

United Nations
**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**

TWENTY-FIRST SESSION

Official Records



**FIRST COMMITTEE, 1438th
MEETING**

Tuesday, 1 November 1966,
at 10.50 a.m.

NEW YORK

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Chairman: Mr. Leopoldo BENITES (Ecuador).

AGENDA ITEM 97

Renunciation by States of actions hampering the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (continued) (A/6398, A/C.1/L.368/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-4)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. VAN DER STOEL (Netherlands) said that there were two sides to the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the most urgent of all disarmament problems: first, how could the spread of nuclear weapons among the non-nuclear Powers be prevented and, secondly, how could the nuclear armaments race between the existing nuclear Powers be halted and reversed? The conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation was an indispensable requirement for achieving the second objective. It was in the interest of all countries, and particularly the non-nuclear Powers, to dispel the gnawing fear that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by another country or countries would give a new impetus to the existing arms race; and a treaty on non-proliferation would be the best way of eliminating one of the most likely causes of disaster. The treaty should not, therefore, be regarded as a one-sided moratorium favouring the nuclear Powers, but as a long overdue measure dictated by the common interest of all nations in survival.

2. He agreed with earlier speakers that a treaty on non-proliferation should not be an end in itself. It should be accompanied or followed by other positive steps on the road to arms control and disarmament. It was on that understanding that his delegation had decided to join the sponsors of the draft resolution originated by the USSR (A/C.1/SR.368/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-4). For the same reason, it fully subscribed to the principles set forth in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), which should be put into effect as soon and as far as practicable. But those principles should not be regarded as a "package" of hard and fast conditions, and the absence of immediate progress on related measures should not be allowed to hinder the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation.

3. His delegation was, as always, convinced that the treaty should be void of any loop-holes permitting any form of proliferation, either directly or indirectly, through military alliances or otherwise. Within an alliance, that requirement would be complied with if nuclear weapons could not under any circumstances be used by non-nuclear members without the explicit consent of existing nuclear Powers. But members of an alliance could not be deprived of the right to engage in collective consultations with a view to safeguarding their security; arrangements of that kind now being discussed within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were entirely divorced from the question of proliferation. The United States representative had spoken of a growing awareness that collective nuclear defence arrangements did not necessarily lead to proliferation. The Netherlands delegation hoped that it would prove possible to devise a mutually acceptable formula which would clear away the last obstacles to agreement on the text of articles I and II of the treaty.

4. The trend of the discussion in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament over the past months suggested that a common understanding of the basic factors of certain issues had been reached. The same impression had been given by the opening statements of the Soviet and the United States representatives in the First Committee (1431st meeting) in which a new tone of confidence had been evidenced. He hoped that the United Kingdom representative had been right in saying that the two sides were coming to recognize that they had a common purpose. He wished to pay a tribute also to the contributions made by other members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, and especially the eight non-aligned countries, in bringing about a more favourable climate.

5. On the question of adequate safeguards to prevent diversion of nuclear materials for military purposes, article III of the United States draft treaty ^{1/} contained a very clear-cut proposal; and in his message of 27 January 1966 to the Eighteen-Nation Committee ^{2/} the President of the United States had gone a stage further by suggesting that all transfers of nuclear materials or equipment to non-nuclear countries for peaceful purposes should be placed under International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent international safeguards. Although the USSR draft treaty ^{3/} contained no reference to safeguards,

^{1/} See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/227, annex 1, sect. A; and ibid., Supplement for 1966, document DC/228, annex 1, sect. K.

^{2/} Ibid., Supplement for 1966, document DC/228, annex 1, sect. D.

^{3/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 106, document A/5976.

the Soviet representative, in his remarks at the 1431st meeting on the proposal made by Poland and Czechoslovakia at the tenth session of the General Conference of IAEA, had recognized the particular relevance of international safeguards, and at that same meeting in Vienna the Soviet delegation had said that the Agency could play an important auxiliary role in the matter of non-proliferation. Further, at the tenth session of the IAEA General Conference and during the general debate at the current session of the Assembly (1430th plenary meeting), the Norwegian Government had recommended that all the peaceful nuclear activities of States not possessing nuclear weapons should be placed under IAEA safeguards. His own Government was in sympathy with that proposal, and with all other proposals designed to promote the full implementation of the Agency's safeguarding functions, and thought that they should be considered seriously and objectively.

