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Chairman: Mr. Leopoldo BENITES (Ecuador).

Invitation to a demonstration by the United States Atomic Energy Commission

1. Mr. FOSTER (United States of America) announced that on 16 and 17 November 1966 the United States Atomic Energy Agency would give a demonstration, at Hanford in the State of Washington, of a method of verification of a shut-down plutonium production reactor. The verification technique to be demonstrated was that described in two papers submitted by the United States to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and annexed to its report.^{1/} On behalf of his delegation, he extended an invitation to representatives of all delegations in the Committee and of the Secretary-General to attend the demonstration. The United States Government would provide travel, accommodation and meals. He asked all representatives accepting the invitation to inform his delegation not later than 10 November 1966.

AGENDA ITEM 26

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (continued) (A/6390-DC/228, A/C.1/L.371 and Corr.1 and Add.1-5, A/C.1/L.372 and Add.1 and 2, A/C.1/L.373)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

2. Mr. Amjad ALI (Pakistan) wished to answer the questions of some delegations on the draft resolution, originally submitted by his delegation and now sponsored also by Jamaica and Saudi Arabia (A/C.1/L.372 and Add.1 and 2), about the convening of a conference of non-nuclear countries.

3. The proposed conference would be based on the principle that the non-nuclear countries had a common interest in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, in safeguarding their security and in securing

the opportunity to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. That common interest created an inevitable unity among them and required that they should work out a common standpoint in the nuclear debate, irrespective of their size, geographical location or degree of technological advancement. Their unity, far from dividing them from the nuclear Powers, would stimulate a much more fruitful dialogue between the two groups of States than there had been before. Thus far the dialogue had been restricted by the fact that only three nuclear-weapon countries had taken part in negotiations and that the question of the security of the non-nuclear-weapon countries had been considered largely in the light of manoeuvring by one nuclear Power against another. It was obviously desirable to make at least a modest beginning towards changing that atmosphere for the benefit of all.

4. It had been asked what the proposed conference would do if the super-Powers agreed on the text of a treaty on non-proliferation before the conference was convened. The answer to that question was three-fold. First, agreement between the super-Powers would be only a partial achievement of the objective, which was the conclusion of a universally accepted treaty; unlike other treaties, a treaty on non-proliferation would be meaningless unless all countries acceded to it without reservations.

5. Secondly, the security of the non-nuclear countries required safeguards beyond mere assurances by the nuclear Powers. The non-nuclear countries had the political and moral capability to create an atmosphere in which the use of nuclear weapons would be recognized as a crime against humanity, and the proposed conference would be a demonstration of that capability.

6. Thirdly, the non-nuclear countries had a vital concern in the use of nuclear technology for economic development. They should not be deprived of the fruits of nuclear science, they should not remain dependent on one or two individual nuclear Powers for the enjoyment of those fruits, and they should secure some safeguard against any diversion of nuclear technology to military uses. Consequently there was an inescapable need for them to confer and to evolve agreed decisions on the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

7. There was not the slightest ground for any fear that the conference might delay the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation. If a treaty was concluded before the convening of the conference, the conference would enlarge the scope and consolidate the basis of the treaty. On the other hand, if no treaty had been concluded, the conference would provide a powerful force for its early conclusion. Furthermore, even after agreement between the super-Powers, the treaty

^{1/} See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1966, document DC/228, annex 1, sect. L and N.

would, in all probability, be regarded as provisional in nature, as shown by the suggestions made in the Eighteen-Nation Committee that the treaty should be reviewed by all countries after a certain period. A conference of all the non-nuclear countries could provide an effective forum for a consideration of the treaty that would establish it on a permanent basis.

8. The conference of non-nuclear countries would complement, rather than compete with, the efforts of the super-Powers in their bilateral negotiations, of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, and of the General Assembly; it could in no way conflict or interfere with any constructive efforts made either now or later.

