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*Chairman:* Mr. Leopoldo BENITES (Ecuador).

AGENDA ITEM 97

Renunciation by States of actions hampering the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (continued) (A/6398, A/C.1/L.368/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. SETTE CAMARA (Brazil) said he would confine his comments to the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, while reserving the right to speak later on the other, no less important, aspects of disarmament.

2. Nothing spectacular was to be expected in the short run from disarmament negotiations, which proceeded even more slowly and cautiously than other types of negotiations. It would have been unrealistic to expect the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to draft a treaty on non-proliferation in six months. Moreover, it was only a year ago that the General Assembly had adopted resolution 2028 (XX), which set forth the principles on which such a treaty should be based. Those principles had been accepted by all States, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, and constituted the corner-stone of the future treaty. Thanks to the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, which for six months had painstakingly studied the two draft treaties submitted respectively by the United States<sup>1/</sup> and the Soviet Union,<sup>2/</sup> the positions of the parties had been clarified, as the Secretary-General had noted in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization (A/6301/Add.1), and all of them were aware of the compromises which had to be made if agreement was to be reached. That clarification was extremely important, for it had perhaps prepared the way for the early conclusion of a treaty. It was clear from the records of the proceedings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee that, from a political

<sup>1/</sup> See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/227, annex 1, sect. A; and *ibid.*, Supplement for 1966, document DC/228, annex 1, sect. K.

<sup>2/</sup> See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 106, document A/5976.

standpoint, the members of the two main military alliances were prepared to conclude a treaty on non-proliferation as soon as possible and that the main obstacle was the question of nuclear armaments within military alliances. Nevertheless, the members of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty Organization had examined all aspects of the problem in detail and had even made important proposals aimed at preventing the dissemination of nuclear technology for military purposes.

3. The eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, which had clearly stated their views in the joint memorandum on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons dated 19 August 1966,<sup>3/</sup> had endeavoured throughout the negotiations to consider the future treaty in the light of the principles laid down in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX). The political importance of all those principles was so great that no lasting agreement could be arrived at unless they were strictly observed. The eight countries had nevertheless quite rightly concentrated their attention on the principle enunciated in paragraph 2 (b), which called for an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. They had felt that the treaty should be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery.

4. His delegation's position went even further. An objective and politically valid treaty on non-proliferation should reflect not only the power relations between the great nuclear Powers but also the power relations between those countries on the one hand and the non-nuclear world on the other. It should be conceived as part of a programme aimed at taking a first and important step towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and at the same time promoting the economic and social development of the less developed countries. That idea had, it should be noted, been put forward by the Disarmament Commission in its resolution of 15 June 1965.<sup>4/</sup> In view of the urgency of the task before the First Committee, it was not possible to establish an immediate link between the signature of a treaty on non-proliferation and the implementation of a programme of related measures. However, if the non-nuclear Powers were now willing to renounce the production and use of nuclear weapons in the interests of mankind—and, thus in the interests of the nuclear Powers themselves—why should the latter not commit them-

<sup>3/</sup> See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1966, document DC/228, annex 1, sect. P.

<sup>4/</sup> *Ibid.*, Supplement for January to December 1965, document DC/225.

selves through a declaration of intent, in return for the signature of the treaty by the non-nuclear Powers, to implement a programme comprising the following points: first, tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery; second, the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests; third, increased co-operation with the non-nuclear Powers with a view to accelerating their utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; fourth, the channelling to the developing countries of at least part of the savings effected through those disarmament measures.

5. That was the Brazilian position. It had been stated at the 244th meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, on 1 March 1966, and was reflected in the penultimate paragraph of the joint memorandum of 19 August 1966 submitted by the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

6. His delegation was not suggesting that the treaty on non-proliferation should be tied to, or dependent upon, such a programme of related measures. However, the States which manufactured nuclear weapons should take account of the balance of obligations referred to in resolution 2028 (XX). They should recognize that it would be neither just nor realistic for the non-nuclear Powers to relinquish their option to produce such weapons without the expectation of receiving anything in return, while the nuclear Powers remained free not only to keep their arsenals but also to develop and increase the weapons in them. It was therefore with the greatest satisfaction that his delegation had heard the United Kingdom representative's statement along those lines at the 1432nd meeting.