6. Unfortunately, the IAEA safeguards had taken a long time to elaborate; and, before them, there had been no world-wide international control system at all. The gap had been filled to a certain extent by a number of bilateral safeguards agreements and by the establishment of two regional organizations—the European Nuclear Energy Agency and Euratom. As some had argued, there might indeed be a certain element of discrimination in the existence side by side of regional and international safeguards systems. But the chronological order of events, and certain political realities, could not be ignored. In his message of 27 January 1966 to the Eighteen-Nation Committee, the President of the United States had suggested that the major nuclear Powers should to an increasing extent accept the same safeguards as they would like to see applied to others. Technically speaking, the safeguards systems of Euratom and IAEA were comparable and equivalent. His Government believed that an appropriate relationship should be established between the two organizations and that a formal agreement between them should be concluded as soon as possible on the basis of article XVI of the statute of IAEA. The Netherlands had recently submitted certain proposals to that effect to its Euratom partners and would continue to base its policy on those proposals, not because it wished to detract in any way from the efficacy of the Euratom control system, but because it was anxious to promote the general acceptance of a world-wide safeguards system.

7. There was no better evidence of a country's firm determination not to take part in the nuclear arms race than voluntary acceptance of safeguards which could limit the spread of nuclear weapons; and article III, paragraph A-5, of the statute of IAEA described the procedure for placing nuclear facilities unilaterally under IAEA safeguards. But, as other possibilities of achieving the Agency's objectives should not be neglected, the conditional offer by Poland and Czechoslovakia to place their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards deserved favourable consideration. His own Government intended to study it very seriously in consultation with its Euratom partners. Some complex problems had been created in recent years by the failure

to make use of opportunities to further the acceptance of a world-wide safeguard system. But he hoped that the situation could be remedied even at the present late hour, and he wished to make some suggestions for a possible programme of action.

8. International safeguards were an essential collateral measure against proliferation of nuclear weapons. As IAEA seemed to be the best instrument for a world-wide safeguards system, the application of the IAEA system should be expanded to provide a workable deterrent against the use of nuclear energy for military purposes. Recognizing that there were at present separate bilateral, regional and international control systems, countries should make every effort to achieve the full implementation of article III, paragraph A-5, and article XII, of the statute of IAEA by voluntarily placing their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, transferring bilateral agreements to IAEA control, accepting the IAEA's safeguards system for any future multilateral arrangement such as denuclearized zones, harmonizing the safeguards of existing regional organizations with the IAEA system and giving reality to the Agency's statutory function as a custodian and supplier of nuclear materials by transferring such materials from military stockpiles.

9. The Government of Japan, the only country to have experienced the dreadful effects of nuclear bombs, had already decided to place all its peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. His delegation supported the Japanese representative's proposal that the General Assembly should ask IAEA to report on the contribution it could make in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Further, an expansion of the promotional functions of IAEA would be the most appropriate way of meeting the wish expressed by the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee in their memorandum of 19 August 1966^{4/} that agreement on non-proliferation should be followed by increased assistance to developing countries in accelerating their programmes for the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

10. A logical counterpart to the acceptance of IAEA safeguards by non-nuclear countries would be an assurance that they would not themselves become the victims of nuclear attack. He agreed with the Canadian representative that it would be interesting to hear the views of the non-aligned countries themselves as to the kind of guarantees they envisaged and a specific proposal had in fact been made in operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.371, submitted under agenda item 26. He hoped that further discussion on the subject—which could be pursued in the Eighteen-Nation Committee—would result in a consensus on the precise form of the assurances to be given and on whether they should be given in the treaty or in some other way. The eight non-aligned countries had recommended that the treaty should be subject to periodic review. The United States draft treaty contained a provision to that effect which would ensure that the treaty could be amended to take account of future developments.