9. Another question that had been asked was whether the non-nuclear countries could be brought together when some were aligned and some non-aligned. The answer was that, as the Australian representative had suggested at the 1439th meeting, a number of practical problems were common to the aligned and the non-aligned countries. Moreover, while the division of countries into nuclear and non-nuclear was clear-cut and unmistakable, the terms "aligned" and "non-aligned" dated from the days of the cold war and had since become considerably blurred. It was possible today for a country to be both non-aligned and doubly aligned and a country wholly aligned today might be non-aligned tomorrow, and vice versa.

10. Several other issues required some explanation. First, in regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy it had been said that no embargo could be put on knowledge or technology. However, if the knowledge and technology of nuclear explosives designed for peaceful purposes was to be disseminated and employed without control, the capacity to produce nuclear weapons would inevitably proliferate among those nations which possessed nuclear technology, while all others would be intimidated and consigned to an underprivileged status. Some thought should, therefore, be given to enlarging the scope of the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Under article III, paragraph B-1, of the Agency's statute its safeguards could be applied, at the request of the non-nuclear Powers, to nuclear materials and equipment used for development.

11. The very essence of the "strategy of non-proliferation" was universality, which under present circumstances did not seem to be attainable through the General Assembly and the Eighteen-Nation Committee alone. The Syrian representative had suggested that universality would require three essential factors lacking in present disarmament negotiations: first, participation of the other two nuclear Powers, secondly, total control by IAEA over all nuclear reactors claimed to be used for peaceful purposes, and, thirdly, a serious dialogue with the non-nuclear States. Any discussion of the strategy of non-proliferation in the presence of two or more nuclear Powers was now dominated by a consideration of those Powers' interests, needs or standpoints, to the exclusion of the interests, needs or standpoints of the non-nuclear States. In order to achieve universal non-proliferation, therefore, it was essential, first, to harmonize the different standpoints of the non-nuclear countries and, secondly, to arrange a dialogue between them and all the present nuclear countries.

12. All the speakers in the Committee's discussion agreed on the desirability of measures for nuclear disarmament. However, some believed that such measures should be adopted in the treaty, others believed that they should be adopted along with the treaty, and still others wanted to have them adopted after—a few saying "immediately after"—the treaty. Thus, the principle stated in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) that the treaty on non-proliferation should be a step towards nuclear disarmament, was open to different interpretations, and at the practical level the differences could be quite substantial. Differences were even more pronounced on the questions of safeguarding the security of non-nuclear countries and of the internationalization of atomic devices. Determined efforts must be made to resolve them in the disarmament negotiations.

13. In spite of the United Kingdom representative's unquestionably sincere statement that nuclear weapons did not constitute a status symbol or create any sense of superiority in the States which possessed them, it was difficult for the non-nuclear countries to avoid misgivings about the possibility of a hierarchy of power based on the possession of nuclear weapons or the capability of producing them. A united policy of the non-nuclear countries would be a most potent means for safeguarding their security and securing the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. He therefore hoped that draft resolution A/C.1/L.372 and Add.1 and 2 would be unanimously adopted.

14. Mr. IJEWERE (Nigeria) said that today the five nuclear Powers between them possessed more than enough nuclear weapons to destroy all life on earth. In addition, there were a score of countries which were in a position to develop nuclear weapons. The Soviet representative had pointed out that the Republic of South Africa, with the help of the Federal Republic of Germany, was preparing to become a nuclear Power. All African States were concerned at such a development.

15. The spread of nuclear weapons would undoubtedly increase the possibility of a thermonuclear war. General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) emphasized not only the dangers of the proliferation of nuclear weapons but the urgency of concluding a treaty on non-proliferation. The subsequent discussions in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had achieved nothing of significance, although they had thrown some light on three major problems.