7. The related disarmament measures referred to in his delegation's statement and in the joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries were not enough. What would be accomplished by imposing a freeze on delivery vehicles, halting the production of fissionable materials or reducing the stocks of nuclear weapons if the Powers producing those weapons did not at the same time stop perfecting their nuclear war technology? A treaty on non-proliferation could put an end to horizontal proliferation and even minimize conventional vertical proliferation, but—and that was perhaps the heart of the matter—could it, by itself, slow down or stop what might be called revolutionary vertical proliferation, i.e., the constant search for new and more powerful weapons or weapons systems? If the treaty was not accompanied by a freeze on nuclear war technology, would it not lead to a more terrifying nuclear arms race between the present nuclear Powers? The very nature of modern technology was such that arms control agreements could be reached only during the brief moments of equilibrium in the scientific search for new weapons. Thus, a halt in the invention of new weapons might be the most important collateral disarmament measure.

8. A freeze in nuclear war technology would not be tantamount to a freeze in the technological revolution. On the contrary, it would entail a political decision to give a new direction to the technological revolution and transform it into a powerful instrument for political stability and for the social and economic

betterment of the entire world. In that connexion, his delegation supported the idea of setting up a new body which had been put forward by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization (A/6301/Add.1). Such a body should also explore the possibility of a freeze on the development of nuclear war technology by the nuclear Powers.

9. He wished to comment on two points relating to the acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations between nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. First of all, there was the question of the guarantees against nuclear attack or the threat of nuclear attack which the nuclear States should extend to the non-nuclear signatories of the treaty. While it was true that a treaty on non-proliferation could strengthen the national security of all States and reduce the possibility of nuclear war, it should not be forgotten that, in signing the treaty, the non-nuclear Powers would be surrendering the most powerful means of ensuring national security against possible aggression. The nuclear States must therefore give consideration to a system of guarantees aimed at ensuring the protection of the non-nuclear States, particularly since the proposed treaty might not be signed by all the nuclear Powers. Secondly, those States which did not at present possess nuclear weapons must have the assurance that by acceding to a treaty on non-proliferation they would not be preventing their countries from producing and utilizing atomic energy for peaceful purposes, but that, on the contrary, the signing of the treaty would be followed by an accelerated transfer of peaceful nuclear technology to the developing countries. In other words, the treaty should lead to a proliferation of the peaceful utilization of atomic energy, which, owing to its cost and complexity, was still the exclusive privilege of a few countries.

10. Special mention should be made of the unremitting efforts of the Latin American countries to create a denuclearized zone in their hemisphere. As the Secretary-General had pointed out in the introduction to his annual report, such a treaty could point the way to, and might perhaps become a model for, the denuclearization of Africa and other areas of the world and, if it received the support of the nuclear Powers, would also help to reduce the size of the problem of proliferation and give a much-needed impetus to other disarmament measures. The Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America had drawn up a set of provisions which were of fundamental importance for the preparation of a draft treaty and which were included in the Final Act of the third session of the Commission (A/6328 and Corr.1). There were substantial differences between a treaty on non-proliferation and a treaty establishing a denuclearized zone. Those differences were emphasized by the absence at the present time of a general treaty on non-proliferation, which, by its nature, would be applicable to the entire world and would set up a universal system of mutual guarantees. A regional denuclearization treaty—especially in an area theoretically still free of nuclear weapons—could not be effective without formal guarantees by all the nuclear Powers and without the agreement of those countries which were responsible, *de jure* or *de facto*, for all Non-Self-Governing Territories situated in

the zone subject to the future treaty. The participation of all Latin American States in the treaty was an equally important prerequisite for its entry into force. Any treaty which did not fulfil those requirements would be devoid of any practical significance. Despite the existing differences of opinion, his delegation hoped that the Latin American States would soon make a breakthrough for the cause of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

11. It was in the light of those considerations that his delegation had joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.368/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3, and of draft resolution A/C.1/L.371 submitted under agenda item 26, which reflected the views of the great majority of States Members of the United Nations as well as the position of the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. The danger that mankind would be virtually annihilated in a nuclear war confronted the United Nations with the historically unprecedented task of stamping out war. That could be accomplished only by facing squarely the fact that the nuclear threat was a real one, that to try to live with it would surely lead to mass suicide, and that war could no longer be an instrument of policy. The first step, which could be taken now, was the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

12. Mr. BELOKOLOS (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons concerned all States and all mankind. That fact constituted a favourable condition for finally achieving an agreement on non-proliferation. There were at present twelve to fifteen States which were capable of creating their own nuclear potential, and their number was increasing. That made it even more necessary for the problem of proliferation to be solved as a matter of urgency. As was known, the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had been unable to achieve any positive results in that regard. The reason was that the United States and its allies had not shown themselves ready to reach an agreement, while United States aggression in Viet-Nam could not fail to exert an unfavourable influence on the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