^{4/} See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1966*, document DC/228, annex I, sect. P.

11. A ban on all nuclear tests, including underground tests, would be one of the most effective ways of ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. As a first step towards nuclear arms control affecting the nuclear Powers themselves, it would be in keeping with the General Assembly's recommendation in resolution 2028 (XX) that there should be an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations between the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. Progress was still being made in the detection and identification of seismic events. At the twentieth session, his delegation had supported the Swedish proposal for a "detection club",^{5/} and thought that it would be worth while to explore further the feasibility and acceptability of a procedure for "verification by consent" which might be tried out for a short period in order to test its efficacy. Serious consideration should also be given to the Canadian representative's suggestion (1433rd meeting) that automatic seismological devices might be used and that the United States and the Soviet Union might provide information from sites close to unidentified events to supplement information obtained by distant monitoring.

12. As the techniques required for peaceful and military nuclear explosions were indistinguishable, and as the development of such techniques would run counter to article II of the United States and Soviet draft treaties, which both stipulated that non-nuclear States should not engage in the testing or manufacture of nuclear weapons, the United States proposal for nuclear explosion services to be provided to non-nuclear States under appropriate international supervision was most sensible and would ensure that the non-nuclear Powers were not deprived of the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology in the future.

13. His Government supported the establishment of denuclearized zones in areas where there were no political or military obstacles to arrangements of that kind, and had informed the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America that it was prepared to assume for Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles the same obligations as the Latin American States themselves would accept. It also favoured the African countries' endeavours to proclaim Africa a denuclearized zone.

14. On the question of general and complete disarmament, the Eighteen-Nation Committee could hardly have been expected to make much progress. As the Canadian representative had stated, the crux of the problem still lay in the different views as to how nuclear armaments would be reduced and then eliminated; but if both sides earnestly endeavoured to reach agreement on specific measures, it should prove possible to reconcile the opposing views. The United States Government had made detailed proposals for a verified cut-off in the production of fissionable material for military purposes, a reduction in nuclear stockpiles and a freeze and eventual reduction in the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear weapon delivery systems, including anti-ballistic-missile systems. It

was gratifying to note that the eight non-aligned countries had given those proposals their full support.

15. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) had been greatly impressed by the spirit of understanding which the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers alike had displayed. The non-aligned countries had tried in a very constructive manner to assist the great Powers in reaching agreement on a treaty on non-proliferation as soon as possible. They should continue their efforts to bring the great Powers closer together on issues such as disarmament and the application of Article 40 of the United Nations Charter.

16. The co-operation and impartiality of the small countries were nowhere more evident than in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, which should be congratulated on its achievements in former years, as well as in the past year. The report it had submitted at the twentieth session^{6/} had provided the inspiration for General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) and the General Assembly's recommendations had in turn provided the basis for the draft resolution before the Committee.

17. His delegation wished to associate itself with the other sponsors of the draft resolution, which was highly significant in that a proposal originally submitted by the Soviet Union had been immediately supported by the United States. If the Assembly were able by its influence to help the United States and the Soviet Union to reach agreement on a treaty on non-proliferation, there would be far-reaching consequences affecting all other aspects of disarmament and the international atmosphere would be greatly improved.

18. In the disarmament negotiations of previous years there had been no differences of opinion on goals or objectives but only on means or, more specifically, on the question of control. In the technical sense, the control of disarmament measures was already feasible, but there were serious differences of opinion between the great Powers on the legal aspects. The Soviet Union regarded control as an instrument of espionage or a violation of sovereignty, while the Western Powers denied that control would amount to espionage if it were effected by neutral authorities. While the dispute had continued, great progress had been made in the technology of armaments production; and, with the emergence of the Nike 10 missile, which was said to guarantee the failure of any nuclear attack, a situation of bipolar nuclear balance had been established. In spite of all the dangers inherent in that situation, there were still some who believed that it would be more dangerous to reduce stockpiles of nuclear and conventional weapons without adequate guarantees.

