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers would soon be allayed.

15. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) wished first to report on the progress during the past year towards the denuclearization of Latin America and then to state his country's views on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons on a world-wide scale.

16. At its third session, held at Mexico City from 19 April to 4 May 1966, the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America had unanimously approved the text of a draft treaty.

Since that text had been circulated to Member States (A/6328 and Corr.1), he would confine himself at present to commenting on five of the major questions it dealt with.

17. First, article 1 stated the obligations of the contracting parties in a most complete and precise manner which seemed to be free from any loopholes that would permit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The parties would undertake to "prohibit and prevent in their respective territories" not only the "testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons", but also "the receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapon, directly or indirectly, by the parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way". They would also undertake "to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession of or dominion over any nuclear weapon".

18. Secondly, article 3 contained a very precise and up-to-date definition of a nuclear weapon: "any device which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and is intended to be used for military purposes". However, any instrument that might be used for the transport or propulsion of the device was not included in the definition if it was separable from the device and not an indivisible part thereof.

19. Thirdly, articles 4 to 7 provided for the establishment of an independent and fundamentally Latin American agency, the Agency for the Denuclearization of Latin America, with a General Conference as its supreme organ and a secretariat headed by a General Secretary, whose responsibilities would be of an exclusively international character.

20. Fourthly, articles 8 to 13 established a control system, which provided for the submission of periodic reports and special reports by the contracting parties and for special inspections to be made under certain circumstances. An important role in the control system would be played by IAEA and its safeguards system.

21. Lastly, no agreement had been reached at the third session as to the entry into force of the proposed treaty. Article 23 therefore contained alternative texts for consideration by Governments. Under the first version, the treaty would enter into force between the States which had ratified it or acceded to it on the date on which they deposited their respective instruments of ratification or accession, and the agency established under article 4 would begin to operate when eleven such instruments had been deposited. Under the second version, the treaty would enter into force only after certain requirements had been complied with: ratification of the treaty by all Latin American States, formal guarantees by all the nuclear Powers and agreement by all States which had de jure or de facto international responsibility for territories situated in the Western hemisphere south of latitude 30° North.

22. Some 90 per cent of the draft treaty had already been unanimously approved by the twenty-one States

members of the Preparatory Commission, and they would do their utmost to work out a complete treaty that would be opened for signature at the Commission's fourth session, to be convened at Mexico City on 31 January 1967. Such a treaty, as the Secretary-General of the United Nations had rightly said in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization (A/6301/Add.1), "would mark a considerable step forward both in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and in disarmament generally" and could point the way to the denuclearization of Africa and other areas.

23. He wished to express the views of the Government of Mexico on two basic aspects of the denuclearization of Latin America. The first was the question of the co-operation of the nuclear Powers. At the eighteenth session of the General Assembly, he had given his delegation's views on the subject in the First Committee (1333rd meeting). At the current session, the Secretary for External Relations of Mexico, speaking in the Assembly's general debate (1418th plenary meeting), had said that his delegation had never used the word "guarantee" when referring to the co-operation of the nuclear Powers; such co-operation would consist merely in respect for a treaty concluded by a group of States in the exercise of their sovereignty. In addition, his Government took it for granted that in their relationships with the parties to the denuclearization treaty, the nuclear Powers would fulfil their obligation under a fundamental principle of the Charter to refrain from the threat or use of force, and hence from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons, the most destructive force ever devised by man.

24. The official communications received by the Preparatory Commission from the Governments of the United States, France and the United Kingdom indicated that those States were prepared to offer their co-operation. The Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated on 7 December 1964 that the Soviet Government was prepared to undertake to respect the status of any denuclearized zones that might be created provided that the other nuclear Powers gave the same undertaking. Furthermore, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union had proposed, in his message of 1 February 1966 to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,<sup>1/</sup> that the treaty on non-proliferation should include a clause on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the treaty which had no nuclear weapons in their territory. He was therefore confident that the Soviet response would also prove favourable.