13. According to the spirit and the letter of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), the prohibition against the proliferation of nuclear weapons must be complete and absolute, and the treaty concluded in the matter must be void of any loop-holes. The position of the Soviet Union satisfied those criteria fully. The Soviet Union advocated prohibiting the transfer of nuclear weapons in any form to non-nuclear States or groups of States and denying to such States the right to participate in the ownership, control or use of nuclear weapons. The United States position, however, was based on a completely different concept: it permitted the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear countries through the creation of nuclear forces within military blocs. The danger of that approach lay mainly in the fact that it allowed the Federal Republic of Germany access to nuclear weapons. The Ukrainian people, who had suffered the horrors of two world wars launched by Germany, viewed the atomic demands of the Bonn militarists with alarm. It was, after all, no secret that the Federal Republic had territorial pretensions and that nuclear weapons were destined to

play a part in Bonn's plans to reshape the map of Europe. The Federal Republic was systematically carrying out research and preparations with a view to manufacturing its own nuclear weapons. It was in the interest of all peoples that the Federal Republic of Germany should renounce its attempts to gain access to nuclear weapons. In that connexion, the constructive proposals of the German Democratic Republic provided the only acceptable solution of the problem, namely, that both German States should renounce nuclear weapons on a basis of reciprocity.

14. His delegation welcomed the initiative taken by Czechoslovakia, Poland and the German Democratic Republic at the tenth session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, when they had stated that they were prepared to accept IAEA safeguards in respect of their nuclear installations on condition that the Federal Republic of Germany and the other non-nuclear NATO countries did likewise.

15. The latest action taken by the Soviet Government was designed to create an atmosphere conducive to the successful conclusion of the negotiations on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. His delegation welcomed that action and had joined in sponsoring the draft resolution originally submitted by the Soviet Union (A/C.1/L.368/Rev.1 and Rev.1/Add.1-3).

16. The prospects of solving the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons had lately appeared more favourable. The United States delegation, for example, had joined in sponsoring the draft resolution before the First Committee. It was to be hoped that, in doing so, the United States, which had made certain statements on the subject, was inspired by a genuine desire to contribute to the success of the negotiations on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation.

17. The Ukrainian delegation fully shared the view that an agreement on non-proliferation could not and must not be the final goal of the joint efforts that were being made. Far from perpetuating the present situation, such a treaty must contribute to the improvement of the international climate; it must create the conditions in which it would be possible for all Powers to become non-nuclear Powers. A treaty on non-proliferation must, of course, form part of the disarmament process; however, the problem of proliferation stood apart from the other aspects of disarmament and must be solved independently of them. To proceed otherwise would only serve to complicate both the question of non-proliferation and the other questions related to collateral measures.

18. There was, of course, no intention of minimizing the importance of collateral measures designed to limit nuclear armaments and reduce the danger of a nuclear war. His delegation had always supported proposals to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons and advocated the preparation of an agreement on that problem. Also, it continued to favour the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. As to prohibiting underground tests, that problem still remained to be solved. The solution of all those problems would contribute to nuclear disarmament, which must provide for the destruction, under international control, of all stocks of nuclear weapons, the

prohibition of their manufacture, the complete destruction of all means of delivery and the prohibition of their manufacture, and the abolition of military bases on foreign soil.

19. During the current discussion, the delegations of non-nuclear countries had raised the question of guarantees. The desire of those countries to obtain guarantees from the nuclear Powers was perfectly legitimate and understandable. It was in that spirit that the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Kosygin, had stated in his message of 1 February 1966<sup>5/</sup> to the Eighteen-Nation Committee that the Soviet Union was willing to include in the draft treaty on non-proliferation a clause on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the treaty which had no nuclear weapons in their territory. Thus, the States in question must not merely be non-nuclear States but must be non-nuclear States having no nuclear weapons in their territory. A State might, for example, have no nuclear weapons of its own, while placing its territory at the disposal of foreign Powers for the installation of nuclear weapons there. That applied to the Federal Republic of Germany, whose territory was literally bulging with such weapons.

20. His delegation was convinced that if all the States taking part in the negotiations displayed a genuine willingness to reach agreement and confirmed that willingness by specific action, the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons would be solved. An important step would thus be taken towards ending the nuclear arms race, and that in turn would open the way towards the complete abolition of nuclear weapons.