16. Difficulties had arisen over the definition of the word "proliferation". His delegation considered that the intention behind General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) had been to prevent not only the geographical dissemination of nuclear weapons, but also their multiplication or increase. It was necessary also to prevent States which at present had no nuclear weapons from acquiring or gaining control of nuclear weapons, either directly or indirectly. In other words, a treaty on non-proliferation should check both vertical and horizontal multiplication of nuclear weapons. That should be made clear to the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

17. The second problem had been that of defining the position of non-nuclear members of a military alliance having one or more nuclear members, without compromising the principles of a treaty on non-proliferation. To regard a group of countries within a military alliance as one nuclear entity would be contrary to the essential aim of a treaty on non-proliferation. There were those who favoured the pooling of nuclear weapons among nuclear and non-nuclear members within a military alliance, and such an arrangement was referred to as consultations in matters of nuclear strategy. It might be asked whether the non-nuclear countries concerned would have a say in the deployment and use of nuclear weapons and in the decisions as to when, where and against whom nuclear weapons should be used. If the answer to that question was in the affirmative then, in effect, such countries would have become nuclear Powers cheaply and by taking a short cut. It was necessary therefore to define early what kind of consultations between nuclear and non-nuclear members of an alliance about the use or deployment of nuclear weapons would be consistent with the aims of a treaty on non-proliferation. There should be no loop-hole which would make it possible for a group of countries to enter into a nuclear conspiracy, with their nuclear allies acting as their agents.

18. The third problem had been how to achieve an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and the non-nuclear Powers, as provided in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX). His delegation maintained that non-nuclear countries which had no nuclear weapons on their territory must be guaranteed against nuclear attack. The treaty should therefore include a solemn declaration that no nuclear Power would use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Powers. His delegation was pleased to note that both the Soviet Union and the United States had indicated their wish to provide a form of guarantee.

19. A treaty on non-proliferation should be supplemented by the following measures: first, a comprehensive test ban treaty and the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests in all environments and for all time; secondly, strengthening of the United Nations capacity to maintain peace in the world and to thwart aggression against any country, small or large, non-nuclear or nuclear; thirdly, a freeze on all production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery; and, fourthly, the initiation of definite action to destroy the nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the present nuclear Powers.

20. The conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation should not depend on the implementation of those four measures. Nigeria was fully aware of the dangers of further delay and was prepared to pay the price demanded by the nuclear Powers. Both the Soviet draft treaty^{2/} and the United States draft treaty^{3/} required an undertaking by non-nuclear signatories not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons either independently or together with other States. For the non-

nuclear signatories, the treaty would be tantamount to a comprehensive test ban treaty and would involve a real sacrifice. On the other hand, in the absence of a comprehensive test ban treaty the nuclear Powers were able to continue their nuclear weapon tests and improve the quality and quantity of their nuclear arsenal. He therefore appealed to the nuclear Powers to remove all the artificial obstacles to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty without which a treaty on non-proliferation would have only a limited life.

21. His delegation fully agreed with the four steps recommended by the United States representative. The timing of those steps was of crucial importance. Admittedly, they should be taken cautiously, but undue delay in taking them might prove as dangerous as not taking them at all.

22. Mr. FUENTEALBA (Chile) said that the Committee's annual practice of measuring the progress made towards disarmament and reaffirming the apparently unattainable objectives was rather discouraging. Progress had been either completely non-existent or insignificant. The peace and security of the world had not been consolidated. On the contrary, tension had been aggravated and the ultimate threat of nuclear war had not been banished.

23. The acquisition of armaments invariably led to war. As had been noted in the Ethiopian memorandum to the Eighteen-Nation Committee,^{4/} there had been more than 1,600 known arms races, and only one in a hundred of them had not ended in war. The advent of nuclear weapons had given a new and terrible dimension to the basic problem of disarmament. World expenditure on armaments had now reached the level of about \$150,000 million a year. As His Holiness Pope Paul VI had said in a letter to the Secretary-General,^{5/} the contrast between the huge sums expended on the manufacture of armaments and the immense and growing material distress of over half the human race was becoming more painful and acute.

24. For that reason, in spite of all the obstacles and disappointments, the Committee should persist in its efforts to find new ways of making progress towards disarmament. Generations might pass before the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament was achieved, but there were some intermediate objectives which would bring the world closer to it and which were of considerable value in themselves. One was the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation, which should not be regarded as an end in itself, but as a step in the direction of a total ban on the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons and the ultimate elimination of nuclear arsenals.