19. The dangers, however, were increased by the addition of new countries to the ranks of the nuclear Powers. Proliferation meant anarchy and the aggravation of all international problems. The Eighteen-Nation Committee had pointed out that a treaty on non-proliferation would be a first step towards a complete nuclear test ban and a substantial reduction of armaments, a reduction foreshadowed by the

^{5/} Ibid., Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/227, annex I, sect. B.

^{6/} Ibid., document DC/227.

announcements made recently both by the United States and the Soviet Union of their intention to destroy certain quantities of fissionable materials. In short, such a treaty seemed to represent the key to the solution of the disarmament problem. It was encouraging that the United States and many other countries had joined the sponsors of the draft resolution before the Committee and that there was every prospect of its being adopted unanimously by the General Assembly.

20. It would be a delicate matter to comment on the remaining points of disagreement between the great Powers. The Eighteen-Nation Committee was the appropriate body to assist in bringing together the positions of the two Powers.

21. The Netherlands representative had discussed the question of guarantees and the possibility of entrusting the task of inspection and control to the International Atomic Energy Agency and to Euratom, and had responded sympathetically to the Polish-Czechoslovak proposal. Guarantees of compliance were obviously essential to the treaty; denunciation of the treaty by one party upon non-compliance by another party would create an extremely dangerous situation.

22. His delegation endorsed the proposals for the denuclearization of Africa and of Latin America. It believed that a treaty on non-proliferation should contain not only guarantees of compliance, but also guarantees of respect for the rights of countries that might be affected by proliferation. The nuclear Powers must solemnly pledge to respect the international status created by denuclearization treaties.

23. While some of the smaller countries were not at present capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons, others were and yet they were prepared to refrain from producing such weapons and to limit their own freedom of action voluntarily in a spirit of humanitarianism and respect for the Charter. Such a spirit of self-limitation must be matched by the nuclear Powers. They must undertake to refrain from any nuclear attack or threat of such attack against the Powers signing a treaty on non-proliferation.

24. The subject of non-proliferation was the central item of the disarmament programme. All other disarmament questions were associated with it—reduction of existing armaments, elimination of the escape clause in the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed at Moscow in 1963, denuclearization of various regions and co-operation between politically, geographically and historically diverse countries. Such co-operation would be a triumph over the rivalry between East and West and would banish the scourge of war, to the immense benefit of all mankind.

25. Miss FAROUK (Tunisia) said that in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization (A/6301/Add.1), the Secretary-General had warned Member States of the danger of upsetting "the existing uneasy balance of terror". It was important that his warning should be understood both by the super-Powers, which bore the heavy responsibility of the world's defence, and by the less

powerful States, which frequently bore the cost of wars but seldom decided their course. The smaller countries were vitally concerned with disarmament because the danger of war threatened all countries equally, and they were continuing their efforts to reconcile opposing views and facilitate the adoption of measures for collective security.

26. Tunisia still believed that general and complete disarmament was the final objective. It recognized, however, that the conclusion of partial agreements could help in attaining it. For that reason, Tunisia had acceded to the partial test ban treaty, had participated in the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries at Cairo in 1964, and favoured a world conference on disarmament. A treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would constitute a similar step forward on the way to general and complete disarmament. She was gratified to note that the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom had agreed with the view that the treaty would be only one of many such steps and had stated that they had no intention of perpetuating a nuclear monopoly.

27. She hoped that the reservations and anxieties expressed by the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee in their memorandum of 15 September 1965 on non-proliferation^{7/} and reflected in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) would be taken into account in the drafting of a treaty on non-proliferation. Tunisia still believed in the need for an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. Her delegation was encouraged by the expressed willingness of the Soviet Union to include in the treaty a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against countries in whose territory there were no nuclear weapons and also by the fact that the United States had promptly joined in sponsoring the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union on the renunciation by States of actions hampering the conclusion of an agreement on non-proliferation. Tunisia had decided to join the sponsors of the draft resolution in its revised form (A/C.1/L.368/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-4) and hoped that it would be adopted unanimously.