21. Mr. WALDHEIM (Austria) said he regretted that the Eighteen-Nation Committee had not been able, as requested by the General Assembly in resolution 2028 (XX), to reach agreement on the basic provisions of a treaty on non-proliferation. The long discussions which had taken place at Geneva had, however, clarified the main aspects of the proposed treaty to a point where its conclusion was now mainly a matter of political will. In view of the importance and urgency of such a treaty, any action which might hamper its conclusion should be avoided, and that was why Austria had joined the sponsors of the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union.

22. His delegation fully realized that an agreement between the nuclear Powers would not be enough, since, although those Powers might undertake not to disseminate nuclear weapons or information necessary for their manufacture, they would hardly be able to prevent the growing application of nuclear technology throughout the world. A treaty on non-proliferation could therefore be effective only if the greatest possible number of countries, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, subscribed to the basic obligation of such a treaty, namely, that of halting the spread of nuclear weapons in any conceivable form.

23. In order to reach an agreement, the principles set out in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) should be relied upon for guidance. The treaty should

not only be void of any loop-holes but should also embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. It was therefore necessary to take into account not only the views of the nuclear Powers but also the legitimate wishes of the non-nuclear Powers who were seeking improved security. In that connexion, it was gratifying to note that the two major nuclear Powers were giving increased attention to the question of the guarantees to be given to non-nuclear States against nuclear attack.

24. The Austrian delegation shared the views of those who considered that the treaty should not be an end in itself but an integral part of the process of disarmament. Therefore it was highly desirable that the treaty, as the eight non-aligned countries had recommended in their memorandum of 19 August 1966, should be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons. The simultaneous adoption of such measures could, however, prove to be a very complex task. Although his delegation realized that a treaty which was not accompanied by the simultaneous adoption of concrete disarmament measures would be politically and operationally weak, it was also convinced that such a treaty would be a significant psychological stimulus and could thus lead to other agreements in the field of disarmament. In order to balance the interests and mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, the treaty should contain, as a minimum, a declaration of intent by the nuclear Powers to set in motion the process of disarmament, especially in the nuclear field.

25. It could be argued that the Treaty on the banning of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed at Moscow on 5 August 1963, contained such a clause which so far had not been implemented. It was regrettable that the tensions which had followed the conclusion of that Treaty had prevented further agreements. Nevertheless, it had significant practical, political and, especially, psychological value. It had removed the danger of contamination of the atmosphere by radio-active fall-out. It had made possible an agreement not to station nuclear weapons in outer space and represented above all a decisive step towards a comprehensive ban of all nuclear weapon tests.

26. In view of the far-reaching consequences of a treaty on non-proliferation, a realistic and pragmatic approach should be adopted. In the introduction to his report to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session (A/6301/Add.1), the Secretary-General had drawn attention to the fact that, for fear that their security might be impaired, some countries were reluctant to renounce the right to acquire nuclear weapons unless the present nuclear Powers committed themselves to an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations. The preoccupations of those countries raised serious and difficult problems which must be solved in consultation and co-operation with all States.

27. The proliferation of nuclear weapons would not only increase the risk of nuclear war but also the threat to the security of non-nuclear Powers. The

<sup>5/</sup> *Ibid.*, Supplement for 1966, document DC/228, annex 1, sect. F.

nuclear Powers could not remain indifferent to a further proliferation of nuclear weapons. They would very probably be led to re-evaluate their global strategic situation and consequently to deploy new defensive and offensive weapons based on the latest technological advances. Such a development of the situation would not be to the advantage of the non-nuclear Powers but would, on the contrary, reduce the chances of successfully solving the crucial problems of disarmament. It was therefore to be hoped that the obstacles to the conclusion of a treaty on non-proliferation would soon be overcome.

28. The extensive discussions at Geneva had not only narrowed the gap between the nuclear Powers but had given weight to the concept of nuclear-free zones and the need for the application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear activities. There was no doubt that the effectiveness of a treaty on non-proliferation would, to a large extent, depend upon the international safeguards it provided for ensuring the strict observance of the obligations assumed. As the Secretary-General had emphasized, the widespread application of nuclear technology demanded the acceptance of international safeguards which should be applied not only to nuclear power reactors but also to all nuclear plants producing, using or processing significant quantities of fissionable materials. As an international body of accepted competence would best be able to supervise such safeguards, it would be appropriate to make use of the existing machinery of the International Atomic Energy Agency. At the tenth session of the General Conference of IAEA, which had been held at Vienna in September 1966, the idea of international safeguards had been strongly supported, as it had been recognized that such safeguards could serve as an effective instrument for ensuring stability and strengthening mutual confidence.