25. As to the People's Republic of China, the Preparatory Commission had, in its resolution 12 (III), requested its Negotiating Committee, consisting of representatives of Ecuador, Brazil and Mexico, "to make informal inquiries, in the manner and by the means it deems fit, to ascertain whether the Government of the People's Republic of China would be prepared to undertake to respect the legal instrument on the denuclearization of Latin America". The

<sup>1/</sup> See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1966, document DC/228, annex 1, sect. F.

Negotiating Committee had made those inquiries through a letter sent on 22 June 1966 by Mr. Eduardo Espinosa y Prieto, Mexican Ambassador to the United Arab Republic and former Ambassador to Poland, to Mr. Wang Ping-nan, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China and former Ambassador to Poland. The reply of the Government of the People's Republic of China had been transmitted to Mr. Espinosa y Prieto orally on 8 August 1966 by Mr. Huang Hua, Ambassador of the People's Republic of China to the United Arab Republic. The main points of that reply, as summarized in the Negotiating Committee's report, were the following: first, although the Government of the People's Republic of China was sympathetic to the Latin American countries' efforts to denuclearize their region, it noted that all activities aimed at such denuclearization were closely related to a resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its eighteenth session; secondly, since the United Nations had violated the rights of the People's Republic of China, the latter could not associate itself with the activities of the United Nations and therefore could not support the treaty for the denuclearization of Latin America; thirdly, denuclearization of the zones adjacent to the United States would be useless so long as the United States maintained nuclear weapons in its territory and at its Latin American bases; and, fourthly, the People's Republic of China still held the view of nuclear weapons it had expressed on 16 October 1964 on the occasion of its first nuclear weapon test. It would never be the first to use nuclear weapons; it was convinced that a nuclear war could be prevented if all peace-loving countries and peoples made joint efforts to keep the peace; it proposed the convening of a summit conference of all countries to discuss the question of the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons and, as a first step, to agree that the nuclear States and potential nuclear States should undertake not to use nuclear weapons against any State or any denuclearized zone; and it was convinced that man, who had created nuclear weapons, would be able to eliminate them.

26. The second basic aspect of the question on which he wished to make clear his Government's position was that of the entry into force of the treaty. Mexico believed that the treaty on the denuclearization of Latin America deserved the unqualified and immediate participation of every Government in the region. However, it respected the right of any other State to hold a different view. There was a considerable difference between the alternative texts relating to the entry into force of the treaty. It might therefore be desirable to refrain from making any substantive provision in that regard in the draft treaty itself and to seek, instead, a largely procedural formula which would enable all Governments to approve the draft without prejudice to their respective positions on the substantive question. The treaty could thus be signed by the twenty-one member States and go into effect as soon as the specified number of States had ratified it.

27. Each signatory State would be free to decide the time when the conditions it regarded as essential for ratification had been met; those conditions might

perhaps be specified in statements made by each country when it signed the treaty. So far as Mexico was concerned, the only prerequisite was the general constitutional requirement that the treaty must be approved by the Mexican Senate.

28. The scope of the treaty would be stated in its provisions at the outset. It could be gradually expanded, however, as instruments of ratification were deposited. Such an expansion had taken place in the case of the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed at Moscow on 5 August 1963, and would no doubt take place also in the case of the proposed treaty on non-proliferation. The treaty would then stand, from the very date of its signature, as a demonstration of Latin America's devotion to peace and repudiation of any nuclear arms race. Moreover, such a procedure would make it impossible for any State, great or small, nuclear or non-nuclear, continental or extracontinental, to have the right of veto in a matter in which the very survival of the present and future generations of Latin America might be at stake.

29. His Government agreed with statements made on that subject by representatives of numerous member States and observers at the third session of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America. For example, it shared the Chilean view that the objectives and aspirations of the States working for denuclearization should not be frustrated by any requirement in the treaty itself which would prevent or indefinitely postpone its entry into force; it also shared the Netherlands view that it would be regrettable if any Latin American Republic or any nuclear Power were able to prevent the desired denuclearization by refusing to co-operate.

