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**Chairman:** Mr. Leopoldo BENITES (Ecuador).

**AGENDA ITEM 26**

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued) (A/6390-DC/228, A/C.1/L.371 and Corr.1 and Add.1-6, A/C.1/L.372 and Add.1-3, A/C.1/L.373)

**GENERAL DEBATE (continued)**

1. U SOE TIN (Burma) noted from the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament that once again that Committee, of which his country was a member, had been unable to reach any agreement. Nevertheless, its discussions had clarified the issues and the respective positions. The eight non-aligned countries had offered various ideas to facilitate an agreement on the banning of underground tests and had made efforts to analyse the problems involved in a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

2. Although disarmament negotiations were complex and often slow and arduous, involving national interests which seldom coincided, at least the two major nuclear Powers, after having joined in sponsoring a draft resolution which the General Assembly had adopted on 4 November 1966 by an overwhelming majority (resolution 2149 (XXI)), had initiated a new series of talks to work out a mutually satisfactory agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons that would be acceptable to the international community. He hoped that in those talks, and in others conducted in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and elsewhere between the two major nuclear Powers themselves and between them and the non-nuclear States, the principles laid down in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) would be strictly adhered to.

3. The idea of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons had first received attention during the thirteenth session of the General Assembly in 1958, when a paragraph of the Irish draft resolution<sup>1/</sup> which would have placed the Assembly on record as recognizing "that

the danger now exists that an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons may occur, aggravating international tension and the difficulty of maintaining world peace and thus rendering more difficult the attainment of ...[a] general disarmament agreement", had received 37 votes in favour to none against, with 44 abstentions, before the draft resolution was withdrawn. The matter had come before the First Committee during the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth sessions, each time at the request of the Irish delegation, and several resolutions, all of which Burma had supported, had been adopted without any opposition.

4. The danger of proliferation had since reached such a point that the Secretary-General, in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization (A/6301/Add.1) to the current session of the General Assembly, had felt obliged to express concern. It was with a sense of apprehension of the dangers involved and in the confidence that an atmosphere conducive to the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation had been created, now that the major nuclear Powers had at last had the courage of their convictions, that Burma, along with other like-minded non-aligned countries, had submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.371 and Corr.1 and Add.1-6) which it hoped all Members would help to have adopted. Non-proliferation was a matter directly related to the cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, and the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed at Moscow in 1963, had been an important step towards a total test ban and the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. However, despite the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the efforts of the Eighteen-Nation Committee towards a comprehensive test ban treaty, nuclear test explosions continued unabated; tests had been carried out in the atmosphere and above ground by the nuclear States which were not signatories of the treaty, and underground tests by the two major members of the nuclear club. Agreement on a treaty banning underground tests was blocked by the dispute between the two major nuclear Powers concerning the means of verifying the observance of the treaty.

5. The Secretary-General, in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization, and the eight non-aligned Powers, in their joint memorandum of 17 August 1966 on a comprehensive test ban treaty,<sup>2/</sup> had expressed the greatest concern about the dangers of continued nuclear weapon tests and had tried to offer ideas and suggestions to facilitate an agreement on the banning of underground tests. The

<sup>1/</sup> See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirteenth Session, Annexes, agenda items 64, 70 and 72, document A/C.1/L.206.

<sup>2/</sup> See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1966, document DC/228, annex I, sect. O.

technical aspects of the question had been thoroughly explored, and it now remained for the nuclear super-Powers to display the necessary political courage in adjusting their positions, so that a treaty could be concluded and arrangements made for an effective ban on all nuclear weapon tests in all environments.

6. The ultimate goal of the current negotiations was general and complete disarmament, which meant the elimination of all weapons of a military nature, nuclear or conventional, with the exception of arms utilized by police forces for a country's internal security. The regrettable disappearance of the trust and understanding that had existed at the time of the founding of the United Nations and the deplorable waste that resulted from massive preparations for a possible future war had placed mankind under a threat and had created international tension. As long as those conditions prevailed, general and complete disarmament would be a far-away dream. Efforts should however continue towards seeking gradual and phased agreements with a view to reaching the ultimate objective. The only practical formula for effecting general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, was for all the major armed Powers, assisted by the non-armed nations, to seek phased, limited agreements and to proceed by an aggregation of limited gains to totality of achievement. His delegation would therefore welcome declarations by all the major Powers of their wish to arrive at phased, limited agreements on general and complete disarmament and on collateral measures, and he hoped that such statements would be followed by concrete deeds.