29. Mr. PISKAREV (International Atomic Energy Agency) recalled that the Agency's report to the General Assembly (A/6345 and Add.1) contained a summary of its activities in the field of safeguards. However, if the necessity arose, the Agency was ready to prepare at a later date a thorough presentation of its safeguards system such as the Japanese representative had asked for (1434th meeting).

30. The revised safeguards system had been unanimously approved at the ninth session of the General Conference in 1965; it extended the system to reactors of any power and provided for the inspection of other nuclear facilities and equipment. The Board of Governors had arranged for a special study concerning reprocessing plants in 1965 and in June of that year had approved a set of special procedures for safeguarding such plants. Those procedures were subject to review after a period of not more than two years after their application. The IAEA was—or would be in the near future—responsible for safeguarding more than fifty reactors in twenty-five countries, with a total thermal capacity of about 2,500 megawatts. During the last year, twenty-five installations had been inspected in twelve member States. In addition, the Agency had made pre-operational visits to nine facilities in seven member States in order to complete arrangements for the entry into force or implementation of safeguards being negotiated or already concluded.

31. With regard to the possible application of IAEA safeguards in a wider context, he referred the members of the Committee to article III, paragraph B-1, of the statute of the Agency and recalled that the Director General of the Agency had told the General Assembly at its twentieth session that IAEA, in accordance with its statute, would be willing to play its part when called upon (1381st plenary meeting, para. 23). The Director General would be present at the current session of the General Assembly at the end of November to present the Agency's report.

32. Mr. HADJIMILTIS (Cyprus) said that the small countries always suffered from the discord of the great. That was why they were raising their voices in an appeal to the nuclear Powers to compose their differences. Recalling the moving appeal made by the Japanese representative that no other country should undergo the tragic experience of Japan, he prayed that that cry should remain engraved in the conscience of mankind and give rise to action which would allow a nuclear holocaust to be avoided.

33. The difficulties inherent in the task of drawing up an agreement on non-proliferation should not be minimized. On the other hand, the interests and fears standing in the way of a solution of the problems at issue should be weighed against the grave dangers that would result from a lack of co-operation and agreement. It would, then, be apparent that mutual concessions were imperative. Much skill had been devoted to proving that agreement should not be achieved at the expense of the structures of collective defence which rested on nuclear foundations. There was, however, a certain irony in a situation whereby unsettled issues pertaining to presumably defensive alliances and collective security arrangements impeded the adoption of a treaty on non-proliferation and thus tended to perpetuate a state of affairs which raised the spectre of global destruction resulting from uncontrollable nuclear power. On the other hand, it might be asked whether the fear of seeing a certain European State with a past history of war-making become a menacing nuclear Power was not more imaginary than real. Whether that was so or not, the two camps primarily concerned should compose their differences, and they deserved to be assisted in that task by all the States of the world, both within and outside the United Nations.

34. In speaking on the subject of disarmament, the Cypriot delegation, which represented a small non-aligned country, was keenly aware of the limited character of the role that it could play. It could not tell other countries, and particularly the two great Powers, what they must do to provide for their own defence and security or to protect their own interests. It did, however, have a duty to safeguard the integrity of its own country and to ensure that it would not be exposed to the catastrophic consequences of a conflagration which might cost it its very existence.

35. The present debate centred essentially on the renunciation by States of actions hampering the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. That was a proposition which, if adopted, would have beneficial consequences. Viewed, however, in a proper perspective, non-proliferation was but a preliminary and essentially inadequate

measure. Even if non-proliferation was achieved, the risks of a nuclear explosion of global proportions would have been somewhat reduced but certainly not eliminated. Much more would have to be done. The nuclear monopoly of a few Powers would have to be terminated, not, indeed, by spreading the deadly merchandise, but by abolishing it altogether. The necessary measures would have to be taken to bring down conventional armaments to a reasonable level

pending the realization of complete disarmament. In view of all those considerations, the sense of urgency attached to agenda item 97 was fully warranted. His delegation accordingly supported the draft resolution before the Committee and trusted that its adoption would enable rapid progress to be made in an absolutely vital field.

*The meeting rose at 4.55 p.m.*