25. The Assembly had shown its awareness of the dangers of proliferation by unanimously adopting resolution 2028 (XX) at the last session, and by deciding to give priority to the question of non-proliferation at the current session. But a further year of negotiations at Geneva had not resulted in the conclusion of a treaty. The obstacles mentioned at the last session had not been overcome and the Committee would be deluding itself if it thought that a

^{2/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 106, document A/5976.

^{3/} See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/227, annex I, sect. A; and *ibid.*, Supplement for 1966, document DC/228, annex I, sect. K.

^{4/} *Ibid.*, Supplement for 1966, document DC/228, annex I, sect. R.

^{5/} *Ibid.*, sect. C.

treaty was to be signed without delay. The conflict in Viet-Nam had, among its other lamentable consequences, made it more difficult to reach agreement on disarmament measures.

26. The discussions in the Eighteen-Nation Committee had, however, been of some use, in that they had clarified many of the problems relating to non-proliferation. His delegation fully supported the proposals in the memorandum of 19 August 1966 of the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee;^{6/} and the principles laid down in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), which had been restated in the eight-nation memorandum, should be strictly observed. It was particularly important to establish effective guarantees to protect the non-nuclear States against a nuclear threat by any of the great Powers. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR had suggested, in his message of 1 February 1966 to the Eighteen-Nation Committee,^{7/} that a clause to that effect should be included in the future treaty, and the United States representative had made similar statements. Suitable guarantees for the security of the non-nuclear States were essential if the treaty were to attract the largest possible number of accessions.

27. The treaty should also include a clause providing for a revision conference. The non-nuclear States would have preferred the treaty to be linked to actual nuclear disarmament measures, but they realized that in present circumstances it was better to conclude a treaty on non-proliferation alone without waiting for agreement on more far-reaching measures. A revision clause would make it possible to satisfy their legitimate demands at a later stage. Even when the great Powers had succeeded in overcoming the primary obstacle to agreement—control of nuclear weapons within military alliances—it would still be necessary to solve a number of other problems relating more directly to the interests of the non-nuclear Powers, such as guarantees against nuclear blackmail, the provision of nuclear explosion services for peaceful purposes, and actual nuclear disarmament measures to be linked with the treaty. All those questions would have to be tackled with a sense of urgency and in a spirit of conciliation.

28. The United States and Soviet representatives had both assured the First Committee that there were grounds for optimism about the conclusion of a treaty on a non-proliferation. The time taken to negotiate the treaty would, ultimately, depend on the extent to which the major nuclear Powers were prepared to compromise with one another and with the non-nuclear Powers. His own country had neither the capacity nor the desire to acquire nuclear weapons. Like other small countries, it could only offer moral support. It was doing so by affirming its determination to co-operate in furthering the cause of peace, not only in the United Nations but in the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America. It was making every effort, also, to promote agreement on the reduction of conventional armaments. Conventional weapons, while not so catastrophic, were no less lethal than nuclear weapons, and they had disastrous effects on

the investments which the developing countries urgently needed to raise the level of living.

29. He wished to correct the impression given by certain reports in the Press that his Government had recently spent large sums on the purchase of aircraft. The aircraft purchased were not supersonic, and would be used mainly for training. The expenditure involved had only been a fraction of the figure mentioned in the Press, and would certainly not affect his Government's intensive economic and social development programmes. Chile was one of the countries of Latin America which allocated the lowest percentage of the national budget to defence. His country had for many years been advocating the conclusion of an agreement on the reduction of armaments in Latin America, and was suggesting that the subject should be included in the agenda of the forthcoming conference of American Presidents.