7. Discussions on disarmament should include all the major Powers, and the full and active participation of France and the People's Republic of China was essential. That would also apply to the world disarmament conference envisaged in General Assembly resolution 2030 (XX). In view of the existing international situation, the People's Republic of China would probably not participate in a world disarmament conference, at least until such time as the principle of sovereignty, respect for sovereignty and sovereign equality of States was fully recognized.

8. The prospect of the world disarmament conference and the vision of general and complete disarmament should not therefore delay the present efforts in search of phased, limited agreements on nuclear disarmament as well as on collateral measures of general and complete disarmament, both in the United Nations and in the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

9. Mr. ROUAMBA (Upper Volta) said that Upper Volta was neither a military nor a nuclear Power and did not intend to become one, since it wished to devote all its resources to its economic and social development, in peace and security. Unfortunately, intensification of the armaments race was affecting the international political climate, and Upper Volta, as a defensive reaction, had joined those who were calling for an immediate and unconditional end to the march towards collective nuclear suicide. Likewise, it unequivocally advocated general and complete disarmament in order to protect Africa from the atomic peril. Even if the proliferation and refinement of devices for mass destruction did not end in catastrophe, they inevitably

led to the establishment of a balance of terror and involved enormous expenditures, to the detriment of assistance to millions of hungry people.

10. Six of the twelve items on the agenda of the First Committee related to problems of disarmament and arms control, and negotiations had been going on for some time on a number of partial disarmament measures. However, certain major Powers held the key to the problem. What should now be done was to give the many resolutions already adopted the force of treaties and to proceed to general and complete disarmament under international control, beginning with the following measures: first, a halt to the proliferation of nuclear weapons through the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting all tests, and conversion of atomic energy produced for military purposes into atomic energy for peaceful purposes; secondly, the creation of denuclearized zones; and, thirdly, the conclusion of an international agreement regulating all activities in outer space forthwith.

11. In order to assist in checking the proliferation of nuclear weapons, Upper Volta had become a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.372 and Add.1-3 and supported the Cameroonian amendments (A/C.1/L.373). In less than a quarter of a century the escalation of the armaments race had reached the dangerous stage of dissemination of nuclear weapons. The urge for power was now the decisive criterion, since even relatively small countries could manufacture advanced nuclear weapons if they wished, and it was greatly to their credit that they had resisted the temptation. The entry of the People's Republic of China into the "nuclear club" could not but cause concern. Uncertainty about that country's intentions, and the fact that another nuclear Power was not at present taking part in the negotiations, might make it difficult to carry out resolutions enthusiastically adopted. An agreement on the cessation of underground tests would restrain the nuclear Powers considerably by leading them to suspend or slow down the development of new weapons of mass destruction.

12. It was also essential to provide for a reduction in the number of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, as well as supervised cessation of production of fissile materials for military purposes and their conversion to peaceful purposes. As the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee had rightly said in their memorandum of 19 August 1966,<sup>3/</sup> a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was not an end in itself, but only a means of achieving general and complete disarmament, and especially nuclear disarmament. If there was a real desire to eliminate the danger of a holocaust and end the balance of terror, action to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons must be accompanied by specific measures to halt the arms race and reduce existing stocks of weapons and delivery vehicles.

13. It must be recognized that it was the increase in the destructive capacity of the founding members of the "nuclear club" which had prompted other Powers to obtain and perfect similar weapons. That was a vicious circle, for the increase in the number of nuclear Powers would not hasten the conclusion of

<sup>3/</sup> *Ibid.*, sect. P.

effective agreements, but would make the use of nuclear weapons in case of war seem normal and even justifiable. There was no guarantee that nuclear weapons would not be used against the non-nuclear States or that the latter would not be the victims of nuclear blackmail. The surest way of eliminating the threat of a thermonuclear war was therefore to ban nuclear weapons completely, destroy all stocks of weapons and convert military atomic energy into peaceful atomic energy, in short, to bring about general and complete disarmament. To that end, it was necessary to take the idea of a treaty on non-proliferation out of political ideologies and consider it only in relation to mankind's higher interests. Compromises and concessions would be essential and the non-nuclear countries should be given real guarantees of peace and security.