30. Turning to the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons on a world-wide scale, he said that Mexico's views on the first of the five principles enumerated in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX)—that the treaty should be void of any loop-holes—had been stated in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. The two major nuclear Powers and their allies would be principally responsible for evolving a satisfactory formula. The non-nuclear and non-aligned States should take that principle for granted and, as stated in the joint memorandum of 19 August 1966 of the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee,<sup>2/</sup> "draw attention to the usefulness of clearly defined terms in order to prevent any misunderstanding or contradictory interpretation now or in the future".

31. Two of the principles enunciated in resolution 2028 (XX) were non-controversial. The principle that the treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament had become axiomatic for nuclear and non-nuclear States. It was also agreed that there should be acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty; in their joint memorandum the eight non-aligned countries had stated that the treaty should be subject to periodic reviews.

<sup>2/</sup> *Ibid.*, sect. P.



32. He found it necessary to comment more fully on one of the five principles which was of particular concern to the non-nuclear States: the principle that the treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. That principle reflected the need to attain two separate objectives at the same time. In the first place, the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be halted immediately by a voluntary decision by the non-nuclear States to refrain from manufacturing or acquiring nuclear weapons, which would complement the undertaking by the nuclear States not to transfer such weapons in any way. In the second place, that decision should not result in the perpetuation of a situation in which certain States had a monopoly and were at a military advantage. In their memorandum the eight non-aligned countries had reaffirmed their conviction that a treaty should be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery. Those tangible steps did not have to be taken simultaneously with the conclusion of a treaty and they were not a prerequisite for its signature. When such a treaty was concluded, however, the nuclear Powers should make formal declarations of their intention to pursue negotiations with a view to taking such steps. It would be even better if the declarations could be incorporated in the treaty, as had been done in the case of the partial test ban treaty. The extension of that treaty to cover underground tests of nuclear weapons would be one of the greatest incentives to the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation. The ultimate objective should, as stated in General Assembly resolution 808 (IX), be the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type. But, unless steps were taken to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, there would be no hope of eliminating them and the threat they posed to human life.

33. States would have to abandon the traditional ideas of prestige and security and seek the common good of all mankind. The Mexican delegation agreed with the Indian representative's remarks (1443rd meeting) to the effect that the prestige attached to the possession of nuclear weapons should be progressively reduced and that nuclear weapons did not bring security. It believed that the prestige conferred by nuclear weapons was a macabre prestige. The General Assembly had declared, in resolution 1653 (XVI), that the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons was a war directed not against an enemy or enemies alone, but also against mankind in general and that any State using such weapons was to be considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization.

34. Security could hardly be strengthened by the proliferation of nuclear weapons. That would increase the risk of a universal conflagration and involve all the dangers of a nuclear arms race, in which the developing countries would be especially vulnerable. As the representative of Ceylon had stated (1445th meeting), renunciation of nuclear weapons actually

protected a country's security because its neighbours would not then be prompted to acquire such weapons.

35. The security of nations would ultimately have to be guaranteed within the framework of the United Nations. It would be necessary to complete and bring up to date the provisions of the Charter and to create the necessary organs. In the meantime, the non-nuclear States were entitled to demand from the nuclear Powers a formal undertaking that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them. That undertaking would represent simply the application to nuclear weapons of the obligation embodied in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter. The Mexican delegation therefore attached special importance to operative paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.371/Rev.1. It should be possible to include such an undertaking in the text of the treaty on non-proliferation; one of the two major nuclear Powers had already submitted a draft article on the subject to the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

36. Two basic points should be borne in mind when considering the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes: first, the nuclear device used in such explosions was, at least at the moment, made by the same production methods and was basically the same as a nuclear weapon, and, secondly, the non-nuclear States could not accept a permanent position of inferiority and be denied the benefits of the new techniques. Any solution should therefore satisfy the legitimate desires of the non-nuclear States and be an effective obstacle to proliferation. The best course in the immediate future might perhaps be to study the possibility of making an international agency, preferably IAEA, responsible for the preparation and conduct of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. IAEA could enlist the co-operation of one or other of the nuclear Powers in certain specific tasks performed under its authority and supervision and, if necessary, entrust the study of aspects most directly related to the actual nuclear device to a small group with the same membership as the Military Staff Committee.

