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*Chairman:* Mr. Károly CSATORDAY (Hungary).

AGENDA ITEM 107

The inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of States and the protection of their independence and sovereignty (continued) (A/5977; A/C.1/L.343/Rev.1, L.349/Rev.2, L.350 and Corr.1, L.351, L.352, L.353/Rev.3, L.354)

GENERAL DEBATE (concluded)

1. Mr. VIZCAINO LEAL (Guatemala) agreed with earlier speakers who had condemned subversive intervention designed to export revolution and impose systems of government which claimed to guarantee respect for human rights and freedoms and to seek the people's happiness but later abolished those rights and freedoms and obliged citizens to go into exile.
2. Subversive intervention, which was in fact nothing more than a manifestation of the cold war, provoked counter-intervention and threatened world peace. The fact that subversive intervention was being carried out in many places in Latin America and South-East Asia—particularly in South Viet-Nam, Thailand and Laos—had prompted his delegation to associate itself with the other sponsors of the Latin American draft resolution (A/C.1/L.349/Rev.2).
3. The events of 1954 in Guatemala, which the Soviet representative had described as intervention, had in fact been a purely domestic affair. If foreign arms had been used, it was because—fortunately—there were no arms factories in Guatemala. Some of the arms had been sent from countries behind the iron curtain to assist a pro-communist Government which had gained power by a complete falsification of election results. The revolutionaries, for their part, had obtained their arms from elements in sympathy with them.
4. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America) said that the debate had been most instructive. Many representatives, especially those from Latin American countries, had given the Committee a better under-

standing of the subject. But the Soviet Union and its allies, by attacking the United States and other members of the Committee, had unfortunately dashed the hopes aroused by the inclusion of the item in the General Assembly's agenda. Nevertheless, to maintain the constructive atmosphere which had prevailed in the Committee during the present session, particularly in the discussions on disarmament, he would confine himself to the facts and would avoid polemics.

5. He would first set the record straight with regard to the conflict in Viet-Nam, since it was a prime example of the use of subversion, terrorism and overt military intervention by one Government to overthrow another.

6. In the first place, the United States Government had no military objective in South Viet-Nam or anywhere else in South-East Asia. It had no desire to establish bases or acquire any territory in that area. Nor had it any desire to secure special privileges or a special sphere of influence, be it political, economic or military.

7. Secondly, its only objective was the deterrence of aggression, the discouragement of armed conflict and the establishment of peaceful conditions, so that the peoples of South-East Asia, including South Viet-Nam, could go about their business in their own way and carry out their own decisions concerning their own political status, in accordance with the principle of self-determination.

8. Thirdly, the United States would continue to explore, on its own and in conjunction with others, both within and outside the United Nations, all possible paths to a peaceful settlement which would be both durable and honourable. It had repeatedly reiterated its readiness—as seventeen non-aligned nations had urged earlier in 1965—to enter into unconditional negotiations. In that connexion, it was ready to accept the proposal made by the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Moscow on 2 December 1965, to the effect that a conference of all the Governments concerned should be convened to arrange a cease-fire and to ensure that both North and South Viet-Nam could be left in peace, assured that they would not be attacked by each other or by anyone else.

9. If the Soviet Union, as one of the Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference, would respond to that suggestion, all the interested parties could be at the conference table tomorrow.

10. Fourthly, there would have been no need for a United States military presence in South Viet-Nam if North Viet-Nam had abided by the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam signed on

20 July 1954, instead of intervening first by infiltration and subversion, and then by sending regular units of the North Viet-Nameese army into the territory of South Viet-Nam with orders to overthrow the South Viet-Nameese Government.

11. However, as long as North Viet-Nam remained adamantly opposed to negotiation and continued its aggression, the United States would do everything necessary to assist the people of South Viet-Nam in turning back that aggression.

12. Fifthly, the United States would continue to assist in the economic and social advancement of South-East Asia, under the leadership of the Asian nations themselves and the United Nations, and it would continue to explore all possibilities of enriching an area too long ravaged by death and destruction.

13. Just yesterday, the President of the United States had announced that his country wished to start peace negotiations. Wherever the United States was represented, he had said, its Ambassadors were waiting for some word to indicate that those on whom peace depended wanted peace as well; and he had given special instructions to the Secretary of State to make sure that no one was uncertain that the United States was earnest both in its devotion to freedom and in its hope for peace.