14. It was for that reason that the most cherished wish of Africans was to denuclearize Africa, as called for in General Assembly resolution 1652 (XVI) and 2033 (XX). Pending the ratification of a legal instrument to that end and the conclusion of a multilateral agreement on the creation of denuclearized zones, the following principles should be carefully considered: first, all countries belonging to the denuclearized zone or having international responsibility for certain parts of it should accede to the agreement; secondly, the treaty should contain clauses making it possible to verify whether the obligations assumed had in fact been fulfilled; and thirdly the nuclear Powers themselves should respect the steps taken to protect the zone from nuclear danger. The declaration on the denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first session, held at Cairo in July 1964, had shown concern for those general principles. The guarantee and inspection system adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at its ninth session, held at Tokyo in September-October 1965, could help the parties concerned to overcome many difficulties.

15. The Soviet Union and the United States had made rapid progress in the exploration of outer space, but the international atmosphere made it more than ever necessary to conclude a treaty or agreement by which the two great Powers would confirm their intention to use outer space for peaceful purposes only. The two Powers concerned had already submitted draft treaties<sup>4/</sup> to the United Nations and it was to be hoped that they would soon succeed in concluding a binding instrument, based on General Assembly resolution 1962 (XVIII).

16. Mr. IDZUMBUIR (Democratic Republic of the Congo) said that his country could not but be interested in disarmament, for it had constantly been the object of acts of aggression hatched abroad and had been obliged to sacrifice substantial resources, which could have been used to combat poverty, in order to counter the aggression.

17. World peace was threatened by two interrelated factors: large stocks of destructive weapons and hotbeds of international tension. In the circumstances, it was hardly realistic to try to prevent non-nuclear

States which believed their security was threatened from seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. Could such States be expected to be satisfied with the nuclear Powers' assurances that nuclear weapons would not be used against them? Non-proliferation had real meaning only in so far as it constituted a *sine qua non* for general and complete disarmament. There was a close correlation between general and complete disarmament, non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and, finally, cessation of nuclear tests. Unfortunately, the correlation was not clear to all delegations. When there was talk of an agreement on non-dissemination, the idea seemed to be to prevent additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons, but it was also essential to know what would follow that agreement. Some members of the "nuclear club" felt that they had been compelled to produce their own nuclear weapons. A similar argument could be adduced, *mutatis mutandis*, by all States Members of the United Nations: that was a vicious circle which could only be broken by measures leading to the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. In other words, non-proliferation had meaning only in so far as the nuclear Powers made a real effort to renounce possession of nuclear weapons forever and to eliminate, in collaboration with all States, the hotbeds of tension which could lead to the use of those weapons.

18. The two conditions should be fulfilled simultaneously: only when the nuclear Powers took steps towards the reduction of international tension, on the one hand, and effective and continuous disarmament, on the other, would non-proliferation appear to be a reflection of a desire for peace, and not a selfish measure born of a desire for power. Disarmament controls were, of course, necessary. The world being what it was and security depending on very strict imperatives, control by an impartial body was a necessary corollary of the disarmament process.

19. He therefore hoped that the military Powers, which had said they sincerely wished to prevent proliferation, would comply with all the requirements of the disarmament process. His delegation remained ready to make its modest contribution.

20. Mr. KANE (Senegal) stressed the developing countries' concern at the growing nuclear threat and their disappointment that, after the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons had not been concluded. Neither the increased international tension resulting from the war in Viet-Nam nor the difficulty of solving the nuclear weapons problem within the framework of military alliances were adequate excuses; the survival of mankind was at stake and could be ensured only by general and complete disarmament, as the Irish representative had very rightly pointed out at the 1441st meeting. The balance of terror engendered by the possession of nuclear weapons was precarious and dangerous, and means must be found to give the world a peaceful and lasting balance. One method would be to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons forthwith.

