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CONTENTS

	Page
<i>Agenda item 26:</i>	
<i>Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued)</i>	
<i>General debate (continued) . . . . .</i>	95

*Chairman:* Mr. Leopoldo BENÍTES (Ecuador).

AGENDA ITEM 26

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued) (A/6390-DC/228, A/C.1/L.371 and Corr.1 and Add.1-5, A/C.1/L.372 and Add.1-3, A/C.1/L.373)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. ALHOLM (Finland) said that, in spite of the apparent lack of progress in solving the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the efforts of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament during the past year had not been useless. The Eighteen-Nation Committee had, in fact, become an important instrument of negotiation and co-operation between the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers and a clearing-house for the exchange of ideas and information on international security problems in general, as well as on questions of disarmament and arms control.

2. Indeed, the lack of progress might prove to be more apparent than real. A study of the negotiations on non-proliferation, not in the abstract but in the context of present-day political realities, would show that there had been a significant change of emphasis. At the twentieth session of the General Assembly, the First Committee's attention had been focussed on the first of the five main principles enunciated in General Assembly 2028 (XX), namely, that a treaty on non-proliferation must be void of any loop-holes. The problem then—and it was primarily a European problem—had been to determine how various collective nuclear defence arrangements within military alliances could be reconciled with the principle. At the present session the problem seemed, fortunately, to have receded into the background. Instead, the Committee's attention had been directed mainly to the second and third principles mentioned in resolution 2028 (XX).

3. The problems involved in the application of those principles were not exclusively European. The case for linking a treaty on non-proliferation with tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and reduce existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles

had been impressively argued in the Indian representative's statement at the Committee's 1436th meeting, only four days after news had been received of a further nuclear test in the People's Republic of China; and the questions raised in that statement could not be ignored. In the first place, if formal restrictions were not immediately placed on the continued production and development of nuclear weapons by the five existing nuclear Powers, non-nuclear States which were asked to renounce any intention of acquiring nuclear weapons would understandably feel concerned about their national security. The reasons for the concern were more psychological than real, as non-nuclear States which forswore the acquisition of nuclear weapons would not, in fact, be weakening their security at all. Most nations were already agreed that, in present circumstances, the most powerful weapons in existence were not the best means of safeguarding their national security. None the less, the feeling of insecurity created in some non-nuclear countries by the prospect of a treaty on non-proliferation was real enough, as were the political problems arising from it.

4. Those problems could not be solved by making the treaty conditional on other related measures. The treaty should not, of course, be regarded as an end in itself but only as the first step in a continuing process of arms control and disarmament measures. Unless that first step were taken, however, the vicious circle around which disarmament negotiations had so long revolved could never be broken. Agreement on specific disarmament measures would undoubtedly be an effective way of reducing international tension; the fact remained that, in the atmosphere of distrust which had existed between the great Powers, no reduction in armaments had been achieved. A treaty on non-proliferation would in itself greatly help to improve the international atmosphere. It would confirm the declared intentions of the major Powers concerned to solve all disputes by peaceful means through negotiation; and by reducing tension and strengthening mutual confidence it could pave the way for realistic efforts to halt the nuclear arms race, to reduce and eliminate stocks of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, to prohibit underground nuclear testing and to establish nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. But it should above all be concluded as soon as possible, and it was that consideration which had led his delegation to join in sponsoring the draft resolution that had been adopted on agenda item 97 (resolution 2149 (XX)). The discussions in the Committee had raised hopes everywhere. Those hopes must not be disappointed.

5. Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) recalled that in a statement on agenda item 97, at the 1435th meeting, his delegation had already expressed its views on the

question of non-proliferation in general and on the urgent need for the conclusion of a treaty on the question. At the moment, therefore, he wished merely to discuss the proposals in draft resolution A/C.1/L.371 and Corr.1 and Add.1-5, and to refer to the question of controls and guarantees.

6. His delegation agreed with the suggestion in that draft resolution that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should be requested to resume its work on a treaty on non-proliferation as soon as possible. Further, to simplify the Eighteen-Nation Committee's task, the discussion in the First Committee should be as extensive as possible, to ensure that the positions of delegations on all points were absolutely clear.