14. Perhaps no other question was as closely linked with the problems of war and peace as the question at present under discussion by the Committee; perhaps no other idea was as important to the standards of behaviour imposed upon all Member States by the Charter; and, with the development of techniques of indirect intervention, perhaps no other question was as complex.

15. Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter stated clearly one of the principles which Member States had to observe; and under Article 2, paragraph 6, the Organization must ensure that States which were not Member of the United Nations acted in accordance with its principles. Intervention, according to the Charter, was therefore anything which violated that standard.

16. When a Government sent its army across a frontier to attack another Government, such action was in violation of the Charter. When it promoted or organized armed guerrilla bands, inspired terrorism and even clandestinely employed its own troops with a view to overthrowing another Government, it could not doubt that its actions contravened the Charter and were in violation of all the accepted standards of international behaviour.

17. Certainly, no one should be taken in by the fraudulent practice of describing guerilla actions and terrorism as "wars of national liberation". There were, of course, real wars of liberation—the United States had fought one itself—but wars designed to overthrow the Governments of newly independent countries were not wars of national liberation. There were acts of intervention.

18. Examples of outright intervention were not lacking. The representatives of the three countries concerned had described the military activity by North Viet-Nam against Laos, the action taken against

Thailand by communist-inspired liberators and the armed intervention which Malaysia was at present resisting. The representatives of Upper Volta and the Democratic Republic of the Congo had shown that the new régimes established on the continent of Africa were still the target of subversive activities by certain States, some of them outside Africa altogether. In recent years there had been a sharp increase in intervention in Latin America where the Cuban Government, aided and abetted by its communist master, had tried in vain to subvert its neighbours. Two years ago the Cuban Government had been caught red-handed and condemned by the Organization of American States for its attempt to overthrow the Venezuelan Government by indirect aggression. But the best example was still the intervention in South Viet-Nam, for which the Government of North Viet-Nam had begun preparing years before in violation of an explicit provision of the 1954 Geneva Agreement.

19. Those were examples of intervention which threatened world peace. Intervention of that kind was encouraged when it was permitted to succeed. It was encouraged, too, when no action was taken to prevent it, as that gave the interveners the impression that they could act with impunity. His own delegation challenged that doctrine of indirect intervention, and thought that the world community should show by its actions and its words that it could not and would not tolerate such activities.

20. The USSR had shown its interest in the question of non-intervention by proposing its inclusion in the Assembly's agenda. Although the past could not be forgotten, it was to be hoped that the ideas of peaceful coexistence and non-intervention which the USSR was currently espousing would be reflected in a new page of Soviet history. It should, however, be recognized that the doctrine of peaceful coexistence permitted subversion and terrorism and that there was another communist country—Communist China—which not only rejected the idea of peaceful coexistence but actually proclaimed its right to intervene in any way necessary to promote and impose on other States its own economic and social system. The United Nations should therefore make a firm pronouncement on the subject of intervention.

21. Sometimes—too often—it was not obvious that intervention was taking place. Since it was not always possible to hold plebiscites, there was one criterion by which people's real feelings could be judged: the way in which they "voted with their feet". When a government was imposed, how did the people show their preference? In Germany, where had the refugees gone: to the East, towards colonial domination, or to the West, towards freedom and democracy? In Africa, had the refugees chosen to return to the colonial régime or had they sought freedom, independence and self-determination? Thousands of Cubans were trying to reach the United States. Did one see crowds pounding on Cuba's gates, seeking admission? And in Viet-Nam, in which direction were the refugees moving? The answers to those questions were well known. If such a test was applied, a first step would have been taken towards establishing standards for assessing the action of States.

22. There were, of course, other equally heinous forms of intervention. He was impressed with the earnest desire of many countries to preserve their sovereign identity and integrity from such intervention. There was a traditional belief in the United States that each sovereign State should be left free to decide its destiny and, thus, to co-operate and maintain good-neighbourly relations with other States. It would therefore be useful, as was suggested in one of the United Kingdom amendments (A/C.1/L.351) to the Soviet draft resolution (A/C.1/L.343/Rev.1), to mention the idea of co-operation and good-neighbourliness in the text that was adopted.

23. In conclusion, he wished to emphasize that it was not enough to adopt resolutions and principles. Action was also needed—action that stemmed from a decision by each State to conduct itself in such a manner as not to harm its neighbour. Such a resolve and such action would make peace a reality.