21. Non-proliferation was a question of vital importance to all the nations of the world, both great and small, and the question could not be settled by a treaty signed solely by the nuclear Powers or a treaty

<sup>4/</sup> See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, agenda item 30, document A/6431, annex III, appendix I.

binding only those nations which did not yet possess weapons of mass destruction. Non-proliferation was not only a question of the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons: proliferation occurred also when the nuclear Powers inordinately increased their arsenals. Many countries were capable of producing an atomic bomb if they wished, and it was to be feared that their Governments would finally cede to the pressure of public opinion, for countries often sought to acquire nuclear weapons for security reasons, particularly those in politically unstable regions. The recent explosion of a bomb by the People's Republic of China did not favour non-proliferation. The number of States technically and economically capable of producing nuclear weapons was continually increasing, and, according to Lord Chalfont, head of the United Kingdom delegation to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, such weapons would be available to all countries by 1980. Speedy action was therefore necessary.

22. A treaty on non-proliferation was doubtless not an end in itself, but it was a means to an end: general and complete disarmament. All the statements of intention by the representatives of the nuclear Powers in the General Assembly or the First Committee and by the Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries at Cairo in October 1964 showed that agreement was close. It would therefore suffice to specify the content of the treaty to be concluded, a task which would be made easier by the fact that the problem of verification did not arise in the case of non-proliferation. In that respect, it was encouraging that both the United States and the Soviet Union had been sponsors of the draft resolution adopted on agenda item 97 (General Assembly resolution 2149 (XXI)).

23. The possession of nuclear weapons was no longer a guarantee of power, security and prestige. The only genuine and lasting security would be that established and maintained under United Nations auspices through a multilateral treaty, a real universal alliance to ensure the survival of mankind. It was in that spirit that his delegation had become a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.371 and Corr.1 and Add.1-6. The non-aligned States which did not belong to any military alliance were entirely justified in seeking assurance that their security and integrity would not suffer as a result of signing a treaty prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons; that had been recognized in the messages sent to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament by the President of the United States of America on 27 January 1966<sup>5/</sup> and by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on 1 February 1966.<sup>6/</sup> A treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should not, however, close the door to research and the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

24. Lastly, his delegation favoured the idea of establishing a new body, as the Secretary-General had recommended in the introduction to his annual report (A/6301/Add.1).

25. Mr. BIYOGHO (Gabon) said that his country could not but associate itself with those who were calling for general and complete disarmament, which the universal fear of total annihilation rendered so extremely urgent. Gabon was favourably disposed to all proposals which might lead to disarmament, and it was in that spirit that it had become one of the first signatories of the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and had sponsored a draft resolution proclaiming Africa a denuclearized zone. Gabon's feelings of horror for war were not limited to atomic weapons, but extended to conventional weapons of mass destruction also. Gabon was deeply convinced that there was no dispute which could not be settled through negotiation. The proliferation of weapons, of whatever kind, placed negotiation beyond all reach and brought countries closer to what might be termed a law of the jungle.

26. It was essential that the appeal to all States to renounce any action that might hamper the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (resolution 2149 (XXI)) should be heeded by all and that it should be made sincerely, without any propaganda aims. Yet it was hard to imagine that the appeal would be universally heeded until certain nuclear Powers stopped manufacturing atomic weapons and destroyed the existing stocks, since other countries which also considered themselves to be nuclear Powers would be tempted to close the gap they saw between themselves and their more advanced partners. In that connexion, his delegation was glad that the appeal came from the major nuclear Powers. It was to be hoped that the negotiations would lead to a positive solution in conformity with General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), and that the mistrust among the nuclear Powers would be dispelled.

27. It was surely abnormal that so much energy and so many resources should be wasted on producing weapons designed to exterminate the human race when there were nobler tasks to be accomplished. There were monsters the destruction of which required no weapons: disease, ignorance, hunger—in a word, underdevelopment. It was universally known that the under-development of two thirds of the world was primarily the result of the economic exploitation of under-developed countries by developed countries which were spending large sums on arms production. Those outlays were made possible by savings on raw materials which were not bought at fair prices. His delegation believed that the resources swallowed up by armaments should be used to ensure the well-being of the world population as a whole. The extensive possibilities opened up by science and technology, particularly in the field of atomic energy, would enable man to free himself from all the evils currently besetting him and, in particular, would permit the under-developed world to emerge from its under-development.