28. A treaty on non-proliferation should be followed by the prohibition of underground tests, the halting of production of fissionable material for weapons use and the conversion of existing nuclear weapons and explosives to peaceful uses.

29. In addition to reducing the differences between the views of the two super-Powers, it was essential to make the other nuclear Powers realize that the effort for world peace would be seriously endangered if they tried to divorce themselves from it.

30. She hoped that it would be possible gradually to create the necessary conditions for ending both the nuclear arms race and the conventional arms race and to devote the enormous resources thus made available to the advancement of under-developed regions.

^{7/} Ibid., document DC/227, annex 1, sect. E.

31. Lastly, her delegation hoped that the Committee would be able to support the Secretary-General's suggestion, in the introduction to his annual report, for "an appropriate body of the United Nations to explore and weigh the impact and implications of all aspects of nuclear weapons", for it was indeed true that "to know the true nature of the danger... may be a most important first step towards averting it".

32. Mr. AL-RASHID (Kuwait) said that the difficulties hampering the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons were political. The Soviet and United States representatives had stated that the difficulties were not insurmountable and that substantial progress had been made. Agreement could certainly be reached if everyone appreciated the danger inherent in the present situation.

33. The projected treaty should deal with proliferation in the wider sense, including not only transfer of nuclear weapons from States which possessed them to others which did not, but also further production of nuclear weapons by States which had been producing them thus far and production of nuclear weapons by States which had thus far refrained from or been incapable of producing them.

34. The division of States into nuclear and non-nuclear was an oversimplification; a more accurate classification should recognize four main groups. First, there were States which openly avowed their nuclear capability; the People's Republic of China was one of those States and its participation was essential to the effectiveness of any treaty on non-proliferation. Secondly, some States were technologically capable of producing nuclear weapons but had, to their great credit, refrained from doing so. Thirdly, some States had the technological capability to produce nuclear weapons but carefully concealed their intention to do so; they constituted a potential threat to the security of other States and were naturally viewed with deep suspicion. Fourthly, there were States which had neither the technological capability nor the desire to produce nuclear weapons; those were the truly non-nuclear States, which must be given assurances against nuclear blackmail and must be allowed to maintain their non-aligned position.

35. It was important to secure international control over the States of the third group. No treaty on non-proliferation had any chance of success unless the International Atomic Energy Agency was given the power of inspection in all States, nuclear or non-nuclear.

36. Since it was universally recognized that the projected treaty concerned every Government, it was unfortunate that negotiations had thus far been conducted bilaterally, giving the impression that a bilateral agreement was contemplated. The non-nuclear States should be allowed to participate in the negotiations at an early stage, in order that the final text might embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations between the four groups of States.

37. He agreed with the Indian and Lebanese representatives that science and technology must be disseminated for the benefit of all mankind. The system of safeguards provided by IAEA was sufficient to

prevent any abuse of peaceful nuclear capability, and the developing countries could not accept arguments designed to exclude them from any branch of knowledge.

38. His delegation endorsed the appeal in the revised draft resolution (A/C.1/L.368/Rev.1/Add.1-4) calling upon all States to take all necessary steps to facilitate the conclusion of a treaty and to refrain from action conducive to proliferation. It wished to add its name to the list of sponsors.

39. His delegation was also a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.371—submitted under agenda item 26—which invited the Powers possessing nuclear weapons to pledge that they would not use or threaten to use such weapons against States which did not possess them. He hoped that by the time the General Assembly met at its twenty-second session, it would be able to adopt the text of the projected treaty on non-proliferation, which should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament, as envisaged in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX).

40. As a small and non-aligned country, which had nothing to gain from global war, Kuwait endorsed the African States' decision on the denuclearization of Africa and would favour similar steps in other regions. It would also favour an extension of the partial test ban treaty to include a ban on underground tests.

41. Lastly, it must be explicitly stated that the resources released by the treaty on non-proliferation would be applied to the social and economic development of hitherto less developed countries.