24. Mr. NSANZE (Burundi) said that nations and peoples had always aspired to independence and defended their national sovereignty. The people of Burundi had never tolerated foreign interference of any kind. They had successively fought off slavery and German tutelage and had not hesitated, in order to regain their freedom and sovereignty, to sacrifice a Prime Minister of self-governing Burundi. Burundi was currently compelled to defend itself against more subtle forms of interference: certain great Powers thought they had a divine mission to change governments and guide the foreign policy of other States, contrary to the wishes of the peoples concerned. Interference was sometimes disguised as technical or economic assistance with inadmissible conditions attached. Burundi, as a non-aligned country, was opposed to any attempt at intervention in the external or internal affairs of States, to any threat to their national independence and to the suppression of the freedoms enjoyed by the newly independent peoples. No State was entitled to impose on other States a political, social or institutional way of life, for every State was free to adopt the system of its choice. Burundi recognized and respected any form of government based on the freedom of citizens and chosen by them. It condemned interference in any form, particularly bribery and the exploitation of so-called "tribal" or "ethnic" differences. In that connexion, the United Nations could not fail to denounce the role played by certain embassies. Burundi felt that the character of its people was fundamentally incompatible with political principles imposed on it from outside and that it should adapt its internal structure first to the needs of Burundi and then to the needs of Africa.

25. Contrary to the assertions made by certain organizations and Press agencies, no crime of genocide had been committed in Burundi and no action had been taken there to eliminate an élite. The repression which had followed the recent coup d'état had punished the guilty without regard to their ethnic origins. Calm had now been restored as a result of Burundi's firm determination to reject any outside interference. Unfortunately, trouble-makers were using devious methods in order to gain control of the internal affairs of Burundi and seek to make the United Nations

condemn it. However, the leaders of Burundi were sparing no effort to enable their people to exercise their sovereignty without hindrance; elections were held by universal suffrage, and the highest posts were divided proportionately among the various ethnic groups.

26. Intervention was nothing but an unlawful and illicit practice, as the International Court of Justice had recognized in its judgement of 9 April 1949 in the Corfu Channel case.<sup>1/</sup> Presidents Washington, Jefferson and Monroe of the United States were among those who had upheld that thesis. It was the duty of the United Nations to join efforts to prevent all types of interference—particularly military, political, racial, cultural and diplomatic interference. All were to be condemned and were incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, the declarations of the Asian-African Conference held at Bandung in 1955, the resolutions of the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo in 1964, and the declaration on the problem of subversion adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at Accra in 1965. Burundi wished to have constructive relations with all States, particularly with Rwanda, the Congo and the United Republic of Tanzania, for which it had nothing but praise. It was prepared to league together with all those fraternal countries for defence against any intervention. The only solution to the permanent insecurity of the modern world was to eliminate ideologies and check messianic expansionism. That was the task of the United Nations.

27. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) said that there were countless motives for intervention: penury and want, the quest for wealth, desire for power, lust for conquest and thirst for glory. The difficulty was therefore to find among all those elements the basic principles for a declaration acceptable to all. The same problems arose as had been encountered by the Sixth Committee when it had tried to define aggression either in general terms or by enumerating its different forms, for intervention was also a type of aggression, sometimes naked and sometimes camouflaged, and it was difficult to define it exhaustively. There were, however, some types of intervention which should not be omitted from any declaration: intervention by provocation, and example of which was the rise of nazism and fascism, provoked by the harsh terms of the Treaty of Versailles; economic intervention, which, in the guise of assistance, made one country dependent on another; political intervention, either by proxy, when political figures were in the pay of a foreign country, by treaty, such as the one concluded after Munich, whose aim had been not so much to protect Poland as to defy Hitler to seize Danzig, or by alliances, of which history offered an impressive list of examples; intervention by indoctrination, using mass information media; and, lastly, intervention by subversion, using secret agents and saboteurs. In the case of certain countries, moreover, the action of settlers who were

<sup>1/</sup> I.C.J. Reports 1949, p.4.

preventing the indigenous inhabitants from attaining freedom and sovereignty should be taken into account. It would be very difficult to distinguish between so-called "legitimate" intervention and subversive intervention, and none of the proposed texts had succeeded in drawing a line of demarcation except by using clichés.