28. His delegation supported draft resolution A/C.1/L.371 and Corr.1 and Add.1-6 and had decided to join the sponsors of that draft. It also supported the amendments to the draft resolution submitted by Cameroon (A/C.1/L.373).

<sup>5/</sup> See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1966*, document DC/228, annex I, sect. D.

<sup>6/</sup> *Ibid.*, sect. F.



29. Mr. RAMAROMISA (Madagascar) said that his country wished to add its voice to those expressing their distress to the Powers which bore major responsibility in the matter of disarmament. Their concern was entirely legitimate in view of the advanced development of nuclear weapons and the arms race which threatened mankind with a holocaust. With the advent of the atomic age the international community had become aware of the nuclear danger. It had accordingly made creditable efforts, which must be redoubled if political, strategic and ideological difficulties were to be overcome. The partial test ban treaty had been an important step, even though there were still nuclear explosions in the atmosphere which not only increased the harmful effects of radiation but also enhanced the destructive power of the country making the tests. General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) and the deliberations of the Eighteen-Nation Committee should be seen as a source of hope, because, given greater will and sincerity, they could widen the road leading to general disarmament.

30. The status of a nuclear Power, which originally had depended on scientific and technical factors, was now attainable at will. His delegation fervently hoped that the efforts to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons would lead to a treaty having that effect. It believed, however, that non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should not be regarded as an end in itself; the ultimate objective was general and complete disarmament, since a ban on the transfer of nuclear weapons would hardly lessen the danger which hovered over the future of mankind.

31. With reference to draft resolution A/C.1/L.371 and Corr.1 and Add.1-6, his delegation endorsed the amendments submitted by Cameroon. The combining of paragraphs 2 and 4 did not change the meaning of the text in any way, and the new wording of paragraph 3 had the advantage of encompassing all States.

32. Mr. BURNS (Canada) said that in his statement in the debate on agenda item 97 (1433rd meeting) he had given his delegation's general views on non-proliferation. He now wished to comment on the draft resolutions before the Committee.

33. His delegation was generally in accord with the substance of draft resolution A/C.1/L.371 and Corr.1 and Add.1-6. However, it had some reservations with regard to operative paragraph 3 of that text. Pending the presentation of any new formulation, he wished to state his delegation's views on that paragraph. The terms of paragraph 3 came under the general heading of security guarantees for nations which did not possess nuclear weapons and which agreed to sign a treaty on non-proliferation imposing on them an obligation not to manufacture or to acquire nuclear weapons. The question of such guarantees was extremely complex. It involved important commitments from the nuclear Powers and affected the security of a large number of States which did not possess nuclear weapons but were members of an alliance that included nuclear Powers. It also concerned, in different ways, non-aligned States which did not possess nuclear weapons, and the sort of guarantee or assurance suggested in paragraph 3 of the draft resolution would not meet the needs of all non-aligned States not possessing nuclear weapons.

Canada favoured an effective system which would guarantee the security of non-aligned signatories of a treaty on non-proliferation, especially against the threat or the actuality of nuclear attacks. It was obvious, however, that such guarantees or assurances would depend on decisions of the major nuclear Powers. Unfortunately, the latter were not yet agreed on the precise assurance and the extent of the assurance which they could offer.