7. Italy had always regarded controls as an essential element in any disarmament agreement, even in limited agreements such as a treaty on non-proliferation, which would call for particularly effective controls. The controls applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency were certainly effective enough, and equivalent international controls—such as those applied by Euratom—ought to be equally effective. Arrangements should be made to ensure that the controls provided adequate and equal guarantees for all States, without any troublesome duplication. Secondly, although the control system would obviously be applied in different ways, it should not be formally discriminatory and should be applied to non-nuclear as well as militarily nuclear States. In the militarily nuclear countries controls would, to all intents and purposes, be applied only to peaceful nuclear activities, that is, to one specific sector; but a treaty on non-proliferation should nevertheless establish a balance between the obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear States in the matter of control. Inspection of non-military nuclear installations in militarily nuclear countries might also facilitate the application of a general cut-off at a later stage.

8. Accordingly, his delegation advocated the adoption of the control provisions in article III of the United States draft treaty,<sup>1/</sup> which would be binding on all parties without distinction. Though there were no corresponding provisions in the Soviet draft treaty,<sup>2/</sup> it now seemed that the Soviet Union was not opposed to the inclusion of appropriate control provisions in a treaty on non-proliferation. He hoped that the Soviet delegation would clarify its position on the matter, and that the controls it envisaged would also be effective and non-discriminatory.

9. Countries which renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons were undoubtedly entitled to have their security guaranteed, if they desired such a guarantee and if they were not already protected by a nuclear guarantee as members of an alliance. That was a delicate question for the non-aligned countries, which would not wish a security guarantee to impair their status of non-alignment. Proposals for guaranteeing the security of non-nuclear States after the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation had already

been made both by the President of the United States, in his message of 27 January 1966 to the Eighteen-Nation Committee,<sup>3/</sup> the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, in his message of 1 February 1966.<sup>4/</sup> The Eighteen-Nation Committee had welcomed that Soviet proposal but had noted that the clause suggested for inclusion in the treaty would merely prohibit the nuclear Powers from using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States which had no nuclear weapons in their territory. In fact, while the USSR was proposing that the nuclear Powers should merely give a non facere undertaking, the United States had offered a positive assurance of strong support to the non-nuclear States against threats of nuclear blackmail. Apart from that, the Soviet proposal seemed to be related to a problem other than that with which the non-nuclear States were concerned, and would be difficult to put into practice. It would call for an extensive series of inspections to determine in advance which countries had nuclear weapons in their territories and which had not. As the controls would apply not to disarmament measures but to the deployment of weapons and to military situations, they would be of the very kind which the Soviet Union itself had always condemned as contrary to the objectives of disarmament. Furthermore, detailed drafting of the Soviet proposal would certainly involve serious delay in the conclusion of a treaty on non-dissemination, and that would be contrary to the Soviet Union's expressed wish that the treaty should be simple and should not include provisions involving long and complicated negotiations.

10. What was required was not a lengthy procedure to discover which countries members of alliances had nuclear weapons in their territories, but an immediate guarantee for the non-aligned countries effective from the very moment when they renounced the right to acquire nuclear weapons. The problem of guarantees could, he was sure, be solved by adopting a flexible formula which would satisfy the requirements of the non-aligned and non-nuclear countries. The Eighteen-Nation Committee should be requested to renew its efforts to devise such a formula. To that end, it should be asked to study all the proposals that had been submitted, all the views expressed in the First Committee's discussions and any other proposals which might be forthcoming from nuclear or non-nuclear countries. Close collaboration between the two groups of countries was a major requirement for solving the problem of guarantees and, indeed, any other problem of nuclear disarmament. When the fate of the world was at stake, it was dangerous for the nuclear Powers and unrealistic for the non-nuclear Powers to conduct negotiations on their own. The progress already made towards the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation had been due to the combined efforts of all countries, and the Committee could pave the way for further progress by unanimously adopting draft resolution A/C.1/L.371 and Corr.1 and Add.1-5, with an additional paragraph requesting the Eighteen-Nation Committee to study the problem raised in operative paragraph 3.

<sup>1/</sup> See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/227, annex 1, sect. A; and *ibid.*, Supplement for 1966, document DC/228, annex 1, sect. K.

<sup>2/</sup> See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 106, document A/5976.

<sup>3/</sup> See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1966, document DC/228, annex 1, sect. D.

<sup>4/</sup> *Ibid.*, sect. F.