37. During the twentieth session of the Assembly, the Mexican delegation had expressed the view, at the 1369th meeting of the First Committee, that nothing in the treaty to be concluded should in any way affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their territories. That view had been favourably received by the other non-aligned countries and had been included in resolution 2028 (XX) as the last of the five main principles. Mexico had submitted a draft article on the subject to the Eighteen-Nation Committee. It now reiterated the view, expressed by the eight non-aligned Powers in their joint memorandum of 19 August 1966, that there would be no difficulty in including a provision on that subject in the text of a treaty on non-proliferation. Canada, Italy, Poland and the Soviet Union had also expressed support for such a provision.

38. The Latin American and African States would be encouraged in their efforts to achieve the denuclearization of their continents by the terms of

operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.371/Rev.1.

39. The conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation was at present the best that could be hoped for on a world-wide basis. In the future, however, it would be denuclearization treaties such as the one planned for Latin America, designed to perpetuate a total absence of nuclear weapons, under effective international control, which would ensure a world free from nuclear weapons and from the danger of a universal nuclear holocaust.

40. Mr. MAVOUNGOU (Congo, Brazzaville) said that in the present international situation, when the United States was waging an aggressive war in Viet-Nam in flagrant violation of the accepted principles of international law, the United Nations should learn from the experience of the League of Nations, whose failure to reach agreement on partial or comprehensive disarmament measures had led to the outbreak of the Second World War, with all its disastrous consequences.

41. The question of disarmament should not be considered in isolation, but in the wider context of the maintenance of international peace and security. A treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would be an important first step in the direction of world disarmament and, in view of the urgent need for a treaty, the Committee had been right to give priority to agenda item 97, proposed by the USSR delegation. In the introduction to his annual report (A/6301/Add.1), the Secretary-General had given a striking illustration of the dangers inherent in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Every effort should be made to facilitate the early conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation, which would certainly help to reduce tension throughout the world.

42. He welcomed the assurance given by the representatives of the two major nuclear Powers that the remaining obstacles to agreement were not insurmountable and that progress was indeed being made. Like a number of other representatives, he believed that the treaty should prohibit vertical as well as horizontal proliferation and should not be designed merely to perpetuate the monopoly of the existing nuclear Powers. He agreed with the views expressed by the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee in their memorandum of 19 August 1966. The treaty should include a multilateral guarantee by the nuclear Powers not to use nuclear weapons against States which did not possess such weapons or had renounced the right to acquire them. The African States, whose decision to declare Africa

a denuclearized zone had been endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 2033 (XX), welcomed the assurance given in that connexion by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, in his message of 1 February 1966 to the Eighteen-Nation Committee,<sup>3/</sup> that the Soviet Government would respect the status of any denuclearized zones which might be established, provided that the other nuclear Powers were prepared to do the same.

43. Although the establishment of denuclearized zones in Africa, Asia and Latin America would considerably facilitate the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation, it would not help to solve the general problem of disarmament. The use of conventional weapons in the zones concerned should also be prohibited; conventional weapons were equally lethal in the hands of major Powers deploying their immense resources against small and peaceful countries. Consequently, serious attention should be given in the negotiations on nuclear disarmament and collateral measures to the dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other States. Military bases in the territories of other States were a constant source of international tension, as they were used for direct intervention in the domestic affairs of States and for the suppression of national liberation movements.

44. The problems of disarmament and denuclearization could not be solved without the participation of the People's Republic of China, which had recently given further evidence of its independent nuclear capability. The People's Republic of China should have its legitimate rights restored, since a treaty on non-proliferation would be doomed to failure without its participation. He hoped too that France would soon resume its place in the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

45. If disarmament could be achieved, the immense resources wasted on the armaments race could be used for nobler purposes, and particularly to help the under-developed two thirds of mankind to improve their lot.

46. As one of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.371/Rev., his delegation was prepared to consider favourably any amendments likely to clarify the issues raised.

*The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.*

<sup>3/</sup> Ibid., sect. F.