30. Mr. ABDULGANI (Indonesia) said that a group of States had first drawn attention to the urgent need for the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests at the Asian-African Conference, held at Bandung in 1955. His country had been represented at the Conference and had fully subscribed to its appeal to all nuclear Powers to reach agreement on the suspension of nuclear testing. Since then, the demands of the non-nuclear countries for a world free from radioactive contamination and the threat of destruction had grown ever more insistent and, from 1958 onwards, the General Assembly itself had adopted a number of resolutions calling for a suspension of nuclear testing. In 1963—as a result of pressure by an anxious and desperate world, and following the development of techniques for detecting tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space—the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom had agreed that a treaty banning tests in the three environments would be in their national interest. The signing of the treaty by three nuclear Powers, and by more than one hundred non-nuclear nations, had engendered a spirit of optimism and had reduced international tension.

31. Since 1963, however, the partial test ban treaty had not been followed by other nuclear disarmament measures. As the Secretary-General had pointed out in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization (A/6301/Add.1), the escalating hostilities in Viet-Nam and the deteriorating international situation had intensified both the conventional arms race and the nuclear arms race. In the circumstances, it was only natural for the non-aligned to assist the nuclear Powers in reaching agreement on further measures; the nuclear Powers themselves had acknowledged the role played by the eight non-aligned nations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. Adoption of the Swedish proposal for international seismological co-operation^{8/} and improvements in the technique of detecting underground tests by national means might in the end help to overcome the remaining obstacles to agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty. But at the present stage of the discussions there was an impression that the nuclear Powers did not really want to reach agreement on underground testing, just as they had not wanted—before 1963—to reach agreement

^{6/} Ibid., sect. P.

^{7/} Ibid., sect. F.

^{8/} Ibid., Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/227, annex I, sect. B.

on any aspect of nuclear testing. In the meantime, negotiations should be continued on other collateral measures. Progress with collateral measures might provide the three major nuclear Powers with an added inducement to agree to a comprehensive test ban.

32. His Government fully endorsed General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) and had full confidence in the Eighteen-Nation Committee in general and in its eight non-aligned members in particular. His delegation supported operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.371 and Corr.1 and Add.1-5, which called for an assurance by the nuclear-weapon Powers that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. He welcomed draft resolution A/C.1/L.372 and Add.1 and 2, which could, however, be strengthened by including a reference to resolution 2028 (XX); its adoption might help to achieve the balance of responsibilities and obligations recommended in paragraph 2 (b) of resolution 2028 (XX) and it would thereby strengthen the cause of disarmament and peace.

33. At the present stage and in present circumstances Indonesia was fully prepared to support the draft resolutions on non-proliferation but reserved the right to change its attitude if developments showed that the monopolistic power of countries possessing nuclear weapons proved inimical to the ideal of general and complete disarmament.

34. As for the relationship between non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the dissemination of nuclear science and technology, his delegation whole-heartedly endorsed what the Indian representative had said (1436th meeting, para. 15). Technology in itself was not an evil. But all peace-loving forces must be mobi-

lized to combat the misuse of technology for such evil purposes as the oppression and exploitation of other nations.

35. His delegation supported the views expressed in the joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries on the conversion to peaceful needs of the resources released by disarmament and would support all efforts to halt the arms race.

36. He suggested that it might be worth while to consider adapting the present arrangements for disarmament negotiations to the world situation. He felt that the elevation of the position of the Eighteen-Nation Committee from its present status to that of a disarmament council as a principal organ of the United Nations in the context of Article 7 of the Charter would be fully justified. Several outstanding issues, including those relating to Articles 26, 47 and others, could be assigned to the disarmament council. The present number of eighteen members seemed satisfactory and their rotation, as in the other principal organs, might well improve democratic representation.

37. The question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was of particular concern to the peoples of South-East Asia who were alarmed at public utterances in certain countries about the possible use of nuclear weapons against an enemy. The population of a territory might be selected by nuclear Powers for testing their latest nuclear weapons. An Asian nation had been the first victim of nuclear weapons and he agreed with the Japanese representative that everything must be done to prevent that occurring again, particularly in South-East Asia now threatened by the dangerous war in Viet-Nam.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.