42. Mr. BOUATTOURA (Algeria) said that, while the advent of nuclear weapons had given a new dimension to the disarmament problem, the experience of the past year—and particularly the war in Viet-Nam—showed that the small nations were still being subjected to pressure by conventional weapons. The disarmament problem was therefore a single and indivisible whole.

43. On the other hand, since the achievement of general and complete disarmament was impossible in the present situation, partial disarmament measures of any kind should be regarded as steps in the right direction. At present, unfortunately, the so-called efforts to achieve disarmament were nothing more than an endeavour to establish a balance of armaments. With their nuclear weapons the two super-Powers had created a balance of terror which seriously threatened the development of normal international relations throughout the world. No real progress could be made so long as the only disarmament measures adopted were those which tended to perpetuate the nuclear monopoly of certain Powers.

44. Non-proliferation was, indeed, a key element in disarmament, as it related both to the transfer of nuclear weapons by a nuclear State to another State or group of States, and to the independent development of nuclear weapons by certain highly developed Powers which did not yet possess them. In both cases, it was generally agreed that a multiplication of nuclear weapons would only increase the risk of a nuclear confrontation.

45. His delegation had been glad to note the progress made towards agreement on non-proliferation, as indicated in the statements by the Soviet and United States representatives at the Committee's 1431st meeting. Although every effort should be made to overcome the remaining obstacles to agreement—to which both representatives had referred in their statements—that in itself would not be enough to ensure that a treaty on non-proliferation would establish an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations between the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX). A balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations could not be achieved by perpetuating the nuclear monopoly of certain Powers or by obliging them merely to give an assurance that they would not use their nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries. It could be achieved only by practical steps in the direction of effective disarmament. To be really effective, the treaty would have to be accepted by all Powers, and especially all the nuclear Powers. The People's Republic of China, which had recently given a further demonstration of its nuclear capacity, should be invited to participate in disarmament negotiations and should have its rights in the United Nations restored.

46. Further, the partial test ban treaty should be extended to cover underground tests, so that the principal signatories to a treaty on non-proliferation could not go on perfecting nuclear weapons after other Powers had accepted an undertaking not to acquire them. Proliferation of nuclear weapons by the nuclear Powers themselves should be prohibited at all costs, regardless of the technical objections raised. Recent technical advances had made it possible to detect any explosions, however small, from distant monitoring stations.

47. A cut-off of the production of fissionable material for military purposes should be accompanied by an appreciable reduction in nuclear stockpiles. If it were not, it would be meaningless, as the super-Powers already possessed enough fissionable material to destroy the world several times. While the commitment undertaken by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1963 not to place nuclear devices in orbit was a positive step, the problem of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles remained.

48. The establishment of denuclearized zones in Asia, Africa and Latin America would be an important contribution to non-proliferation, and it would help to avoid a fruitless armaments race which would be a heavy burden on the national budgets of the countries concerned. But all weapons—and not merely nuclear weapons—should be banned in the zones concerned, and all foreign military bases should therefore be dismantled. Foreign military bases represented a permanent threat to the independence and security of small countries and obliged them to make heavy sacrifices to provide themselves with weapons for the defence of their integrity and freedom.

49. Pertinent suggestions on all those points had been made by the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee in their memorandum

of 19 August 1966; but one striking feature of the disarmament problem was that negotiations seemed to be advanced further at the technical than the political level, though the political factor was still the prime mover in any progress towards disarmament. Partial agreements might help to create a favourable psychological atmosphere for reducing international tension. In view of the small number of States involved, however, they could never have more than a limited effect. In the long run, the only way of solving the disarmament problem as a whole and establishing a genuine balance between the mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear States would be to conclude an international treaty on general and complete disarmament with the participation of all nations, particularly the nuclear Powers and including France and the People's Republic of China.

50. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) said that the nuclear Powers had an opportunity to demonstrate their awareness of the urgent need to take advantage of the propitious circumstances which still existed for a step towards general and complete disarmament, in the form of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was noteworthy that, following the submission of a draft resolution by one nuclear Power, the other two nuclear Powers which were participating in the work of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had spontaneously expressed their desire to join in sponsoring it. It was also noteworthy that the nuclear Powers had been ready to accept the changes suggested by the eight non-aligned countries, thus making the text fully acceptable to all delegations, including his own. Those encouraging circumstances gave particular significance to the constructive tone of the statements made by the Soviet and United States representatives at the 1431st meeting. It was to be hoped that the talks now taking place between the nuclear Powers would lead to the early conclusion of a treaty which would end the proliferation of nuclear weapons and thus eliminate the risk of a holocaust. Although it was on the nuclear Powers that the success of negotiations ultimately depended, the consequences of a nuclear conflagration would not be limited to the nuclear Powers, but would affect the whole world.

51. The operative paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/L.368/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-4 contained a twofold appeal, addressed to all States both nuclear and non-nuclear. With regard to the former, useful suggestions on the implementation of the appeals were to be found in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), in the memoranda of the eight non-aligned countries and in the records of the First Committee and of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. As to the latter States, it would be useful for them to have at their disposal, in addition, a study such as that suggested by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report (A/6301/Add.1).

52. Mexico's record with regard to non-proliferation was well known. He would only recall that, as early as March 1962, the Mexican representative in the Eighteen-Nation Committee had declared the Mexican Government's determination not to allow nuclear weapons on its national soil; that the Declaration

of 29 April 1963 on the denuclearization of Latin America^{8/} had resulted from the Mexican President's initiative; that it was Mexico whose efforts had led to the establishment of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America; and, finally, that President Díaz Ordaz had repeatedly stressed Mexico's desire that the power of the atom should be used to preserve life and not to kill.

53. Mr. ANSARI (Iran) said that the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons was one aspect of the problem of preventing nuclear war. The question of non-proliferation had long been a major preoccupation of both the General Assembly and the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and its urgency had been recognized by the General Assembly in resolution 2028 (XX). His delegation had been impressed by the statements made by the Soviet and United States representatives (1431st meeting), and took note of the general optimism about the prospect of an early conclusion of a treaty. He felt bound to recall that a similar optimism at the previous session had proved unjustified. However, an understanding had now been reached on the question of what constituted the dissemination of nuclear weapons, and the negotiations had also helped to define other issues. What was urgently needed now was to translate the climate of understanding into concrete measures. It should be possible to remove the remaining obstacles through negotiation. The circumstances might soon be less propitious. The danger implied in the emergence of a sixth nuclear Power should prove a stimulus to agreement.

54. His delegation welcomed the Soviet delegation's initiative; the appeal to States to refrain from actions which would hamper the conclusion of an agreement was timely and should be accepted as an interim measure. His delegation had consequently joined in sponsoring the draft resolution before the Committee.

^{8/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 74, document A/5415/Rev.1.

55. The conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation was not an end in itself; the final goal should be general and complete disarmament. Measures to ban the spread of nuclear weapons should be coupled with steps to halt the nuclear arms race and eventually to eliminate stocks of nuclear weapons and means for their delivery. Reduction and elimination of nuclear armaments should be provided for in the treaty, or at least there should be a declaration of intent on the subject. For non-nuclear States, accession to the treaty contained an obvious security risk which should be compensated by a clear assurance that they would be immune from nuclear attack. He welcomed the statement of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR^{9/} that the Soviet Union would agree to the inclusion in the treaty of a clause on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the treaty which had no such weapons in their territory.

56. The conclusion of a universal treaty on non-proliferation could be accompanied by other measures to check the dissemination of nuclear weapons. One possible measure was the establishment of nuclear-free zones. He wished the African and Latin American countries success in their attempts to create such zones. Progress had already been made with regard to the proposed Latin American zone, and the precedent thus established might be found useful in other areas. The conclusion of a comprehensive test ban would doubtless also serve the cause of non-proliferation.

57. Acceptance of international control over peaceful nuclear activities was another safeguard. The willingness expressed by Czechoslovakia and Poland to place their atomic energy installations under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency was a step forward in that direction.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

^{9/} See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1966, document DC/228, annex 1, sect. F.