34. In the view of his delegation, the formulation of operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution was unsatisfactory for several reasons. Firstly, it did not provide any security for a non-aligned State not possessing nuclear weapons if it was threatened by a nuclear Power which was not a party to the treaty. Secondly, the paragraph would also apply to States not possessing nuclear weapons which already had guarantees as to their security because they were members of an alliance in which there was a nuclear member. Thirdly, it would reduce or nullify the effect of the balance of deterrence, whereby opposed alliances which included nuclear Powers would not engage in war against each other for fear of setting off a general nuclear conflagration. Fourthly, there was no indication that the non-possession of nuclear weapons would be tested and proved by any kind of inspection procedures. Verification by inspection, of course, would be necessary if the condition of not using nuclear weapons against a State not possessing such weapons and member of an alliance was to be accepted. It was clear that the question of inspections of that kind would in fact make the conclusion of a simple treaty on non-proliferation quite impracticable. Perhaps the drafters of paragraph 3 had intended to call on the nuclear weapon Powers to give the assurance in question in some other way than by including it in a treaty on non-proliferation. However, even if that were so, some of the foregoing objections would remain. Finally, paragraph 3 failed to take into account other suggestions which had been advanced for giving assurance to non-aligned States not possessing nuclear weapons. Thus, while his delegation supported draft resolution A/C.1/L.371 and Corr.1 and Add.1-6 in general, it could not agree to operative paragraph 3 in its present form.

35. With regard to the amendments to that draft resolution submitted by Cameroon (A/C.1/L.373), his delegation would have no objection if the sponsors of the draft resolution were willing to accept the first Cameroonian amendment. In the opinion of his delegation, however, the second amendment in document A/C.1/L.373 would change the character of the entire resolution. It would make it a resolution to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, instead of one for the guidance of the States and committees taking part in negotiations on a treaty on non-proliferation. It therefore dealt with a question which should be discussed under item 29 of the agenda of the General Assembly, if it was to be discussed at all. As his delegation had stated many times, declarations aimed at prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons would have little legal binding force and would be completely unrealistic if the nuclear Powers continued to maintain their stocks of nuclear weapons. In the absence of any effective international system of collective security, vague or pious declarations

would certainly be of no value. What he had said did not apply to specific assurances which might be given to non-aligned, non-nuclear States by the nuclear Powers in very specific terms. If the Cameroonian amendment was put to a vote, Canada would be obliged to vote against it because, if accepted, it would have the effect of turning a resolution on non-proliferation into a subject of dissension, thus diminishing the hope of achieving unanimity on the subject.

36. With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/L.372 and Add.1-3, introduced by Pakistan, Canada appreciated the desire of other non-nuclear countries to follow the development of a treaty on non-proliferation and to have an opportunity to make their views known on the subject. It was well known, however, that the major nuclear Powers were engaged in delicate negotiations concerning such a treaty. A conference of non-nuclear States organized to discuss the issues on which the nuclear Powers would be negotiating could well accentuate existing difficulties and create new ones without providing any positive benefits for its participants. Even if the conference were not to have undesirable effects on negotiations between the nuclear Powers, it was questionable whether the outcome would justify the effort and expense involved. In virtually all cases, the issues which concerned non-nuclear States could be satisfactorily resolved only if there was a meeting of minds between the nuclear and the non-nuclear Powers. That was particularly true with regard to security guarantees and arrangements for ensuring that all nations benefited from the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions.

37. There were a number of ways in which the non-nuclear States not represented in the Eighteen-Nation Committee could appropriately follow the negotiations on the proposed treaty and express their views; they included the debates in the First Committee and private bilateral discussions. Consultations would continue at Geneva during the months ahead, and a wider forum could be arranged through an appropriate organ of the United Nations. For all those reasons, his delegation would not be able to vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.372 and Add.1-3. Perhaps the Pakistan delegation and the other sponsors of the draft resolution might consider not pressing their text to a vote, leaving the question open until it was possible to determine the results of the negotiations in progress.

38. With regard to peaceful nuclear explosions, the United States had suggested that, in exchange for giving up the right to conduct their own peaceful nuclear explosions, the non-nuclear States might be provided with a nuclear explosion service by the existing nuclear Powers. It was a fact that any country with the capacity to conduct nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes would also be able to effect explosions for warlike purposes and that was contrary to the concept of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. No country relished the prospect of a permanent monopoly of the technology of nuclear explosions by a small number of countries, but it must be recognized that that was a price which one must be prepared to pay for the general welfare of mankind. In accepting that situation, however, the non-nuclear Powers did not need to deny themselves the benefits which might

accrue from nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes or to depend on the goodwill and co-operation of the nuclear Powers. His delegation was convinced that international arrangements could be devised through an international body, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, which would be responsible for examining the feasibility of proposed projects, establishing the price to be charged for the nuclear explosion service and acting as an intermediary between the recipient country and the nuclear Power concerned. In that way, no country would have to be beholden to another country bilaterally; it would also be possible to make sure that the explosion had been exclusively for peaceful purposes, and the only monopoly which the nuclear States retained would be that of the technology involved in exploding a device, which was also the technology of the nuclear weapon. Such a system would ensure that all countries had equal and unrestricted access to the benefits of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