28. However, there was not an unbridgeable gap between the Latin American draft resolution (A/C.1/L.349/Rev.2) and the Afro-Asian draft (A/C.1/L.353/Rev.3). Since the declaration should above all serve the cause of the small countries, the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom should join with the sponsors of those texts in working out a joint declaration and then withdraw their own proposals: that would make it possible to avoid a political vote.

29. Lastly, the ambiguous term "neo-colonialism" should be abandoned and reference should be made, for example, to "colonialism in its classical form and in all its new forms". He hoped that a text along those lines could be drafted, so that his country could become a sponsor.

*Mr. Fahmy (United Arab Republic), Rapporteur, took the Chair.*

30. Mr. RICHARDSON (Jamaica) said that it would be better for the General Assembly to draw up and proclaim a declaration than to adopt a resolution, since experience had shown how much prestige and authority went with a declaration, doubtless partly because there were only a very few, whereas there were hundreds of resolutions. Moreover, a declaration would include principles which could be embodied in a treaty binding on the signatories. Jamaica therefore urged the Committee to recommend that the General Assembly should draw up a universal declaration on non-intervention in the domestic affairs of States. Unfortunately, those who favoured a declaration did not seem inclined to set aside the necessary time to draft it, while those who were prepared to take all the time required were in favour of adopting a resolution. If necessary, his delegation would be satisfied with a resolution, but it would have been easy to set up a small, balanced intersessional group to draft the text of a declaration and to submit it for public discussion and to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session.

31. As far as the content of such a declaration was concerned, its principles could be expressed in broad terms; the wording would not have to be as precise as in a treaty but should be explicit concerning the prohibitions envisaged and more comprehensive with regard to forms of intervention. The preamble would list the fundamental principles on which the concept of the inadmissibility of intervention rested: equal rights, self-determination of peoples, and the sovereign equality of the States which represented them. In that connexion, it would be difficult to improve on the wording of article 15 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, and an intersessional working group could usefully consult the report of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and

Co-operation among States<sup>2/</sup> to see whether there should also be a prohibition on hostile propaganda, incitement to revolt, training of persons for infiltration into another country, assistance to seditious minority groups in another State in overthrowing a freely chosen Government, etc.

32. It would certainly be more difficult to define exceptions—those cases where intervention might be justified. Intervention by competent organs of the United Nations, in strict conformity with the provisions of the Charter, would be included, but it was doubtful that intervention by regional organizations could be sanctioned, except when it was authorized by the Security Council or recommended by the General Assembly, or when it was in exercise of the right of collective self-defence referred to in Article 51 of the Charter. Although there seemed to be agreement not to attempt a precise definition of the concept of intervention, it generally amounted to uninvited interference in the internal affairs of a country; it followed that intervention which had been requested could not be forbidden, but the question then arose of determining whether the authorities which had requested the intervention were competent to do so. It had been recognized that some forms of intervention were permissible; however, his delegation believed that intervention for humanitarian reasons did not confer the right to maintain a military presence for new and unjustified reasons. It was to be hoped that all such intervention would some day take place under the authority of the United Nations; in the meantime, particularly when it was carried out by a single country, it must be limited and not linked to any objective sought by the intervening Power or by other States.

33. Lastly, his delegation would take part in any vote which was held, but would still prefer that the General Assembly should devote as much time as necessary, even if it was a question of several months, to drawing up a universal declaration.

*Mr. Csatorday (Hungary) resumed the Chair.*

34. Mr. ALARCON QUESADA (Cuba), exercising his right of reply, said that those remaining in Cuba were the people, and the people preferred the present revolutionary freedom of the pseudo-freedom of exploitation and poverty. If true freedom prevailed in the United States, why did that country forbid its nationals to go to Cuba freely in order to judge for themselves what had been accomplished? Had it, moreover, been the United States or Cuba which had organized, financed and trained bands of mercenaries to attack the other country, bombed open towns and sugar-cane fields, promoted infiltration by spies and saboteurs, violated the other's air space, imposed an economic blockade, instigated piratical attacks on the coasts, worked to bring about the diplomatic isolation of its adversary, maintained a military base in the territory of the other party against its will, and stationed occupation troops in the Dominican Republic for seven months? It was the United States which had intervened and was continuing to intervene in every possible way in world affairs and which deserved the title of enemy of the peoples.

<sup>2/</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda items 90 and 94, document A/5746.

35. Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), exercising his right of reply, said that he did not intend to repeat facts which were only too well known in response to the United States representative's futile attempts to distort the motives of the Soviet Union and justify Washington's criminal policy of international piracy, armed intervention and *Diktat*. As Mr. Gromyko, the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, had stated in the Supreme Soviet, the USSR had not been concerned, in putting forward its proposal, with its own immediate interests, because it was capable of defending itself alone; however, there were a great many young States in the world which must be given all possible support and guarantees against foreign interference if a policy of self-determination was to be pursued.

36. The United States representative's accusations regarding the alleged subversive activities of world communism were unfounded. The United States representative had once again attempted to exonerate United States troops and to present their behaviour as the disinterested acts of champions of peace and justice, laying the blame on ideologies which opposed racism, slavery and imperialist piracy. The debate now drawing to a close had thrown sufficient light on the subversive activities of the United States almost everywhere in the world: Cuba, Viet-Nam, the Dominican Republic, Panama and the Congo were a few examples. The Chairman of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Fulbright, had himself stated in September 1965 that a new anti-communist crusade threatened to nullify all the hard-won progress made in the 1960's in improving East-West relations.

#### Organization of the Committee's work

37. The CHAIRMAN announced that the general debate on agenda item 107 was concluded. He recalled that it had not been possible to establish the working group that had been proposed for the purpose of drafting a single text on the basis of the various draft resolutions and amendments before the Committee. The sponsors of some of those drafts had, however, now agreed to meet in an informal working group in an effort to reach agreement, but the Committee would have to grant them a few days. If it agreed, it would have to decide whether it wished in the meantime to consider the question of Cyprus, which was the next item on its agenda, and whether it wished to start the next day or wait until the following Monday.

38. Mr. BARNES (Liberia) said that, in view of the importance of the question, the Committee should give the sponsors of the various drafts and amendments sufficient time to work out a single text; in the meantime, it should proceed to the next item on its agenda but should wait until the following Monday, since some delegations were not yet ready to take part in the debate.

39. Mr. VIZCAINO LEAL (Guatemala) supported the Liberian representative's suggestion.

40. Mr. SHAW (Australia) said that he shared the opinion of the previous speakers. However, in view of the limited time still available to the Committee before the end of the session, he was concerned

about what would happen to the other agenda items which remained to be discussed.

41. Mr. BURNS (Canada) asked whether the debate on Cyprus would be interrupted when an agreed draft on non-intervention had been prepared, or whether the Committee would wait until it had completed its discussion on Cyprus before returning to non-intervention. It would unquestionably be preferable to consider the question of Cyprus without interruption, since the Security Council was shortly to discuss the matter. His delegation felt that, in order to save time, the Committee should start its discussion of that item the next day, since the countries primarily concerned were certainly ready to speak.

42. Mr. BAYULKEN (Turkey) said that he would be able to speak on Cyprus the following day if the Committee wished.

43. Mr. BARODY (Saudi Arabia) said that the Committee should begin its discussion of the question of Cyprus on the following day if there were sufficient speakers on the list. Otherwise, it could either wait until the following Monday or take up a different agenda item—the question of Korea, for example, if the United States was ready to speak.

44. The CHAIRMAN said that the order of priority could not be changed and it was up to the Committee to progress as rapidly as possible in its work.

45. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America) assured the Chairman of the co-operation of his delegation, which was ready to speak on the question of Korea at the appropriate time.

46. The CHAIRMAN, replying to the Canadian representative's question, said that it was always best not to interrupt a debate if it could be avoided. The Committee would therefore complete its discussion of Cyprus before returning to the question of non-intervention, unless, of course, it decided otherwise.

47. Mr. FUENTEALBA (Chile) said that the Committee might not have time to take a decision on the question of non-intervention if the debate on Cyprus was a prolonged one. He therefore urged that the date and time of the meeting at which the Committee was to take a decision on agenda item 107 should be set in advance, even if it was only one hour before the end of the session.

48. The CHAIRMAN said that the Secretary-General was counting on the Committee to complete its consideration of the question of Cyprus by the following Tuesday at the latest, since the Security Council, which was about to take up the question, would have to take into account the result of the Committee's discussion. There was therefore no danger that the Committee would not be able to take a decision on non-intervention.

49. Of the eleven delegations which had informed him that they would take part in the debate on Cyprus, five, including Italy and Iran, were ready to speak the following day. He therefore suggested that the Committee should meet the next morning and take up agenda item 93.

*It was so decided.*

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.