11. Mr. TRIVEDI (India) was encouraged by the fact that the vast majority of delegations had reaffirmed their support for the principles laid down in paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), and especially principle (c), which was based on views expressed in the joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee dated 15 September 1965.<sup>5/</sup> At the present stage of the discussion on a treaty on non-proliferation, it was essential to adhere to the basic approach defined in resolution 2028 (XX) and to reject any proposal which was not consistent with it, in particular the proposal that the treaty should consist merely of provisions preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and the emergence of additional nuclear Powers.

12. In his statement at the 1436th meeting, he had said that, if the Committee wished to deal comprehensively with the problem of proliferation, it should consider the causes of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the past. Countries which had already acquired nuclear weapons had done so partly for reasons of political prestige and partly for reasons of national security. Both reasons must be proved invalid.

13. The United Nations should make a determined effort to ensure that there were no differences of prestige between nuclear and non-nuclear Powers and that no special prerogatives were exercised by the nuclear Powers. Participation in conferences or other meetings on disarmament should not be restricted either to nuclear or to non-nuclear Powers. Disarmament problems, and particularly the problem of proliferation, were of common interest to all countries, large and small, nuclear and non-nuclear. For that reason, the Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries had at their Belgrade Conference in 1961 and their Cairo Conference in 1964 proposed the convening of a world disarmament conference; and the United Nations itself had endorsed their proposal. The prestige attached to the possession of nuclear weapons should be progressively reduced. Where disarmament was concerned, it was nobler as well as safer to lose prestige than to acquire it. But the problem could not be solved effectively until the existing nuclear Powers began to reduce their stockpiles of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. As the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee had suggested in their memorandum of 19 August 1966,<sup>6/</sup> tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race should be embodied in a treaty on non-proliferation as part of its provisions or as a declaration of intention.

14. A similar answer could be made to the argument that the acquisition of nuclear weapons was an effective means of national defence. India shared the view of the other non-aligned countries, expressed in the Declaration adopted at the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo in October 1964, that the existence of military blocs, great-Power alliances and pacts arising therefrom had accentuated the cold war and heightened

international tensions. True national security could be achieved only through international security and hence through meaningful steps towards general and complete disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, as was emphasized in the principle enunciated in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), paragraph 2 (c).

15. The non-nuclear-weapon Powers were irrevocably opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such proliferation had, however, no practical connexion with the possible future use of nuclear fusion for the building of canals, dams or harbours. Controlled fusion techniques were still in an experimental stage even for the super-weapon Powers, while for the developing countries even the early experimental stage was far away. The subject under discussion now was the possibility that new Powers might manufacture nuclear weapons not by the fusion process, but by the fission process; the latter was the principal method used by two of the existing nuclear Powers for the production of nuclear weapons and a method which many non-nuclear-weapon countries had the capability to use today. The fact that countries such as India had not produced nuclear weapons was not the result of an inability to use the fission process, but a matter of deliberate policy. If such countries ever wished to manufacture weapons, they did not need to wait for the successful use of controlled fusion by the super-Powers. The question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should not, therefore, be confused with that of the future and distant development of controlled-fusion techniques.

16. What was important was the question of principle: was it desirable, or morally defensible, to deny the benefits of the peaceful uses of atomic energy to other nations, particularly to the developing nations? The first impact of that question was whether countries should be allowed to develop their own techniques of controlled fusion for peaceful purposes; no developing country could accept a prohibition of such activity. Controlled fusion explosions must be adequately safeguarded, in keeping with the principle that atomic energy must be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The Latin American States had suggested a system which would prevent any abuse of such peaceful undertakings; it was outlined in article 13 of the proposals for a treaty on the denuclearization of Latin America contained in the Final Act of the third session of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America (A/6328 and Corr.1). India agreed with the Latin American approach and believed that any State conducting such an explosion should announce it beforehand, make known its precise purpose and permit international observation and inspection.

17. As to the second aspect of freedom of technology—the dissemination of nuclear technology—his delegation supported the objectives of the three International Conferences on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy and believed that atomic energy provided the only effective way to meet the energy needs of the world, particularly of the developing countries. As an illustration, the complete combustion of a pound of coal yielded some 14,650 British thermal units of energy, while the complete fission of a pound of uranium yielded 33,000 million units, which was

<sup>5/</sup> Ibid., Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/227, annex 1, sect. E.