39. Mr. PEREZ GUERRERO (Venezuela) said that his delegation had joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.371 and Corr.1 and Add.1-6, now before the Committee, as a protest against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It had acted in the same spirit when, during the preceding week, it had joined nearly all the other delegations in voting for the draft resolution on agenda item 97, which constituted a major step towards the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation.

40. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.371 and Corr.1 and Add.1-6 reflected the fears of mankind in the face of the threat of a world-wide conflagration. Its adoption would have the effect, if not of ending the agony, at least of affirming the unwavering determination of the United Nations to give urgent consideration to one important aspect of the disarmament problem. Its aim was to halt what had come to be called the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, although it should also apply to vertical proliferation—in other words, to the still more dangerous arms race in which the five nuclear Powers, and particularly the nuclear super-Powers, were engaged. Yet it would be unjust to think that the nuclear Powers which supported the draft resolution were pursuing the selfish aim of maintaining the membership of the "nuclear club" at its existing figure. It was clear from the statements which had been made that non-proliferation would not be fully effective until existing stocks of nuclear weapons were frozen and then destroyed.

41. However, although it was necessary to resolve both aspects of the problem, it would be a mistake to attempt to do everything at once. What was important was to display the intention to denuclearize, and then to act without delay. That was what mankind expected. Non-proliferation or non-nuclearization at the world level or at the regional level—as in Latin America—were both of particular importance. If they were to be achieved, a programme or time-table would have to be established, taking into account an order of priority based on the imperatives of the times.

42. Thus, for example, certain measures which were proposed as a matter of urgency would remain inoperative unless it became possible speedily to adopt a whole series of others, of wider scope, which now had to be postponed because the factors essential

to their success could not be brought together. The progressive adoption of important measures would promote the establishment of conditions which would make it possible to move forward.

43. Operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution simply contained an appeal to the nuclear Powers, and not a declaration of intention on their part. In any event, there could be no valid assurance in the existing nuclear situation. The world could not be divided into nuclear and non-nuclear Powers in the current political circumstances; it would be more correct to speak of groups of countries in which one or more States possessed nuclear weapons. In that connexion, he recalled that another nuclear Power was emerging and that its indirect presence had been asserted not only through the recent explosion of a nuclear device but also through the single negative vote which had been cast on the draft resolution adopted the preceding week.

44. Apart from that disturbing unknown quantity, which must, of course, be recognized, the fact that the nuclear Powers, realizing their responsibilities, were displaying greater mutual understanding and that the small and medium-sized non-nuclear countries were now tending to encourage them to do so was reassuring. The tragic threat overhanging the world had led peoples to realize that their ideological differences could only be settled in the political arenas.

45. Mankind would derive great economic and social benefits from denuclearization and disarmament, or even non-nuclearization. The financial and human resources which would thus be released could be used for the advancement of the developing countries.

46. The atom, used for peaceful purposes, would then play an increasingly important part. Although Venezuela's economy was still essentially dependent upon petroleum, Venezuela hoped that atomic energy could be utilized for the welfare of all humanity, for the atom alone could provide the necessary energy for which there would be a constantly growing demand.

47. Fear of the destructive force of the atom must not lead to a refusal to use it for peaceful purposes. Venezuela ardently hoped that a satisfactory arrangement would be arrived at for the inspection and control of nuclear disarmament. Although the task was an arduous one, he hoped that the Eighteen-Nation Committee would be able to report encouraging progress at the next session of the General Assembly.

48. He was sure that all Members fully appreciated the urgency of the undertaking, which was accentuated by the war in Viet-Nam where, it was feared, the final stage of escalation might be reached, leading to an atomic conflagration. At least, the countries concerned were anxious to find an appropriate solution.

*The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.*