<sup>6/</sup> Ibid., Supplement for 1966, document DC/228, annex 1, sect. P.

equivalent to from 2 to 3 million pounds of coal. However, the fission process itself would become insignificant in comparison with the vast supplies of energy that would become available when the technique of controlled fusion had been mastered. Then fuel would be as plentiful as the heavy hydrogen in the oceans. That supply of energy for peaceful purposes, not the purposes, not the production of nuclear weapons, was the main objective of the developing countries in the promotion of nuclear technology.

18. Mr. LEKIC (Yugoslavia) said that the armaments race was becoming an independent and ever more important factor in the creation and execution of foreign policies. Reactionary forces were attempting to use immense military power to turn back the wheel of history and to perpetuate the imperialism that had been defeated in the Second World War, while the so-called limited and controlled wars were threatening to lead to an unlimited and uncontrolled conflagration. The fundamental task was to end the arms race, which constituted a most dangerous threat to the survival of mankind. If world public opinion were informed of the dangers inherent in the arms race, the existing possibilities for disarmament, the benefits to be derived from using atomic energy solely for peaceful purposes, and the enormous resources that could be released by disarmament, that would help to enlist the peoples of the world in the task of preventing a further arms race, and to put an end to the present negative trends. Yugoslavia therefore supported the Secretary-General's suggestion for an appropriate body to explore and weigh the impact and implications of all aspects of nuclear weapons.

19. All those working for disarmament should do their best to secure representation of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and in the organs dealing with disarmament, and also to secure French participation in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. A specific plan for general and complete disarmament should be suggested by the non-aligned countries, in co-operation with all other countries and on the basis of existing proposals and past experience. The current atmosphere of international distrust also made it necessary to resort to partial, initial and collateral measures, which would serve as essential steps to the achievement of general and complete disarmament. Some of the resources saved through partial measures should be devoted to the development of the world's under-developed areas. In addition, the measures must contribute towards the relaxation of international tension, must not require an unduly long period for their acceptance and practical implementation, and must have some value in themselves as disarmament measures. In its memorandum to the United Nations Disarmament Commission (DC/216), Yugoslavia had suggested the acceptance of a minimum number of logically and naturally linked measures: prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, banning of all nuclear weapon tests and prevention of further proliferation of nuclear weapons, with an agreement to begin solving the problems of denuclearization of nuclear Powers themselves.

20. Members of the Committee had been encouraged by the statements of the Soviet and United States representatives about the possibility and necessity of an early treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The treaty must prevent any State from acquiring nuclear weapons, directly or through military alliances or through any other means; his country was particularly interested in preventing any nuclearization of the Federal Republic of Germany since it had been a victim of German aggression twice within twenty years.

21. He welcomed the proposal made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR in his message of 1 February 1966 to include in a treaty on non-proliferation an obligation not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States which had no nuclear weapons on their territory. Many non-nuclear States would not consider the so-called "nuclear umbrella" as suitable protection since such an arrangement could make them largely dependent on a great Power and expose them to possible nuclear attack by a State or group hostile to that Power. Regardless of treaty guarantees, however, full protection for non-nuclear Powers could be ensured in the long run only through nuclear disarmament, and to ensure the success of a treaty on non-proliferation, the nuclear Powers should undertake measures for their own denuclearization as soon as possible.

22. His delegation was concerned over the intensified nuclearization of the Mediterranean area through the so-called nuclear strategy measures of the Western Powers. A treaty on non-proliferation should open the way to the creation of denuclearized zones in the Mediterranean, in Latin America and elsewhere. In addition, military bases should be dismantled and army contingents withdrawn from foreign territory.

23. The continuation of nuclear weapon tests—with over 100 tests, either underground or in the atmosphere, reported since the signing of the Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water at Moscow in 1963—had increased international tension. The immediate cessation of all tests and agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty were highly desirable. In the present state of technology, such agreement could be reached without any risk that some countries would carry out secret nuclear tests of practical military significance. He expected the problems of nuclear weapon tests to be solved either simultaneously with the adoption of a treaty on non-proliferation or immediately thereafter.

24. In its resolution 1653 (XVI) the General Assembly had adopted a declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, declaring the use of such weapons a crime against mankind in general; his delegation believed that the declaration should be transformed into a treaty as soon as possible.

25. Lastly, consultations between States should be continued with a view to reaching a consensus on the preparations for convening a world disarmament conference, as urged in General Assembly resolution 2030 (XX).

*The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.*